

M. 326,

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JAMES

OUTRAM'S (PERSIAN CAMPAIGN

IN 1857;

COMPRISING

GENERAL ORDERS AND DESPATCHES

RELATING TO THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PERSIA, FROM THE
LANDING AT BUSHIRE TO THE TREATY OF PEACE;

ALSO,

SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PLENIPOTENTIARY DURING THE WAR IN PERSIA.

*Printed for Presentation to Personal Friends of Sir James Outram, who begs that it
may be regarded as a Private Communication, and not a Publication.*

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
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1860

Presented to

John Bax Esq

by J. B. Bax



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INTRODUCTION.

THE Despatches and Correspondence relating to the Campaign in Persia form a companion volume to those illustrative of Sir James Outram's operations during the Sepoy war. They have been reprinted for precisely the same reasons; and, as in the case of his Lucknow papers, their circulation is limited to Sir James's personal friends and comrades.

In these despatches the story of the campaign is told as it were day by day. As, however, some slight *lacunæ* occur here and there, and the events of the Persian war have been almost forgotten in the enthralling interest of the Indian mutiny, there is prefixed a slight *resumé* of the war; which, though of short duration, threatened at one time very serious complications with our late Crimean antagonist. Owing, however, to the energy of our troops, both European and Native, the Shah was compelled to succumb, and our hands were fortunately freed. Fortunately, as we may say; for the ratifications of the treaty had scarcely been exchanged, when every soldier that England could collect was required in India to suppress the Mutiny.

When the Persian assault on Herat compelled the Home Government to declare war on the Shah, the Government of Bombay was called on to effect a descent on the Persian coast, and to Sir James Outram, then at home, was given the chief command of the expedition. Such activity was displayed by Lord Elphinstone (repeated allusions to which will be found in the accompanying letters) that the expedition had started before the new Commander-in-Chief could reach India, and it had effected a landing near Bushire on the 9th December, 1856; whence General Stalker, the temporary Commander, marched to attack the Persians, who had collected in considerable force.

After some smart skirmishing, the Arab levies made a headlong retreat to their earthworks round the old fortress of Reshire (some miles from Bushire), where they offered a most strenuous resistance. The English infantry, however, leapt into the ditch and charged an embankment of loose sand and stones; in ascending which, Brigadier Stopford was killed. On the fall of this officer, Europeans and Natives vied in courage; H.M.'s 64th, the 2nd Europeans, and the 20th N.I. side by side, charged with the bayonet. The foe was speedily expelled, and fell back on the town of Bushire; Colonel Malet of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry unfortunately falling in the pursuit. The fire of the steamers was then directed upon the fortifications round the town, and after a two hours' cannonade, the Persian Governor surrendered. A full account of the capture of Bushire will be found in the despatches of General Stalker and Admiral Leake, which are inserted in their proper place for the sake of supplementing the narrative; although not immediately connected with Sir James Outram's services in Persia.

No further operations were carried out until the arrival of Sir James Outram; but considerable reinforcements were sent up, and the Bombay Government displayed the utmost energy in supplying the wants of the troops. The war was gradually assuming larger proportions. The letters addressed by Sir James Outram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Board of Control, will serve to show the plan of operations he designed for humbling the Shah; it required a very considerable force, which there was, however, not the slightest hesitation in supplying. General Outram arrived in Camp on the 27th January, 1857, and relieved General Stalker from the temporary command in the following General Order:—

“The Lieutenant-General has great pleasure in announcing to the troops at Bushire, that Major-General Stalker, C.B., will continue to command them as now constituting the first division of the augmented Expeditionary Army, and he begs to thank that officer for the praiseworthy zeal for the public interest which has induced him to afford to the Lieutenant-General the

aid of his valuable services by retaining the command of the troops he has heretofore so ably led."

The semi-official letters contained in this collection prove the friendly feeling existing between General Outram and the lamented General Stalker, as well as the magnanimous manner in which the latter officer consented to act under a junior, whom a special Brevet had placed above his head.

On the 3rd of February, General Outram marched at the head of some 5,000 men, with 18 guns, to attack the enemy, who occupied an intrenched post near Boorasjoon, about 46 miles from Bushire. The march was a most fatiguing one, owing to the harassing nature of the soil and the incessant rain; but the troops held out nobly, and on the 5th of February surprised the enemy, who fled from their encampment almost without striking a blow.

After remaining for two days in the Persian camp to recruit his men, General Outram set out on his return for Bushire on the 7th, having carried off immense stores of provision from Boorasjoon, and destroyed vast quantities of ammunition. At 11 o'clock of the same night, however, his rear-guard was attacked by the Persians, and the battle soon became general. General Outram formed a square for the protection of the magazines and baggage; but while riding back, on the rear-guard being attacked, the General was thrown from his horse and disabled for several hours. He, however, recovered in time to reassume the command at daybreak on the 8th, when the action recommenced. The brilliant charge of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, who broke through a solid square of infantry and utterly cut up an entire regiment, decided the fate of the day. In about an hour from the time the first shot was fired, the Persians were flying in every direction, leaving 700 dead on the field, 100 prisoners and two guns; it was only owing to the paucity of cavalry on our side, that they escaped annihilation. Such was the battle of Kooshab. The accompanying despatches and letters, giving full details of the bravery displayed by the officers and men, will serve as a record of one of the most brilliant actions which our Anglo-Indian troops can inscribe on their colours.

Owing to the stormy weather preventing the arrival of the cavalry reinforcements so urgently required, Sir James Outram remained in forced inactivity at Bushire until the 20th March, when he was enabled to carry out his long contemplated expedition to Mohamrah. The flotilla reached that place on the 28th, and found that the enemy's works had been enormously strengthened since the last reconnaissance: defences of solid earth twenty feet thick and eighteen high, with casemated embrasures armed with heavy ordnance, after the Sebastopol model, had been thrown up. In less than an hour, however, all the enemy's guns were silenced by the fire of our 8-inch mortars from a raft under Commander Rennie, and the 68-pounder guns from the broadside of the frigates. The troops were then landed. After blowing up their magazines the Persians fled in disorder, and their army of 13,000 men was dispersed, leaving sixteen guns and one mortar in our hands. To prove how utterly they were disorganized, it may suffice to mention that Captain Malcolm Green pursued them with only forty-five sabres, and yet they did not dare to make a stand.

Sir James Outram then despatched three small steamers, with 100 Europeans in each, to Ahwaz, a small town where the Persians had halted. This small body was landed, and the enemy again fled in the utmost confusion. The morning after the Ahwaz expedition returned, news arrived of the peace between Persia and England, and the campaign was virtually at an end. At this time Sir James Outram was at the head of an army of 14,000 men, with which he might have marched through Persia. But however much the Indian papers might have condemned the sudden cessation of warfare, it may now be regarded as a special interposition of Providence; for it enabled the Commander-in-Chief to send back the European troops to India, where their presence was so soon to be required in suppressing the Mutiny.

The remaining details of the expedition, including the recall of the whole force long prior to the stipulations of the treaty being carried out (for that was not conceded till the end of September), are given in the letters of Sir James Outram,

appended to the despatches. The following passage from a letter in the *Bombay Gazette*, describes the breaking-up of the Expeditionary Force:—

“The capture of Mohamrah and the expedition to Ahwaz formed the last operations in this brief war, and the curtain is now about to drop over the exciting drama. Our victorious troops are about to return to the shores of India, perhaps only to be recalled in case of our intervention being required to protect the Shah against his northern neighbour. Persia is now doubtless aware of the folly of resisting the just demands of the British Government, and has probably made up her mind to retire from the hostile position she occupies before Herat, menacing our Indian Empire in its most valuable quarter. If anything contributed to the early conclusion of this war, it was the prompt despatch of additional troops to this country, which must have frightened the Shah into submission.”

“Sir James Outram returned from Bushire yesterday (8th May), for the purpose of breaking up the forces under his command. A general parade was ordered to take place this morning, and the troops assembled under arms at daybreak, each regiment in front of its lines. Sir James, accompanied by Brigadier Havelock and the whole of his staff, appeared on the ground shortly after five, and proceeded to inspect the different corps. . . . The General next galloped towards the 78th Highlanders, which regiment presented a firm and bold appearance. Sir James Outram addressed them as follows: ‘Seventy-eighth, you are about to return to India, I have come to take leave of you, and to thank you for your excellent conduct while under my command in Persia. I am sorry there has been so little fighting, but that is neither my fault nor yours. You will now go on to Bombay, and your services may be required in China; but I hear that business is settled also. I wish you a prosperous voyage, and a happy meeting with your families, and I am sure that, wherever you go, you will sustain the honour of the British army.’ . . . When Sir James Outram alluded to the possibility of the regiment being sent to China, one sturdy Scot exclaimed in a loud and spirited tone: ‘We will meet them ten to one, hurrah!’ and an involuntary cheer broke from the spectators when this was uttered. The hurrah was repeated again and again, and the soldiers seemed to vie with each other in cheering the General. As they marched past Outram, they doffed their caps and cheered him vigorously, ‘Hurrah for the General!’ being frequently exclaimed by the men, leading to a loud and spontaneous burst of hearty congratulations.”

The despatches and letters of Sir James Outram, will show how much was effected in a short space of time to humiliate Persia, and offer a guarantee that no dangerous tentatives will be made by that country to attack us in India, however much Russian influence may be brought into play. It may be that the present European complications will induce Russia to try to

extend her authority over Central Asia; and, indeed, we learn on good authority, that an expedition for "purely scientific purposes" has already reached the frontiers of Affghanistan. It will be noticed that Sir James Outram repeatedly alludes to Russian interference.

Owing to the labours thrown on the Government of India by the Mutiny, the recommendations of Sir James Outram on behalf of the meritorious officers attached to the Persian Expedition had, necessarily, been left in abeyance. There is, however, every reason to believe that before long the Indian Government will direct its attention to this matter, and that the officers whose names are so honourably mentioned in the accompanying letters will receive the due meed for their exertions.

The tribute paid to the officers of the Expedition in Sir James Outram's despatches and letters, shows that although the Persian campaign was speedily terminated, it afforded the officers and soldiers engaged in it opportunities for distinguishing themselves which none neglected. At the same time, there is no doubt that much of the success was owing to the energetic manner in which the General commanding was supported by those more immediately connected with him; and the repeated allusions he makes to the zealous co-operation of the late lamented General Jacob show how much his country lost in the death of that gallant officer.

During the campaign it was the fashion with certain Indian papers to allude to the shortcomings of the Bombay Government, and the cry was taken up by some of the English journalists. A perusal of Sir James Outram's letters will show the injustice of such a charge. They prove that Lord Elphinstone, his colleagues and subordinates, put forth their utmost energies to satisfy the demands of the Expeditionary Force, and that their efforts were successful.

PART I.

DESPATCHES, &c.

RELATING TO

THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION OF 1857.

DESPATCHES

&c., &c.

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 18th October, 1856.

Instructions having been received from the Home Government to prepare and hold in readiness an Expeditionary Field Force for foreign service beyond sea, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that a force be accordingly assembled under the command of Major-General F. Stalker, C.B., and be embodied from the 20th instant, from which date all appointments connected therewith are to date, and to take effect.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is requested to cause all such subsidiary orders as he may deem proper for the efficient organization of the force to be issued forthwith.

The services of the undermentioned officers are placed at the disposal of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, temporarily, for duty with their respective regiments, proceeding on field service :—

Captain J. B. Dunsterville, of the 4th Regt. N. I. (Rifle Corps).
Captain H. H. A. Wood, of the 4th Regt. N. I. (Rifle Corps).
Captain (Brevet Major) E. Baynes, of the 20th Regt. N. I.
Lieutenant W. Waddington, of the 20th Regt. N. I.
Lieutenant E. L. Taverner, of the 20th Regt. N. I.
Lieutenant F. W. McL. Atkins, of the 20th Regt. N. I.

Major (Brevet Lieut.-Col.) G. G. Malet, of the 3rd Regt. L. C.
 Lieutenant P. H. LeGeyst, of the 3rd Regt. L. C.
 Captain C. T. Aitchison, of the 2nd Eur. Regt. L. I.
 Lieutenant G. A. Laughton, of the 2nd Eur. Regt. L. I.
 Lieutenant S. Scott, of the 2nd Eur. Regt. L. I.
 Lieutenant D. Hutcheon, of the 2nd Eur. Regt. L. I.
 Lieutenant D. C. E. Twyford, of the 2nd Eur. Regt. L. I.
 Captain W. R. Dickinson, of the Engineer Corps.
 Lieutenant H. Pym, of the Engineer Corps.
 Lieutenant J. LeMesurier, of the Engineer Corps.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor in
 Council,

P. M. MELVILL, *Colonel,*
Secretary to Government.

BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

1. With reference to G. G. O., dated the 18th instant, the Commander-in-Chief, under the authority of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, is pleased to make the following appointments of officers for the staff duties of the Field Force therein ordered to be held in readiness for foreign service beyond sea, under the command of Major-General F. Stalker, C.B.:—

COMMANDS.

To be Brigadiers of the 2nd Class.

Brigadier J. Stopford, C.B. Her Majesty's 64th Foot.
 Colonel R. W. Honner 4th Regt. N. I. (Rifle Corps).

Staff.

Brev. Lt.-Col. R. R. Younghusband	Assist. Adjutant General.
Captain J. A. Collier	Deputy Assist. Adj. General.
Captain J. Wray	Assist. Quarter-Master General.
Lieutenant W. V. Shewell.....	Deputy Assist. Qr.-Mast. General.
Lieutenant T. J. Holland	Deputy Assist. Qr.-Mast. General.
Brevet Major H. Boyé	Deputy Judge Advocate General.
Brevet Major H. J. Barr	Pay Master.
	Deputy Commissary General.
Lieutenant W. F. Gordon	Deputy Assist. Commy. General.
Lieutenant W. Gray	Sub Assist. Commissary General.
Lieutenant M. W. Willoughby...	ditto.
Lieutenant E. L'Estrange	ditto.
Lieutenant D. D. Thain	ditto.

Staff—continued.

Captain C. P. Rigby.....	Superintendent of Bazars.
Captain B. K. Finnimore	Commissary of Ordnance.
Brevet Major J. Hill.....	Commanding Engineers.
Lieutenant J. W. Playfair	} Field Engineers.
Lieutenant J. B. G. Close	
Lieutenant J. S. Trevor	} Assistant Field Engineers.
Lieutenant C. J. Merriman	
Lieutenant W. W. Goodfellow....	
Lieutenant C. W. Finch	
Surgeon T. Mackenzie.....	Superintending Surgeon.
Surgeon M. Stovell	Field Surgeon.
Assistant Surgeon J. Mills	Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
Rev. G. A. F. Watson	Chaplain.

2. Major-General Stalker will be good enough to make such arrangements as he may deem requisite with respect to appointing postmaster and provosts marshal, &c., submitting his nominations to army head-quarters in the usual manner.

3. The troops are to be formed into brigades, and staff officers attached, as set forth in the following detail:—

BRIGADE STAFF.

Artillery.

Brevet Lieut. Col. H. W. Trevelyan, commanding	} 3rd troop Horse Brigade. 1st co. 1st batt. European Foot Artillery. 4th co. 1st batt. European Foot Artillery. Reserve Artillery, European Foot Artillery.
Captain J. Pottinger, Major of Brigade	
...	

Cavalry Brigade.

Brevet Lieut. Colonel T. Tapp, commanding	} Head-qrs. and two squads. 3rd Regt. L.C. 2 troops Poona Irregular Horse.
...	

1st Brigade of Infantry.

Brigadier J. Stopford, C.B. commanding	} H.M.'s 64th Regt. of Foot. 20th Regt. N.I.
— Major of Brigade	

2nd Brigade of Infantry.

Brigadier R. W. Honner, commanding	} 2nd European L.I. 4th Regt. N.I. (Rifle Corps). 2nd Belooch Battalion.
...	
— Major of Brigade	

Engineer Department.

Brevet Major J. Hill, commanding	} Head-quarters and 2 companies of Sappers and Miners.
...	

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 3rd December, 1856.

Reports of the departure of the last of the transports forming part of the Expedition to the Persian Gulf having been submitted to Government, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has the highest satisfaction in publicly recording the approbation which his Lordship feels to be most justly due to all departments, naval and military, and to every officer and man, who have taken part in the preparation, the embarkation, and despatch of the force intended to operate on the Coast of Persia, for the purposes proclaimed in the Notification issued by the Government of India on the 1st November last.

Orders for the preparation of this force were received on the 22nd August; orders for the actual despatch of the force did not arrive until the 23rd October; the final instructions from the Government of India reached Bombay on the 9th November; and the flag-ship, with the head-quarters and the main body of the Expedition, sailed from Bombay within four days from that date.

The Expeditionary Force of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, comprises a strength of 5,670 fighting men (of whom 2,270 are Europeans) with 3,750 followers, 1,150 horses, and 430 bullocks. The fleet consists of eight war-steamers of the Indian Navy, seven hired steamers, and thirty sailing ships; and numbers in all forty-five sail.

The force has been embarked at four points—Bombay, Vingorla, Porebunder, and Kurrachee; and the embarkation has been so perfectly arranged and ordered, that the whole operation has been completed at the appointed time, without the slightest embarrassment, difficulty, or confusion, and without the occurrence of a single serious accident.

This most satisfactory result of the united efforts of many departments, reflects the highest credit upon all, and affords a fresh and remarkable proof of the thorough and well-tried efficiency, and constant readiness for active service, which have long distinguished the Bombay Army and Indian Navy.

To the naval department has been entrusted the duty of selecting and recommending the engagement of the transports; and the Government is satisfied that no body of troops of equal strength has ever been embarked in finer vessels; and that in space, ventilation, and fittings, everything has been supplied that could possibly be desired.

The duty of distributing the various divisions and descriptions of troops, followers, equipments, cattle, and stores, composing the Expeditionary Force, among the vessels provided for its transport, and of superintending the fittings and preparations required, has devolved upon the Transport Committee, convened under the General Order of the 9th September last; and to the admirable manner in which this duty has been executed by the members of the Committee, and in particular by the senior military member, Major Glasse, the Governor in Council considers that the facility, regularity, and promptitude, with which the embarkation has been effected, may, in a great degree, be justly attributed.

By the Commissariat the utmost care has been exercised to protect and ensure, so far as circumstances render it possible, the health and the welfare of the troops in a strange country and climate.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council requests that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy, will be pleased to communicate the approbation of Government to the officers, departments, and esta-

blishments under their respective orders and control. To Sir Henry Somerset, and to Sir Henry Leeke, personally, the thanks of Government are specially due for their great exertions in assembling the troops and fitting out the fleet. To the commissary-general, Colonel Davidson, whose long and extensive experience in the field has given peculiar value to his zealous efforts to furnish the force with every possible requirement that could be foreseen, the Government is largely indebted. Equally meritorious have been the energetic endeavours of the inspector-general of ordnance, Major-General Lester, and of the principal commissary, Colonel Willoughby, C.B., and of the agent for gun carriages, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, that nothing should be wanting which the Arsenal is expected to supply; and the chief engineer of public works, Major-General Waddington, C.B., and the garrison engineer, Major Tremenhere, have contributed their cordial assistance in preparing the frame-work of hospitals and barracks, which will, beyond doubt, be found of the greatest value in giving cover to the troops in the encampments they are destined to occupy.

BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Head-quarters, Poona, 12th December, 1856.

The Commander-in-Chief has much pleasure and satisfaction in communicating to the army the approbation of Government as expressed in General Orders by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, of the 3rd December.

Adverting to para. 9 of the above Order, his Excellency is desirous of recording his thanks to the heads of departments and the officers of the general staff of the army, for the very satisfactory manner in which the

arrangements have been carried out, in organizing and equipping the force lately despatched to the Persian Gulf.

The sentiments of his Lordship in Council bear testimony to the combined efforts of the various departments, and which have been graciously acknowledged by the Government in terms most gratifying to all those who have been so zealously employed in fitting out the Expedition.

The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, most cordially acknowledges the assistance rendered by the departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General of the army. Upon Colonel Holland and the officers of the latter department necessarily devolved the more arduous part of the movement of the Expedition, for the efficient and satisfactory performance of which the acknowledgment of his Excellency are especially due.

His Excellency is also much indebted to Colonel Lugard, C.B., deputy adjutant-general Queen's Troops, detached on special duty to Vingorla, for the very satisfactory inspection and report made by him of her Majesty's 64th Foot and the 20th Regiment N. I., previous to their embarkation.

The thanks of the Commander-in-Chief are also due to the Medical Board for the completeness of the arrangements in this most important part of the Expedition, and for the care which the Board has evinced in providing, in the most perfect manner, for all connected with the Medical Department.

His Excellency has observed with much pleasure the very favourable notice which the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has been pleased to bestow upon Major Glasse and the members of the Committee of Embarkation, whose exertions were most praiseworthy and conspicuous.

By the various reports received from the general officers commanding divisions, his Excellency has become acquainted with the precision with which the several instructions issued to them have been carried out, and, in thanking them for their assistance, the Commander-in-Chief desires that his acknowledgments may be conveyed to their several staff officers.

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 27th December, 1856.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council has the highest gratification in publishing, for general information, the following despatches received from Major-General Stalker, C.B., commanding the Expedition to the Persian Gulf, from Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leeke, K.H., R.N., and from Commander Jones, I.N., Political Agent with the Field Force, announcing the surrender of Bushire on the 10th instant.

The Island of Karrak was occupied by the British Forces on the 4th instant, without opposition.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council will feel most sincere pleasure in drawing the attention of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council to the gallantry displayed by Major-General Stalker, C.B., and Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leeke, K.H., and by the officers and men under their command, during these important operations.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council,

H. L. ANDERSON,
Secretary to Government.

Major General F. Stalker, C.B., commanding Expeditionary Field Force, to H. L. Anderson, Esq., Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.

Head Quarters, Field Force, Bushire, 12th December, 1856.

I have the satisfaction of reporting to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, that the British flag has been hoisted on the walls of Bushire, which, as well as the Island of Karrak, is garrisoned by our troops.

I have the honour at the same time to forward copy of my letter of this day's date to the Adjutant-General, and I trust that the amount of duty of all kinds with which I am overwhelmed will plead my excuse for any deficiency of detail.

I have, &c.,

FOSTER STALKER, *Major-General.*
Commanding Expeditionary Field Force.

Major-General F. Stalker, C.B., commanding Expeditionary Field Force, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Bombay.

Head-quarters, Field Force, Bushire, 12th December, 1856.

I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the complete success which, under the protection of Almighty God, has attended our arms. The British flag waves over the walls of Bushire. The place, infinitely stronger than I had any reason to believe from the information I had received, surrendered on the appearance of our troops before it on the 10th instant. The previous day we had a smart affair in dislodging the enemy from a strong position they occupied in the old Dutch fort of Reshire. The casualties on this occasion, though numerically small, were principally among the officers, and, I regret to say, included Brigadier Stopford and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet, 3rd Light Cavalry, killed; Captain Wood, Lieutenants Utterson and Warren, 20th Regiment, wounded, the two latter since dead (Captain Wood, though severely wounded, is doing well). The lesson the enemy received on this occasion, together with the bombarding of the works, the imposing appearance of the troops in line, and of the fleet, was doubtless the cause of their want of spirit in surrendering the strongly fortified town of Bushire, in which we have found fifty-nine guns,* with large quantities of ammunition and warlike stores. The Governor of the place, and the commander of the troops, came out and gave up their swords. They and one of the principal officials are now in my camp, and will be sent to Bombay. The garrison, to the number of 1,500 or 2,000 men (a large number having previously effected their escape, and very many others having

* Six others have since been discovered.

been drowned in attempting to do so), grounded their arms in front of our line, and were next morning escorted by the cavalry some distance into the country and set free. Every assistance and co-operation has been rendered by the fleet: a heavy fire was opened in the early morning, and kept up spiritedly for some hours, till the place surrendered. At Reshire also, the previous day, all the co-operation possible was rendered by the fleet. And my very best thanks are due to Sir Henry Leeke, the officers and seamen, for their unwearied exertions in landing the troops, which, owing to the absence of any other boats than those of the fleet, was a work of much labour, occupying the greater part of three days and two nights. The force landed at Hallila Bay, about twelve or thirteen miles south of Bushire, without any serious opposition—a body of 300 or 400 men, who appeared, being scattered by the fire of the gun-boats. There being no carriage cattle, the troops were landed without tents or baggage of any description—three days' rations being carried in their haversacks. The hardships which the men have been called upon to undergo have been endured most cheerfully, and I cannot say too much in their praise. Being still without our baggage, I have been unable as yet to obtain the reports called for from the several officers commanding brigades, regiments, and detachments; but I shall do myself the honour to enclose them for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I ought to have mentioned that on approaching Bushire the enemy were observed to occupy in some force an entrenched position, with a strong redoubt about a mile and a half from the walls, and commanding the wells from which the main supply of water for the town is derived. This position was precipitately abandoned on my line being formed. It also had sustained a bombardment from the fleet.

I would beg especially to mention the unwearied exertions and valuable aid rendered to me, from the landing at Hallila Bay to the taking of Bushire, by my Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Younghusband; Captain Wray, the Assistant Quartermaster-General; Major Hill, commanding Engineers; Captain Dunsterville, Assistant Commissary-General; and Dr. Mackenzie, the Superintending Surgeon.

Brigadier Stopford and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet died leading on their men in the most gallant style. Brigadier Honner, commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Shephard, who succeeded to the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, commanding the Artillery Brigade; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, commanding the Cavalry Brigade, have earned my warmest thanks for the manner in which their arduous duties have been carried out; as also Captain Pottinger, Brigade Major of Artillery, whose exertions were conspicuous; and my best thanks are equally due to Major Sterling, commanding her Majesty's 64th Regiment; to Captain Macleod, who succeeded to the command of the 20th Regiment; to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, commanding 2nd European Light Infantry; to Major Manson, commanding 4th Rifles; to Captain Hough, commanding 2nd Belooch Battalion; to Captain Forbes, who succeeded to the command of the 3rd Light Cavalry; to Major Blake,

commanding 4th troop Horse Artillery; to Captain Hatch, commanding No. 3 Light Field Battery; to Captain Gibbard, commanding No. 5 Light Field Battery; and to Captain Dickinson, commanding the Sappers and Miners.

I have also derived every possible assistance from my Aide-de-camp, Captain Hunter; Major Ballard, head of the Intelligence Department; Major Boyé, the Deputy Judge Advocate-General; Captain Rigby, who has acted as my Persian interpreter; Captain Finnimore, Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Collier, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Shewell, and Lieutenant Holland, Deputy Assistant Quartermasters General; Major Barr, Paymaster; and Lieutenant Willoughby, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.

Lord Dunkellin, of the Coldstream Guards; Major Taylor, of the Persian Embassy; and Mr. Johnstone, of the Indian Navy, also rendered most efficient service (having attached themselves to my personal staff); and to Mr. Johnstone's knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, with the unwearied zeal he has exhibited, I am much indebted.

In fine, nothing could have surpassed the admirable spirit exhibited by the officers and men of all ranks, and the utmost praise is due for their zeal, devotion, and gallantry.

I have, &c.,
F. STALKER, *Major-General,*
Commanding Expeditionary Field Force.

Rear Admiral Sir Henry J. Leeke, K.H., R.N., Commanding Naval Force, Persian Gulf Expedition, to the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.H., Governor of Bombay.

*Honourable Company's Steam Frigate "Assaye,"
at anchor off Bushire, 10th December, 1856.*

It becomes my pleasing duty to report to your lordship in Council, that after a bombardment which commenced this morning at 8 o'clock between the Persian batteries and the men-of-war of the Indian Navy, and lasted on both sides until nearly an hour after noon, the town of Bushire has been taken, and the flag of our Sovereign is now flying on the citadel.

It was determined that the disembarkation of the troops should take place in Hallila Bay, about ten miles south of the town. All was ready on the morning of the 7th instant, and the gun-boats in advance to cover the landing, when a number of the enemy were discovered in a date-grove about 200 yards to the left of the beach; the boats opened fire, and, after the exchange of a few shots, the enemy retired. Here the famous Chief, the son of Baucher Khan, was killed by a shell from one of the advanced boats, and this, I trust, gave a check to, and prevented the approach of, a large number of Persian troops, who would have very much harassed the army while landing.

On the following day I paid a visit to General Stalker at the camp, and on parting I promised him that I would keep close to the shore in this ship, and support the left of the army on its approach to the fort of Reshire (about four miles from this place), where it was supposed, from the information we had received, the enemy, in number from 1,500 to 2,000, would receive our troops, and make a powerful resistance. On my nearing the fort, this information was confirmed, and we saw it perfectly full of Persian soldiers, who were drawn up ready for the attack. At this moment I was about 1,700 yards from them, when we commenced firing shell—many, dropping within the trenches and committing much slaughter, obliged the Persian troops to fly, with the exception of about 800, who made a resolute stand, and were driven out by the troops in one of the most brilliant and gallant charges I ever witnessed. Here the troops halted for the night.

I then pushed on for this roadstead, and at daylight this morning, seeing the Persian army drawn up near the wells (their centre supported by a high fortified tower and redoubt), it was my duty to dislodge them; and for this service I ordered the vessels named in the margin,* under the command of Lieutenants Tronson, Worsley, Chitty, and Giles, and eight heavy-armed gun-boats under Lieutenant Stradling, to place their ships in position to attack it. This was done in a most gallant way, and in the course of an hour I had the satisfaction to see the whole of the Persian troops in full retreat to the town, but in perfect order and with great coolness, supported by their artillery. A boat, with a white flag, was now seen approaching the ship, and on one of the chiefs arriving on board, a request was made by the Governor of the town for a delay of operations for twenty-four hours, to offer terms. This I instantly refused, in consequence of his having fired on one of our small steamers, bearing a flag of truce the day before. Half an hour was given him to get out of the way of our shot; and the ships having been placed in line of battle, my flag-ship in the centre, the action commenced, and continued on both sides for two hours, when, observing two batteries outside the town, one a kind of miniature Malakoff, harassing the *Semiramis* and *Feroze*, I directed our fire towards them, and in three hours they were perfectly silenced, and the guns dismantled. A tower on the north-west angle of the fort, and a masked battery below the Residency flagstaff outside the walls, kept up a constant and steady fire upon the *Semiramis* and *Feroze*. It was necessary to silence them also; and seeing that both ships were much damaged by their steady aim, the foremost guns of this ship were ordered to be directed towards them, and in the course of an hour both batteries ceased firing.

I was now anxious to make an opening in the wall of the town, that the troops might have nothing in their way, if General Stalker, on his arrival, determined upon carrying the place by assault. Our fire was therefore directed to the south-west angle, and the breach commenced by knocking down a part of the tower and the embrasure, in which a gun was mounted, as well as the lower part of the wall. The fire

* *Falkland*, sloop; *Ajdaha*, steam-frigate; *Bernice*; *Victoria*, steam-sloop.

from their batteries at this time gradually slackened, and at this moment the flagstaff in the town was hauled down in token of submission, and the place surrendered.

The army was by this time close to the town, and it was a source of the greatest pleasure to me to feel that we had cleared away every obstacle that presented itself on their onward march, the more so as they had lost so many gallant fellows the day before when storming the fort of Reshire.

The ships of the fleet have suffered considerably in their hulls, masts, and rigging, from the fire of the enemy's guns: the *Semiramis* and *Feroze* have some shot through them, but nothing to prevent all being ready for sea in a day or two. I am most happy to add, that no person has been touched, nor has any casualty occurred during the four hours and a half we were under fire; how this has happened is miraculous, for the grape shot, which fell at every instant around and abreast the gun-boats, and round shot over and about our ships, was very severe, and proved that our enemy were more formidable than they were supposed to be even by those who had known the town years before, there being fifty-nine guns mounted on the batteries.

It now becomes a pleasing part of my duty to bring to the notice of your Lordship in Council the very great assistance I have received from Commodore Ethersey (who met me off the Island of Kishm, and from his knowledge of this place gave me much valuable information), Captains Jenkins and Young, Commanders Macdonald (in charge of all the transports) and Rennie, and acting Commanders Foulerton and Adams, the latter the captain of this ship, the officers, petty officers, and seamen of the fleet under my command; nor can I ever forget their gallant conduct in this day's battle, or their cheerfulness and activity in carrying out my orders, and in moving their ships into position abreast of the batteries, and I am sure the Government will think with me that this was no easy task to perform, for most of the vessels drew from fifteen to sixteen feet water, and we had to take them (at high water) some way through soft mud to get near enough to the forts, and this under a heavy fire.

Where all have so ably and gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to particularise individuals, but I desire to express my warm thanks to Captain Griffith Jenkins, the first captain of this ship, for the very great assistance he has afforded me throughout the whole of the operations, and particularly during the action. He was the first officer, assisted by Major Hill, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Clarkson, the first lieutenant of my flag-ship, to enter the town and hoist the British flag.

I trust, my lord, it will not be taking too much upon myself to express my admiration of the gallant conduct of General Stalker and his brave army, the more so as I have had the honour of being associated with them for many weeks, and have been an eye-witness of all their proceedings from the day of landing, as well as on their advance to the town. In doing so I offer the humble tribute of a British admiral to the brave General, his officers, and soldiers, whose dashing conduct on the day of storming the fort of Reshire can never be forgotten.

I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of bringing to the notice of your Lordship in Council the excellent manner in which the commanders and officers and crews of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ships, named in the margin,* have conducted their ships during the time they have been with the fleet. They are at all times ready for any hard work, and have rendered me very essential service, and I beg to express my sincere thanks to them collectively and individually.

To the masters commanding the merchant ships (named in the margin),† and their officers and crews, especially to the Commander of the *Result*, Captain Cow, whose kind and considerate conduct in bringing off the wounded did him honour, I tender my best thanks for their active exertions. All did their duty, and vied with each other, day and night, which ship should do the most in landing the troops, horses, and stores.

In conclusion, may I again request your lordship's notice of the gallant officers who have given me so much assistance and support during the time I have been fitting out the Persian Gulf expedition:—by their exertions nearly 10,000 persons, with all their camp equipage, provisions, guns, and stores, and 1,100 horses, have been landed on the shores of Persia, without the slightest accident, and, with the exception of five horses, without a casualty of any sort; and by to-morrow evening the troops will have their tents pitched, cooking things ready, and every arrangement to give them comfort and shelter from the cold weather and rains of the winter. The Indian Navy being a service of seniority, precludes promotion, and, unlike their brethren of the army, they can gain nothing of advancement to a higher rank; but if, in bringing to the notice of your Lordship in Council their good and meritorious conduct upon this as well as every other occasion, I have the good fortune to render a service to those who have so thoroughly done their duty, it will be a source of the greatest gratification to me.

I have, &c.,

HENRY J. LEEKE, *Rear-Admiral, R. N.,*

Commander-in-Chief I. N.,

and commanding the Naval Force, Persian Gulf Expedition.

Commander Felix Jones, I. N., Political Agent with the Forces, and Resident in the Persian Gulf, to H. L. Anderson, Esq., Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Residency in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, 13th December, 1856.

My last despatch made known my retirement from Bushire. I now continue the report of my proceedings to the present date, in connection with the expeditionary force in this Gulf.

* *Precursor, Pottinger, Chusan, Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy.*

† *Result, Abdullah, Alabama, Madge Wildfire, Dahotah, Fairlie, Hydree, Mirzapore, Melbourne, Merse, Maria Grey, Arthur the Great, Rajah of Cochlin, Clifton, Thames City, Wansfield, Sindian, Bombay, Rhoderic Dhu, Philo, Sibella.*

On the 29th November a detachment of the fleet, as per margin,* first hove in sight of Bushire, and dispelled the prevailing idea that the force would not quit the shores of India. This illusion I had been able to maintain perfect to the last moment, though the object I had contemplated of an immediate descent on the coast failed, from the fleet being scattered in various parts of the Gulf. It was not indeed until the 6th instant that they were sufficiently collected to admit of direct operations being commenced; but, in the meantime, the Island of Karrak was occupied and formed into a military depôt, as reported in my despatch to Major General Stalker, under date 4th instant.

The day consequent to the arrival of the first ships the Governor of Bushire wrote to me officially on the subject of the display before the town; but, as I was then about proceeding to meet the General some miles off at sea, an answer to his inquiries was delayed, as shown in the accompanying letters. On the 3rd December, the Governor-General's proclamations were sent to him officially, with the sanction of the Major-General commanding the force. To these there was no reply.

On the 6th instant the fleet moved down to Hallila Bay, which Commodore Ethersey had pronounced the best suited for the debarkation of the force; and no spot could have been better selected. Dispositions were made for landing the force on the following morning, when it was effected in admirable order, though not unobserved by the enemy, small parties of whom were driven from their lurking-places in the date-groves by the fire of the gun-boats and well-directed shot from the steam-frigate *Ajdaha*, commanded by Lieut. Worsley.

Shortly after noon the force was enabled to advance from the beach, and take up an extended front before the enemy, seen at intervals watching our movements, a few miles in advance. Great difficulties, however, had to be contended with in landing the cavalry horses and artillery equipage from a paucity of native boats, which I failed in procuring from the Arab coast, owing to the impracticability of dealing with the people in moments of emergency and need. These difficulties were, however, readily surmounted by the skill and activity of the Indian naval officers and men, whose exertions on this occasion merit the highest praise. These exertions were fully appreciated by their associates in arms, not less active in their endeavours to get at the enemy with the least possible delay.

Forty-eight hours sufficed to put the troops in motion northward; the ships of war, led by the Admiral, advancing along the coast to their support. This was on the morning of the 9th, and by noon the enemy were observed to be in some force in the village of Reshire. Here, amid the ruins of old houses, garden-walls, and steep-ravines, they occupied a formidable position. But, notwithstanding their firmness, wall after wall was surmounted, and finally they were driven from their last defence (the old fort of Reshire), bordering on the cliffs at the margin of the sea. This was carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy then only flying in despair down the cliffs, where

* *Feroze*, steam-frigate, towing two merchant ships, and corvette *Fulkland*.

many met their deaths in their endeavours to escape through the ravines of the south. The nature of the ground, however, rendered pursuit difficult to the horse, though many were cut up in a chase of some distance. Details of this spirited affair will be given by the proper officers. I shall therefore merely observe that the enemy received at first a lesson he will not readily forget, for the tribe families of Dashti and Tungestoon comprising its ranks are regarded as the most brave as well as the most skilled in the defence of posts like Reshire, where regular troops cannot work with full effect. Brigadier Stopford, C.B., met his death here, and other loss was experienced. The wounded were received into the ships the same evening, and provisions were thrown into the camp from seaward during the night.

It had been agreed upon that I should proceed in person to the town of Bushire in a small steamer with a flag of truce, bearing the accompanying copy of a summons to surrender, with the terms offered to the garrison. While the above was enacting, I proceeded on this errand, with the humane object also of receiving such of the merchants and townspeople as might be desirous of shelter in the fleet. This was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India in regard to the inhabitants of Bushire; and the Major General, the Admiral, and myself were induced to believe that my presence near them might tend to avert much bloodshed. In this, however, we were disappointed; for, on passing through the intricate channel leading to the town, two batteries, at a distance of 500 yards, opened upon the *Assyria*, bearing the flag of truce, in defiance of all usage of war. Deeming it might be a mistake, I caused the vessel to stop, but a second and third shot passing close to us, I was compelled to retrace my steps, and, even then, two more guns were discharged. I could scarcely account for this conduct, having taken some pains to explain the meaning of a flag of truce, in the event of warfare, before quitting the town; but, while relating the circumstance to Rear Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, a flag of truce from the shore was reported, and the bearer (Mirza Ismail, Collector of Customs in the town,) came off with a written apology from the Governor, who, with the chief officers of the garrison, was stated to have been outside of the walls examining into the condition of the exterior defences at the time; every regret was expressed; the act was attributed to the ignorance of an artilleryman, with hopes that it would be overlooked. To this the admiral and myself replied, that so far as we were personally concerned we were willing to credit the statements of the Governor and accept the apology, though the act itself, in whatever way originating, must stigmatise the Persian Government and its officers in the eyes of all civilized States. Mirza Ismail returned with a summons to the shore.

While this was going on, a note from the Major General Commanding announced his intention of advancing on the town the following morning, and the Admiral disposed his fleet in order of battle, for first dismantling the newly-erected outworks, and then moving with the view to breaching the south wall of the town. The following morning, as the tide served, the ships were in the positions

assigned them. A second flag of truce had come off begging twenty-four hours' delay, but this was promptly rejected, and at near eight o'clock the signal was hoisted to engage. Shot and shell were aimed at the redoubt south of the town, but with little effect, owing to the great range, though eventually the enemy, assembled there to oppose the troops, were dislodged, and beat a retreat with their guns into the town. The ships, in the meantime, have moved upon the town, and such was the ardour displayed to get close in to the works, that every ship was laid aground at the turn of high water, and for four hours continued to cannonade the defences, which were active in replying the whole time. Many of their guns, however, were not of sufficient calibre to reach the ships, but the perseverance of the Persian gunners in firing from the more heavy pieces was admired by every one. Their shot told very often on the hulls of the *Victoria*, *Falkland*, *Semiramis*, and *Feroze*, which latter vessels, under Captain John Young and Commander James Rennie (if comparisons are admissible where all exerted themselves alike), had the posts of honour for the day. Details of the affair it is unnecessary for me to enter upon. It will suffice for me to report that some of the guns being silenced, on the approach of the army under Major General Stalker, C.B., to breach the wall on the gate side before assault, the Persian flagstaff was felled in token of submission. This was at noon. The Persian flag has since been recovered by myself, and presented as a joint trophy to the chiefs conducting the combined operations in this expedition, who, with every officer and man in it, whether soldier or sailor, have certainly won for themselves an honourable name.

After surrender, some little hesitation was shown on the part of the Governor and garrison to come out of the town: an assuring note, coupled with the threat of an assault in half an hour, was, however, sent in by a freed captive; and on the expiration of the time that officer was seen issuing with his suite from the gate. I moved forward with a party to receive and conduct him to head-quarters, where, after tendering his sword, he met with a gracious reception from the Major General and Rear Admiral commanding the forces. Shortly afterwards, the Sirhang, or Lieutenant Colonel and Commandant, submitted, the entire garrison at the same time laying down their arms on my proceeding into the town with assurances of safety from the Major General Commanding in Chief. The British colours were then hoisted at 4.30 P.M. on the Residency flagstaff by Lieutenant Clarkson, of the Indian Navy, the troops under orders to garrison the town moving at sunset into the place.

Since the occupation, I have been engaged with my assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in giving confidence to the townspeople, securing the magazines, granaries, and other public stores, endeavouring to re-open the bazars, and in adopting measures for the public safety, as well as in taking steps for obtaining supplies. Owing to the distrust naturally prevailing amongst suspicious people quite new to us, and generally ignorant as to our usages and institutions, we have some difficulty to contend with. Time, however, will aid to dispel fears, to restore confidence, and eventually, I hope, secure to us all we require. I must not conceal, however, that our chief local supplies of fresh

meat, grain, &c., must be drawn from Busreh and Bagdad, and boats are not readily procurable. A large quantity of coal should therefore be stored both here and at Busreh, for the use of steamers, those of small size being best adapted for this service; they should not fail us, for in any case to ensure cattle living, the voyage should be shortened as much as possible by their taking boats in tow.

No intelligence of any kind has come in from the interior; but I may be able to glean some in a few days. All is, however, quiet in the town and districts at the present time.

I beg to enclose copy of a Proclamation, with appended articles, which forms the basis of our future administration in these tracts. These will doubtless require emendation as we progress in the government of a strange people, but they seem to me at present best adapted to work upon, and have accordingly received the sanction of the Major General Commanding in Chief of the Force.

I have, &c.,

FELIX JONES,

Political Agent with the Forces, and Resident in the Persian Gulf.

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 13th January, 1857.

Under instructions from the Home Government, and with the sanction of the Government of India, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has been pleased to direct that a force be assembled to form the 2nd Division of the Expeditionary Force for service in Persia, under the command of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B.

This 2nd division is to be considered as organized from the 10th January, and all appointments connected with it are to take effect from that date.

The entire force, consisting of two divisions, is combined under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

The following appointments are made on the personal, head-quarter, divisional, and brigade staff of the Persian Expeditionary Force :—

Field Force.

Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Outram, K.C.B.	To command.
Major General Stalker, C.B. ...	Commanding 1st Division.
Brigadier General Havelock, C.B.	Commanding 2nd Division.
Brigadier General J. Jacob, C.B.	Commanding Cavalry Division.

Personal Staff of Lieutenant General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B.

Capt. M. S. Green, 16th N. I. ...	Mil. Sec. and Aide-de-Camp.
Lieut. W. H. F. Sykes, 3rd L. C.	Aide-de-Camp.
Capt. C. R. W. Hervey, 2nd Eur. }	Acting Aide-de-Camp.
L. I. ... }	
Capt. E. P. Arthur, 1st Lancers	Persian Interpreter.

Head Quarter Staff.

Col. Lugard, C.B., H. M.'s 29th Rt.	Chief of the Staff.
Lieut. Col. R. R. Younghusband	Deputy Adjutant-General.
Captain J. Wray ...	Deputy Quarter-master General.
Captain J. A. M. Macdonald ...	Deputy Assist. Quart.-mr.-Gen.
Major H. Boyé ...	Deputy Judge Advocate-General.
Major H. J. Barr ...	Paymaster.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Pope ...	Deputy Commissary-General.
Captain C. P. Rigby ...	Superintendent of Bazzars.
Captain B. K. Finimore ...	Commissary of Ordnance.
Lieutenant J. Ballard, C.B. ...	Assist. Qr.-mr.-Gen. and Superin- tendent, Intelligence Depart.
Major J. Hill ...	Commanding Engineer.
Major W. F. Curtis ...	Director Land Transport Corps.
Captain W. W. Taylor ...	1st Assistant Director Land Transport Corps.
Captain R. P. Warden ...	1st ditto ditto.
Lieutenant Pengeley, Indian Navy	1st ditto ditto.
Lieutenant C. E. Boodle...	1st ditto, and Staff Officer.
Lieutenant W. A. Armstrong ...	2nd ditto.
Lieutenant A. R. Wilson ...	2nd ditto.
Lieutenant D. B. Young ...	3rd ditto.
Lieutenant G. S. Morris...	3rd ditto.
The Rev. G. P. Badger ...	Chaplain.

First Division.

Major General Stalker ...	Commanding.
Captain W. F. Hunter ...	Aide-de-Camp.
Captain J. A. Collier ...	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain W. V. Shewell ...	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Major T. T. Christie ...	Deputy Judge Advocate-General.
Captain H. J. Willoughby ...	Deputy Paymaster.
Captain J. B. Dunsterville ...	Assistant Commissary-General.
Lieutenant W. Gray ...	Dep. Assist. Commissary-General.
Lieutenant F. P. Mignon ...	Sub-assist. Commissary-General.
Lieutenant E. L'Estrange ...	Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant D. D. Thain ...	Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant G. B. Mellersh ...	Deputy Commissary of Ordnance.
Captain W. Dickinson ...	Field Engineer, and Commanding Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant C. J. Merriman ...	Field Engineer.
Lieutenant. G. M. Duncan ...	Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant H. Pym ...	Ditto.
Surgeon M. Stovell ...	Superintending Surgeon.

First Division—continued.

Surgeon A. Burn. M.D. Field Surgeon.
Assistant Surgeon J. Miles Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
Rev. G. A. F. Watson Chaplain.

Brigade Staff.

Lieut. Col. H. W. Trevelyan Commanding Artillery.
Captain J. Pottinger Major of Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp Commanding Cavalry.
Brigadier N. Wilson, K. H. Commanding 1st Inf. Brigade.
Major C. W. Sibley Major of Brigade.
Brigadier R. W. Honner... Commanding 2nd Inf. Brigade.
Captain C. T. Aitchison... Major of Brigade.
Captain W. Dickinson Field Engineer, and Commanding Sappers and Miners.

Second Division.

Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B.	Commanding.
—	Aide-de-Camp.
Captain S. J. Holland Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain Annesley Deputy Paymaster.
Captain A. W. Lucas Dep. Assist. Commissary-General.
Lieutenant M. W. Willoughby Sub-Assist. Commissary-General.
Lieutenant F. J. Steuart Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant W. H. Blowers Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant E. H. Shewell Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant J. W. Playfair Field Engineer.
Lieutenant W. W. Goodfellow Ditto.
Lieutenant C. W. Finch... Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant J. LeMesurier Ditto.
Lieutenant J. Hills Ditto.
Surgeon T. Mackenzie Superintending Surgeon.
Surgeon J. Deas Field Surgeon.
Assistant-Surgeon W. Davey Deputy Medical Storekeeper and Staff Surgeon.
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Brigade Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Hutt, C.B.	Commanding Artillery.
Captain H. M. Douglas Major of Brigade.
Colonel C. Steuart* Commanding Cavalry.
—	Major of Brigade.
Brigadier W. Hamilton Commanding 1st Inf. Brigade.
—	Major of Brigade.
Brigadier J. Hale Commanding 2nd Inf. Brigade.
—	Major of Brigade.

Cavalry Division.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob, C.B.	Commanding.
—	Aide-de-Camp.
—	Assistant Adjutant-General.

† Commanding H.M.'s Light Dragoons.

*Head-Quarters, Persian Expeditionary Force, on board
"Semiramis."*

FIELD FORCE ORDERS.

1. Lieutenant-General Outram, on assuming command of the Expeditionary Force, has much gratification in promulgating the very justly-merited acknowledgments of the Governor-General of India in Council of the great service achieved by Major-General Stalker and the troops under his command in the capture of Reshire, and especially of the gallant conduct in the action at Bushire, which led to the surrender of the city.

The thanks and acknowledgments of the Governor in Council, Bombay, have already been communicated, and the Lieutenant-General trusts those of our gracious Queen will soon follow.

2. The Lieutenant-General has great pleasure in announcing to the troops at Bushire, that Major-General Stalker will continue to command them, as now, constituting the 1st division of the augmented expeditionary army; and he begs to thank that officer for the praiseworthy zeal for the public interest which induced him to afford the Lieutenant-General the aid of his valuable services, by retaining the command of the troops he has heretofore so ably led.

EDWARD LUGARD, *Colonel Chief of the Staff.*

January 27, 1857.

*His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset,
K.C.B. and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, to Lieu-
tenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., Com-
manding Persian Expeditionary Force, Bushire.*

*Head-Quarters, Bombay,
7th March, 1857.*

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated the 10th ultimo, detailing the events connected with the movement of the force under your command upon the town of Barazjoon, the capture of the military material therein collected, and the signal defeat of the Persian army under the command of Shoojaool-Moolk on the 8th idem.

The events narrated in your despatch most clearly illustrate the perfect success which has attended a movement brilliant in conception, and carried out in a manner characteristic of the originator.

With the sincerest pleasure I congratulate you on this important achievement. The consequences which may result from it, however great they may be, will add only to the satisfaction you feel, and have so generously expressed, towards the officers and soldiers under your command, for their gallantry and good conduct throughout the expedition, under circumstances which called for a long continuance of privation and of exposure to most inclement weather.

In tendering my sincere thanks for the great service you have rendered, may I beg you will convey to the force under your command my grateful acknowledgments for their gallantry and excellent conduct under trials which have taxed their powers to an extraordinary extent.

The gallant and steady conduct of the troops, while

exposed during several hours of the night to a severe fire from the enemy's guns, and the spirited attack made by the artillery and cavalry, supported by your infantry brigades against a superior force of the enemy (the moment that daylight admitted of your operations), demand my highest admiration and thanks.

My thanks are particularly due to Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, and the officers and men under his orders, for the noble and spirited manner in which the guns were served; and to Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, Poona Irregular Horse, and Captain Forbes, Commanding 3rd Cavalry, for the brilliant and effective charges made by the cavalry under their orders.

Upon these two arms of the service you state that the brunt of the action principally fell. The duty has been nobly performed; and it is peculiarly satisfactory to me to notice the high terms in which you have alluded to the gallant charges made by the cavalry. The artillery has sustained its high reputation by the precision of its practice, and its destructive fire upon the enemy's ranks.

I have marked with much pleasure the cordial manner in which Major-General Stalker, C.B., has co-operated with you in this expedition; and also that Colonel Lugard, C.B., has rendered you that efficient assistance which my knowledge of his military reputation and great professional experience, ability, and zeal led me to expect from him as chief of the staff. To these officers you will be pleased to convey my warmest thanks.

You will further have the goodness to express my thanks to the officers of your personal staff, including Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, for their services so gallantly rendered. It will afford me much pleasure to see the further report alluded to by you; and I need

scarcely assure you that your recommendations will meet with my warmest support.

I also observe with satisfaction that the medical department has given you that assistance which it always so readily renders on active service; and I request you will convey to those officers my warmest approbation and thanks.

The valuable assistance rendered to you by Major Taylor will, I trust, be duly noticed in the proper quarter; but I must, in conclusion, again convey to you and beg that you will accept my grateful thanks for the important service you have rendered to the State, and for the honour and distinction you have been the means of earning for the gallant army under my command. At the same time I beg you to express to Major-General Stalker, C.B., to the Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Stisted, to the officers in command of regiments, the heads of departments, and to all under your command, the officers as well as to the soldiers, European and Native, my heartfelt acknowledgment for the important service they have achieved, and their devoted gallantry and good conduct.

H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-Gen.*,
Commander-in-Chief.

G. F. Edmonstone, *Esq.*, *Secretary to the Government of India*, to *Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram*, *K.C.B.*, &c. &c. &c.

SIR, *Fort William,*
23rd March, 1857.

I have the honour, by direction of the Governor-General in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch to the address of the Governor-General,

dated the 14th ult., reporting your operations in the neighbourhood of Borazjoon.

In reply, I am directed by his Lordship in Council to communicate to you, and to the officers and men under your command, the thanks of the Government of India for the signal success which has been obtained over the Persian army on this occasion, and at the same time to express to you the admiration with which the courage, energy, and discipline of the troops have been viewed by the Governor-General in Council.

On the receipt of your despatch, the sentiments of the Government on the operations were proclaimed in a public Notification, dated the 12th instant, a copy of which is enclosed for your information.

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 13th March, 1857.

The Governor-General in Council has great pleasure in publishing the accompanying despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

It describes a new success of the British Army in Persia, achieved, between the 3rd and the 9th of February, against a force much superior in number, and in the face of the difficulties which have made conspicuous the energy and promptitude of the commander and of the officers associated with him, as well as the courage, discipline, and cheerful endurance of the troops.

The rapid and toilsome night-marches, deliberately planned and accomplished with precision; the inclement weather, against which no protection of any kind was available to men or officers; the steady resistance to an attack, in circumstances the most trying to the patience

and order of an army ; and the utter rout and confusion of the enemy, with very heavy loss, when the morning light enabled our soldiers to discern their assailants—have marked this operation against the Persian entrenched camp at Borazjoon, as one of which the force under Sir James Outram's command may well be proud. In the course of it, officers and men have exhibited all the qualities which make an army invincible.

To Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, and to his brave companions in arms, the Governor-General in Council desires to offer an early assurance of the warm approbation and thanks which they have so well earned. These are especially due to Major-General Stalker, C.B., and to Colonel Lugard, C.B., chief of the staff, who are described by Sir James Outram as having guided the troops to victory in the time—most happily not of long continuance—during which he was disabled by a severe fall of his horse. But they are due to all of every rank who have taken share in this signally successful exploit, which has called for extraordinary exertions from all, and in which all have borne themselves with gallantry.

The Governor-General in Council will have the greatest satisfaction in expressing to the Honourable Court of Directors, his appreciation of the service rendered, and of the manner in which it was performed.

The Governor-General in Council has to lament the loss of one gallant young officer—Lieutenant Frankland, of the 2nd European Regiment—who, acting as brigademajor of Cavalry, fell dead in the first of the brilliant charges by which our small body of horse on that day distinguished itself. Captain Forbes, commanding the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, of her Majesty's 64th Regiment, have been severely wounded. But, upon the whole, the casualties on the side of the British force have been few compared with

the very heavy loss inflicted upon the enemy, both in men and munitions of war.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council,

G. F. EDMONSTONE, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

Lieutenant General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., Commanding Expeditionary Force, to his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B., and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Camp near Bushire, 10th February, 1857.

I have the honour to report for your Excellency's information, that the Persian Expeditionary Force obtained a signal victory over the Persian army, commanded by Shooja-ool-Moolk in person, on the 8th instant.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great. It is impossible to compute the exact amount; but from the number of bodies which strewed the ground of contest, extending several miles, I should say that fully 700 must have fallen. Two 9-pounder guns, with their carriages and horses, eight mules laden with ammunition, and several hundred stand of arms were taken; and the Persian Commander-in-Chief, with the remainder of his army, only escaped annihilation owing to the numerical weakness of our cavalry.

The loss on our side is, I am happy to say, comparatively small, attributable, I am inclined to believe, to the rapid advance of our artillery and cavalry, and the well-directed fire of the former, which almost paralysed the Persians from the commencement. I have, however, to regret the loss of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European Regiment, who was acting as Brigade Major of Cavalry, and was killed in the first cavalry charge. Captain Forbes, also, who commanded and most gallantly led the 3rd Cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, 64th Foot, were severely wounded.

Returns of the killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance and other stores taken, are annexed.

I, myself, had little to do with the action, being stunned by my horse falling with me at the commencement of the contest, and recovering only in time to resume my place at the head of the army shortly before the close of the action.

To Major General Stalker and Colonel Lugard, chief of the staff, is the credit due, for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion.

The circumstances preceding this satisfactory termination of a brief, but arduous campaign, I now proceed to detail for your Excellency's information.

On the 27th ultimo, I landed at Bushire, and assumed the command of the army, issuing on the occasion the order, of which copy is annexed. The vast preparations of the Persian Government for the recovery of Bushire then came to my knowledge. Shooja-ool-Moolk, who commands the Persian troops, had assembled a force, as per margin,* at the town of Borazjoon, forty-six miles distant from Bushire, and entrenched his position. This army was well supplied with food and ammunition, of which considerable magazines had been collected. It was intended that this force should form the nucleus of a very large army, to be assembled for the re-capture of Bushire. I therefore deemed it imperatively necessary to strike a blow in this quarter, before prosecuting operations at Mohumra or elsewhere.

The 1st brigade, 2nd division, which arrived on the 31st ultimo, and 1st instant, was landed immediately; and on the evening of the 3rd, the troops, as per margin,† marched from this camp, without tents or extra clothing of any sort, each man carrying his great coat, blanket, and two days' cooked provisions; the commissariat being provided with three days' in addition; the protection of the camp and town of Bushire being duly provided for by a detachment of troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Shepherd, reinforced by a party of seamen from all the ships in the harbour, which the senior naval officer was so good as to place at my disposal.

After a march of forty-six miles in forty-one hours, during which the troops were exposed to the worst of weather, cold nights, and deluging storms of rain, they reached the enemy's entrenched position on the morning of the 5th, and found it abandoned. The enemy, on hearing of our approach, had evacuated his entrenchments the previous night so precipitately, that his tents and camp equipage and ordnance magazines were left behind. The former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers, operating for some hours before we arrived. I endeavoured to intercept the retreat of some of the Elkhanees' horse, who had held the camp during the night and were still in sight, and a little skirmishing took place, but eventually they made off.

The enemy having succeeded in withdrawing their guns to the strong passes, where I did not deem it prudent to follow them, and being satisfied with the moral effect of our occupying their position for two days, I decided upon moving the troops back to Bushire. The return march was accordingly commenced on the night of the 7th, first destroying their magazines, found to contain about 40,000 lbs. of powder, with small-arm ammunition, and a vast quantity of shot and

* Guards, 900; 2nd Karragoozlar Regiment, 1,500; Shiraz Regiment, 200; 4th Regiment of Tabriz, 800; Arab Regiment, 900; Kashkhai Regiment, 800; total Infantry, 5,100. Tufengchees, 1,000. Cavalry, 300; Elkhanees' Horse, 500; total Cavalry, 800; guns (said to be), 18.

† 3rd Cavalry, 243; Poona Horse, 176; total, 419 sabres, 64th Foot, 780; 2nd Europeans, 693; 78th Highlanders, 739; total, 2,212 Europeans. Sappers, 118; 26th N.I., 442; 4th Rifles, 523; 26th N.I., 479; Beloochees, 460; total, 2,022 N.I.; 3rd troop Horse Artillery, 6; 3rd Light Field Battery, 6; 5th Light Field Battery, 6; guns. Camp.—378 Europeans; 1,466 N.I.; 1 company European artillery; 14 guns.

shell; and carrying away large stores of flour, rice, and grain, which the Persian Government had been collecting for a long time past for their army, thereby effectually crippling their future operations. Some of their guns are supposed to have been cast into wells, and as their wheels and axles fall into our hands, it will be impossible they can be used again for the present.

At midnight an attack was made upon the rear-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side; the troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage, and resist the horsemen in whatever direction they might attempt to charge. Four of the enemy's guns, of heavy metal, opened their fire upon the column, whilst the darkness of the night prevented any steps being taken to capture them.

I should here state that, on abandoning the position, Shoojaool-Moolk with his force had taken the direct road to Shiraz by the "Mhak Pass," and the Elkhaneh with his horse had retired by the one leading to the "Huft Moola;" and from information subsequently received, I learned that they had planned a combined attack upon our camp the night we marched. Indeed the explosion of their large magazines gave them the first intimation of our departure, when they hastened after us in the expectation of being able to attack us on the line of march, and possibly create confusion and panic in the dark.

At daybreak the Persian force, amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men, with some guns, was discovered on our left rear (north-east of our line of march) in order of battle.

Our artillery and cavalry at once moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution. The cavalry brigade twice charged with great gallantry and success. A standard (of the Kaskhai Regular Infantry Regiment) was captured by the Poona Horse; and the 3rd Light Cavalry charged a square and killed nearly the whole regiment. Indeed, upon the cavalry and artillery fell the whole brunt of the action, as the enemy moved away too rapidly for the infantry to overtake them. By 10 o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete. Two guns were captured, the gun ammunition, laden upon mules, fell into our hands, and at least 700 men lay dead upon the field. The number of wounded could not be ascertained, but it must have been very large. The remainder fled in a disorganised state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers, and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns.

The troops bivouaced for the day close to the battle-field, and at night accomplished a march of twenty miles (by another route), over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain which fell incessantly. After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight; thus performing another most arduous march of forty-four miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during its progress, within the short period of fifty hours. The cavalry and artillery reached camp this morning.

The result is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, have a very beneficial effect upon our future operations.*

The greatest praise is due to the troops of all arms for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances of peculiar hardship, rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind; and I cannot too strongly express the obligation I feel to all under my command, for the almost incredible exertions they have undergone, and the gallantry they have displayed on this occasion.

To Major General Stalker and to Colonel Lugard my especial thanks are due.

To the heads of the several departments, as well as to every officer belonging to those departments, and to my personal staff (including Lieutenant Colonel Lord Dunkellin, who volunteered his services as aide-de-camp) I am much indebted. From all I received every possible assistance, and although I do not now specify by name the departmental and personal staff, and other officers alluded to, I shall hereafter take an opportunity of bringing them individually to your Excellency's notice. Indeed, when all have behaved so nobly, it is difficult to specify individuals.

The rapid retreat of the enemy afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry. I have already alluded to the successful charges made by the 3rd Cavalry and Poona Horse, under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant Colonel Tapp, and to the very efficient service performed by the artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Trevelyan, the brigadiers commanding the infantry brigades—Wilson, Stisted, and Honner—with the several commanding officers of regiments, and indeed every officer and soldier of the force, earned my warmest approbation.

To the medical officers of the forces I am under great obligation for their untiring exertions throughout these arduous operations.

* This view is quite confirmed by the following extract from a letter written by Colonel Taylor, late Commissioner to Herat, to Sir E. Lugard, describing his return journey from Teheran to Bushire:—

Bombay, June 21, 1858.

"We (the members of the mission) divided at Shiraz. Clerk went by Kuza-roon and Dalikee, Hardly by Huft Moollah, and I by Feroozabad. Not one of the three routes would be practicable if we had an opposing enemy, but if it had been possible to pursue them after Kooshab, we should have captured six more guns deserted at Borazjoon, and ten at Dalikee. They ran as hard as they could, and never stopped till they reached Shiraz! If the weather had not been bad, the six at Borazjoon would certainly have been ours. A Swedish doctor accompanied the Persian troops, and told me that the cause of their discontinuing the firing that night was their not being able to fix our locality. I went to the Elkhane's village at Feroozabad, and had a long chat with him. He would join us any day, but of course wants a guarantee for the future. Bakir Khan lives at Rushire, a sort of hostage, but his son, who has complete control over the tribe, told me plainly that he would never again take up arms against us. I passed the day with him at Ahram. The Prince-Governor, who was at Mohumra (Mirza), having been bled very freely, has been re-appointed to his Government."

I cannot conclude, without alluding in strong terms, to the valuable assistance I have received from Major Taylor, whose services were placed at my disposal by the Hon. C. A. Murray, C.B.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding Expeditionary Force.

A.

RETURN of KILLED and WOUNDED belonging to the Persian Field Force during the action at Kooshab, on Februry 8th, 1857.

Rank.	Names.	Killed.	Wounded.	Nature of Wound.
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Divisional Staff.

Lieutenant... | Frankland | 1 | 0 | Gun shot wound in head.

3rd Troop, Horse Artillery.

Gunner ...	James Kelly ...	0	1	Gun shot wound in left leg; dangerous.
" ...	James Ryan ...	0	1	" " right leg; "
Farrier ...	George Eagan ...	0	1	" " left fore-arm; "
Horse-keepr.	Rewjee ...	0	1	" " right thigh; since dead.
"	Sullowa ...	0	1	" " right leg; amputated.
"	Kasseerow ...	0	1	Left leg very slightly grazed.

1st Company 1st Battalion Artillery.

Gunner ...	John Abbott ...	0	1	Right buttock grazed slightly.
Horse-keepr.	Suddo ...	1	0	Gun shot wound.

4th Company 1st Battalion Artillery.

Gunner ...	James Courtney.	0	1	Right buttock grazed slightly.
Trumpeter...	Joseph Manning.	0	1	Gun shot wound on face; dangerous.

3rd Light Cavalry.

Captain ...	J. Forbes ...	0	1	Ball through right thigh; severely.
Havildar ...	Runjeet Sing ...	0	1	" left lung; dangerous.
Trooper ...	Ram Sing ...	0	1	Sword cut on right foot; slightly.
" ...	Ragonath Sing...	0	1	Ball through left calf; severely.
" ...	Ramdeen ...	0	1	" anterior to humerus of left arm; severely.
" ...	Wazier Khan ...	0	1	" through fleshy part of right arm, and left thigh.
" ...	Shaik Yushun...	0	1	" right thigh; severely.
" ...	Rowjee Jadoo ...	0	1	" left thigh;
" ...	Bujjoo Pursad...	0	1	Contusion on left ankle; slightly.
" ...	Mahomud Hussun Khan.	0	1	Ball into arm, below elbow joint; dangerous.
" ...	Shaik Khooda Bux	0	1	" through abdomen; since dead.
" ...	Bindah Sing ...	1	0	" through chest.
" ...	Nundah Khan ...	0	1	" on the head; slight.
" ...	Seetul Sing ...	0	1	" wound in the hand; slight.
" ...	Gindeen ...	0	1	Sword cut in hand; slight.
" ...	Sen Surrum Sing	0	1	Ball struck left side of chest; slight.

Rank.	Names.	Killed.	Wounded.	Nature of Wound.
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Her Majesty's 64th Regiment.

Captain ...	R. Mockler ...	0	1	Contusion of calf of right leg from a round shot.
Lieutenant...	D. Greentree ...	0	1	Severely by a round shot, which caused loss of left foot.
Col. Sergt....	W. Brady ...	0	1	Slight contusion.
Private ...	T. Montgomery .	0	1	Slight abrasure in right axilla, from round shot.
" ...	Fredk. Reilly ...	0	1	Slightly; right side.
" ...	John Shaw ...	0	1	" chest.
" ...	Wm. McCarty...	0	1	Dangerously; fracture of right femur.
" ...	Charles Murchin	0	1	" of right femur, and wound of left knee.
" ...	Alex. Fergusson.	0	1	Mortally; thigh amputated, since dead.
" ...	Patrick Hagoty..	0	1	" compound fracture of both legs, since dead.
" ...	Thos. Simmons...	0	1	Dangerously; lacerated wound of both thighs.
" ...	Mal. Doncaster..	0	1	Slight contusion above right knee.
" ...	John Prescott ...	0	1	" wound in scalp.

2nd European Regiment, Light Infantry.

Ensign ...	Woodcock... ..	0	1	Gun shot left shin; slightly.
Private ...	Thomas Deveran	1	0	Gun shot.
" ...	Thomas Galahar	1	0	Ditto.
" ...	Morgan Shield...	0	1	Gun shot right side; dangs. since dead.
" ...	James Clarke ...	0	1	" right shin; severely.
" ...	Wm. Price ...	0	1	" left leg; slightly.
" ...	John Norwell ...	0	1	" right thigh; ditto.
" ...	James Thaque...	0	1	" right hand; ditto.
" ...	James McArdele	0	1	" right foot; dangerous, leg amputated.
" ...	John McKay ...	0	1	" left foot; severely.
" ...	John Rhodenhurst	0	1	" left leg; ditto.
" ...	James Doulin ...	0	1	" right thigh; slightly.

Poona Irregular Horse.

Duffadar ...	Meer NubbeeBux	0	1	Severe gun shot wound in the loins, right inguinal region.
Subadar ...	Badoola Khan ...	1	0	Gun shot.
Bargier ...	Golam Modheen Khan	1	0	Ditto.
" ...	Nooroolla Khan	1	0	Ditto.
" ...	ShaikJewan ...	0	1	Ditto, wound through thorax; since dead.
" ...	Pailwan Sing ...	0	1	Slight gun shot wound through right deltoid muscle.
" ...	Goolol Khan ...	0	1	Ditto of right arm.
Syce ...	Madoo ...	0	1	Round shot, requiring amputation of left leg.
Private ...	Jugganal Dachle	0	1	Severe gun shot wound through left fore-arm.
" ...	Liximon Doobay	0	1	Gun shot wound above left knee.
" ...	Abou Sawunt ...	0	1	Severe contusion of the calf of right leg by spent ball.

Rank.	Names.	Killed.	Wounded.	Nature of Wound.
<i>26th Regiment Native Infantry.</i>				
Assist-surg..	J. M. Barnett ...	0	1	Slightly; spent musket ball, right arm.
Havildar ...	Nainan Nais ...	0	1	Slight contusion of head.
Private ...	Doorjim ...	0	1	Ditto, ditto.
" ...	Bunds Koray ...	0	1	Severe wound of head from round shot.
" ...	Bodoo Kulwar...	0	1	Ditto gun shot wound of right shoulder and chest.

2nd Belooch Battalion.

Private ... | Shaik Mahomed. | 1 | 0 | Round shot through left breast.

Ordnance Department.

Store Lascar	BurwajeeCoobajee	0	1	Dangerously; gun shot wound, left arm.
Tent ditto	Lusman Balloo...	0	1	Seriously; sword wound in face.
Store ditto	Baboo Nannoo...	1	0	Gun shot wound in abdomen.

Europeans killed ... 3 Europeans wounded ... 31

Natives, „ ... 7 Natives „ ... 31

Total ... 10 62

Died of wounds since the action, 3 Europeans and 3 Natives.

M. STOVELL, *Superintending Surgeon,*
1st Division, P. E. F. Force.

B.

RETURN of ORDNANCE captured on the morning of the 8th instant.

Bivouac Kooshab, 8th February 1857.

No.	Description.	Marks.	Vent.	Calibre or Weight of Ball.	Length.	Bore.	Remarks.
1	Brass Gun	Persian Inscription.	Good.	9-pounder	6 Feet.	4 2	Of Persian manufacture.
2	Ditto ...		Spiked	9-pounder	Ditto .	4 2	

These guns are in good travelling order, mounted on travelling field carriages, each limber fitted with a limber box, to contain about thirty rounds of ammunition. One gun was taken with three horses, harness, &c., complete.

The carriages are of block trail construction, the checks of one require to be replaced.

Eighteen rounds of ammunition and some food were in the limber boxes.

Besides the above were 262 rounds of gun ammunition, which I destroyed before leaving the bivouac on Sunday evening. The mules, eight in number, which carried it, I have brought into camp.

I have 350 stand of arms, and I think treble that number must have been taken by camp followers and others.

One gun was spiked by our horse artillery, as they had to leave it when following on in pursuit. I have since removed the spike.

B. K. FINNIMORE, *Captain,*
Field Commissary of Ordnance, P. E. F.

C.

RETURN of ORDNANCE STORES found in the *Enemy's Entrenched Position*
at *Burazpoon, on the 5th instant.*

Bivouac Kooshab, 8th February, 1857.

No.	Description.	How disposed of.
*3,500	Gun cartridges attached to 12, 6, 3, and 1½ pr. shot.	Cartridges broken and exploded in the mine on the 7th inst., shot scattered.
*600,000	Musketry Balled Cartridges	15,000 broken up, and balls brought on by Ordnance Department; remainder destroyed by mines on the 7th instant.
10	Casks of Flints (English)...	Given to the troops.
5,000	Fuzes	Exploded by the mines on 7th inst.
20	Quick match, lbs.	Ditto ditto
400	Slow match, yards... ..	Ditto ditto
1,000	Port Fires	Ditto ditto
4,000	Tubes for priming... ..	Ditto ditto
3	Trumpets	Given to the troops.
1	Drum	Ditto.
20	Tents	Given to the troops; part were brought away, the remainder destroyed.
12	Wheels	Given to the troops for fire-wood.
A large quantity in bags, exact amount not known.	Sulphur	Destroyed by the mines on 7th inst.
	Indigo	Ditto ditto.
	Saltpetre	Ditto ditto.
	Tar	Ditto ditto.
	Charcoal	Given to the troops for cooking.
	Rope	Destroyed by the mines on 7th inst.
	Drag ropes... ..	Ditto ditto.
	Wood	Given to the troops for cooking.
	Large shot	Scattered.
	Loose shell	Burst and destroyed.
74	Pigs of lead... ..	Brought into camp by Ordnance Department.
7	Axle-trees	Ditto ditto.
7	Brass nave boxes	Ditto ditto.
10,000	Gunpowder lbs.	Exploded in the mines on 7th inst.
A large quantity }	Iron... ..	Distributed among batteries and troops
	Red orpiment	Destroyed by the mines on 7th inst.

B. K. FINNIMORE, *Field Commissary of Ordnance.*

* Cartridges and powder exploded in the mines amount together to about 40,000 lbs.

D.

TO THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

*Deputy Commissary General's Office, entrenched camp, Bushire,
12th February, 1857.*

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding, that, in obedience to the instructions received, I proceeded to the town of Borazjoon on the morning of the 7th instant, and removed from the Persian magazine the undermentioned commissariat stores. I had not the means of weighing the articles, but have no doubt that the quantities set down are substantially correct:—

Since ascertained by actual weighing.			
Wheat, flour...	... 19,000 lbs.	Flour 17,042 lbs.
Rice 2,000 „	Barley 3,788 „
Barley 2,000 „	Wheat...	... 2,504 „
Wheat 1,500 „	Rice 2,907 „

The whole of the above have been brought on or issued on the march, with the exception of some rice, which was lost by the upsetting of the cart in which it was being conveyed.

I have, &c.,

G. POPE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,
Deputy Commissary-General.*

*His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset,
K.C.B., and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.*

Head-Quarters, Bombny,

SIR,

13th April, 1857.

I have had the honour to receive your despatches, dated the 27th ult.

The announcement therein contained of the reduction of the strong position occupied by the enemy in defence of the passage of the "Shat-ool-Arab," and the entrance into the Karoon river leading to Mohumra, I have perused with the greatest pleasure, and beg to assure you of the high sense I entertain of the masterly manner in which these operations have been conducted; and to congratulate you on the capture of works so important to the enemy.

The ability displayed in the execution of this very bold and difficult operation has caused its success with

a loss of life quite disproportionate to the magnitude of the means of resistance at the disposal of the commander of the Persian Forces.

I desire to express to you my perfect satisfaction at the very complete and skilful manner in which the expedition was arranged and conducted, and at the cordial co-operation between the naval and military services; and I beg that you will offer to Commodore Young, and the officers and seamen under his orders, the expression of my admiration at the gallant and excellent service performed by the squadron under his command.

The precipitate flight of the enemy and the abandonment of their entrenched position and camp, leaving guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and public and private property, without an effort at resistance, after the troops were landed, speaks strongly against the probability of any future opposition in that quarter; and I am in great hopes that the report of your signal success at Mohumrah will hasten the Shah of Persia to ratify the "Treaty of Peace" which was signed by his ambassador at Paris on the 3rd ultimo.

You will be pleased to make known to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., to Brigadier-General Lugard, C.B., to the officers of your personal and head-quarter staff, to the brigadiers and officers commanding regiments and detachments, and to the officers and soldiers under their command, my warm acknowledgments for their conduct on this occasion.

I shall be happy to bring to the notice of Government the eminent services of Brigadiers-General Havelock, C.B., and Lugard, C.B., together with the names of such of the officers of your staff, personal and departmental, whom you may desire to particularize.

H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-Gen.*,
Commander-in-Chief.

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 23rd April, 1857.

It is with great satisfaction that the Governor-General in Council directs the publication of the accompanying despatches received from the seat of war in Persia. They describe fully the operations of the British sea and land forces in the attack and capture of Mohumra on the 26th of March, the flight of the Persian army, thirteen thousand strong, and the complete success of the British arms at every point.

The scheme of the attack was chosen by Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram with excellent judgment; it was carried through with steady precision; and it has led to the accomplishment of the object in view at a small cost of life. The Governor-General in Council desires to offer to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram his best congratulations and thanks for this happy result.

The engagement was, on the side of the British arms, a naval one—no land force, with the exception of one mortar battery, having taken an active share in it. The manner in which the task was performed is most honourable to the Indian Navy.

That the officers, seamen, artillery-men, marines, and others of the squadron did their duty with intrepidity and ardour, is the smallest part of the praise which is owing to them. The plan of the naval attack, which was to be carried out in shoal and narrow waters, and in a rapid current, by steamers of heavy draught, some of them encumbered with vessels in tow, and the thoroughly successful execution of every part of it, without miscarriage or confusion of any kind, in the face of strong defensive works at point-blank range, have given

proof of a cool judgment, a well-ordered discipline, and a skilful management, of which Commodore Young, and the officers and men under his command, may well be proud.

The cordial thanks of the Government of India are eminently due to Commodore Young and to those who shared that day's work with him; and the Governor-General in Council will have pleasure in expressing to the Honourable Court of Directors his hearty approbation of the conduct of all concerned. It will be his agreeable duty to bring to the special notice of her Majesty's Government and of the Honourable Court of Directors, the meritorious services of those whom Commodore Young has named in his despatches of 27th of March.

The disembarkation of the troops above the forts took place under the able direction of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., rapidly and in good order; but before the landing was effected, success was already complete. The whole Persian army was in full retreat, leaving in our hands seventeen pieces of ordnance, their tents, baggage, stores of all kinds, and large magazines of ammunition and provisions. An accurate return of casualties has not yet been received. These were confined to the squadron, and it is believed that the number does not exceed six killed and thirty wounded. It is estimated that the enemy lost two hundred killed.

For the judicious arrangements by which the troops were held in readiness, and their landing facilitated, the thanks of the Government of India are due to the officers of the general staff, and to the other staff and regimental officers indicated in Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram's despatch. The Governor-General in Council will not fail to call the attention of her Majesty's Government and of the Honourable Court of Directors

to the zeal and exertions of these officers, as also to the assistance rendered to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram by the officers and others serving on his staff.

The Governor-General in Council cannot close this notice of the operations at Mohumra without tendering his thanks to the commanders and crews of the transports engaged on this occasion. The alacrity with which a dangerous service, far beyond their strict obligations, was undertaken, and the courage and skill with which it was performed, entitle the officers and men of those vessels to the best acknowledgments of the Government of India.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council,

G. F. EDMONSTONE,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding Expeditionary Force, to his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B. and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Camp near Mohumra, 27th March, 1857.

I have the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, the successful results of the operations against Mohumra. The Persian army evacuated their entrenched position and camp yesterday about mid-day, leaving behind all their tents standing, with nearly the whole of their property—public and private—all their ammunition and seventeen guns. As far as I am able to learn, only five* guns and a portion of the personal effects of the Shahzada have been carried away.

It was my intention to have proceeded against this place immediately upon my return from the Borazjoon expedition last month; but, owing to the non-arrival of the requisite reinforcements, caused by the tempestuous weather in the Gulf, together with unforeseen causes of delay, I was not able to leave Bushire until the 18th instant.

* The remainder supposed to have been thrown into the river.

In the meantime, however, I had despatched the transports into the Shat-ool-Arab from Bushire, as the troops were embarked, so that upon my arrival in the steamer *Feroze*, no further delay occurred beyond what was necessarily caused by the tides, and by towing so many large vessels up the river.

For some months past, the Persians had been strengthening their position at Mohumra; batteries had been erected of great strength of solid earth, twenty feet thick and eighteen feet high, with casemated embrasures, on the northern and southern points of the banks of the Karoon and Shat-ool-Arab, where the two rivers join. These, with other earth-works armed with heavy ordnance, commanded the entire passage of the latter river, and were so skilfully and judiciously placed, and so scientifically formed, as to sweep the whole stream to the extent of the range of the guns up and down the river, and cross to the opposite shore. Indeed, everything that science could suggest, and labour accomplish in the time, appear to have been done by the enemy to effectually prevent any vessel passing up the river above their position. The banks for many miles were covered by dense date-groves, affording the most perfect cover for rifle men; and the opposite shore being neutral territory (Turkish) was not available for the erection of counter-batteries.

The accompanying rough sketch will, I fear, give your Excellency but a faint idea of the great strength of the Persian position, and the difficulty of successfully attacking them in it without very considerable loss. I could have landed my troops on the Island of Abadan, which was strongly occupied by the Persians; and there is no doubt that, after defeating them, the southern battery eventually would have fallen to us; but the several batteries on the northern bank of the Karoon commanded the entire southern bank, as well as the stream of the Shat-ool-Arab, and it would have been a serious and an extremely difficult operation to have crossed the rapid current of the Karoon in the face of the enemy, had the means existed of doing so; but until our small steamers and boats could round the southern point and join us, we should have been helpless.

After mature deliberation, I resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, as soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force two miles above the northern point, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp.

I have now the very great satisfaction of announcing to your Excellency the complete success of the first two operations; the third, to the regret of the army, being frustrated by the precipitate flight of the enemy.

The Persian army, ascertained from credible report, to amount to 13,000* men of all arms, with thirty guns, was commanded by the Shahzada, Prince Khanler Meerza, in person. The British force

* Cavalry Irregulars, 1,500; 9 regiments Regulars, 700 each, 6,300; Arabs and Bukhtyarees and Beloochees, 4,600; Gunners, 600; total, 13,000.

under my command composed as follows,* was the utmost I deemed it prudent to withdraw from Bushire; but with the aid of four armed steamers and two sloops of war to effect my landing, I felt confident of success, although I anticipated some loss, from what I learnt of the determination expressed by the enemy to oppose our further advance to the utmost of their power, and of their extreme confidence of succeeding, as evinced by the fact of their having sent away their baggage cattle.

On the 24th instant, the steamers, with transport ships in tow, moved up the river to within three miles of the southern battery, opposite the Arab village of Hurteh; but as some of the large ships shoaled on the way, and did not reach the rendezvous until after dark, I was obliged to defer the attack for another day. During the night a reconnaissance was made in a boat to ascertain the nature of the soil of an island west of, and immediately opposite, the northern battery, where I wished to erect a mortar battery; but as it was found to be deep mud, I determined to place the mortars upon a raft. This was constructed the following day, under the superintendence of Captain Rennie, I. N., and being armed with two 8-inch and two 5½-inch mortars, with a party of artillery under Captain Worgan, was towed by the steamer *Comet*, and moored in position close to the island during the night unobserved by the enemy, who, from our preparations at the rendezvous, and their confidence as to the impossibility of any vessel being able to pass above their batteries, apparently expected that we should land on the southern island (Abadan). The horses and guns of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry and the infantry, were transhipped into boats and small steamers during the day, in readiness for landing the following morning.

At break of day on the 26th, the mortars opened their fire upon both the northern and southern batteries. The range of the 5½-inch proved too short; but the 8-inch shells were very efficient; bursting immediately over and inside the enemy's work; whilst, from the position of the raft, but few of the Persian guns could be brought to bear upon the mortars.

At 7 o'clock the several vessels of war moved up into the position allotted them by Commodore Young, and by 9 o'clock the fire of the heavy batteries was so reduced, that the small steamers, with boats in tow, and one large steamer, the *Pottinger*, towing the transport, *Golden Era*, were able to pass up and land the troops above the northern battery, without a single casualty amongst the troops, although they had to run the gauntlet of both gun and musket fire. Two or three native followers only were killed, in consequence of their unnecessarily exposing themselves.

By half-past one o'clock the troops were landed and formed, and advanced without delay through the date-groves and across the plain upon the entrenched camp of the enemy, who, without waiting

* Cavalry: H.M.'s 14th Dragoons, 89; Scinde Horse, 303; total, 392. Infantry: H.M.'s 64th Foot, 704; 78th Highlanders, 830; 23rd Regiment N I., 749; 26th do., 716; Light Battalion, 920; total, 3,919. Bombay Sappers and Miners (natives), 109; Madras ditto, 124. Artillery: 3rd troop Horse Artillery, 6 guns and 166 men; No. 2 Light Field Battery, 6 guns and 176 men. Grand total, of all arms, 4,887 men and 12 guns.

for our approach, fled precipitately, after exploding their largest magazine, leaving, as I have before stated, their tents and baggage, public and private stores, with several magazines of ammunition and sixteen guns, behind. The want of cavalry prevented my pursuing them as I could have wished; but I despatched a party of Scinde Irregular Horse, under Captain Malcolm Green, to follow them up for some distance. This officer reported that he came upon their rear-guard retiring in good order; but that the road in many places was strewn with property and equipments. The loss of the Persians has been estimated at 200 killed, among whom was an officer of rank and estimation, Brigadier Agha Jan Khan, who fell in the northern battery.

I beg to annex a report received from Commodore Young, with copy of a letter I had previously caused to be addressed to that officer, expressing my entire satisfaction with the naval operations. Indeed, it was impossible for my instructions to have been more ably, or more successfully, carried out; and the Commodore, and every officer and man under his command, have nobly earned my warmest thanks. From Commodore Young, ably seconded by Captain Rennie and the other officers of the fleet, and masters of transports, I have throughout received every possible assistance.

With exception of the artillery, with the mortar battery under Captain Worgan, no portion of the military force was actively engaged with the enemy, beyond some European riflemen sent on board the war vessels; but I am not the less indebted to all for their exertions and zeal, and especially for the great order and despatch with which the landing of the troops was effected under Brigadier-General Have-lock, C.B. The highest spirit prevailed; and had the large Persian army only waited our approach out of the range of the ships' guns, I feel confident that it would have received a lasting lesson.

From recent information I learn that the Persian force, in a very disorganized state, is still in full retreat, and I propose to despatch immediately, up the Karoon, to Ahwaz, three small armed steamers, with 100 European infantry in each, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance, and, if practicable, effecting the destruction of the magazines at that place.

I take this opportunity of recommending to your Excellency's notice Colonel Lugard, C.B., the chief and the several officers of my general and personal staff, the Brigadier-General, the brigadiers and their respective staff, as also the officers commanding the several regiments, batteries, and detachments of cavalry and heads of departments composing this force, upon whom much responsibility has devolved, and whose zeal and exertions throughout this expedition have been most praiseworthy.

To Captain Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Consul-General at Bagdad, I am much indebted for his very valuable assistance, also to Major Taylor, as well as to Lords Dunkellin, Seymour, and Schomberg Kerr, who volunteered their services on my staff.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Expeditionary Force.*

RETURN showing the number and description of Ordnance Stores abandoned by the Enemy at Mohumra on the 26th instant.

Camp before Mohumra, 28th March, 1857.

	Number.	Description.	Remarks.
16 guns and 1 mortar.	1	12-pr. brass gun, Russian	Requires bouching.
	1	12-pr. ditto Persian	In good order.
	1	12-pr. ditto "	} Spiked.
	1	9-pr. ditto "	
	1	9-pr. ditto "	} In good order.
	1	9-pr. ditto "	
	2	Brass guns, 6-pr. ...	Taken by the navy from the Southern Fort.
	2	Ditto ...	Calibre not known, being buried in the mud, but apparently 18-pounders.
	1	8-inch brass mortar ...	Unserviceable, mounted on a platform cart.
	2	9-pr. iron guns ...	} These are old ship carronades and are mounted on ship truck carriages, apparently made here. They are unserviceable. 30 of these were found in the Upper or Khanler Meerza's camp; 80 in the Lower or Ebraheem Meerza's camp; 22 in the camp of the Northern Battery. They have all been distributed among the troops.
	4	6-pr. ditto ...	
	132	Tents of different sizes...	
	16	Gun wheels (spare) ...	
	13	Gun axle trees, some old iron work for guns, some incomplete sets of harness ...	} Found in the enemy's magazines.
	100	Cartridges attached, and shot and shell ...	
	300	Boxes containing 36,000 of fixed or gun ammunition, 3,600 loose shot or shell, and 14,400 lbs. of powder ...	
	*4,000	Loose shot and shell ...	
	144,000	Powder, lbs. ...	These are being collected and brought in.
	14,400	Ditto ...	Destroyed by the explosion.
			Captured.

* During the morning of the 26th instant, there were apparently one very large and six smaller explosions near the northern forts; in the afternoon, one very large and one small explosion in Khanler Meerza's camp. Near this latter large one I have found the remains of about 500 ammunition boxes; it may therefore be assumed that 6,000 cartridges, attached to shot and shell, were then destroyed. Estimating the large one, in the morning, at the same, and each of the (8) eight smaller at one half, we have in the two large magazines ... 6,000 by 2 = 12,000 by 4 lbs. powder = 48,000 lbs. powder. In 8 small magazines 3,000 by 8 = 24,000 by 4 = ... 96,000 ditto.

Total destroyed	...	144,000	ditto.
We have captured	...	14,400	ditto.

These make the total loss to the enemy	...	158,400	ditto.
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J. N. FINNIMORE, Captain, Field Commissary of Ordnance.

To Colonel E. Lugard, C.B., Chief of the Staff.

Camp Mohumra, 28th March, 1857.

I have the honour to report for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding, that large quantities of flour, grain, dates, chopped straw, &c., were found in the camps abandoned by the enemy on the 26th instant, which were distributed to the troops and followers on the spot. No account of these articles could be taken, as none of the commissariat establishment had then been landed, but they have been nevertheless made available for the public service, by their issue diminishing the demand on the commissariat stock.

Very extensive magazines of flour, wheat, and barley, belonging to the enemy, have been found in the town of Mohumra, over which guards have been placed in the meantime, and an accurate report of the contents shall be furnished as soon as it is found possible to weigh the same.

I have, &c.,

G. POPE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Deputy Commissary-General.

*Colonel E. Lugard, C.B., Chief of the Staff, to Com-
modore J. W. Young, I.N., commanding Gulf
Squadron.*

Camp near Mohumra, 27th March, 1857.

I am instructed by Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding the Expeditionary Force, to express to you in warm terms his appreciation of the great services rendered by the Indian Navy yesterday in reducing the strong batteries which the enemy had erected on the left bank of the Euphrates to defend their position at Mohumra—a service so ably planned and conducted by yourself, and so gallantly and effectually performed by the armed steamers and sloops of war, *Feroze, Assaye, Semiramis, Ajdaha, Victoria, Clive, and Falkland*, with their brave crews, commanded by Captains Rennie, Selby, Grieve, Manners, Adams, and Lieutenants Tronson and Worsley, that nothing was left for the army to do, after being conducted by the navy past the silenced batteries, than to land and take possession of the enemy's entrenched camp, which they had abandoned so precipitately as to leave behind all their tents and property, public and private, with a vast amount of ordnance stores and sixteen guns—a small portion only of the personal effects of the Shahzada and five guns having been carried away.

The Lieutenant-General tenders to you, your officers and crews, his best thanks for your services, and his hearty congratulations upon the successful issue of the undertaking. He further begs you will thank Lieutenant Chitty and Mr. Holland for the important services they rendered in the *Berenice* and *Comet*, and also the masters commanding the several steamers and transport ships for their zealous assistance throughout the expedition.

I have, &c.,

EDWARD LUGARD, *Colonel, Chief of the Staff.*

Acting Commodore J. W. Young, I.N., commanding the Persian Gulf Squadron, to Lieut.-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

Dated H. C. S. F. Feroze, off Mohumra, 25th March, 1857.

In acquainting you with my intention of attacking the forts defending Mohumra with the squadron under my command at early dawn to-morrow morning, I beg to inform you that when the forts appear to me to be sufficiently silenced for the troops to be brought up in the vessels told off for this purpose, from the present rendezvous to the place of debarkation between the first and second creek south of Jaber's Fort, the rendezvous flag will be hoisted by the vessel bearing my pendant, and repeated by the other vessels at the time in company with me.

I have, &c.,

J. W. YOUNG, *Acting Commodore, I. N.,
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron.*

Acting Commodore J. W. Young, I.N., Commanding the Persian Gulf Squadron, to Lieut.-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

Dated H. C. S. Feroze, off Mohumra, 27th March, 1857.

In continuation of my letter of the 25th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, having observed the mortars placed on the raft constructed under the superintendence of Commander Rennie of the *Feroze*, and anchored on the evening of the 25th instant in the channel to the westward of the Dubbee Island, had opened fire, the Indian Naval squadron under my command got under weigh, and ran up river until opposite the forts defending the channel leading to Mohumra, in the following order:—the *Semiramis*, with *Olive* in tow, followed by the *Ajdaha*, proceeded up western channel to support the Mortar Battery; the *Feroze*, *Assaye*, and *Victoria*, the latter, with *Falkland* in tow, remaining in reserve until the fire of the forts was deranged.

This was soon accomplished, on which the vessels in reserve entered the Eastern channel, the *Feroze* opening fire on the South Fort at less than point blank range, as she passed to take up her position against the North Fort, and sufficiently in advance to receive support from the *Assaye* immediately in stern of her. The division of the ships in the western channel was then recalled and joined in close attack; the *Semiramis* and *Victoria*, the latter with *Falkland* in tow, engaging the South Fort as well as the inland one on the north side. Besides the fire maintained on the forts, frequent discharges of shell and grape were made in the direction where it was supposed the enemy's entrenched camp was situated.

So effective was the fire from the ships, that in less than three-quarters of an hour from its commencement, the batteries were only

able to reply from three or four guns. At this period (7.45 A.M.) of the engagement, the *Feroze* flying, my pendant hoisted the rendezvous flag at the mast-head, which was repeated by the other vessels engaged, the pre-concerted signal for the troop ships to advance.

This movement on the part of the vessels in question not being made with such celerity as could be desired, Commander Rennie, of the *Feroze*, volunteered to proceed through the fire to accelerate that advance, which was accomplished in admirable order, although at the time the fire from the batteries was far from being silenced.

From between 9 and 10 o'clock five heavy explosions in different parts of the fortifications indicated the overwhelming nature of the attack, and led me to suppose that the resistance hitherto afforded could not much longer continue. I was, therefore, anxious to have the troops landed as expeditiously as a due regard to their security would allow, so as a combined and simultaneous movement by the naval and military forces might be made with the certainty of a successful issue, and with this view, passed up river, until close to Jaber's Fort, where the disembarkation was effected easily and without interruption.

After the batteries had ceased firing artillery, a fire of musketry was opened from them, as well as from breast-works in their vicinity, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storming parties were landed from the *Semiramis*, *Clive*, *Victoria*, and *Falkland*, who drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns.

Considering the strength of the fortifications both as regards position and construction, with a numerous garrison and the large number of guns which could be brought to bear on the ships, in consequence of their closeness to the enemy's defences, which were likewise strengthened by breast-works occupied by large bodies of small arm men, whose fire at times was annoying, I am thankful to say the casualties sustained by the squadron during the engagement amounted only to five killed and eighteen wounded.

Before concluding, I feel it to be the most pleasant part of my duty to bring to your notice the great gallantry and coolness displayed by every officer and seaman under my command, during the operations so successfully carried out.

The important services rendered by Commander Rennie, of the *Feroze*, are a further and honourable addition to an already well-established reputation.

Commander Selby, to whose local knowledge I am much indebted, elicited my warmest admiration by the dashing manner in which he carried the *Semiramis* into the channel leading to Mohumra, between the forts on either banks.

To the excellent way in which Commander Grieve, of the *Clive*, Acting Commander Manners, of the *Victoria*, and Lieutenants Commanding Tronson, of the *Falkland*, and Worsley of the *Ajdaha*, handled their respective ships, and to the closeness and precision of their fire, much of the success of the day is to be attributed. Special commendation is due to Commander Adams, of the *Assaye*, for the gallant and most efficient manner in which he seconded my attack on

the Northern Forts. The conduct of Lieutenant Chitty, of the *Berenice*, also calls for my approval for conducting his vessel under shelter of the ships of war, passed the batteries with about fourteen hundred troops and followers on board.

Commander Nisbett, agent for transports, by the assiduity with which he had my arrangements carried into effect, was of material assistance.

To Acting Masters Commanding McLaurin, of the *Napier*, Holland, of the *Comet*, Fletcher, of the *Planet*, Neale, of the *Assyria*, Davies, of the *Ethersey Flat*, and Mr. Dark, of the *Hugh Lindsay*, my warmest acknowledgments are due for the zeal and intelligence with which they acted on this occasion, and by all of whom my instructions were ably carried out.

The peculiar nature of the services required to be performed rendered unavoidable the exposure of the steam transports to the effects of musketry fire. The able manner, however, in which the officers in command of these vessels brought them through the ordeal with all but immunity, was highly creditable and praiseworthy.

To the commanders of the transports generally too much praise cannot be accorded for the willing assistance they rendered throughout the day, both personally, and with earnestness of the means at their disposal, for the furtherance of the public service.

Finally, allow me personally to acknowledge the many obligations I owe you for the great assistance you afforded me in maturing and facilitating measures that appeared likely to conduce to the success of the enterprise. My thanks are also due to your staff for the completeness with which every arrangement was made for the immediate landing of the troops in a state fit for active service.

I feel confident that, although the victory is a naval one, it would not have been so complete but for the sight of the imposing force with which the enemy felt he must soon come in hopeless contact, unless he made an immediate retreat.

I have, &c.,

J. W. YOUNG, *Acting Commodore,*
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron.

P.S.—The many matters of detail to be attended to at a period of such hurry, has placed it out of my power to obtain an authenticated list of the casualties sustained during the action. You will, however, observe that, according to the numbers already given, they have been comparatively few. This is in a great measure to be attributed to the very efficient protection afforded the crews by a breast-work made of trusses of pressed hay, which were placed on the bulwarks round the several vessels; neither have I an account of the damages inflicted on the ships by the enemy's fire. They have, however, been considerably cut up in the rigging, and injured in the hull, although rarely, if at all, under the water line.

I had almost forgotten to mention the services of Mr. Sweny, my flag lieutenant, who, besides buoying off the channel across the bar of the river, was invaluable to me in communicating orders to the ships of war and transports. His coolness during the action, when performing his office of flag lieutenant, was conspicuous.

Mr. Rogers, my Secretary, likewise deserves being brought to notice for his services on the occasion, which were such as to meet with my warm approval.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.H.,
Governor and President in Council, Office of the
Commander-in-Chief, I.N.*

Bombay, 10th April, 1857.

The Hon. Company's steam-ship *Berenice* arrived in this harbour to-day, bringing important despatches, which I have the honour herewith to forward to your Lordship in Council, from Captain Young, the senior Indian naval officer in the Persian Gulf, reporting the fall of Mohumra, after a brilliant action and bombardment of some hours by the squadron,* and giving a detailed account of the naval operations and the successful result, reflecting the highest credit upon Captain Young and all the officers and men under his command, whose services and assistance he so warmly acknowledges and appreciates individually and collectively. I take this opportunity of expressing to your Lordship in Council my highest approbation of all the proceedings, arranged and carried out by Captain Young under very trying and peculiar circumstances, exhibiting the greatest skill and energy, as well as good seamanship; and I feel sure that I have only the pleasing and gratifying task of bringing this to the knowledge of your Lordship in Council, to ensure for Captain Young and all under his command the due reward of their gallantry and exertions. It also affords me the highest satisfaction to record my meed of praise to all who have so nobly done their duty to their country and upheld the character of the Indian Navy.

I have, &c.,

H. J. LEEKE, *Commander-in-Chief of I. N.*

N.B.—I have not received any official return of the names of the killed and wounded, but I will forward it to your Lordship in Council the moment it arrives. I have much pleasure in forwarding a letter to the address of Commodore J. W. Young, from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., communicating his thanks for the great assistance rendered by the Indian Navy during the late operations.

*Acting Commodore J. W. Young, I.N., Commanding
Persian Gulf Squadron, to Rear Admiral Sir
Henry Leeke, K.H., R.N., Commander-in-Chief
of the Indian Navy.*

Dated H. C. F. S. Feroze, off Mohumra, 27th March, 1857.

With reference to the letter which I did myself the honour to address to you on the 18th instant, intimating that, consequent on the

* Steamers *Feroze*, *Semiramis*, *Assaye*, *Ajdaha*, *Victoria*; sloops *Clive*, *Falkland*, *Berenice*.

Lieutenant-General, commanding the Persian Expeditionary Force, having embarked on board of the *Feroze*, it was my intention to leave Bushire on the morning of the 19th, for the purpose of proceeding to the attack of Mohumra. It has now become my agreeable duty to inform you that, after a severe bombardment from the squadron, the forts defending the town were captured, and their artillery secured by the force at my disposal yesterday.

In continuation of my letter already referred to, I will proceed to narrate the events as they occurred, from the 18th instant up to the date on which the place fell.

Having left Bushire, as intimated, in the *Semiramis*, with the Persian Gulf squadron under my command, Mohumra, the rendezvous appointed, was reached on the evening of the 21st of March. The 22nd and 23rd were occupied, before making a further advance, in the arrangement of details of attack. On the morning of the 24th, the fleet of ships of war and transports again got under weigh, and ran up the river as far as the village of Hurtch, about four miles below Mohumra, where it was again brought to anchor, to allow the engineer officers of the force to erect a mortar battery for opening the attack on the morning of the 25th, if a suitable site could be found on the Dubbee Island. A survey of the whole island having been made during the night of the 24th and 25th, under the guidance of Commander Selby and Mr. Holland, both of the *Comet*, and each possessed of much local experience, the idea of opening the bombardment from a land mortar battery had to be given up in consequence of the extremely marshy nature of the land and its slight elevation above the surface of the river. Commander Rennie, however, with his usual fertility of resource under such circumstances, employed himself next day in superintending the construction of a mortar raft, to be moored in the channel to the westward of the Dubbees, and succeeded so well in his endeavours, that it was completed and placed in position late on the night of the 25th, without attracting the enemy's attention.

By arrangement, the mortars were to open on the forts defending the channel of approach to the town at dawn, and so soon as this took place, the squadron was to move upwards in support, the ships taking up their positions in the following order:—the *Semiramis*, with the *Clive* in tow, followed by the *Ajdaha*, entered the western channel in support of the mortar battery; the *Feroze*, *Assaye*, and *Victoria*, the latter with the *Falkland* in tow, remaining in reserve until the fire of the forts was deranged. This was soon accomplished, on which the vessels in reserve entered the eastern channel, the *Feroze* opening her fire on the Southern Fort at less than point blank range, as she passed to take up her position against the North Fort, and sufficiently in advance to receive support from the *Assaye*, immediately astern of her. The division of ships in the western channel was then recalled and joined in close attack—the *Semiramis* and *Victoria*, the latter with the *Falkland* in tow engaging the South Fort, as well as the inland one on the north side. Besides the fire maintained on the forts, frequent discharges of shell and grape were made in the direction where it was supposed the enemy's entrenched camp was situated.

So effective was the fire from the ships, that in less than three-quarters of an hour from its commencement the batteries were only able to reply from three or four guns.

At this period (7.45 A.M.) of the engagement, the *Feroze*, flying my pendant, hoisted the rendezvous flag at her mast-head, which was repeated by the other vessels engaged, being the pre-concerted signal for the troop ships to advance. This movement on the part of the vessels in question not being made with such celerity as could be desired, Commander Rennie, of the *Feroze*, volunteered to proceed through the fire to accelerate their advance, which was accomplished in admirable order, although at the time the fire from the batteries was far from being silenced.

From between 9 and 10 o'clock five heavy explosions in different parts of the fortifications indicated the overwhelming nature of the attack, and led me to suppose that the resistance hitherto offered could not continue much longer. I was, therefore, anxious to have the troops landed as expeditiously as a due regard to their security would allow, so as a combined and simultaneous movement by the naval and military forces might be made with the certainty of a successful issue, and with this view passed up river until close to Jaber's Fort, where the debarkation was effected easily and without interruption.

After the batteries had ceased firing artillery, a fire from musketry was opened from them, as well as from breast-works in their vicinity, and maintained with great spirit for some time, when storming parties were landed from the *Semiramis*, *Clive*, *Victoria*, and *Falkland*, who drove before them the last of the enemy and took possession of their works and guns.

Considering the strength of the fortifications, both as regards position and construction, with the numerous garrison and large number of guns which could be brought to bear on the ships, in consequence of the closeness to the enemy's defences, which were likewise strengthened by breastworks, occupied by large bodies of small arm men, whose fire at times was annoying, I am thankful to say the casualties sustained by the squadron during the engagement, so far as I have yet ascertained, amount only to five killed and eighteen wounded.

According to these numbers, they have comparatively few. This is in a great measure to be attributed to the very efficient protection afforded the crews by a breast-work of trusses of pressed hay, which were placed round the several vessels. Hitherto the many matters of detail to be attended to at a time of great hurry has placed it out of my power to obtain authenticated lists of our actual loss; neither have I an account of the damages inflicted on the shipping by the enemy's fire. They have, however, been considerably cut up in their rigging and injured in the hull, although rarely, if at all, under the water line.

Before concluding, I feel it to be the most pleasant part of my duty to bring to your notice the great gallantry and coolness displayed by every officer and seaman under my command during the whole of the operations so successfully carried out. The important services rendered by Commander Rennie, of the *Feroze*, are a further and honourable addition

to an already well-established reputation. Commander Selby, to whose local knowledge I am much indebted, elicited my warmest admiration by the dashing manner in which he carried the *Semiramis* into the channel leading to Mohumra between the forts on either bank. By the excellent way in which Commander Grieve of the *Clive*, Acting Commander Manners of the *Victoria*, and Lieutenants commanding Tronson of the *Falkland*, and Worsley of the *Ajdaha*, handled their respective ships, and to the coolness and precision of their fire much of the success of the day is to be attributed.

Special commendation is due to Commander Adams, of the *Assaye*, for the gallant and most efficient manner in which he seconded my attack on the northern ports. The conduct of Lieutenant Chitty, commanding the *Berenice*, also calls for my approval for conducting his vessel, under shelter of the ships of war, past the batteries with about 1,400 troops and followers on board.

Commander Nisbett, agent for transports, by the assiduity with which he had my arrangements carried into effect, was of material assistance. Lieutenant Sweny, my flag lieutenant, besides buoying of the channel across the bar of the river, was invaluable in communicating my orders to the different ships of war and transports—a duty which in action required more than usual exposure, and rendered his coolness conspicuous. Mr. Rogers, clerk in charge of the *Comet*, who has been doing duty as my secretary, deserves being brought to notice, for his services on this occasion were such as to meet with my warm approval.

To Acting Master Commanding McLaurin of the *Napier*, Holland of the *Comet*, Fletcher of the *Planet*, Neale of the *Assyria*, Davis of the *Ethersey* flat, and Mr. Dark of the *Hugh Lindsay*, my warmest acknowledgments are due for the zeal and intelligence with which they acted on this occasion, and by all of whom my instructions were ably carried out. The peculiar nature of the service required to be performed rendered unavoidable the exposure of the steam transports to the effects of a musketry fire. The able manner, however, in which the officers in command of these vessels brought them through the ordeal with all but immunity, was highly creditable and praiseworthy. To the commanders of the transports, generally, too much praise cannot be accorded for the willing assistance they rendered throughout the day, both personally and by availing themselves amply and with earnestness of the means at their disposal for the furtherance of the public service.

In conclusion, I beg to enclose, for your information, a copy of a congratulatory letter to my address from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

I have, &c.,

J. W. YOUNG, *Acting Commodore*,
Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron.

*His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset,
K.C.B., and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, to Lieu-
tenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., Command-
ing Persian Expeditionary Force, Bushire.*

Head-Quarters, Bombay.

20th April, 1857.

SIR,

I have had the gratification to receive your despatch, dated Mohumrah, the 4th instant, announcing the entire success which has attended the armed reconnoissance of the river Karoon as far as Ahwaz, which you entrusted to the direction of Commander Rennie, I.N., acting commodore in the Persian Gulf.

This excellently arranged expedition has been carried out with the gallantry, zeal, and discretion which have gained for that distinguished officer a highly honourable reputation, and his exertions have been ably supported by the whole of the officers and men, naval and military, serving under his orders.

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the utter fear in which our united forces are held by the Persian army than the fact you have mentioned of 7,000 infantry, with five or six guns, and a host of cavalry, precipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and three gunboats.

The capture and destruction of their magazines, of ordnance stores and provisions, in the face of such an army, must also produce the best effect at the court of the Shah of Persia, in furtherance of the desire of our Government for peace with that Potentate.

In again begging that you will accept my congratulations on the highly favourable results that have attended all your combinations, I request you will convey to the officers undermentioned my special thanks for the good service they have rendered :—

Acting Commodore Rennie ...	I.N.
Captain Hunt ...	Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, commanding the troops (whose excellent disposition of his small force I have remarked with much satisfaction).
Commander Selby, I.N. ...	Commanding H.C. steamer <i>Comet</i> .
Captain A. B. Kemball ...	Bombay Artillery, Resident in Turkish Arabia.
Lord Schomberg Kerr ...	Attached to Persian Mission.
Captain J. Wray ...	Deputy Quartermaster-General Persian Field Force.
Captain M. Green ...	Military Secretary.
Lieutenant Baigrie ...	Commissariat Department.
Mr. Acting Master Fletcher ...	In charge of steamer <i>Planet</i> .
Mr. Acting Master Neal ...	In charge of steamer <i>Assyria</i> .

And that you will also express to all the officers and men of the naval and military services employed on this expedition, my perfect concurrence in the thanks you have bestowed upon them for their laudable services and great exertions on this occasion.

H. SOMERSET, *Lieut.-Gen.*,
Commander-in-Chief.

TO OUR GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

London, 8th April, 1857.

The details of the operations in the Persian Gulf, which led to the occupation of Kararak and the capture of Bushire, having been laid before us by the Secret Committee, we have sincere gratification in expressing our entire satisfaction at the skill with which these operations were planned, and the gallantry with which they were accomplished by the naval and military forces under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leeke and Major-General Stalker respectively.

The last mail brought us the despatch of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K. C. B., announcing a decisive victory over the Persian army at Kooshab, gained on the 8th February by the forces under his command.

We desire to express our high sense of the important service rendered by Sir James Outram, in planning and carrying out the rapid movement into the interior which led to that important victory.

We regret to learn from the despatch of this distinguished officer, that he met with a serious accident in the early part of the contest, but from which he soon happily recovered.

We have great satisfaction in expressing our cordial thanks to Major-General Stalker, C.B., for his conduct throughout the whole of the operations, and especially in the battles of Reshire and Kooshab.

We entirely concur in the sentiments of approbation expressed by Sir James Outram, of the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the force under his command, and particularly of those who are named in his despatch.

We rejoice to take this opportunity of expressing our cordial approbation of the zeal, energy, and foresight displayed by your Government, and by the Governor in Council at Bombay, acting under your instructions, in equipping and despatching the expedition to the Persian Gulf, and in furnishing continued supplies to maintain the force in a state of perfect efficiency.

W. H. SYKES.

And Thirteen other Directors.

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 4th May, 1857.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has much gratification in publishing for general information the following despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding

Expeditionary Force in Persia, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, reporting the result of the Expedition against the Persian army at Ahwaz, on the Karoon river.

The Governor-General in Council desires to express his high sense of the enterprising spirit, the gallantry, and sound judgment, which were exhibited by Captain Rennie, Indian Navy, and Captain Hunt, of her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, in the execution of this service.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council,

G. F. EDMONSTONE, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

Lieut.-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., Commanding Expeditionary Force, to his Excellency Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B., and K.H., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Camp Mohumra, 4th April, 1857.

In my despatch, dated the 27th ultimo, I announced to your Excellency my intention of immediately despatching up the Karoon River, to Ahwaz, an armed flotilla, being the only means I had of effecting a distant reconnoissance, owing to the total want of baggage cattle; but as the steamers had to be coaled, and seven days' provisions for the troops put on board, whilst all were busily engaged disembarking tents and stores from the transports, some little delay occurred, and it was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the party could be despatched.

The flotilla I placed under the immediate command of Captain Rennie, I.N., aided by Captain Kemball, political agent in Turkish Arabia, who zealously undertook the political conduct of the expedition. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded the military detachment; and Captain Wray, deputy quartermaster-general, and Captain M. Green, my military secretary, accompanied the expedition, for the purpose of reporting upon the country in the vicinity of Ahwaz.

My instructions to Captain Rennie were "to steam up to Ahwaz, and act with discretion, according to circumstances. Should the Persian army have arrived, and apparently be prepared to make a determined stand, the party was to return after effecting the reconnoissance; but in the event of the enemy having proceeded beyond Ahwaz, or if they continued their flight on seeing our steamers (as I fully expected they would, under the impression that the flotilla was the advanced guard of the British army), it was my desire that the

party should land and destroy the magazines and stores which the Persians had collected."

By the annexed reports from Captains Rennie and Wray, which I have the honour to submit, your Excellency will learn how admirably my instructions have been carried out, and the complete success which has attended the energetic and judicious measures adopted by all concerned. Indeed it is impossible to calculate upon the advantages which must ensue from the successful result of this expedition, in the effect it will have upon the Arab tribes, who, in crowds, witnessed the extraordinary scene of a large army of 7,000 infantry, with five* or six guns, and a host of cavalry, precipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British Infantry, three small steamers, and three gunboats.

I feel that I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency the great obligation I am under to the several officers and men of the expedition.

Captain Rennie, Indian Navy, whose gallant conduct at the bombardment of Mohumra I so recently recorded, has again earned my highest praise and warmest thanks for the able manner in which he has conducted the expedition.

Captain Kembell, who on this, as on every occasion of difficulty and danger upon which I have required his services, has rendered me most valuable assistance, materially contributed to the success of the expedition by his counsel and energy. Great praise is also due to Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, who so successfully carried out the military operations; to Captain Wray, Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Captain M. Green, my Military Secretary, for the part they so ably performed; and to all the officers and men employed in the expedition. I have to thank them all, and beg to recommend those specially named to your Excellency's notice.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding Expeditionary Force.

*Acting Commodore J. Rennie, I.N., commanding
Squadron in Persian Gulf, to Lieut.-General Sir
James Outram, K.C.B., commanding Expeditionary
Force.*

Ahwaz, 3rd April, 1857.

It affords me much gratification to report the complete success that has attended the expedition you did me the honour to place under my command.

On arrival near Ahwaz, on the morning of the 1st instant, the Persian army was observed posted on a strong position on the right bank of the river; and having reason to believe that whatever force there might be on the left bank did not amount to such a number as would entail serious risk to our force, it was at once determined to carry Ahwaz.

* One or two guns said to have joined them at Ahwaz.

Our arrangements for attack were speedily completed, and by 10-30 A.M. Captain Hunt, his advance flanked by the gun-boats, moved off with his gallant band of 300 men, and in one hour and a half from the time of the gun-boats opening fire he was in possession of Ahwaz, and the Persian army, consisting of six thousand infantry, five guns, and a cloud of Bakhtyar horsemen, were in full retreat upon Dizful, leaving in our possession one gun (a brass 14-pounder field-piece) 154 stand of arms, 56 mules, 230 sheep, besides an enormous quantity of grain, wheat, and barley.

Captain Kemball requested me to remain at Ahwaz for two days, to afford him time to communicate with the Arab tribes, as also to ensure the impossibility of the defeated Persians returning to Ahwaz: they retired so precipitately as to have been unable to carry with them means of subsistence for more than two days.

It would be presumption in me to offer a remark on the gallantry and zeal of those serving with me; I shall therefore merely take the liberty of attaching a nominal list of the officers, with the number of men under their command, composing an expedition that penetrated over one hundred miles beyond Mohumra, and which, in so short a time, compelled the Persian army to abandon a depôt of provisions on which it almost entirely depended for subsistence.

In conclusion, I beg to add, that it is to Captain Kemball who planned, and to Captain Hunt who executed this bold stroke, that thanks are more especially due. Further comments from me are unnecessary.

I have, &c.,

J. RENNIE, *Commander I. N. Acting Commodore,
Commanding Squadron, Persian Gulf.*

Nominal Roll of Officers and men comprising the Expedition to Ahwaz, under Commander JAMES RENNIE, I.N., Acting Commodore, Persian Gulf Squadron, commanding the Expedition, Lieutenants CROCKETT, WAT, and TOZER, Naval Aides-de-Camp.

Armed Steamer "Comet."—Commander W. B. Selby, I. N.; Mr. Acting Master Holland; Mr. Acting 1st class 2nd Master Salmon; Assistant Surgeon W. Wood, M.D.; 21 seamen, and 16 Mussosoles.

River Steamer "Planet."—Mr. Acting Master Fletcher, in charge; Mr. Acting Master Keen; 6 Europeans, and 13 Lascars.

River Steamer "Assyria."—Mr. Acting Master Neale, in charge; Mr. Acting 1st class 2nd Master Fivey; 5 Europeans, and 12 natives.

No. 6 Gun-boat.—Lieutenant Edwards; Mr. Midshipman Burn and 16 seamen.

No. 5 Gun-boat.—Mr. Mate Hewett; Mr. Midshipman D'Arcy, and 14 seamen.

No. 9 Gun-boat.—Lieutenant Lake; Mr. Midshipman Finnis, and 14 seamen.

"Falkland's" Cutter.—Mr. Midshipman Law, and 11 men.

"Ferooz's" Cutter.—Mr. Midshipman Booth, and 11 men.

"Assaye's" Cutter.—Mr. Midshipman Scamp, and 9 men.

Assistant Surgeon Asher, in medical charge of gun-boats and cutters

from *Ferooz*; Mr. Sims, 3rd class Gunner of *Feroze*, temporarily attached for the expedition to steamer *Planet*.

W. B. SELBY, *Commander I. N.*,
Commanding "Comet," and Surveyor in Mesopotamia.

Nominal Roll of Political and Staff Officers present with the Detachment under Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, in the advance upon Ahwaz, on the 1st April, 1857.

Captain A. B. Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Resident in Turkish Arabia.
 Lord Schomberg H. Kerr, attached to Persian Mission.

Captain J. Wray, Deputy Quartermaster General, Persian Field Force.

Captain Malcolm Green, Scinde Horse.

Lieutenant Baigrie, Commissariat Department.

J. WRAY, *Captain*,
Deputy Quartermaster General.

Nominal Roll of Officers of Detachment under the command of Captain G. H. HUNT, 78th Highlanders.

H. M.'s 64th Regiment.—Captain W. Goode, Lieutenant G. H. J. Haldane, Ensign J. J. Pack, and Assistant Surgeon E. L. Lundy.

H. M.'s 78th Highlanders.—Captain G. H. Hunt, Captain D. McAndrew, Lieutenant A. Cassidy, Lieutenant J. Finlay, and Lieutenant G. D. Barker.

Detachment consisting of 300 men, being 150 from each of the above regiments.

G. H. HUNT, *Captain, 78th Highlanders*,
Commanding Detachment.

*Captain Wray, Deputy Quartermaster General, P.H.,
 to Colonel Lugard, G.B., Chief of the Staff.*

Camp Mohumra, 5th April, 1857.

According to the instructions received from you, I have the honour to forward the following report upon Ahwaz and the country in its vicinity, with a brief account of the military operations of the expedition.

Ahwaz is situated on the left bank of the Karoon River, at about 100 miles from its mouth. The town is in ruins, and not more than one-third of the houses appear to be occupied. There is no fort or defences of any kind beyond an old ruinous stone wall round part of it. The inhabitants number about 1,200, chiefly Arabs of the Chab Tribes. Close to the town are two old broken-down bunds across the river, through which the water rushes with great rapidity. One of these is just opposite the town, the other considerably below it. These bunds are impassable for boats drawing more than a few feet water, and the strength of the current renders the passage of any boats a matter of great difficulty; indeed, we did not ascertain satisfactorily that boats could pass at all. The river is from 90 to 140 yards wide, and there are several low islands in the middle, covered with low

tamarisk jungle. The banks of the river are generally high, and the water so deep that our small steamers could lie close alongside. The country on the town side of the river is a bare plain, with very slight patches of cultivation here and there, and on the south-east side of the town is a range of sandstone hills perfectly bare. The country on the opposite side of the river is much the same—a barren plain without a tree; and the most desolate-looking place imaginable. A few hundred yards above the bank is a ridge, which, when we approached Ahwaz, we found occupied by the Persian army. The river passes round this point, rendering the position very strong; but, at the same time, a force driven out of it by an enemy attacking at A., and being obliged to embark and retire down the river in boats or small steamers, would be exposed to the fire of batteries or musketry from the river banks from any point which an active enemy might select. The advantages of this site for a cantonment for our troops are, first, that our commissariat and stores, coming by land from Mohumra, could join our camp without having to cross the river; second, the strength of the position.

It is impossible to form any idea of the healthiness of the place. There had been a good deal of rain when we were there, and the surface of the ground was very heavy; but there is no reason to suppose that troops stationed here would be otherwise than healthy. At present the climate is very pleasant, the mornings delightful, and the days, though warm, quite bearable.

The Arabs furnished us with sheep in abundance, milk, ghee, &c.

The Karoon River has already been reported on by Captain Selby, and I found the map drawn up by that officer perfectly correct. The river is generally from 90 to 180 yards wide; a fine stream, with very rapid current; the banks for the first few miles after leaving Mohumra covered with date trees, afterwards with cypress, or swamp poplar jungle, for a hundred yards or so from the water's edge; the interior a barren desert. We passed a few Arab villages on the left bank, at long intervals, and anchored for the night at two of them to get supplies. Excepting here, we did not see a single soul the whole way. The country on the right side appears an uninhabited wilderness.

The operations against the enemy were conducted as follows, under the orders of Captain Rennie, I. N. At 3 A.M., 1st April, our little fleet left Coomaria, an Arab village on the left bank, where we had remained during the night; soon after daylight we came in sight of Ahwaz, and found the Persian army collected behind a ridge on the right bank—crowds of horsemen, apparently some guns on the ridge, and infantry innumerable. Anchored at twelve miles below the place. Some horsemen came down, but a rifle-shot sent them off at full gallop, and no one attempted to come very near again. Heard from the Arabs that Ahwaz was not occupied, and that the troops that had been there had gone up the river the day before, frightened by the appearance of the steamers, and that nothing remained now but thirty horsemen; that they had no means of crossing, excepting by two boats and two canoes. It was therefore determined to land all our party (three hundred men), advance up the left bank upon Ahwaz, and endeavour to destroy the enemy's dépôt of guns and ammunition; and

in the event of our finding that we had been deceived, or that they were in force in the town, that we should turn once more into an armed reconnoissance, and return to our ships. Meanwhile we captured a bugla, lying under the left bank, with a brass 12-pounder gun, which was taken on board.

At 11 A. M., the troops commenced landing, and advanced at once in three columns, covered by skirmishers; the whole party being extended in such a way that they looked like a large body of men. Capt. Hunt, 78th, commanded and arranged it all. Left column consisted of the light company 78th divided into skirmishers and supports, both in one rank; the remainder of the company in columns of threes, also in single ranks. The 64th Grenadiers and the other company 78th formed centre and right columns in the same way. Two gun-boats were sent off in advance up the river, which took up positions within shell range of the enemy's ridges, and opened fire. The enemy apparently had some guns in position on the ridge, but the moment the gunners made their appearance, the gun-boats opened and drove them away; they consequently did not return a single shot, though they attempted a little musketry which did no harm. In the meanwhile the troops pushed on; the Persians still collected, though in reduced numbers, on the opposite bank of the river, at about 1,000 yards from us.

At 12 o'clock the troops approached the town, when the Arab Sheik came out, tendered submission, and informed our party that the enemy were retreating; and with our glasses we saw a large army of 7,000 men, with a perfect swarm of Bakhtyaree horsemen, and five or six guns, retiring from a very strong position, before a body of 300 infantry, three small river steamers, and three gun-boats. The enemy retired in tolerable order, covered by their horse; the Shahzada himself travelling in a green palanquin carriage, the wheel marks of which we had seen in several encamping grounds on the river. The town was filled with flour, wheat, barley, &c.; fifty-five mules and a horse were also found, besides fourteen boxes of new flint muskets, tower mark, each containing ten. A party crossed the river, examined the enemy's camp, and set fire to the remainder of their magazines. The Arabs had plundered it before we arrived, and had carried off the powder, ball, ammunition, and muskets, the cases of which we found; but the enemy had left a great quantity of loose shot on the ground also, which could not be destroyed or carried away. Thus ended a very successful day. It was expected that when our troops reached the town, the enemy would open fire with their guns from the ridge on the opposite bank, but that we should be able to hold our ground under cover of the houses and walls, until all the stores were destroyed or carried off; but in this little or no loss was anticipated; and as the enemy were unable to cross the river, and it was known that they had never had more than 800 men in the town, there was no great risk incurred in the move. As it was, the enemy commenced their retreat exactly one hour from the time the first shell was fired from the gun-boats.

J. WRAY, *Captain,*
Deputy Quartermaster-General, P. F. F.

FIELD FORCE ORDERS.

Mohumra, 9th May, 1857.

Consequent upon the cessation of hostilities in Persia, the following troops will be held in readiness to embark for India:—

Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons.

3rd Troop Horse Artillery to Kurrachee.

1st Company 2nd Battalion (No. 2 Light Field Battery) to Kurrachee.

Reserve Company Artillery to Bombay.

Her Majesty's 64th Foot to Vingorla.

Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders to Bombay.

2nd European Light Infantry to Kurrachee.

Light Battalion to Bombay.

Madras Sappers and Miners to Bombay.

2. The 23rd Light Infantry and 26th Regt. N. I., are transferred to the 1st division, and will proceed to Bushire with the detachment of Scinde Horse and Land Transport Corps now at Mohumra.

3. The staff of the 2nd division will return to Bombay, with the exception of the Engineer, Ordnance, and Commissariat departments, which will proceed to Bushire and await further instructions.

4. Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., will command the troops stationed at Bushire, which will be organized as follows:—

Cavalry Brigade.

3rd Regiment Light Cavalry	} Brigadier Steuart.
Scinde Irregular Horse	
Poona Irregular Horse	
Aden Troop	

Artillery Brigade.

4th Troop Horse Artillery	} Lieut.-Col. Trevelyan.
1st Comp. 1st Batt. (3rd Light Field Battery)	
4th Comp. 1st Batt. (5th Ditto Ditto)	
4th Comp. 3rd Batt. (8th Ditto Ditto)	
3rd Comp. 2nd Batt.	
4th Comp. 4th Batt.	
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.	

Infantry.

20th Regt. N. I.	} 1st Brigade, Colonel Macan.
26th Regt. N. I.	
4th Regt. N. I. (Rifle Corps)	} 2nd Brigade, Brigadier Honner.
23rd Regt. N. L. I.	
2nd Belooch Battalion	

5. The Lieutenant-General avails himself of this opportunity to return his warmest thanks to the whole of the troops placed under his command for service in Persia, for their very exemplary conduct since their arrival in this country, evinced by the fact of scarcely one instance of misconduct on the part of any individual having been brought to his notice. This entire absence of crime amongst so large a body of troops assembled in camp, redounds to the credit of both officers and men, and is the strongest possible proof of the high state of discipline of the force; whilst their conduct throughout the expedition to Borazjoon, and in the engagement at Kooshab, bore ample testimony to the gallantry of all ranks before an enemy, and to their patient and cheerful endurance of fatigue and hardship under the most trying circumstances.

6. Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, as a soldier who has been honoured with such a command, cannot help expressing his deep regret that more opportunity has not been afforded the troops by the enemy for a display of that prowess and gallant spirit which he knows to pervade all ranks; but as a peace has been concluded by her Gracious Majesty's Government, it is a source of much satisfaction to the Lieutenant-General that a great portion of the force is thus enabled to return at once to India before the monsoon commences, and he hopes that an early compliance on the part of the Persian Government with the conditions of the treaty, will shortly remove the necessity which still exists of a further occupation of Bushire.

7. Whilst bidding farewell to the troops about to leave Persia, and wishing them a pleasant voyage and happy meeting with their families and friends in India, the Lieutenant-General begs to assure that portion of the force remaining at Bushire, that every care has been taken for their welfare, and that no exertion will be spared to render their short sojourn in this country as comfortable and as little injurious to their health as possible; spacious barracks are in course of erection, and hutting materials of every description are being collected for their use.

8. The Lieutenant-General begs in conclusion to offer his sincere thanks to all now about to return to India, especially to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., for the zealous and valuable assistance he has afforded him at all times in command of the 2nd division, and requests he will be so good as to convey to Brigadiers Hale, and Hamilton, and Hutt, C.B., and to the several officers of his personal, divisional, and brigade staff, as well as to the medical and departmental officers, a similar expression of his thanks for the valuable and efficient services they have performed. The Lieutenant-General has also to thank Brigadier Wilson, K.H., and his staff, who leave with the European Infantry troops of the 1st Division, and likewise Major Boyé, Deputy Judge Advocate-General, and the Rev. T. Watson, Chaplain, who also return to India.

By command,
EDWARD LUGARD, *Chief of the Staff.*

*Extract from Field Force Orders, dated Bushire,
16th June, 1857.*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, accompanied by all the officers of the head-quarters staff returning to

India will embark on board the steamer *Chusan*, bound for Kurrachee and Bombay, on Wednesday morning, the 17th instant.

On the departure of Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, the supreme authority, political and military, will devolve upon Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., to whom all reports and communications are to be made accordingly.

The Lieutenant-General begs that Brigadier-General Jacob will accept his most cordial thanks for the very able assistance he has afforded him at all times since joining the Persian expeditionary force, and especially while exercising the important command of the troops at Bushire, where his vigilance and admirable arrangements, and the bold front maintained by the small force under his command, mainly contributed (the Lieutenant-General is convinced) to deter the Persian army, so far superior in numerical strength, from venturing upon an attack.

EDWARD LUGARD, *Brig.-Gen.*,
Chief of the Staff.

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 23rd June, 1857.

The following Notifications, from the Foreign Department, are published in General Orders:—

Authentic intelligence having been received that the ratifications of the treaty, which was signed at Paris by the Plenipotentiaries of England and Persia, on the 4th March last, were exchanged at Bagdad, on the 2nd of May, the Right Honourable the Governor-General in

Council is pleased to direct that a royal salute shall be fired from the ramparts of Fort William, as well as at every principal station of the army, in honour of the peace which has been concluded.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has had the satisfaction of announcing, from time to time, the signal successes which have been achieved by the combined action of the military and naval forces, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., on the coasts and in the interior of Persia.

The surrender of Bushire on the 10th December, after a brief and ineffectual opposition; the operations against the Persian entrenched camp at Borazjoon, and the complete victory obtained over the Persian Army at Kooshab, on the 8th February; the bombardment and capture of Mohumra, on the 26th March; and the brilliant attack, by a few hundred men, against Ahwaz, on the 1st April, followed by the precipitate flight of the whole Persian Army serving in that quarter,—have signally instanced the vigour, the enterprising spirit, and the intrepidity with which the operations against Persia, both by sea and land, have been directed, and have earned for those who had a share in their execution, the cordial approbation and the thanks of the Government of India.

The Governor-General in Council has now the gratification of announcing that the ratifications of the treaty, which was signed at Paris by the Plenipotentiaries of England and Persia, on the 4th March last, were exchanged at Bagdad, on the 2nd May; and the entire withdrawal of the British Forces from the soil and the waters of Persia awaits only the fulfilment of the conditions of peace, which were accepted by the Plenipotentiary of Persia, on her behalf.

The peace which has been thus concluded accomplishes the principal objects of the war, without needless humiliation to Persia, and places the relations of the British Government with that country, both political and commercial, on an improved footing. Though the negotiations by which this result has been obtained were conducted in Europe, their rapid and unchecked progress, and their early completion must be ascribed, in no small degree, to the vigorous operations and the successful achievements of the Persian Expeditionary Force.

The brilliant reputation of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., has acquired additional lustre from the promptitude, the vigorous energy, and ability with which he has exercised the command entrusted to him; and the Governor-General in Council desires to record his high sense of the important services rendered by this distinguished officer.

The Governor-General in Council deeply laments that Major-General Stalker, C.B., should not have lived to witness the successful completion of the war, in the commencement of which he took so prominent and conspicuous a part.

His Lordship in Council cordially appreciates the zealous and active exertions of Brigadier-General Have-lock, C.B., and commends the order and despatch with which the troops were landed and formed at Mohumra under his direction.

To Brigadier Honner, who shared with his brigade in the attack on Bushire, and in the operations against Borazjoon; to Brigadier Wilson, K.H., who commanded the 1st Brigade of Infantry at Borazjoon and Mohumra; to Brigadiers Hamilton and Hale, who were present with their brigades in the advance upon Mohumra; and to Brigadier Steuart, who was at the head

of the Cavalry, 2nd Division, on the same occasion ; to Lieutenant-Colonel Shepheard, who succeeded to the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade on the lamented death of Brigadier Stopford ; to Colonel Stisted, who led the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, in the march on Borazjoon and the victory of Kooshab ; to Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, who commanded the Cavalry Brigade on the same occasion, as well as at Bushire ; and to Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, commanding Artillery, who took a part in every operation of the troops, except that against Ahwaz ;—to all these, whose valuable services have been gratefully acknowledged by the late Major-General Stalker, C.B., and Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., the Governor-General in Council begs to offer his warmest thanks, and the assurance of his heartfelt approbation.

The late Major-General Stalker and Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., have expressed their obligations to the officers commanding regiments and batteries of Artillery on the several occasions which called for their exertions ; and the Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in publicly tendering his best thanks to Major Sterling, of her Majesty's 64th Foot ; to Major McIntyre, who took command of her Majesty's 78th Highlanders during the Expedition to Borazjoon ; to Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Ramsay, of the 2nd Bombay European Light Infantry ; to Major Manson, of the 4th Bombay Rifles ; to Lieutenant-Colonel Shepheard and Captain Macleod, of the 20th, Major Travers, of the 23rd, and Colonel Macan and Captain Bowditch, of the 26th Bombay Native Infantry ; to Captain L. Stephen Hough, of the 2nd Belooch Battalion ; to Major Blake, Captain Hatch, Captain Gibbard, and Captain Aitkin, commanding, the first, a troop of Horse Artillery, and the others,

Light Field Batteries; to Captain Dickinson, of the Sappers and Miners; and to Captain Forbes, of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, whose gallantry on the field of Khooshab was conspicuous.

The Governor-General in Council cordially unites with the late Major-General and the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Expeditionary Force, in expressing his marked acknowledgments of the ever-ready and efficient assistance afforded by Colonel Lugard, C.B., her Majesty's 29th Foot, the chief of the staff, and the several officers composing the general staff.* To Captain Malcolm Green, military secretary; Lieutenant Sykes, and Captain Hervey, A.D.C.; Captain Arthur, Persian interpreter; and Major Taylor, transferred from the Persian Mission in the capacity of political secretary; as well as to Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, detached from the staff of the Governor-General, who volunteered his aid on the personal staff of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.; to Captain Hunter, who served as aide-de-camp to the late Major-General Stalker, on the attack on Bushire; and to Mr. Johnstone, of the Indian Navy, to whose knowledge of the country and unwearied zeal the late Major-General was much indebted,—the Governor-General in Council begs to offer the expression of his approbation.

The valuable assistance afforded on every occasion of difficulty and danger, and especially in the brilliant Expedition against Ahwaz, by Captain Kembal, political

* Lieut.-Colonel Younghusband, Deputy Adjutant General; Captain Wray, Deputy Quartermaster General; Major Boyé, Deputy Judge Advocate General; Major Barr, Paymaster; Lieut.-col. Pope, Deputy Commissary General, and Captain Dunsterville, Assistant ditto; Captain Rigby, Superintendent of Bazaars; Captain Finnimore, Commissary of Ordnance; Lieut. Ballard, C.B., Superintendent, Intelligence Department; Major Hill, Commanding Engineer; Major Curtis, Director, Land Transport Corps; Captain Collier, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; Captain Shewell, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General; Lieut. Holland, ditto; Lieut. Willoughby, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.

agent in Turkish Arabia, and Consul-General at Bagdad, has been highly commended by Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., and merits the unqualified approbation and the hearty thanks of the Governor-General in Council, no less than does the gallantry of Captain Hunt, her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, and of the other military officers* who accompanied the Expedition in question.

The Indian Navy has taken a conspicuous part in the operations which have now been brought to a termination, and the Governor-General in Council must not omit to put on record the high sense which he entertains of its most valuable and important services.

To Rear-Admiral Sir H. Leeke, K.H., Royal Navy, the Governor-General in Council begs again to offer his sincere acknowledgments for the promptitude and energy with which he gave his assistance in landing the troops at Hallila Bay, and in attacking the fortifications of Bushire. To Captain Griffith Jenkins, captain of the fleet; to Acting Commander Adams, of the *Assaye*; and Lieutenant Clarkson, of the same vessel; to Captain Young; Commanders Rennie and Macdonald; and Acting Commander Foulerton,—much praise is due for their gallantry on the same occasion.

The Governor-General in Council, however, desires specially to record his admiration both of the skill and energy displayed by Acting Commodore Young, Indian Navy (upon whom the command of the Gulf Squadron devolved on the lamented death of Commodore Ethersey), in the conduct of the difficult naval operations against Mohumra, and of the signal success with which they were crowned.

* Captain Wray, Deputy Quartermaster General; Captain Green, Military Secretary; Lieut. Baigree, Commissariat Department.

The Governor-General in Council has further remarked, with the highest gratification, the distinguished conduct of Commander J. Rennie, who, since the departure of Captain Young, has most efficiently commanded the Naval Forces in the Persian Gulf. In the enterprising advance upon Ahwaz, the signal success obtained was due, in a very large measure, to the judgment and resolute gallantry of this able officer.

The acknowledgments of the Government are also due to Commander Selby, of the *Semiramis*; Commander Grieve, of the *Clive*; Acting Commander Manners, of the *Victoria*; and to Lieutenants commanding, Tronson, of the *Falkland*, and Worsley, of the *Ajdaha*, who contributed largely to the success of the day; and the special thanks of the Government are claimed for Commander Adams, for the efficient manner in which he seconded the attack on the northern forts at Mohumra.

Acting Commodore Young has commended the conduct of Lieutenant Chitty, commanding the *Berenice*; of Commander Nesbitt, agent for transports; and of Acting Masters commanding, McLaurin, of the *Napier*; Holland, of the *Comet*; Fletcher, of the *Planet*; Neale, of the *Assyria*; Davies, of the *Ethersey* Flat; and Mr. Dark, of the *Hugh Lindsay*, for the effective aid which they respectively rendered in the attack on Mohumra: and the Governor-General in Council has great pleasure in acknowledging their good services.

Finally, the Governor-General in Council wishes to offer his hearty thanks to all the officers and non-commissioned officers of whatever designation, and to all the soldiers and sailors of the force, for the bravery, the endurance, and good conduct which they have displayed during the several operations in which they have been engaged.

It will afford the highest gratification to the Governor-General in Council to recommend the arduous and successful services of the military and naval forces on the coasts and in the interior of Persia, to the most favourable consideration of the Honourable Court of Directors and her Majesty's Government.

G. F. EDMONSTONE, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

Head-quarters, Calcutta, 8th July, 1857.

The following Notifications, from the Foreign Department, are published in General Orders:—

Since the Notification, dated 18th ultimo, was published, the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has received a despatch, dated 27th May, 1857, from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., bringing to notice the services of certain officers, attached to the Expeditionary Force, whose names were not before the Government at the time when the Notification above referred to was issued.

The officers now noticed by the Lieutenant-General are:—

Captain Pottinger, Brigade-Major, Artillery, at Bushire.
Captain Graves, 3rd L. C., who brought the regiment out of action at Bushire.

Captain Aitcheson, Brigade-Major, Infantry, at Bushire.

Brevet Major Sibley, Brigade-Major, Infantry, at Bushire.

Captain D. Hay, Acting Brigade-Major, Infantry, at Bushire.

Brevet Major Baynes, commanding 20th N. I. at Bushire.

Surgeon Stovell, Superintending Surgeon, at Bushire.

Brevet Major Heatly, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Havelock, at Mohumra.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hutt, C.B., commanding artillery at Mohumra.

Captain Worgan, commanding mortars on the raft at Mohumra.

Captain Douglas, Brigade-Major, Artillery, at Mohumra.

Captain Bouverie, Brigade-Major, Infantry, at Mohumra.

Captain Mackechnie, Brigade-Major, Infantry, at Mohumra.

Lieutenant-Colonel Le Grand Jacob, commanding Light-Battalion at Mohumra.

Major Boileau, commanding Madras Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant C. Clerk, Madras Cavalry, Aide-de-Camp.

Captain Lucas, Assistant Commissary-General.

Lieutenant Havelock, Acting Assistant Quartermaster General.

Surgeon Mackenzie, Superintend.-Surgeon at Bushire and Khooshab.

To all these officers, no less than to those who were honourably mentioned in the Notification of the 18th ultimo, Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., has expressed his obligations; and the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has great pleasure in offering to them his cordial thanks, and assuring them that it will be his care to recommend their services to the most favourable consideration of her Majesty's Government and the Honourable the Court of Directors.

G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to Major-General Sir James Outram, K. C. B.

Fort William, 31st August, 1857.

In transmitting to you, by direction of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Honourable Secret Committee, dated the 13th ultimo, No. 1820, enclosing copies of four letters addressed to you by Lord Clarendon, relating to the late operations in Persia, I am desired to express the high gratification which the Governor-General in Council feels in conveying to you the announcement of her Majesty's gracious approval of your conduct throughout the whole of the operations in which you have engaged in Persia.

I have, &c.,

G. F. EDMONSTONE, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

*Fort William, Foreign Department,
6th November, 1857.*

Referring to the Notifications from this department, dated the 18th June and 1st July last, in which the services of the Persian Expeditionary Force were acknowledged, the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council desires to express his obligations to the clergymen who were attached to the force, and to certain officers whom Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., omitted to notice in his despatch.

The Reverend Messrs. Badger, Watson and Schwabe, and the Reverend Mr. Strickland, Roman Catholic clergyman, were assiduous in their attention to the spiritual wants of the officers and European troops during the continuance of the campaign, and have established a claim as well to the gratitude of those who benefited by their ministrations, as to the thanks of the Government of India.

Captain Playfair, of the Bombay Engineers, was field engineer under the late Major-General Stalker at the affair of Reshire and the capture of Bushire, and he acted in the same capacity at Khooshab, and again at Mohumra, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram. On all occasions Captain Playfair made himself conspicuous by his zeal and activity, and won the approbation of his superiors.

Captain Good commanded a detachment of her Majesty's 64th Foot, on the expedition to Ahwaz, and contributed to the signal success which was there achieved.

Lieutenant W. Gray, late deputy assistant commissary-general, was in charge of the executive commissariat duties at Bushire, which were of an extensive and important character, and were conducted by that officer with commendable zeal and efficiency.

The services of these officers have been noticed by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., with much approbation, and the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has great pleasure in tendering to them the thanks of the Government of India.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has received official information of the evacuation of Bushire by the British troops on the 2nd October. The island of Karrak is the only spot of Persian soil which is still in the occupation of the British Government, and the relinquishment of that post only awaits the receipt of authentic intelligence by the officer in command, that the conditions of the Treaty of Peace concluded on the 4th March last have been completely fulfilled by the Persian Government.

In making this announcement, it becomes the gratifying duty of the Governor-General in Council to record the sense which is entertained by the Government of India of the services rendered by Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., and the officers under his command.

When Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram, K.C.B., left Bushire in progress to Mohumra, the command of the troops remaining at the former post was committed to Brigadier-General John Jacob, and subsequently, when the Lieutenant-General was recalled to India, all the military and political authority, which had been exercised by him, devolved on Brigadier-General Jacob. The admirable discipline, order, and efficiency, which have been maintained amongst the troops under Brigadier-General Jacob's command at Bushire, and the judgment with which he has discharged all his high and important functions, entitle that very distinguished officer to the warmest thanks of the Government of India.

The confidence with which Lieutenant-General Sir J. Outram resigned his command into the hands of the Brigadier-General, has been fully justified by the issue. The British troops leave behind them in Persia a reputation, not for valour alone, but for discipline, moderation, and justice, and it is to Brigadier-General Jacob especially, and to the able officers by whom he was surrounded, that this gratifying result is due.

Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., has expressed his obligations to the field force under his command.

The thanks of the Government of India are especially due to Brigadier Wilson, K.H., Brigadier Steuart, commanding the cavalry at Bushire, and Brigadier Honner.

Colonel Trevelyan, commanding the Artillery, has zealously and usefully aided Brigadier-General Jacob in matters beyond the ordinary range of his duty, and Major John Hill, commanding the Engineers, has done excellent service.

To the officers commanding regiments, and to the heads of departments, high credit is due, for the perfect order and efficiency maintained during the whole period of occupation; and to none more than to Superintending Surgeon Stovell, who has laboured to preserve the health of the army with assiduity and success.

Captain Felix Jones, of the Indian navy, political resident and civil commissioner of Bushire, has, together with the officers under his orders, earned the best thanks of the Governor-General in Council for the mode in which his charge has been administered.

The various duties which have fallen to Commodore Rennie, Indian Navy, since the cessation of hostilities, have been scarcely less important than those previously discharged by him; and through the ability and zeal of himself and the officers under his command, they have been performed in a manner to call

for the marked approbation of the Governor-General in Council.

Finally, the Governor-General in Council begs to offer his cordial thanks to all the officers, the non-commissioned officers and men, composing the force under the command of Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., for their orderly conduct and their steady discipline during the occupation of Bushire, and to assure them that it will be his care to bring their services under the favourable notice of her Majesty's Government and the Honourable the Court of Directors.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

G. F. EDMONSTONE, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 13th January, 1858.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has received from the Government the following letter from the Right Honourable the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State, conveying her Majesty's approval of the conduct of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., and of the troops under his command, during the late operations against Persia.

The approval thus accorded by her Most Gracious Majesty to the distinguished officer who held the command, and to the troops which served under his immediate orders, must be a source of just pride to all who were engaged in the late operations; and in announcing her Majesty's approbation of their conduct his Excellency has great pleasure in desiring that Lord Clarendon's letter shall be read and explained to all the regiments and detachments serving under this Presidency, at a special parade to be ordered for the purpose.

To Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

Foreign Office, 11th July, 1857.

I have great satisfaction in conveying to you, by command of the Queen, her Majesty's entire approval of the zeal, judgment, and ability which you have shown throughout the whole of the operations in the south of Persia, in which you have been engaged; and her Majesty is convinced, that if the war had not been happily brought to an early conclusion by the treaty of the 4th of March, she could have fully relied on your zeal, and on the courage and devotedness of the army under your command, for the continued prosecution, to a successful issue, of the military operations which might have been found necessary to induce the Government of Persia to agree to a just and honourable peace.

Her Majesty has received, with peculiar satisfaction, your reports of the exemplary conduct, on all occasions, of the forces employed under your orders; and it is her desire that you take the proper steps for making known to them her gracious approval of their conduct.

I am happy to add, that her Majesty has been graciously pleased to signify her intention of conferring upon you the honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath, in testimony of her approbation of your conduct in Persia.

I am, &c.,
CLARENDON.

BY THE HON. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF
INDIA IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 12th February, 1858.

The Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council is pleased to direct the publication in General Orders of the following paragraphs of a military letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors to the Government of India, No. 37, of the 16th February, 1858:—

1. We have the satisfaction to announce to you, that the Queen has been graciously pleased to permit the officers and men of the land and sea forces, who took part in the services performed against the enemy in the late war with Persia, to wear a medal commemorative of that event.

2. The medal will be struck from the die which has been approved for Indian service agreeably to the recommendation of the late Governor-General of India.*

3. In the case of those officers and men who are already entitled to wear the medal for Indian service, a bar or clasp, with the word "Persia" inscribed on it, will be all that will be required. Those who are not so entitled, will receive the medal and clasp, with the word "Persia" inscribed on it.

F. D. ATKINSON, *Major,*

Officiating Secy. to the Govt. of India, in the Military Dept.

*Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Taylor, Herat Commissioner,
to G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secy. to the Govt. of
India, Foreign Department.*

Camp at Bushire, 7th June, 1858.

I have the honour to report for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, the arrival at Bushire of the Herat Commission, and its intended departure for Bombay this day.

I take this opportunity of reporting, that during my march through Persia, I have observed in many instances the good effects of the late occupations by British troops. The whole people of Fars (Southern Persia) are loud in their praises of the justice and humanity evinced on every occasion by all officers with whom they came into contact; the treating wounded soldiers and presenting them with a gratuity on their recovery was contrasted with the conduct of their own people, who instantly plundered them of the clothes and money they

* *Vide Military letter to India, dated 1st March 1854, No. 6, par. 112.*

had received from their enemies; the prompt payment and liberal price given for every necessary article has kept up the impression of the unlimited resources of the Government, and the wealth of individuals.

The discontent which prevails in Persia at the present time is quite incredible, and the pent-up feelings of an oppressed people would burst forth into revolution if they only knew where to find a leader.

Throughout the country, overtures have been made to me by all classes, and not only unsought, but positively discouraged. The soldiers at Shiraz spoke out boldly against the Shooja-ool-Moolk (the Hero of Kooshab) and their other officers. The Elkhanee (the most influential man in all Fars) remarked that we could take the low country easily enough, but that we should find difficulty in forcing the passes, "which," he significantly added, "are in my hands." He continued, "your Government makes a mistake in not placing chiefs in higher positions: when Fars is annexed, confer the rank of colonel, &c., and do not limit them to soobadars and jemadars." The eldest son of the Fungistan chief, who has the sole control of everything, said with much emphasis, that the next time British troops came into Persia, he should join them bodily with every efficient man, without even waiting for a guarantee for the future.

To all these overtures, I gave a general assurance that the English Government was not disposed to weaken Persia, but rather keep her strong, as was manifested by the mild chastisement inflicted on the occasion of the last war; but, I added, that their appreciation of the justice, humanity, and liberality of the English officers, could not fail to afford satisfaction to the Governor-General.

Full details of the several routes are in course of pre-

paration, and will be submitted with such elucidatory remarks as may appear relevant, without loss of time.

I have the honour, &c.

R. L. TAYLOR, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Commissioner for Herat.

To the Right Hon. the Governor General of India in Council.

East India House, London, 13th July, 1857.

We transmit for your information, a copy of four despatches, dated the 11th instant, which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

No. 11, announcing that it is not intended to give Mohumra back to the Shah of Persia until the provisions of the treaty of March the 4th be fulfilled.

No. 12, approving of the conduct of Captain Kemball in his correspondence with the Wuzeer of his Royal Highness Khanler Meerza.

No. 13, approving of the proceedings of Brigadier Jacob with respect to an attempt made by the Persians to obtain secret information as to Bushire and the British position, and

No. 14, notifying the Queen's entire approval of the zeal and ability shown by Sir James Outram, and of the courage and devotion exhibited by the forces under his command, during the operations which have been carried on in Persia.

2nd. We take this opportunity of expressing our high admiration of the manner in which the operations have been conducted.

We are, &c.,

ROSS D. MANGLES,
F. CURRIE,
CHARLES MILLS.

BY THE HON. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA
IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 14th September, 1858.

The Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council, with the concurrence of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, is pleased to permit the several regiments in the service of the East India Company, which were employed with the recent

expedition to Persia, to wear on their colours, standards, and appointments the word "Persia." Those regiments which were present at the actions of Reshire and Kooshab, will bear those names in addition to the word "Persia."

F. D. ATKINSON,

Officiating Secy. to the Govt. of India in the Military Dept.

PART II.

SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE

OF

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR J. OUTRAM, K.C.B.,

AS

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PLENIPOTENTIARY DURING THE WAR
IN PERSIA, 1857.

S E L E C T I O N S,

&c. &c.

*From Sir J. Outram to the Right Hon. R. Vernon
Smith, M.P., President of the Board of Control.*

India House,

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR, 18th November, 1856.

I beg most respectfully to submit the following suggestions for your consideration :—

The force at present at Bushire, of about 5,000 men of all arms, will not admit of detaching the European portion to a distance if it be intended to maintain that city during the hot season.

To enable the European troops to be moved to a more healthy locality, and to maintain such posts with native troops as may be required to keep open the communication, at least three additional regiments of native infantry, one of irregular cavalry, and more artillery, will be required.

So far as at present advised, Shuster, on the river Karoon, a place about 120 miles from the sea and upwards of 250 from Bushire, is considered the most eligible position for the European troops, with reference to sanitary considerations, during the hot weather ; and a portion of the army being thus advanced in the direction of Ispahan, while Shiraz is threatened from Bushire,

may have a good moral effect, as menacing invasion from either or both those points.

The position of Shuster appears, moreover, of great political importance, as from its vicinity to the Turco-Arab frontier, it facilitates the organization of Arab levies; and a regiment of Scinde (Jacob's) Horse should be stationed there to form the nucleus of the cavalry host.

As the success of our future operations in the interior of Persia must mainly depend on our cavalry, the utmost exertions should be used to enrol as numerous a body as possible of mounted Arabs, and to bring them into the best state of discipline practicable, during the season of inactivity—namely, from the beginning of the hot weather to the end of the monsoon. Colonel John Jacob, of the Bombay Army, I would earnestly recommend should be entrusted with this duty, as well as with the command of the entire cavalry forces, with local rank of Major-General, to enable him effectively to exert his authority, and to place him in the position of second in command of the army. By this arrangement a most efficient leader would be secured should death or sickness remove me from the command with which I have been honoured.

To officer these Arab levies, some active subalterns from India should be placed at Colonel Jacob's disposal; those who have acquired a knowledge of Arabic being especially selected. If Lieutenant Playfair, the Assistant Resident at Aden, could be placed on Colonel Jacob's staff, his experience among Arabs, and his knowledge of their language, would prove very valuable.

The additions to the present force above suggested may suffice through the hot season and until the termination of the monsoon, when such reinforcements as may be deemed adequate for the more extended opera-

tions which may then become necessary, can be brought from India in September; ample provision in carriage, cattle, and supplies being in the interim prepared for their reception. Our activity in collecting this material, and exaggerated reports of the magnitude of the approaching armament, would doubtless have due effect at Tehran.

If European Dragoons—say two squadrons—could at once be despatched from Bombay to join the advanced force at Shuster, it would be very advisable; I think they should be provided as an indication that greater objects are intended than the mere occupation of the coast.

In conclusion, I think it my duty to bring to your notice, that, for the efficient execution of the duties with which I am charged, I should require the aid in the military department of a military secretary and aide-de-camp, with the joint duties of private secretary; and, in the political department, an assistant thoroughly conversant with the Persian language. The Reverend Mr. Badger will, I am sure, should he be attached to the force as chaplain, willingly afford me his valuable aid as Arabic interpreter.

I have, &c.,
J. OUTRAM.

To Mr. Secretary Edmonstone.

Red Sea,

MY DEAR EDMONSTONE, *9th December, 1856.*

Since I despatched my letter to you from Suez, I have written to the President, forwarding a copy of my letter to you; and as I have entered more fully in my communication to him into the consideration of our contemplated measures than I had done in my letter to you, I now prepare a copy of that to Mr.

Vernon Smith to forward to you from Aden, where we shall probably arrive before the departure of the Bengal steamer; and I beg you will do me the favour to submit it to the Governor-General simultaneously with my previous letter.

I shall anxiously look for a telegraphic message from you about a week after my arrival in Bombay, when you will, I suppose, be in possession of my letters.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Chairman of the East India Company.

"Pekin," Red Sea,

MY DEAR FRIEND,

9th December, 1856.

In the hope of meeting the Bengal mail before we reach Aden, I have prepared a letter for Mr. Vernon Smith, inclosing a plan of operations I have submitted to the Governor-General. As it is rather long, I am unable to get a copy ready for you, but doubtless the President will show it to you. Did I not assume this, as a matter of course, I should manage to get it ready; but as it is, I hope you will consider this unnecessary.

Whatever may be decided on as to ulterior operations, should our present demonstration on the Coast of Persia fail in its object of causing the submission of the Shah to our terms, it is of the utmost importance that the question should be considered now, to insure the Government of India being in possession of the views of her Majesty's Ministers in time to effect the requisite preparations, either for adequately reinforcing the army of Persia for operations in the heart of that country, or for the equipment of an army to advance from Shikarpoor against Herat. These preparations should be completed ere October next, when the season for active operations will commence.

I am happy to tell you that, thanks to Mr. Hartley,

a director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, who accompanied us to Cairo, and of Captain Field, the commander of the *Colombo*, the warm clothing was disembarked, and pushed on to Suez, in time to accompany the mail, and all is now safe on board the *Pekin*.

J. OUTRAM.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR,

Red Sea, 9th December, 1856.

The accompanying extracts from a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, enclosing my proposed plan of operations, have been prepared for your information, in the expectation of my being able to forward this letter by the Calcutta mail we hope to meet before we reach Aden.

Your generals accustomed to European warfare alone may consider such a division of our forces as I contemplate somewhat hazardous, but you may rest satisfied that it is not so when you consider that the country intervening between my advanced positions and the interior of Persia is of such a nature that no regular troops in any state of organization, and but very scanty artillery, could be brought against us ; in fact, no troops that would be any match for the compact little divisions I should have in those positions. The enemy could attempt nothing beyond the interruption of our communications ; and those I can render sufficiently secure with the means I rely on having placed at my disposal from India, aided by the Turco-Arabic levies I purpose to organize at Shuster.

I am satisfied that we shall securely maintain such advanced positions until the period arrives for the more serious operations we shall have to commence in October next, should the Shah's submission not be tendered in the interim. By holding those positions we secure the

resources of the whole country below the mountains; and a base for operations, whether against Shiraz from Khist, or against Ispahan from Shuster, should it be decided that war is to be prosecuted in the interior of Persia.

Ere then, I shall have thoroughly acquainted myself with the comparative advantages of either line of operations; and I can then unite my divided forces at either position far more rapidly than the enemy can bring together the armies which, of necessity, he will have prepared to meet us on both the points threatened with invasion.

If it be decided that our operations are to be confined to the expulsion of the Persians from Herat only, then the Government of India will make the requisite preparations for the despatch of a force through the Bolan Pass in October or November next, chiefly to be composed of the troops I should tranship from Persia to Kurrachee, after providing for the maintenance of Bushire and such other places on the coast as we may choose to retain.

In thus suddenly transferring the seat of war from Persia to Affghanistan, we should have greatly the advantage of the enemy, who, by our threatening attitude on the seaboard of Persia, will be compelled to concentrate all his forces in that quarter, withdrawing, doubtless, for that purpose, all the troops now in Affghanistan beyond what may be absolutely necessary to garrison Herat itself.

If anything can terrify the Shah into compliance with our demands before he has actually felt the weight of our power, it will be the appearance of our armies in such threatening proximity to Shiraz and Ispahan. On political grounds, therefore, as well as on military and sanitary considerations, I would hold the advanced

positions I have alluded to, until the latest moment for entering on the next campaign.

I hope her Majesty's Ministers will see the necessity of promptly deciding on the ulterior measures to be pursued, should the present demonstration fail of its hoped-for effect, in order that the requisite preparations for effectually carrying out our objects may be completed by October next.

Either reinforcements for the army in Persia must then be furnished to an adequate amount, for operating in the interior of the country, or commissariat stores, carriage cattle, &c., must be prepared at Shikarpoor in Sindh, for the army, to be sent up the Bolan Pass to Herat. All the additional troops which will return to Kurrachee from Persia, required to compose the army of Herat, to the strength of about 10,000 men, will be assembled there by that time.

Should it be determined to restrict our operations to the latter subject alone, I would not advise any relaxation in our offensive preparations in Persia in the meantime. On the contrary, the more ostentatiously extensive those preparations are, the less opposition will the Herat army have to encounter, as compelling the enemy to direct his strength to the defence of his own territory; and the more formidable we appear in that quarter, moreover, the more likely will be the Shah to submit to our terms.

We shall be equally prepared for either theatre of operations, whether Persia or Affghanistan; and I am equally confident of success on either.

Government, however, must be prepared for more extensive requisitions for troops for carrying on war in the heart of Persia than would be called for to operate against Herat alone.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

P.S.—I beg to call your attention to passages in Count Nesselrode's despatch, addressed to Count Pozzo De Borgo on the 20th October, 1838, having reference to our quarrel with Persia at that date about Herat, for they pretty clearly indicate the course Russia will follow on the present occasion, now that she may even more plausibly assume "the necessity" for counter measures of "security and precaution" when we are in occupation, not merely of an obscure island dependent on Persia, but of the entire maritime towns and districts of Persia itself—a pretext she may be expected the more eagerly to avail herself of when her spirit is far more inimical to Great Britain than it was in 1838, and she is no longer restrained by that wholesome dread of the operations of our fleets in the Baltic which she then was impressed with—for has not a British admiral proclaimed that Cronstadt is impregnable.

The passages I refer to are as follow :—"The Emperor, yielding to the wishes of the Shah, does not hesitate at the present time to appeal to the sentiments of equity entertained by the British Cabinet, with the view of inducing it to put a stop to a state of things which, if prolonged, would end by seriously endangering the tranquillity of Persia, and would thus become to Russia herself a matter of uneasiness, which would compel her in her turn to take measures of security and precaution. . . . Thus, in order, &c., not to excite the disturbances which at that time she desired to prevent, England, according to our intimate conviction, ought not to delay in re-establishing her relations with the Court of Tehran upon the ancient footing; or she should recal her squadron from the Persian Gulf and evacuate the Island of Karrak, which her troops in that quarter have occupied for a time."

At that time we did all Russia asked us to do. It

has yet to be seen how far Russia has adhered to the engagement which she volunteered in the passage which follows the above :—

“ On her thus replacing matters in their ordinary position, England will find us ready to second her in the endeavour to maintain hereafter the Persian Government within the limits which its own interests recommend it not to transgress, and for the future to renounce every expedition like that which it has just been forced to abandon.”

J. O.

To the President of the Board of Control.

Red Sea,

MY DEAR SIR,

9th December, 1856.

I beg to return my grateful thanks for your attention to my solicitation for the aid of Colonel Jacob and a regiment of his Horse. They will indeed be an invaluable addition to the expedition. But I must confess my great disappointment that your desire to confer such rank on Colonel Jacob as would render his assistance more effective than his present rank will permit should have been met by objections which are deemed insuperable at the India House; for in advocating that measure I can most truly declare that I am actuated solely by public considerations.

As a major-general, his services would be available in command of a division of the army, whereas, with his present rank of lieutenant-colonel, he cannot control more than a brigade. But it is chiefly with reference to the possible contingency of my being removed by illness or death, that I am anxious so well tried an officer as Colonel Jacob should be placed in a position to assume the command, thus averting the chance of any evil that

might arise from the conduct of such important interests suddenly devolving on less capable hands.

You are so kind as to say that "we must not think of such an event as your (my) failure." Under the blessing of God, I trust your confidence in me will not prove misplaced; but in entering on so serious an undertaking as war, in a country so far removed from our resources, it were wise to be prepared for such possible contingency as that which I would wish you to provide against.

If, however, the local rank of major-general cannot be conferred on Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob, I beg most earnestly to submit to your consideration a means by which the more efficient rank of colonel may be secured for that officer, without affording ground for cavil in any quarter; for even that rank, though more restricted than I could wish, will enable me to render Colonel Jacob's services more extensively useful than as he is at present situated.

The important services which induced Lord Ellenborough to confer on Lieutenant-Colonel (then Captain) Jacob, many years ago, the great distinction of honorary aide-de-camp to the Governor-General of India, would of themselves, I believe, fully warrant your placing his name before her Majesty, with your recommendation that he be nominated an aide-de-camp to the Queen. But those services have since been eclipsed by the far more important services—administrative as well as military—which he has rendered to the State, as Custodier of the Scinde frontier for fifteen years past.

I would beg to suggest that the opinion of the late Governor-General of India be obtained as to the merits and qualifications of Colonel Jacob, as the testimony of such high authority as Lord Dalhousie must be conclu-

sive as to whether or not that officer is worthy to be recommended to her Majesty for so distinguished an honour.

J. OUTRAM.

*To the Honourable C. A. Murray, Her Majesty's
Ambassador to the Court of Persia.*

On board the "Pekin," 20th December, 1856.

MY DEAR MR. MURRAY,

I presume you have received direct from home a letter to your address from Lord Clarendon, dated 19th November, intimating that during the continuance of hostilities—when necessarily the functions of ambassador are in abeyance—I am to conduct any diplomatic negotiations to which the appearance of our armaments in the Persian Gulf may lead, I having been appointed to the command of the expedition.

I can only say, it will be a most happy day to me when, by the submission of the Shah to our terms, you are enabled to return to Tehran in all honour, and I shall resign into your hands the diplomatic powers with which I am entrusted in the interim.

I know not whether you will continue at Bagdad until you are invited to return to Tehran; but I hope so, as there I shall be within hail of you, to benefit by your advice, which I am sure you will kindly tender to me whenever I may have occasion to seek the aid of your counsel.

In case the letter from Lord Clarendon may not have reached you, I send a transcript of a copy which was furnished to me. And I also beg to submit to you confidentially copies of that addressed at the same time to Lord Stratford, and of my own instructions.

I shall keep this open until an occasion offers for

sending the packet from Bombay—where we shall be to-morrow—to tell you when I expect to arrive at Bushire, where I hope to hear from you.

Pray oblige me with a draft of the commercial treaty you would wish me to require from the Shah, should the opportunity offer.

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J. OUTRAM.

Bombay, 28th December, 1856.

P.S.—We have had no opportunity of sending a packet to Bushire since I arrived; but a steamer is to leave to-morrow, by which I shall despatch this, to the care of General Stalker.

Lord Elphinstone approves of the plan of operations I had prepared before I arrived here, and, indeed, had contemplated even larger reinforcements than I had looked for, which has induced me to revise my original plan. Both that and the revised one I enclose for your information.

From your correspondence with the home authorities, I am happy to observe that you had yourself advised the advance on Shuster, which I contemplate. It is decidedly the move best calculated to inspire the Shah with such wholesome dread as may cause his submission to our terms. At or near Shuster, too, we may hope to come in contact with the Prince Viceroy and his host, when a decisive affair may materially quicken the Shah's decision.

You will, I am sure, kindly afford me the great assistance of your advice, which, when in that quarter, will reach me quickly; for we can easily, I suppose, maintain a direct communication by aid of your Turco-Arabian friends. I should like much to have your opinion as to our best course in raising the levies of Horse we con-

template embodying from among them, the chiefs and tribes we should most look to, and those we should avoid, &c.

It is a great object, if possible, to remove any apprehensions the enemy may entertain of our appearing at Shuster, and thus prevent their taking measures to obstruct our advance, as they otherwise might do, by desolating the country on both banks of the river Karoon. I shall, therefore, try to make it believed here that, now we have taken Bushire, our object in sending up more troops is to advance on Shiraz, and that that is the first great object of the war. I shall ask Stalker and Kemball to encourage this idea at Bushire and Bagdad, and I hope you will do so likewise.

J. O.

To General Stalker, C.B.

On board the "Pekin," 20th Dec., 1856.

MY DEAR STALKER,

Though the papers had reported the probability of your being sent in command of the Persian expedition, your nomination to that command was not positively known to the Home authorities when I was sent for by the President of the Board of Control, five days before the departure of the mail, and offered the command of the army of Persia, in conjunction with sole diplomatic powers. As the object of her Majesty's Government was to unite the military and diplomatic responsibility, I hope you will not feel hurt at my nomination; for certainly no reflection on your military qualifications was intended by those authorities, and I have no doubt I should have been sent in the same manner no matter who had been appointed in India, the object of the Home Government being to send out some one thoroughly and

personally instructed as to their political views. The evils of divided responsibility on such occasions having been too frequently experienced heretofore, it was determined to avoid that excuse for failure.

The enclosed extract from a letter I sent to Mr. Secretary Edmonstone, from Aden, will show you the view in which I hope the Governor-General will regard my nomination to the Persian command, and I trust I have therein correctly estimated your own sentiments.

Her Majesty conferred the local rank of Lieutenant-General on me, in the view of my assuming that command, but they have gazetted me for India only,—consequently I must wait in Bombay till the mistake is rectified, which it will be by next mail I believe, as Captain Green, who overtook me at Malta, tells me that the “Chairs” had noticed the error.

I presume the army will be considerably augmented, and that there will be two divisions,—the head-quarters of the first (comprising all, or most, of the troops now with you) to be at Bushire; the second division to be sent up the Karoon River to Shuster.

I know not whether you may be induced to stay after I relieve you from the command; but if you will do so, I would beg you to keep the command of the first division, and I myself would go with the other. I can only say it will be a source of much gratification to me to be associated with you in the field, and I am sure we should get on well together.

Should you, however, determine on returning to India, pray allow me to take everything off your hands, in the shape of horses and their equipments, military trappings, &c.,—tent equipage and carriage, servants, and kit and supplies of all sorts—for which I shall be exceedingly indebted to you. I shall, however, take up a sufficiency of everything in the hope that you will

stay ; but if you do go, I shall be the better for having all yours in addition.

I shall keep this open until I have seen Lord Elphinstone, lest I may have anything to communicate.

Parill, 28th December, 1856.

P.S.—As there was no steamer to despatch sooner, this packet could not go before, and will now be taken on to you by the *Semiramis*.

I enclose the proposed plan of operations, which is approved of by Lord Elphinstone and his colleagues, but of course is liable to modification, should you, from the local knowledge you have now acquired, think any alteration advisable.

I fancy I shall be with you in about ten or twelve days after you receive this, as I shall leave, I suppose, the day after the next mail arrives.

I congratulate you most heartily on the brilliant victory at Reshire, and on the successful occupation of Bushire. Your summary discomfiture of the enemy will cause the latter to exaggerate your strength vastly in order to excuse their own defeat to the Shah, and may have a wholesome effect on the Royal mind when deliberating on the choice now left to him—between submission to our terms or fighting it out.

I know not which to admire most, the handsome style in which you polished off the foe, or the modest, unpretending style of your despatch. It is admirable !

* * * * *

Pray send an express steamer with the accompanying packet for Mr. Murray, and the enclosed note to Kemball. The latter is open for your perusal. The former should have been so also, so far as I am concerned, but as it contains secret despatches from the Foreign Office, I should not be warranted in leaving them open, though,

when we are together, everything I myself write or receive shall be laid before you.

I hope you will think the move on Khist advisable. Being so elevated, it ought to be more healthy than Bushire for the Europeans—and the detachment there would be regarded at Tehran as the advanced guard of the great army they will hear is coming from India.

In the meanwhile, pray contrive to make it believed that our sole object for the present is the seizure of Shiraz, and that you are only awaiting the reinforcements from India to advance.

I hope you will be able to effect a survey by the Quartermaster-General's Department, so far as Khist. But the party will require strong escort, and should keep a sharp look out against attempts at surprise—ambuscade—and night attacks especially. It would be prudent for the party to proceed as rapidly as possible to Khist in the first place, and then survey leisurely back, to prevent time for any preparation for resistance, to which they might be exposed should they survey as they advanced. It would be well if Captain Jones, or some one well accustomed to the people, could accompany the party. I have recommended that Jones shall retain his position as "Resident in the Persian Gulf."

I fear it will be a month, at least, after I join you before all the reinforcements can be assembled at Bushire, until when, I suppose, you would not think it advisable to move the troops to Khist—but of course your opinion on the matter will guide me.

Yours sincerely, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

(Enclosure to the above.)

Proposed reorganization of the Expeditionary Army in Persia, in the event of her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, one regiment of Scinde Horse, her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, three regiments native

infantry, one troop horse artillery, one company foot artillery, mountain train, one company sappers, being added to the present force.

The army to be divided into two divisions:—

FIRST DIVISION (BUSHIRE, &c.)

Two brigades of infantry.

One brigade of cavalry.

One brigade of artillery.

Engineer department.

1st infantry brigade	{	One European regiment.
		One native regiment.
2nd infantry brigade	{	One European regiment.
		Two native regiments.
Cavalry brigade . .	{	Two squadrons regular cavalry.
		One squadron irregular cavalry.
Artillery brigade . .	{	One troop horse artillery.
		One company foot artillery.
		One battalion reserve artillery.
		Mountain train.

Engineer department. Including two companies of sappers.

From the 1st division it is proposed to detach the—

1st brigade of infantry.

Two squadrons regular cavalry.

Mountain train.

One company sappers.

Troop horse artillery, to Khist.

And one wing of a native regiment to Karrak.

This will leave at Bushire:—

2nd infantry brigade—less one wing of a native regiment.

One squadron irregular cavalry.

One company foot artillery.

One company sappers.

One battalion reserve artillery.

SECOND DIVISION.

One European regiment—H. M.'s 78th Highlanders.

Three native infantry regiments.

H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons.

One regiment Scinde Horse.

One troop horse artillery.

Mountain Train.

One company sappers (Madras).

One company foot artillery.

Arab levies.

To be divided into—

Two brigades of infantry.

One brigade of cavalry.

One brigade of artillery.

Engineer department.

1st infantry brigade .	{	H. M.'s 78th Highlanders.
		One regiment native infantry.
2nd infantry brigade .		Two regiments of native infantry.
	{	H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons.
Cavalry brigade . .		One regiment Scinde Horse.
		Arab levies.
	{	One troop horse artillery.
Artillery brigade . .		One company foot artillery.
		Mountain train.

Engineer department . Including one company of sappers.

Of the Second Division, the 2nd infantry brigade will remain at Mohumra.

The 1st infantry brigade,
The cavalry brigade (with mountain train attached),
The artillery brigade,
Company of sappers,

will be stationed at Shuster.

J OUTRAM.

*To Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to the Government of
India, Foreign Department.*

SIR,

Bombay, 22nd December, 1857.

In conformity with the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, conveyed to me under date the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Governor-General of India in Council, my arrival this day in Bombay. I had the honour to transmit to you from Aden, by the *Bentinck*, certain propositions for submission to his Lordship, your telegraphic reply to which I presume I shall have to await ere I leave for Bushire, if indeed it may not be necessary to delay here until a mistake has been rectified regarding my local brevet rank, which, as I am at present gazetted, will not admit of my assuming command in Persia.

As I find the attention of the Court of Directors had been attracted to the mistake when the last Marseilles mail left, I assume that the next mail will bring the requisite correction. The mistake I refer to is the

limitation of my local rank of Lieutenant-General to the "East India" only.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

JAMES OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Captain Kemball, Resident at Bagdad.

(Secret)

Bombay,

MY DEAR KEMBALL,

28th December, 1856.

As it is probable that our first operation will be the seizure of Mohumra, and advance up the Karoon river to Shuster, I am very desirous to obtain from you all the information you can furnish me with regarding the harbour and town of Mohumra; its capabilities of, and preparations for, resistance; opposition likely to be met with in ascending the river; capabilities of, and preparations for, resistance at Shuster; amount of force supposed to be with the Persian prince at Diz-phool, &c.

The force to be employed on this duty will probably be about equal to that now under General Stalker at Bushire (rather stronger in cavalry, *i. e.*, 14th Dragoons and one regiment of Sindh Horse) for which carriage cattle will be required for the whole to march up by land, the commissariat supplies being chiefly carried up the river in steamers, to protect which the army would encamp daily as near the river as possible. You will, I believe, receive instructions by this opportunity, to commence at once purchasing carriage cattle and supplies.

The more mules you can obtain the better—also yaboos or tattoos, which should be provided with baggage saddles. Camels also, as many as can be obtained.

At Shuster, to what extent may we expect to obtain supplies?

Selby's chart leads us to suppose steamers of light draught can ascend to within five miles of Shuster.

It will be at least six weeks before our fleet conveying the troops can reach Mohumra. But I myself shall, I hope, leave for Bushire about the 8th or 9th proximo, after the arrival of the next English mail, where I trust to hear from you, and shall feel greatly indebted to you for any information you can afford me on the above points, and for any suggestions you may have to offer calculated to promote the success of our undertaking.

At Bushire, and here, I shall try to have it believed that the reinforcements are intended for an advance on Shiraz from Bushire—so I hope they may be little prepared for us on the Karoon. Pray inculcate the same belief at Bagdad and at Bussorah—otherwise the enemy may lay desolate the country bordering on the river.

I shall ask Stalker to send this to you by express steamer, in the hope that your reply, returned by it, may meet me soon after my arrival at Bushire. I hope also to hear from Mr. Murray by the same opportunity.

Our greatest difficulty will be forage, I fear, for our 2,000 horses, on first landing at Mohumra. Some boats carrying stocks of hay should be ready to send to us the moment we reach the place.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Chairman of the East India Company.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Bombay, 1st January, 1857.

Your letter of the 26th November, enclosed in the Governor's packet, I only received on my arrival here. The sight of it upbraids me with the injustice

I did you in supposing you had not written, because I had no letter from you at Malta. Not merely had you written, but you had forgotten none of my requests, and had done everything that was possible to effect the arrangements I had recommended; and I am indeed most deeply grateful to you.

Did we not know the Persians, and bear in mind how shamefully they shuffled out of their pledges to Mr. McNeil in 1838, under very similar circumstances, the intelligence you communicate in your postscript of Ferukh Khan's promise on the part of the Persian Government to withdraw instantly from Herat, and to give the Herattees indemnity, might encourage me to hope for a speedy arrangement of our differences; but I fear those promises were held out merely to gain time, and so avert the threatened occupation of Bushire. It is well, therefore, I think, that a blow has already been struck there likely to inspire the Shah with a wholesome dread of the consequences of persisting in his hostile course; for doubtless the troops defeated at Bushire will vastly exaggerate our strength to lessen their own disgrace. And when it is seen by the arrival of reinforcements, and our preparations for a forward movement, that we are bent on more serious measures, I do hope that he will become amenable to reason; for no doubt his Minister had led his Majesty to believe that nothing beyond the occupation of Bushire would be attempted.

I have been received most kindly by Lord Elphinstone, and have enjoyed the most complete support from his Lordship and his Council. They had, indeed, themselves contemplated the advisability of an advance to Shuster, before they saw my plan of operations which I submitted to the Governor-General from Aden, and they were prepared to send H. M.'s 78th High-

landers, in addition to the reinforcements I had proposed. As the Prince Viceroy of Khuzistan is reported to have a force of 8,000 men at Dizphool, who doubtless will endeavour to obstruct our movements to Shuster, it is certainly prudent to have another European regiment in the field, especially as the 2nd Europeans are said to be still in a sickly state.

I enclose a copy of a letter I have written to Stalker, to show you the terms on which we are likely to stand. Also a memorandum, showing the proposed organization of the augmented force—should the Governor-General sanction it, which possibly we may learn before the mail starts. I go up to Bushire as soon as possible after the receipt of next mail, which I hope may bring out Fred, that I may take him up with me. In the meantime, Captain Hervey is acting for him.

As I have nothing to communicate to Mr. Mangles worth troubling him with, I do not write to him by this mail—neither have I written to the President.

J. OUTRAM.

*To Mr. Anderson, Secretary to the Government of
Bombay.*

SIR,

Parill, 7th January, 1857.

With reference to the letter dated East India House, 19th November, 1856, and my appointment to command the troops in Persia, and also to the duty which is to be entrusted to me of conducting the diplomatic affairs in that country, I have the honour to request that you will do me the favour to submit to the Right Hon. the Governor in Council the necessity of my having attached to my personal staff an officer, as private secretary, with a suitable establishment. I would also solicit, with regard to the contemplated organization

of Arab levies, that the Rev. Mr. Badger, who could also act as chaplain to the forces, may be appointed Arab interpreter with an adequate native establishment.

I have the honour, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

*To the Military Secretary to the Government of
Bombay.*

SIR,

Parill, 7th January, 1857.

Having been informed by the second paragraph of Mr. Secretary Anderson's letter, No. 10, of 1857, dated Bombay Castle, 5th January, 1857, that I am to be allowed a similar staff to that granted to Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, when commanding the Bombay column of the army of the Indus in the year 1838, I have the honour to request that you will do me the favour to submit the names of the following officers to the Right Hon. the Governor in Council, to fill the situations hereafter detailed, viz.:—

Military Secretary and Aide-de-camp, Captain M. J. Green, 16th Regiment Native Infantry.

Aide-de-camp.

Persian Interpreter, Captain C. P. Arthur, 1st Lancers.

I do not require the services of a medical officer, as allowed to Sir J. Keane, but I should be glad to have an experienced apothecary attached to my staff; such a warrant officer having been sanctioned in addition to the surgeon during the war of 1838.

I beg also to be allowed the usual number of tent Lascars.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

*To Colonel Melvill, Military Secretary to Government,
Bombay.*

SIR,

Parill, 8th January, 1857.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, No. 124, I have the honour to propose, for the consideration of the Right Hon. the Governor in Council, that a roomy transport be provided for the accommodation of the sick and convalescents of the 2nd Division, it being probable that Mohumra, the intended base of the operations of that division, will afford no salubrious position for a stationary hospital on shore.

The sick of the 2nd division would be well cared for in such a transport until opportunity offered of transporting portions, from time to time, to the stationary hospitals at Karrak: thus room for such further drafts of sick as may subsequently arrive from the interior will be provided.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

To the Military Secretary to Government, Bombay.

SIR,

Parill, 9th January, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 122, dated 7th instant, previous to the receipt of which I had already forwarded to you the names of the officers I am desirous should form my personal staff.

With reference to the second and third paragraphs of your letter, I beg to state that the proposed formation of the head-quarter staff, as shown to me by the Adjutant-General and yourself, appears complete and efficient with one exception.

I allude to the omission therein of a "chief of the staff," as proposed by his Excellency the Commander-

in-Chief, and submitted with his recommendation by his Lordship the Governor for the confirmation of the Governor-General.

I had scrupled at first to ask for the aid of such a functionary, until I found that an officer was attached in that capacity to the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Contingent, and was also allowed in the Cape war, when the commanders in neither case were burdened with the diplomatic and political duties which will devolve on me; and which must impose on me such an amount of official labour, that I should have but little leisure to devote to details, from the consideration of which a chief of the staff would relieve me.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

To the Military Secretary to Government, Bombay.

MY DEAR MELVILL,

12th January, 1857.

In accordance with your request, I note down the order in which I should wish the troops of the 2nd Division to be despatched.

First brigade of infantry to sail as soon as practicable.

The second brigade of infantry and horsed battery of artillery to follow as soon as they can conveniently be despatched.

This portion of the troops to be sent direct to Bushire, unless it may be necessary to touch anywhere for water. As it is possible they may be detained (at least the 1st Brigade) some days on shipboard at Bushire, they should be as little crowded as possible; for if, on my arrival at Bushire, I find it advisable to proceed at once to Mohumra, it would not of course be worth while to land the 1st Brigade for the short interval that would elapse ere the junction of the 2nd Brigade.

The troops on board to be provisioned and watered for a month, ere the termination of which time, it is to be hoped they would be in occupation of Mohumra. And provisions should be prepared either to accompany, or soon after to follow, those brigades for at least another month.

The 14th Dragoons, Horse Artillery, and Jacob's Horse, to be despatched about ten days after the departure of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, to sail direct to Mohumra.

When once started, the transports should make the best of their way to their destinations without waiting for each other.

The guns and ordnance of the mountain-train to be sent with either the 1st or the 2nd Infantry Brigade, as most convenient, and to be arranged so that one-half may be landed at Bushire for Stalker.

Please let me know the probable dates of despatch and arrival of the several detachments.

Can you oblige me with a memorandum of steamers, gun-boats, &c., that will be at my disposal, with their armaments, draft of water, &c.

Pray also inform me if any, and if so, what carriage cattle may be expected with the troops from Bombay or Kurrachee.

J. OUTRAM.

To Viscount Canning, Governor-General of India.

MY LORD, *Bombay, 13th January, 1857.*

Your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 7th instant, directed me to "write to you fully before I go, and say whether I have any change to suggest." Accordingly, I have now the honour to address your Lordship personally.

My departure has been unavoidably delayed longer

than I would have wished, chiefly owing to the error in my brevet, which however has been rectified in the *Home Gazette* received by the mail last night. But as no further operations could be undertaken until the reinforcements intended for the expeditionary army now in preparation had arrived at Bushire, and as no communication from the Court of Tehran is likely to be received there in the interval, I could not be better employed than in personally submitting to this Government, which does me the honour of consulting me, my suggestions regarding the organization, &c., of the additional troops about to be despatched, and which have been provided, I consider, to the full extent requisite for carrying out our present objects—and with so complete and liberal an equipment in every respect, that I have no changes to suggest to your Lordship.

But I have recommended as a precautionary measure, and with a view to political effect, that two more native regiments be warned for service, in readiness to meet General Stalker's demand for reinforcements hereafter, should I find it necessary to draw more largely on his division than I at present anticipate, in support of the contemplated movement on Shuster, and because the intelligence which doubtless will be forwarded to Tehran with the usual exaggerations, of still further armaments being in preparation, may have an advantageous effect on the councils of the Shah.

The second division of the expeditionary force has now been organized, and will, I believe, be sent to Persia in the order suggested in the accompanying copy of a note which I have addressed to the Military Secretary of this Government as soon as the transports are ready, which I am assured will be, for the first infantry brigade, on or about the 19th instant; for the second a week afterwards, and for the cavalry in

about ten days after the last of the infantry have sailed.

I myself leave in the *Semiramis* on Thursday, the 15th instant, touching at Kurrachee to communicate with General Jacob, and I expect to reach Bushire about a week or ten days before the first of the reinforcements.

During this interval, I shall have thoroughly acquainted myself with the relative advantages of the proposed advanced posts of Khisht and Shuster, whether as regards sanitary considerations, or the facilities afforded by either route for future operations in the interior—in order that, should it not be found prudent to occupy both, in consequence of a more formidable opposition being prepared than our previous information had led us to anticipate, I may be enabled to decide which to choose; for should the power of the enemy be such in either quarter as must cause a battle to be fought ere the desired position is attained, it may be necessary to hold such post in greater strength than would admit of such division of the forces as I had contemplated in the event of meeting the slight or no opposition which was expected on first establishing ourselves.

Should the enemy really be mustering in advance of Bushire in such force as General Stalker is led to believe, it is next to certain their object is to oppose our advance on Shiraz; for they would hardly have the temerity to attack our entrenched position in front of Bushire. In that case, the passes below Khist would afford positions so naturally strong, and which they would not fail to improve by art, that we may be exposed to severe loss ere we make our footing sure at Khist. And then it might require our whole means, thus weakened by battle, to maintain our position there;

for the neighbouring tribes are not to be depended on, being, I believe, chiefly Sheeahs, who are more subservient to the Shah's Government than are the half Arab-Sunni tribes who intervene between Shuster and Mohumra.

Our advance from Mohumra to Shuster, on the other hand, though liable to be opposed by the army of the Viceroy of Khuzistan, represented at from 3 to 8,000 men, has no great physical difficulties to contend against—no passes to surmount—and our army there would possess the advantage of water-carriage for its supplies, and a better provision of land-carriage than can be obtained at Bushire.

The neighbourhood of Shuster, moreover, is described as abounding in forage, fuel, and water; and the population being Sunnies, with strong ties of connection with the Turco-Arabian tribes in their vicinity, are generally, it is said, bitterly inimical to their Sheeah rulers, and would, it may be hoped, readily be induced to favour our cause. Our vicinity to the Turkish frontier would, besides, facilitate the organization of the Turco-Arabian levies.

So far as at present informed, therefore, I should be disposed, on military grounds, to choose Shuster in preference to Khist for occupation this season, if both cannot be maintained.

On sanitary considerations, too, it appears preferable, because, while the salubrity of Shuster has been tested by a two years' residence of Sir William Williams, and testified to by Layard, Chesney, and others, Khist has never been tried.

Political considerations also appear to weigh in favour of Shuster, provided access to the interior of Persia is as feasible thence as from Khist. Accounts differ so much, that it is impossible to form any judgment

on this point ; but certainly nothing can be worse than the passes between the latter place and Shiraz for military operations ; and the Court of Tehran will doubtless feel that they are as vulnerable from the one quarter as the other to the armies which forced the Khyber—Ispahan being as directly menaced from Shuster as Shiraz from Khist ; being less prepared (so far as I can learn) for resistance than Shiraz, and being nearer to the capital. Our occupation of Shuster, therefore, is likely to have greater effect on the popular mind in Persia than our holding Khist would have, more especially, if, as I hope, we have opportunity for defeating the Viceroy's army, which doubtless will move from Dizphool to oppose us. While, at the same time, the disaffection (to the Persian Government) of the tribes in the former quarter, which we may reasonably calculate on being more or less displayed, and the active organization of our Arab levies, must naturally more strongly impress the Shah with our determined purpose than the mere holding of Khist would do, where neither levies could be organized, nor carriage, nor supplies, obtained to any extent.

Shuster, being further from Mohumra than Khist from Bushire, might be more difficult to support were the intervening tribes hostile, and were it not that we have the river Karoon to aid us, navigable to our armed steamers. But there, not merely are the people likely to be with us, but we shall soon have more ample means for controlling the intermediate country, in our Arab levies, than we ever could have at Khist, where we should be too far from the Turkish frontier to obtain the services of the tribes we wish to embody. And the increasing strength of our levies would, I hope, prevent the necessity for further reinforcements until the season for active operations in October next.

Should I find, therefore, that it is impracticable to maintain both Khist and Shuster, I may probably confine our operations to the latter quarter. In which case, it may be advisable to borrow one of General Stalker's European regiments and some of his European artillery, with the double view of adding to our strength on the Karoon and securing better climate for the Europeans; and General Stalker's attention would be confined for the present to the defence of Bushire, and holding Karrak, for which the troops then left to him would, I think, amply suffice.

Materials for the barracks of one European regiment have been provided, and may, I hope, be furnished for the remainder of his European artillery, but certainly it would be impossible to prepare accommodation for more Europeans at Bushire. The native troops can have nothing but tents, I fear.

Hospitals are preparing at Karrak, which place was found remarkably healthy when we held it formerly. These will receive the sick of the 1st, or Bushire, Division, as well as such of the 2nd Division as may be sent from time to time from Mohumra, where a transport hospital-ship will be stationed for the reception of the sick of the 2nd Division, sent down from the interior.

Of course, there will be no time to prepare much shelter for the Europeans at Shuster; for we can hardly arrive there before the commencement of the hot season, but it is to be hoped we may find means for covering their tents with grass "chuppers."

I shall not fail to keep your Lordship duly informed of all my proceedings.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

To the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 14th January, 1857.

Since despatching my letter of yesterday, I have reconsidered the questions contained in your Lordship's letter of the 3rd instant, and I think I had, in anticipation, fully met your inquiry as to the "allowance I would make for sickness," or, to "what rate I would expect to receive reinforcements during or before summer," by my proposition for two native regiments to be warned for service to meet General Stalker's requirements, should I have occasion to draw on his division more largely for Shushter than at present I anticipate.

Either sickness or other causes may possibly, however, oblige me to transfer one or even two native regiments from Bushire to Mohumra, in which case, General Stalker would look for reinforcements to the same extent from Bombay. But I hardly expect this; for I hope to secure the good will of the population bordering on the Karoon River, that the Arab levies may soon come into play, and that I may thus avert the necessity for stationing many of our own troops on that line of communication.

It only occurs to me to add, to what I have already written to your Lordship, that I purpose enlisting the Arabs on pledge for service only so long as the war lasts; and perhaps some three or six months gratuity on discharge. May I beg your authority for giving such promise, should it become necessary.

From what your Lordship remarks regarding Affghanistan, I perceive that military operations there are not to be thought of; but had we found it necessary to transfer the war to that country, we should, I presume, have held what we had in Persia till the close of the war. In that case the levies would have aided in main-

taining such positions as we might have thought proper to retain.

I am gratefully sensible of the kindly consideration expressed at the conclusion of your Lordship's letter, regarding my position in Oude, and respecting my health, which, I am happy to assure you, is now equal to any amount of exertion.

I shall not fail, as desired by your Lordship, to write constantly and unreservedly.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Quartermaster-General of the Army, Bombay.

SIR,

Parill, 14th January, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 13th instant, with enclosures. I consider that the arrangements regarding office-tent carriage to staff officers, which General Stalker has already found so inconvenient while the troops are stationary, must prove exceedingly embarrassing and detrimental to the public service when the army has to operate at a distance from the shore.

I would, therefore, most respectfully recommend, that the proposals contained in your letter, No. 3,482, dated 5th November, 1856, to the address of the military secretary, should be again laid before Government, with my request that they be reconsidered, on the ground that more extended operations are now intended than were contemplated when Government negatived your suggestions.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

Extract from a letter to Colonel Sykes, Bombay, 15th January, 1857:—

"I have delayed till the last moment, in hope of further accounts from Bushire, and now have only time to write a hasty line, referring

you to the accompanying copies of letters to the Governor-General for all I have to say as to our prospects and purposes.

"I have sent a copy of the same to the President, and you must await my report from Bushire, ere you can learn what our next operations may be.

"If I find the enemy in that neighbourhood within tangible distance, and I have the means of moving a sufficient force thus far, and they are in an assailable position, I shall, of course, attack the Persian troops. If not, content myself with leaving Stalker sufficient defensive means, and go on at once to Mohumra.

"J. OUTRAM."

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Bombay, 15th January, 1857.*

I leave for Persia to-day, and shall shortly be followed by the additional troops which have been in the course of organization since I arrived here on the 22nd ultimo.

My next from Bushire will inform you what we have in prospect more clearly than I can at present indicate; but you will gather what I expect to have to do from the enclosed copies of letters I have addressed to the Governor-General.

Nothing could exceed the cordiality of the support I have received from Lord Elphinstone and the Bombay Government, and heads of all departments here, in equipping the reinforcements about to be despatched. And I have perfect confidence in the small but very complete force I shall have under me, as it is composed of admirable material in all its branches.

The plan of operations which I submitted to the Governor-General from Aden, of which a copy was furnished to you, may require to be somewhat modified, perhaps, should the enemy occupy the passes below Khist, in the strength which it is now supposed they possess there. And my letter to the Governor-General details the alterations proposed in the event of certain contingencies.

To what I have therein said, I have nothing further now to add. Since my first was written, I have heard from his Lordship, dated 3rd instant, who generally approves of my proposed measures.

I have been particularly indebted to Colonel Holland, the quartermaster-general of the Bombay army, for the very valuable and able assistance he has so cheerfully given to Government, and to me personally, at a time when about to relinquish his important office on account of failing health. He will soon, I believe, return to England; and I would beg to refer you to that officer for any information you may require on local matters, as one in whose knowledge and judgment I have the utmost confidence; and I am sure he would at all times be happy to afford every information in his power.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD,

Bombay, 15th January, 1857.

I know not what foundation the claim of the Porte to Mohumra may possess, which has been advanced I understand, or is likely to be so, nor am I aware how far it may be deemed politic, or otherwise, to implicate the Turks as principals in our quarrel with Persia. But it occurs to me that the question is worthy of your Lordship's consideration, as involving important consequence to our military operations in that quarter; whether it may not be advisable, after we have obtained possession of Mohumra, to make that town over to such troops as the Pacha of Bagdad might afford for its occupation (should I find they are capable of holding the place, and may be trusted with the maintenance of the position when we advance towards Shuster), and thus relieve our troops from an unhealthy and perhaps harassing charge.

The Porte being thus brought into the position of a belligerent ally, we should be secured from any obstruction to the recruiting of our Arab levies within the Turkish frontier, to which possibly we may otherwise be exposed. And other advantages may be obtained from its active, or even passive, co-operation, should we hereafter have to carry the war into the interior of Persia, for instance, in the event of the direct road from Bagdad to Ispahan being thrown open to us, which cannot be available so long as the Porte is strictly neutral.

Your Lordship's instructions regarding this matter would overtake me probably before I reached Mohumra; or, should you not deem yourself warranted in authorizing the measure I suggest, your opinions, if submitted to her Majesty's Government by the first mail, might elicit direct instructions, to be forwarded to me *viâ* Bagdad, in time to enable me to carry out the arrangement ere the hot weather has commenced.

I propose forwarding a copy of this note to the President of the Board of Control by the mail of tomorrow, in order that the Cabinet may be prepared to meet the question when submitted by your Lordship, should it not already have been under their consideration.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.

MY DEAR SIR, *Bombay, 15th January, 1857.*

Since I wrote to you this morning, a question has occurred to me, of great importance, which I have submitted to the Governor-General, informing his Lordship that I should forward a copy of my letter to you, which accordingly I have the honour to do.

I am aware that I am somewhat irregular in seeking instructions from the Governor-General in matters

relating solely to Persian and Turkish policy—for which I ought to look to her Majesty's ministers alone—but I have learnt that a messenger from Lord Stratford passed on to Calcutta by the steamer which took the last mail, and he possibly may have carried communications from the Ambassador on this very subject of Mohumra; his Lordship being unaware, perhaps, that the delay of a fortnight at least would thereby be caused, before the Governor-General's instructions could arrive at Bombay.

Should Lord Stratford's communication not convey the orders of her Majesty's Ministers, the Governor-General will not, of course consider himself warranted in giving me the requisite authority, and thus no harm will have been done by referring the question to his Lordship, although, perhaps, I ought to have confined myself to addressing yourself, or Lord Clarendon, alone.

My object was to save time, and I beg you will accept my apologies if I have erred.

J. OUTRAM.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, Governor of
Bombay.*

MY LORD, *At Sea, 21st January, 1857.*

Since despatching my hasty note to your Lordship from Kurrachee, where we stayed six hours, it has occurred to me that possibly the account of the disturbances on the Scinde frontier—or, rather beyond the frontier in the Khelat territory—may incline the Governor-General, or yourself, to countermand General Jacob and the Scinde Horse. I write to implore your Lordship to allow them to come on under any circumstances, for I consider that the success of my operations depend mainly, if not entirely, on their aid. No other Horse could supply their place; for no Irregular Cavalry

in India could impart the tone with which they would inspire the Arab levies—certainly not the Southern Mahratta or Poona Horse, nor any of the Bengal Irregulars I have seen, nor even the Nizam's Horse. The latter, though bearing so high a character, would soon become *yagee* if kept for any time at such a distance from their homes, or exposed to unusual privations, and they have been too much addicted to turn upon their officers to be trusted on such a service, where doubtless their fidelity would be exposed to much temptation from our wily foes.

In fact, I look upon the presence of the Scinde Horse and General Jacob as indispensable to secure the success of any forward move, and even to enable us to advance to, and maintain our ground at, Shuster; for, to do so, we must depend greatly on our Arab levies, and they must be formed on the nucleus of Jacob's Horse.

In undertaking this duty, I mainly relied on the aid of General Jacob and his Horse, and they were promised to me when in England; I certainly shall feel utterly crippled without them, for I could not move to any distance from the coast, or maintain the position at Shuster without them.

If disturbances of a serious nature are apprehended on the Scinde frontier, an Irregular Cavalry Regiment can be moved down from the Punjaub in as little time as Jacob's Horse could get back from Kurrachee; and Captain Merewether, so long trained in the Jacob school, can be thoroughly depended on for carrying out the same measures that Jacob himself would adopt were he to remain. He might be allowed to select additional officers, if necessary, from the troops in Scinde or the Punjaub, and would raise another body of horse on the foundation of the regiment which remains with him.

I entreat your Lordship, therefore, to allow General Jacob and the Horse to come on, or, to communicate this—my most earnest remonstrance—to the Governor-General, should he suspend their despatch by telegraph.

Should, however, his Lordship insist on either General Jacob or his Horse remaining in Scinde, at least do not keep both, but let me have either him or his regiment; in the latter case under command of Major Green, with higher local rank, whom I should require to command the Arab levies if Colonel Jacob does not come.

But I shall consider myself deprived of my right arm if Colonel Jacob is withdrawn.

Your Lordship's compliance with my request will be but an additional obligation to the load of kindness for which I am already indebted to you.

J. OUTRAM.

P.S.—We have not spoken a single vessel from Bushire since we left Bombay, and had no later intelligence thence at Kurrachee.

This is written in readiness for any vessel we may happen to meet.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.H.
Bombay.*

MY DEAR LORD, *Bassadore, 25th January, 1857.*

The flat we towed from Kurrachee, and a squall we encountered has delayed us so long. We arrived here this morning, and leave again at mid-day.

The *Ajdaha* is here, and has been occupied for a month past in preparing two batteries for 68-pounders (one in each) nearly a mile from the Bunder, and from the buildings and stores they have to protect, besides requiring an armed steamer to prevent an enemy land-

ing and cutting off the communication. To man these batteries, and a 12-pounder and two field pieces placed elsewhere, there is a guard of some seventy marine sepoy, with no native officers, and only one havildar at the head of the whole, so far as I can ascertain.

I have ordered the guns to be withdrawn to a position closer to the coal stores, &c., where they can effectually protect everything, and are together. After they have been placed in the new position, the services of the steamer may be safely dispensed with there, the *Constance* being sufficient for the protection of the place. This will occupy the *Ajdaha* two or three days, when she will proceed to Bombay, where, doubtless, she is required.

We have had no opportunity of despatching the letters we wrote the day after leaving Kurrachee, in the expectation of meeting a vessel going down; so the *Ajdaha* will take one which I then addressed to your Lordship, as well as this.

We have no late accounts here from Bushire.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.B.

MY DEAR LORD, *Bushire, 27th January, 1857.*

We arrived this afternoon. General Stalker met me before I reached the shore, in the *Sir Jamsetjee*, in which he was coming off to receive me. He welcomed me most cordially, and is evidently heartily glad that I have arrived, and is most ready to meet all my requirements for Mohumra, where I find we may look for serious opposition. Accounts differ as to the enemy's preparations there, but all agree in stating that their numbers are considerable (4,000 to 5,000), independent of the Arab tribes who may be expected to hold with them until we have struck the first blow, and discom-

fited their Persian masters. Then, doubtless, they too would turn against them, but not before.

The Persians have been busily stockading for some time past at Mohumra; and their works, as described to me—earth works, staked with felled date-trees sloping outward—will not be carried without loss, unless we can enfilade them from our floating batteries. Unfortunately our best steamers, the *Assaye*, *Punjaub*, and *Feroze*, are all away, and none of them will come back with the 1st Brigade. We hope the *Punjaub* may be with the 2nd Regiment, but the *Assaye* and *Feroze* can only be looked for with the cavalry, and we must be in the possession of Mohumra before the cavalry arrive. The *Berenice* was prepared to start for Bombay to-morrow morning, with some fifty European invalids and other matters, and, should I find Comodore Ethersey approves, whom I am to see early to-morrow morning, she will be instructed to call at Bassadore, and send the *Ajdaha* here, should the latter not yet have left in accordance with my order for her to proceed to Bombay, as I had already explained.

But I fear she may have left before the *Berenice* arrives at Bassadore, in which case we must do as well as we can with the old *Semiramis*, the *Clive*, the *Falkland*, and the gun-boats, which will suffice no doubt, only we should be more able to do the work rapidly and well, with another steam-frigate to tow and protect our unwieldy transports, all of which, it is to be hoped, will be able to get up the river.

Mr. Murray is here, with whom I had an interview after landing at the residency. He met me, I am happy to say, as cordially as did General Stalker. I purpose sending Captain Jones in the *Hugh Lindsay* to-morrow to Bussorah, whence he will open communications with the Chaab Arabs (the owners of Mohumra)

to impress upon them the advisability of their remaining neutral during our contest with the Persians in their neighbourhood, to preserve Mohumra from the damage to which it inevitably will be exposed should they act hostilely towards us, while at the same time assuring them of good treatment should they act in our favour. Thus, I trust, they may be induced to turn against our enemy after we have defeated him, and so do him the damage which our deficiency in cavalry will disable us from effecting. My chief object in opening negotiations with the Arabs is, however, to avert collision with them during our first encounter with the Persians in their territory, it being so obviously our policy to secure their friendly co-operation, or connivance at least, ere we pass up the Karoon, beyond their confines.

I shall not close this note till I have seen the Commodore in the morning, and concluded my arrangements with Captain Jones.

J. OUTRAM.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Bushire, January 28th, 1857.*

My official reports of proceedings will go by Bombay; but as an opportunity offers for sending a packet to Bagdad, I avail myself of it to inform you that I arrived and assumed command of the Expeditionary Force yesterday evening, and found everything going on satisfactorily in this camp. General Stalker welcomed me most heartily, and cheerfully retains his command under me, like the gallant good soldier he is.

2nd. I learn that the Persians are in considerable force at Mohumra, and have been busily engaged in stockading and strengthening their field works com-

manding the approaches to that town for some time past.

3. In about a week or ten days my infantry and artillery of the 2nd Division will have arrived, when I shall proceed to Mohumra, where, having driven out the Persians, I shall organize the means of land-transport supplies, &c., for our forward movement to Shushter.

4. In this quarter the enemy remains in this position under the passes, into which he would retire should we advance against him. This, however, we have no means of doing, no carriage cattle whatever having yet been obtained for this division, and none being procurable until we have secured our footing at Mohumra.

5. No advantage would, however, be secured by attacking the enemy in his present position, even if we could get at him, for he certainly would retire to the strong positions in his rear, whence we could not expel him without great loss, and to no advantage, as we could not remain there, having no means of conveying provisions so far, and to retire, even after a victory, might have the effect of a defeat. The enemy's object in that quarter being merely to bar our advance on Shiraz, and our position here being unassailable, our main object now is the occupation of Shuster, after the preliminary measures at Mohumra.

6. In a note which I addressed to you just before leaving Bombay, I put a question respecting the possible contingency of the Turks claiming Mohumra after we had driven the Persians thence. I have ascertained, however, since I arrived here, that it would be impolitic to plant the Turks there at present, under any circumstances; for their rule would be as hateful to

the Chaab Arabs (to whom Mohumra belongs) as is that of their Persian tyrants. That measure, consequently, I no longer contemplate, even should it be sanctioned conditionally. As it is, however, a great object to secure the friendly co-operation of the Chaab tribe, or their connivance at least, ere we pass up the Karoon, I purpose despatching the Political Agent, in a steamer to-morrow, to Bussorah, whence he will open communication with the Chaab Chief if practicable, to impress upon him the advisability of his tribe remaining neutral during our contest with the Persians in their neighbourhood, in order to preserve Mohumra from the damage to which it will be exposed should they act hostilely towards us, while at the same time assuring them of good treatment should they act in our favour. Captain Jones will endeavour also to obtain more distinct information than we yet possess as to the strength of the enemy and the nature of their works in that quarter, and by about the time he returns I hope the troops of the 2nd Division will have arrived.

7. I find I shall require some modification of my instructions ere I can carry out the measures on which I chiefly rely for effecting our objects, or, rather, for successfully prosecuting war in Persia, should our present measures fail to induce the Shah's compliance with our demands. I am restricted by my instructions from seeking the aid of any but independent tribes. But it now appears that there are no such independent tribes in the neighbourhood of our intended operations. The tribes in this quarter of Persia are warlike, turbulent, and disaffected to the Persian Government, to which they scarcely more than nominally submit; but they are all on Persian soil, and undoubtedly are Persian subjects. Then, as we proceed further west, or north-

west, we find other predatory Arab tribes and Kurds; but these again are Turkish subjects, and any attempt at enrolling them might be seized upon by Russia as a pretext to interfere, on the ground that the neutrality of Turkey is thus compromised.

8. Lord Clarendon's instructions assume that there are independent tribes, and I had hoped that such there might be, though I had looked for my levies chiefly from among the Turco-Arabian tribes, bordering on the confines of Persia. Should I be debarred from recruiting from the nominal subjects of either Turkey or Persia, I shall be awkwardly situated, and deprived of one of the principal means for successful operations on which I had relied.

9. I beg you will submit the question to the deliberation of Government, whether I may entertain in our ranks members of these semi-independent tribes on either side of the border; or, if not on both, on which side, or neither? But as regards the Persian territory, we have to pass through to Shuster; either we must avail ourselves of the assistance of the warlike Persian nomadic tribes, or we must be prepared to incur their hostility; neutral they cannot remain. The tribes to which I refer are the Chaab, the Bene Lane, the Fyllie, and the Buktyari. Some of these are found both in Turkish and Persian territory, and some of them spend half the year on Persian and half on Turkish soil; yet all have a certain recognised location for their pasture, and pay, or are supposed to pay, tribute to Turkish or Persian governors.

10. It appears to me that we need not scruple to avail ourselves of the services of members of the above-mentioned tribes, provided we make it a condition in the treaty that an amnesty is to be proclaimed to all who

may have in any way befriended us during the war. This, while not supporting any claim to future independence on the part of the tribes, would guarantee them from oppression on the ground of the past, and so far I think we could pledge ourselves without cause for future embarrassment.

11. I should have addressed you officially on this subject, but really have no time, as the despatch to Bagdad is about to start and cannot be delayed. I entreat that you will obtain for me Lord Clarendon's instructions regarding these points as early as practicable, sending duplicates *via* Bagdad to Major Kemball's care, with directions to forward them immediately. If a telegraphic message through Lord Stratford could reach me sooner, pray communicate by that means.

12. It has been suggested to me that the Shah may seek to substitute the nephew of the Sudr Azeem as Minister, on complying with our demand for the dismissal of the latter, which would be a mere evasion, likely to lead to further embroilments hereafter. The repeated instances of tyranny and cruelty, on the part of this nephew, the Caimacam, Governor of Tabreez, reported to her Majesty's Government by the British Consul at Tabreez, elicited instructions from Lord Clarendon to the ambassador, to the effect that Mr. Murray should demand of the Persian Government that the Caimacam (then absent on leave) should not be allowed to return to Tabreez as governor.

13. Should the Shah desire to appoint this man in lieu of the dismissed Minister, the consequences must be prejudicial to the interests of England as well as of Persia itself. Should I, therefore, in negotiating the treaty, insist on the dismissal of the Sudr Azeem, includ-

ing also the non-appointment of his brother, nephew, or any relative of the Sudr Azeem?

14. Mr. Murray has, he tells me, recommended this, but as no answer has been received, I am anxious to be instructed also on this point at an early period.

15. From the little information I have been able to obtain here, it appears very probable, at least so the higher classes of Persians here think, that if the Shah does not succumb in consequence of the capture of Bushire, he will do so on learning that we have advanced to Shuster.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Governor-General of India.

Camp at Bushire,

14th February, 1857.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I arrived at Bushire, on the 27th ultimo, when I learnt that extensive preparations were being organized by the enemy, which at first I was led to believe were merely intended to bar our advance to Shiraz; and, as I supposed, their troops were immediately under the passes, into which they would retire at our approach, I did not contemplate the advisability of proceeding against them until the capture of Mohumra had opened a supply of carriage cattle, with which we are yet unprovided.

2. Subsequently, however, it became apparent that the enemy were concentrating a far greater force than it had hitherto been supposed they possibly could accumulate below the passes. And it was evident that unless now checked, they would soon be in a position to attempt the recapture of Bushire. Moreover, that the Persian Commander-in-Chief, Sooja-ool-Moolk, had

formed an entrenched camp at Borazjoon, said to be about forty-six miles distant, and twelve from the passes, which he occupied with a force of 8,450 regular infantry and cavalry (as detailed in the note),* with seventeen guns and one mortar, and that reinforcements from Tehran, and elsewhere, were rapidly approaching, to the extent of twelve regiments of regular infantry, with thirty-five guns, while preparations were making for raising the tribes, of whom 4,000 would be assembled in twenty-four hours.†

3. Parties of horse had been sent forward, and violent denunciations were proclaimed‡ to deter the country people from furnishing supplies to our camp. And mistrust and apprehension prevailed in the town.

4. It became imperatively necessary, therefore, to strike a blow in this quarter before extending our operations elsewhere. And to enable me to effect this, I determined to land the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division so soon as it should arrive.

5. The first portion of the Brigade, in tow of the *Pottinger*, anchored in the harbour on the 31st ultimo; and the remainder, in tow of the *Precursor*, on the 1st instant. And all were landed by the evening of the 2nd, in light marching order, leaving all surplus baggage on board.

6. On the evening of the 3rd instant, I marched with a force of 4,653 men of all arms, and eighteen

* Detail of the enemy's forces occupying the entrenched camp at Borazjoon:—Fouji Khalsah, 800; 4th Fouji Tabreez, 800; Fouji Shiraz, 600; Fouji Arab, 800; Fouji Shaskar, 800; Tufungehees, 1,000; 2 regiments of Khara-goosloos, 1,000; Shah Selman, 400; Shirazi, or inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Shiraz, 400; Eelyaut Horse, 400; Afsharee Horse, 750; total, 8,450.

† See intelligence Report A., dated February 3rd, on which date reports of previous days had received confirmation through sources which could be relied on.

‡ Of the nature of the annexed specimen B.

guns,* but having barely sufficient carriage cattle for commissariat supplies for three days, we were necessarily without tents, or cover of any sort beyond what the men carried on their backs, in addition to the two days' provisions with which they were supplied.

7. As we were exposed during the six days occupied in this expedition, to frequent heavy rain, the troops suffered much discomfort in bivouack, and still greater hardship on the march, owing to the heavy, spongy nature of the ground they traversed, all which they bore with admirable cheerfulness and fortitude. The shoes of the greater portion of the infantry were literally drawn off their feet in struggling through the mud; and those which remained were rendered so utterly unserviceable, that I have had to issue a new pair from the stores to every European and native infantry soldier. This I have done gratis, and I trust it will meet with your Lordship's approval.

8. My despatch, dated 10th instant, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, will inform your Lordship of our military proceedings. The moral effect of the defeat of the Sooja-ool-Moolk's army, composed of some of the *élite* of the Persian troops, by a British force numerically so inferior,† the capture of his camp, and destruction of his magazine, must prove advantageous to our cause, and will, I think, deter the Persian General, when reinforced by the troops and guns now approaching from Tehran, from appearing before Bushire during my absence at Mohumra.

* Cavalry sabres, 419; European Infantry, 2,212; Native Infantry, 2,022; total, 4,653.

† See intelligence report of information derived from native sources subsequently marked C, from which it would appear that 6,900 men and seven guns were actually engaged. The number of guns with the enemy uncertain, but four only opened fire.

But I consider it urgently requisite that General Stalker should be reinforced as early as possible, by at least another European and two native infantry regiments, with another troop of Horse Artillery and a foot battery horsed—also some guns of position*—to avert the necessity of my detaching to his aid any portion of the force destined for Mohumra and the subsequent advance on Shuster. The latter movement, indeed, on which I mainly rely for securing healthy summer quarters for a portion of the European troops, and for effecting any real impression on Persia (and this chiefly through the organization of the Turco-Arabian levies, who could only be raised in that quarter) would, in that case, have to be abandoned, and our operations would then of necessity be confined to the sea coast.

9. It being known that the enemy had of late been very busy in preparing defensive works at Mohumra, I despatched the *Hugh Lindsay* to Bussorah the day after my arrival, conveying Captain Jones and the Rev. Mr. Badger, with a view to open communication with the Chief of the Chaab Arabs (to whom Mohumra belongs) of a nature which will be gathered from the former officer's report. And I took advantage of this opportunity to depute Captain Malcolm Green, my military secretary and aide-de-camp, to make such military survey of the enemy's works as could be effected from the vessel in passing them on her way up and return. And also Commodore Ethersey and Captain Young, of the Indian Navy, to examine the channels over the bar, and capabilities of the river for naval operations in the vicinity of the point of attack.

* Namely, two 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, with proportion of ammunition.

10. Captain Jones' report of his proceedings, with accompanying chart of the river and sketch of the enemy's works, executed by the above-named gentlemen, are herewith transmitted to the Bombay Government, with a request to furnish your Lordship with a copy.

11. It is my intention to proceed to Mohumra, so soon as the troops can be re-embarked after the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, now long over due.

12. By the latest accounts from Mohumra, I learn that the Prince Governor of Booroojid (Khanler Mirza)* had arrived there with large reinforcements of infantry and cavalry, and eight guns, and that the enemy's force now there may probably be estimated at about 10,000 men of all arms, and sixteen guns.

13. Assuming that the Golundauze Company will accompany that brigade (to be left with General Stalker in substitution for the reserve company of Artillery now here, required for the mountain train), the force for Mohumra will consist of 3,710 men of all arms, as per note.†

14. In the meantime, the chief engineer is occupied in preparing field redoubts for the protection of this camp, should the enemy approach during my absence; and it will depend on his attitude, whether, after garrisoning Mohumra, I return here with the chief portion of the 2nd Division, or advance to Shuster.

15. Contrary to all expectation, founded on the supposition that the passes could not be descended by large guns, or by even light ones, without a vast expen-

* Governor-General of all Persian Arbistan (S.W. Persia).

† H.M.'s 64th, 500; H.M.'s 78th, 550; 26th N.I., 400; 23rd N.I., 750; 20th N.I., 300; Light Battalion, 800; 1 company of Sappers, 100; 1 troop of Horse Artillery, 150; 1 company Foot Artillery, 100; Mountain Train, with reserve company of Artillery, 60; grand total, 3,710.

diture of time and labour, the Persian Government appears to be preparing all its strength to meet us in the low country—a fortunate circumstance if it really carries out that intention; for we may thus be saved the necessity of penetrating above the passes, should we have an opportunity of signally defeating her armies in this neighbourhood. The accompanying *précis* of intelligence marked D, regarding the armaments now in progress to Bushire, which has been gleaned from so many sources that, I believe,* it may generally be relied on, would indicate that the Shah is putting forth his utmost power to oppose us here. Beyond these troops, and those at Mohumra, the Shah has, I think, no disposable forces, unless he recal his army from Herat—a very tedious and problematical operation. But should so great an increase to the forces we have already encountered, really be brought below the passes, further reinforcements may yet be called for; and it may be prudent, therefore, to hold some additional troops in readiness to meet any further requisition I may be compelled to make.

16. It is my obvious policy under these circumstances, to establish my troops in such positions as may best facilitate their junction at any point where the enemy may concentrate his forces in this quarter. This must be somewhere in the neighbourhood of Borazjoon, or between Dalikee and Chahkowta, the positions nearest to the only passes by which his artillery can descend into the plains.

17. The tribes in this neighbourhood, moreover, being more under the control of the Shah's Government

* With the exception of the guns, so many of which I do not think can possibly be brought down; and probably there will be more cavalry and less infantry.

than are the Buckteari and Chaab Tribes in the vicinity of Mohumra and Shuster, necessitate our presence here in greater strength than I can at present afford to leave with General Stalker, at least until the reinforcements I have requested for him shall have arrived. But as our supplies from the westward, on which we are entirely dependent for carriage cattle especially, are utterly cut off while the enemy possesses Mohumra, the capture of that place must be effected as early as practicable. I greatly regret, therefore, that the remainder of the 2nd Division should be so long delayed.

18. Should the European portion of that division return to Bushire, the intention of summering them at Shuster will have to be abandoned; but I still hope, in that case, that after the capture of Mohumra we may obtain sufficient carriage cattle to enable me to advance against the enemy here, ere the heats commence; when, after driving him from the low country, I may find it practicable to establish my camp at Borazjoon for the summer, immediately above which is a table land 3,500 feet above the sea,* where the Europeans may be favourably placed—supported by the native troops encamped below—and with intermediately secure posts of communication with Bushire.

19. Still we have to contemplate the possibility of remaining here. In which case, however, I do not apprehend such deadly effects on the Europeans as we had been led to expect. It is the town of Bushire to which such strong objections are advanced as a residence during the months from August to November inclusive, the earlier summer months not being severe. But the dry sandy plain on which this camp is formed, is a far preferable position, where, during that season,

* *Vide E.*, the report of Superintending Surgeon Mackenzie on Gezagoon.

the poorer classes of the town's-people who do not possess the advantage of upper storied houses, bivouack in the open air at night. And I trust we should be able to provide tolerable shelter by kadjan coverings to the tents of those for whom huts cannot be prepared.*

20. So far as our Persian foes are concerned, I shall, with the reinforcements I have asked for, be sufficiently strong to maintain the country below the passes, namely, Khuzistan and Faristan (including Shuster, should certain restrictions with which I am at present hampered be removed, to which I shall hereafter advert), and prepared to advance to Shiraz whenever the additional troops destined to operate in the interior of Persia, shall have joined. I am now thoroughly informed as to the proper seasons for such movement, and have no hesitation in stating, that, if in time sufficiently strengthened in troops, and supplied with baggage cattle (as I hope we may be), we can occupy Shiraz before winter—up to which point our sepoys would be available; for though Shiraz itself is very cold, they would not, I believe, suffer there if properly housed—at any rate they would suffice to hold Bushire and the line of communication below Shiraz. But during the summer and autumn, the water is bad and scarce; and forage hardly procurable between those two points.

21. On all considerations, therefore, it would appear preferable to defer the advance on Shiraz until the early part of spring (March).

22. There are two routes between Shiraz and Ispahan, which unite at about two-thirds of the way. The one

* Enclosure G. contains the opinions on this subject of Dr. Mackenzie and Stovell.

called the "winter" route, is said to possess but few natural difficulties, and the wild Bukhtiari generally migrate by the other, or "summer" route, during the winter.

23. Between Ispahan and Tehran, the track is fair and practicable for artillery. The march should be accomplished, however, in the cold season, owing to the scarcity of water, especially across the "valley of the Angel of Death." Thus the advance to Shiraz during spring would be in time for the further progress to Tehran in the following winter.

24. With reference to my allusion, in paragraph 20, to certain political restrictions which hamper my proceedings and may render nugatory the chief object of my proposed advance to Shushter, I beg to submit to your Lordship, in explanation, the accompanying extracts, paragraphs 6 to 10 (marked H in the appendix), from a demi-official letter which I addressed to the President of the Board of Control, and despatched *viâ* Bagdad, on the 28th ultimo. In addition to this, I now beg to observe, that whilst something like valid objections might be urged against such an enlistment of the semi-independent Perso-Arab tribes as I therein propose; first, on the ground of political integrity, and secondly, on that of political expediency—prior to any attack made by us upon the territory occupied by such tribes; nevertheless, it seems to me that such objections must lose their force when once the territory is taken possession of by our army, and the inhabitants are virtually our subjects for the time being, by right of conquest. Unless, indeed, this principle is admitted, every Arab, or Persian, on Persain soil, would justly be deemed a traitor who served us with the most insignificant supplies; and, in that case, any attempt to wage war in the country would be futile.

25. Should this, my view of the case, meet with the approbation of her Majesty's Cabinet, to whom I shall submit a copy of this despatch through the President of the Board of Control, I believe its adoption would remove every obstacle, and at the same time be a sufficient reply to any objection which may be raised on the score of our fostering insurrection in the country. Of course this argument applies only to the tribes on Persian soil.

26. Furthermore, I beg to observe, that, in attacking Persia from the south, I am deprived of one of the most essential elements of success, if I am restricted from availing myself of the friendly assistance of those portions of the nomadic population who are known to be hostile to the Persian Government. In fact, the circumstance of the Chaab, Fylie, Bukhtiari, and other tribes being constantly in revolt against the Persian authorities, was the principal reason which weighed with me (supposing them independent), when I considered Mohumra and Shuster, the most vulnerable points in Persia. It is true that we do not seek at present to dethrone the Shah, but we do wish to alarm and coerce him into concession of our just demands; and nothing is more calculated to do so, and thus save an enormous waste of time, money, and bloodshed, than to convince him by experience, how little he can depend upon these warlike tribes whose attachment has been alienated by the oppression and misgovernment of his officers. On the other hand, these tribes are too warlike and predatory to remain idle at such a crisis, and if I do not invite or accept their friendship, I must be prepared to expect their hostility—which would meet me in the shape of my supplies and information being cut off, and my baggage and convoys being plundered whenever the opportunity offered. And, consequently,

in addition to the regular Persian army, we shall, by pursuing this course, create formidable enemies (whom we must treat as such) in those very tribes whose co-operation would enable us to obtain our object more readily.

27. Finally, I beg to observe, that in availing ourselves of the assistance of the tribes above named, I do not contemplate holding out to them any promises of future independence. Should the first view submitted be approved of, it appears to me that the tribes who have aided us, will have a sufficient apology in the fact, that, having been subjugated, they were obliged to co-operate with us; and, in any case, the promise of our amnesty, which might be made a condition of peace, would, I feel persuaded, be a sufficient guarantee, in addition to the prowess of these warlike tribes, to shield them from the future vengeance of the Shah's Government.

28. Herewith I have the honour to transmit a *précis* of the latest intelligence received from Tehran.

29. It was my good fortune to find here, on my arrival, the Hon. C. A. Murray, Ambassador at the Court of Tehran, who most kindly afforded me his cordial aid towards obtaining, through his influence with trustworthy Persians, information as to the position and designs of the enemy, most valuable to me, especially in the absence of Captain Jones, the political resident, which I am bound to say, considerably influenced me in seeking the enemy on his own ground on the late occasion. I am indebted to that gentleman also for placing at my disposal Major Taylor, of the 18th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, attached to the British Embassy, from whom I have derived very valuable assistance, and who will, I trust, be permitted to remain with me during the war in the capacity for

which I have applied for his services to the Bombay Government.

30. I likewise obtained from Mr. Murray the aid of a Persian gentleman, named "Mirza Agha," Persian Secretary to Her Majesty's mission at Tehran, who accompanied me on the expedition to Borazjoon, and displayed throughout a zeal and devotion to British interests, which certainly surprised me, as he thus exposed himself to the bitter hostility and vengeance of his countrymen. I feel greatly indebted to this gentleman for the service he rendered me on that occasion, and have formed so high an opinion of his qualifications, that I have requested Mr. Murray to permit him to remain with me for the present.

31. I take this opportunity to inform your Lordship that the French Imperial frigate, *La Sibelle*, on her voyage to the westward, anchored in these roads on the 31st ultimo, and that Captain Maisonneux favoured me with a visit on the following day, the 2nd instant. I returned the visit, and met with a most kind and courteous reception from that gentleman and his officers. Salutes were exchanged between the frigate and the men-of-war of the Indian Navy anchored in the bay.

32. As yet the Persian Government has given no indication of a desire to communicate with me; indeed, there has not been time to do so since the Court of Tehran was informed that I alone am empowered to negotiate. But Mr. Murray has learnt from Tehran that a nobleman of high rank, "Mirza Mahomed Khan," Sirkesheechee Bashee, Commandant of the King's Body Guard, deputed from Tehran to assume command of the Persian army in this quarter, has been entrusted with full powers to negotiate; and that he is accompanied by the Shah's uncle, "Thumza Mirza." We know that these noblemen have left Shiraz in this

direction, but it is uncertain when they can join the army.

I have, &c.,
J. OUTRAM.

P.S.—Since the above was drafted, a small portion of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division has arrived in the harbour.

2nd P.S.—*February 16th.*—The steamer could not be got ready in time to leave last night, she goes at 12 A.M. to-day. In the meantime further information has been received, which will be found in the Appendix K.

To the President of the Secret Committee.

Camp Bushire, February 14th, 1857.

In forwarding the accompanying copy of a despatch, I have this day addressed to the Governor-General of India, I beg more particularly to call your attention to the 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th paras., having reference to the subject on which I had the honour to address you demi-officially on the 28th ultimo *viâ* Bagdad, and that you will do me the favour to submit my proposition to the early consideration of H. M.'s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, trusting as I do, that the arguments employed in favour of one or other of the courses therein advocated may lead to the modification of my instructions which I have solicited.

I have, &c.,
J. OUTRAM.

To Commodore R. Ethersey, S. I. N., Commanding Persian Gulf Squadron.

Bushire, February 14th, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters Nos. 83 and 84 of 1857, and, in reply to

the former, beg to state, that as the *Punjaub* is the only armed steamer available besides the *Semiramis*, its services are indispensable for the Mohumra expedition, and she must be taken there on my responsibility.

With regard to the latter, I have already particularly requested that only transports of light draught should be sent up. The inconvenience arising from ships of heavy draught should also be brought to the notice of Government through your department.

I beg to make the following remarks upon the extracts accompanying your letters of this date.

The *Punjaub*, as above stated, is urgently required for the expedition to Mohumra, and consequently cannot be spared. Since the letter of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy was written, the *Feroze*, *Ajdaha*, and *Victoria*, have in all probability reached Bombay, and the *Precursor* will return thither to-morrow. These, with other steamers available in Bombay, will suffice, it is to be hoped, to bring up all the remaining troops and stores.

With regard to the extract (para. 3rd) of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, I beg to remark that no vessel but the *Constance* can at present be spared for the defence of Bussadore, where, moreover, there is but little coal left—and little else of great value, excepting two 68-pounder guns, which could not be taken away. I would observe, however, that commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be furnished to the party of marines at that station, who, though about eighty strong, are commanded by a havildar.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

*To the Governor-General of India.**Bushire, February 15th, 1857.*

I have the pleasure to acknowledge your Lordship's letter, dated the 17th ult., transmitting Major Laughton's memorandum, which is very acceptable, and confirms nearly exactly all the information I had gleaned here respecting roads, tribes, and climates, on which subject I had entered in my official despatch to your Lordship.

I therein show that I look to the aid of our sepoys only so far as Shiraz. If war is to be carried farther into the interior of Persia than Shiraz, it must be with European troops—the sepoys holding the low country and posts of communication up to Shiraz.

From various reliable sources, I learn that the force at present being organized against us, between Shiraz and Kisht, exclusive of the guns and men placed *hors de combat* in our late engagement, amounts, in the aggregate, to the following:—

Horse	2,000
Infantry:—	
Musketeers	3,000
31 regiments at 800 each	24,800
	<hr/> 27,800

And 85 guns.

I do not think it probable they can really bring so many guns down into the plains, and I think that their cavalry will be found stronger, and infantry weaker than the above estimate.

This is exclusive of the 10,000 men and 16 guns said to be with the Prince Royal at Mohumra.

Supposing I am able, besides garrisoning Mohumra, to drive them back and to occupy Shiraz with the troops which would be at my disposal in the course of a month or two (should the advance to Shiraz be undertaken this autumn, instead of waiting till the

more favourable season of next spring), I estimate the following would be the force requisite to hold Shiraz and to keep open the communication with the sea:—

EUROPEANS.—2 regiments of Cavalry; 6 regiments of Infantry; 4 troops of Horse Artillery; and 6 companies of Foot Artillery.

NATIVE.—2 regiments of Regular Cavalry; 2 regiments of Irregular Cavalry; 8 regiments of Infantry; 4 companies of Sappers; four companies of Golundauze.

Consequently, to effect this object, viz. seizure and occupation of Shiraz (and even supposing our casualties not to be very great), having now only *—

EUROPEANS.—1 regiment of Cavalry; 3 regiments of Infantry; 2 troops of Horse Artillery; and 3 companies of Foot Artillery.

NATIVES.—2 regiments of Cavalry; 6 regiments of Infantry; 1 company of Golundauze; and 2 companies of Sappers.

I should require in addition—

EUROPEANS.—1 regiment of Cavalry; 2 regiments of Infantry; 2 troops of Horse Artillery; and 3 companies of Foot Artillery.

NATIVES.—2 regiments of Cavalry; 2 regiments of Infantry; 3 companies of Golundauze; 1 company of Sappers.

Exclusive of such garrison as I may leave at Mohumra (probably two native regiments and a ship of war for the present).

In the above calculation I omit the Turco-Persian levies I purposed raising, regarding whom an unexpected obstacle has arisen which your Lordship will find alluded to in my despatch, and until that is removed I cannot look for their aid.

For the advance beyond Shiraz, two-thirds of the European troops may be available; all additional forces must be Europeans, to an extent which India could not possibly supply, and which, consequently, should be sent from England without delay.

The strength of our army for operating northward of Shiraz must depend on circumstances which cannot yet

* Assuming that the 14th Dragoons and Sinde Horse, &c., previously ordered, do actually join.

be foreseen—the strength and state of the troops we have driven from below—the strength of forces Persia may recall from Herat, and the probability or otherwise of Persia receiving direct aid from Russia.

But as the latter contingency might arise, it is well to be provided against it; in which case the additional number of European soldiers required, would, of course, depend upon the extent of the military aid supplied by Russia.

My despatches are so full that I will not further intrude on your Lordship than to thank you most sincerely for the cordial support I have received from you, especially in granting me the aid of Colonels Havelock and Jacob, with rank of brigadier-generals, and of Colonel Lugard, the chief of the staff. Colonel Lugard has already proved invaluable to me; and my despatch regarding the affair of the 8th I feel does not do him justice; for during the two or three hours I was disabled at the most exciting crisis before the break of day, my duties entirely devolved on him; and to him (in aid of General Stalker) we are indebted for preserving our troops in such admirable order while beleaguered in the bivouac, and for placing them in order for the contest so soon as the dawn admitted a view of the enemy's disposition, and which order insured the successful result so soon as they could engage the enemy (I mean so soon as there was light enough for them to do so).

It was the noise of the commencement of this contest that brought me to my senses, in time to see our troops triumphant. I feel therefore that I owe more to Colonel Lugard than my despatch may express. Moreover, his services are invaluable; he is the most indefatigably active man in the army, sees into all departments, but is so kindly in his deportment to all officials, that all

cheerfully attend to his suggestions, instead of chafing, as might have been expected, at the interference of an officer in a position heretofore novel in the Indian army. Charged as I am with such onerous duties as attend my diplomatic position, in addition to those of Commander of the Forces, I feel that I could not possibly have found time to devote my attention to the details appertaining to the latter office, without neglecting my other duty; and this inconvenience I am entirely relieved from by the chief of the staff.

The high estimation I have formed of Colonel Lugard's military abilities makes me very anxious that he too, like Colonel Jacob, should be placed in a position to enable me to confer on him the command of a division should any emergency arise wherein I might require his services in that capacity. Your Lordship would greatly gratify me, therefore, and promote the public interests I am convinced, if you would confer on Colonel Lugard brigadier-general's rank, to which his position, as chief of the staff, alone would, I believe, entitle him.

J. OUTRAM.

To Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay.

Bushire, February 15th, 1857.

I beg to thank you most sincerely for your three letters of the 27th ultimo, received yesterday, and for your most kind exertions in our behalf.

The postscript to your first letter, informing me that the Sinde Horse would really come, relieved me from a load of anxiety; for, as Captain Elliott landed with your letters the day after the mail had been brought on shore, I had previously received Mr. Edmonstone's letters saying they had been countermanded.

Without their aid, I could not attempt to organize

the proposed levies ; but as it is, a *hitch* has arisen, which greatly embarrasses me, the nature of which your Lordship will understand from the reference made to it in the enclosed copy of a letter I addressed to Mr. Vernon Smith, *viâ* Bagdad on the 28th ultimo, and my allusions to the same subject in my official letter of yesterday to the Governor-General, of which a copy is forwarded to you.

It is possible I may have to act somewhat in contravention of my instructions not to employ Persian subjects, after taking Mohumra, if the Chaab Arabs are to be considered such ; but in that case, I hope I may be borne out by the understanding that they are conquered enemies compelled to serve us ; or secret friends, who, as their country has been seized by us, are necessitated to serve us. And there too I hope to commence my levies, by embodying the Bashi Bazooks floating about Bagdad, who have returned from the Crimea.

It is very probable, however, I may have to return here should the enemy be mustering in such force in this neighbourhood as is threatened ; viz., 2,000 horse, 85 guns, 3,000 musketeers, and 31 regiments (24,000) of infantry.

The destruction of their magazines, and the lesson they have had, will, I think, afford an excuse for delay, which their generals may gladly avail themselves of. But vast efforts are being made at Tehran to maintain their war supplies, and such excuse would not avail them long. In the meantime, however, I trust they will be paralyzed until I have had time to dispose of Mohumra.

Then our intercourse with Bussorah will be open, and the resources of the Euphrates secured to us, and I may hope, ere long, to equip this army with baggage cattle.

Your Lordship judged very correctly in supposing that our great want is cavalry. Had we had more the other day, we must have annihilated Sooja and his host. As it was, our small body of horsemen scattered them like chaff, and literally cut them down like corn under the sickle: most stalwart men though, their gigantic carcasses proved them to be. I never witnessed such carnage at such little cost. The fellows really appeared to court death unresistingly, as if to spite their cowardly officers, who so shamefully deserted them.

But, as your Lordship truly surmises, our great difficulty will be forage. And I regret to say our beach is now strewed with hundreds of screwed hay bales—(the Commissary informs me he has sent to recover them, and that they are fit for use) from one of the boats lost in the late storm—to what amount, or what boats have been lost, we don't yet know. I hope, however, that when we hold Mohumra, we may secure some supply of that most necessary article; though there too, and all up to Bagdad, it is said to be most scarce this year. I trust, therefore, your kindly exertions to supply us with fodder from Bombay will not be relaxed.

I am indeed most grateful to your Lordship for the foresight which led you to add 500 Irregulars, under Colonel Malcolm, to the 14th Dragoons, and Sinde Horse, to which I had limited my requisitions. Every sabre is required, for on that arm we must chiefly rely for decisive results.

With such a body of cavalry, and the increase which I have solicited for General Stalker, we may, I think, feel pretty sure of beating all the power of Persia, that can be brought below the passes, even should it amount to the vast armament said to be approaching. But it

may be prudent to have troops in readiness to support us if necessary.

I fear your Lordship's Government may be disappointed by our tardiness in releasing transports and storeships ; but really, all hands concerned, navy, commissariat establishments, &c., are working like slaves, and could not do more to clear them sooner, owing to the paucity of boats, and the difficulty of communicating with the shipping in foul weather. During the last ten days, for instance, the shipping has with difficulty held any communication with the shore, and to land stores has been impossible.

There is every appearance of fair weather now, however, which we may hope will last for some time, after so long a spell of foul.

The day before yesterday, to my great joy, the *Punjaub* hove in sight, but could not communicate with the shore till yester-afternoon. But still we have to wait for the rest of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division.

I was anxious to obey the admiral's requisition for the immediate return of the *Punjaub* ; but the only other armed steamer here, the *Semiramis*, would hardly suffice for our friends at Mohumra, who may, for all we know, be strongly stockaded in the date-groves behind the forts there, which could not be seen from the *Hugh Lindsay*, and we must be prepared for heavy batteries which may be there masked.

I am obliged to keep her, therefore, until I see whether the *Feroze*, or *Ajdaha* come up with the next batch of transports. In that case I shall substitute one of them and send back the *Punjaub*, which from her size is less adapted for the river.

The captain of the *Punjaub* tells me the *Feroze* had arrived in Bombay just before he started, and I presume the *Victoria* likewise, as she went with the *Feroze* to

Kurrachee. And he met the *Ajdaha* half-way down, so I hope your difficulties for steamers are greatly lightened, and that Dragoons and Sinde Horse may by this time be on their way up to us.

I would fain have sent back the *Berenice*, but it is impossible we could get our armament up to Mohumra without her.

From General Stalker I receive the most hearty support, and I have indeed every reason to be most grateful to him. Not contented with seconding me in command, he insisted on my being his guest, and sharing his tent. No brother could be more kind or cordial, and I shall be very sorry to leave him for a time. His position here will be very onerous until reinforced, or until I can return; for, on learning the diminution of the force here, the enemy may be encouraged to come on, though I do not think this immediately likely.

But no time should be lost in sending him the requisite reinforcements as soon as they possibly can be forwarded. One, if not two native regiments, may, I hope, be spared at once, and a wing of Europeans (perhaps the Fusiliers from Kurrachee) the rest to follow when they can be got. For artillery I fear you can only look to Madras.

I purpose landing seven guns from the gun-boats to arm some of his new batteries with; but still he will be weak in artillery, for the enemy are strong in that arm, if they should come on.

In my despatch I have specified "horse" artillery and foot batteries "horsed," which are of course the most efficient; but so many horses will cause difficulty in transport, and rather than incur so much delay as sending horses might impose, it may be preferable to send foot batteries only. And, indeed, I am perhaps wrong in proposing more horse artillery for present pur-

poses, considering the difficulty of foraging horses or cattle. With two companies of foot artillery (besides the Golundauze Company) to man the redoubts of this camp, all the *horse* artillery and foot-horsed batteries, would be available for the field.

The greatest want in this camp is artificers, and engineering means for the erection of hospitals, barracks, &c., which I regret to say have not even yet been begun there having been so much delay in disembarking the materials, and so much occupation for all the departments concerned. When I remove the 2nd Division and Major Hill, General Stalker is apprehensive that matters will go on very slowly, and he is most anxious to get Captain (or Major) Tremenhere, who as junior to Major Hill in the line (though senior regimentally), would be no supersession to the latter; and if your Lordship could have that officer sent up, General Stalker would be very grateful. I enclose a note just received from him on the subject.

I have sent an official application for certain engineering materials which are urgently required.

I implore your Lordship's indulgence for so lengthy an infliction, and remain, &c.

J. OUTRAM.

To the President of the Board of Control.

Bushire, February 16th, 1857.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter dated Christmas-day.

His Majesty of Persia is more shameless than our Indian Mahomedan potentates, since he does not object to proclaim himself a liar, even to his loving ally of Russia. However, as this is purely a matter of taste, and since the Shah prefers it, we need not be so chary of his

feelings, perhaps, as we otherwise should be disposed to be. But I shall be careful, notwithstanding, not needlessly to wound his vanity at my interviews with his representative, a nobleman of high rank and renown, who is said to be on his way to assume command of the armies in our front, with power to negotiate after he has sufficiently humbled me in the field.

My official despatches to the Governor-General, and Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, copies of which I have forwarded to you as President of the Secret Committee, are so full that I will not trespass on your time by alluding to the subjects of which they treat in this private communication.

As I have yet no diplomatic proceedings to report, I have not intruded on Lord Clarendon, which I trust you will do me the favour to explain to his Lordship, should he consider me remiss in not addressing him.

J. OUTRAM.

P. S.—I am bound to express my great obligations to Mr. Murray, whom I found here, for the cheerful aid he has afforded me, as acknowledged in my despatch to the Governor-General.

To Colonel Sykes, Chairman of the Court of Directors.

February 16th, 1857.

I have deferred writing to you to the last, in the hope of having something more definite to tell you as to the movements of the enemy and the effect of their late defeat, than I had been able to communicate in my official despatch to the Governor-General, a copy of which I have forwarded to the Secret Committee, addressed to your President. Nothing further has yet transpired than what I have just appended to the post-

script to that despatch. The enemy's loss of men in the late affair appears to have been enormous, owing to the rapid and admirable fire of the artillery, and gallant charges of our cavalry. Every officer who was on the spot, and saw the vast number of bodies that strewed the field, considers the estimate in my despatch far too low; and we now learn that hundreds of wounded are crowding the villages in the vicinity of the spot where the battle was fought. But unhappily the loss has been suffered almost entirely by the men in the ranks; the officers appear almost wholly to have escaped by their shameful flight on horseback. Had we had more cavalry we must have annihilated them. Their guns are admirably horsed, and move as quickly as their cavalry.

I am much vexed at the delay in the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, which was over-due when I returned from our late expedition, and I had hoped to find ready here on my return, and thus have been enabled to proceed to Mohumra so soon as the 1st Brigade could be re-shipped. But up to this moment there are no signs of the missing ships. I am anxious to get away and dispose of Mohumra before the enemy's reinforcements can get down the passes, with a view to send back troops to Bushire, lest the enemy might be tempted to assail Stalker before his reinforcements from Bombay arrive. As it is, I must leave more troops here than I intended, consequently I cannot take so large a force to Mohumra as I wished. I shall have about 3,500 men of all arms, but with the aid of two armed steamers and the *Falkland* and *Clive*, they ought to be ample.

Unfortunately my cavalry (14th Dragoons and Sinder Horse) cannot arrive for some days or a fortnight yet; and as Stalker has only 500 here, of whom he cannot

spare a man, I shall have no cavalry to follow up the enemy after he is driven from his position.

So far as the officers I lately sent there could see from the deck of the steamer, no works could be detected beyond the forts commanding the river. But we may calculate on their having stockaded themselves in the date groves behind, where they ought to make a stand. . . .

J. OUTRAM.

*To the Right Honourable the Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B.
and K. G., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.*

Camp, Bushire, February 22nd, 1857.

An opportunity having arisen of communicating with your Lordship *viâ* Bagdad, I gladly avail myself of it to forward to you a copy of my despatch to Lord Canning of the 14th instant, with its accompaniments. I have already requested the Bombay Government to send a copy of the same to the Secret Committee; but the annexed will, in all probability, reach England much earlier.

2. I regret to say that the severity of the weather, and the violent north-westerly winds, appear to have detained the remaining part of the 2nd Division, before the arrival of which I cannot carry out my operations against Mohumra.

3. But before proceeding thither, I am under the necessity of bringing to your Lordship's notice, in continuation of the remarks made in paragraphs 24 to 27 of my letter to the Governor-General on the same subject, the evident impracticability of successfully carrying on the war in that direction without trespassing upon the restrictions which have been placed upon my general operations; and the matter is one of such im-

port, involving as it does serious political considerations, that I have deemed it expedient to lay it directly before your Lordship for the decision of her Majesty's Cabinet.

4. The restrictions referred to are:—1st, that no attempt shall be made to subvert the reigning Shah; 2ndly, that his people shall not be instigated to rebellion; 3rdly, that no Persian subjects shall be enrolled in the ranks of the British army.

5. Before proceeding, however, to explain the difficulty which has arisen, I feel bound to confess, that prior to actual experience of the peculiar condition of these districts and of the tribes inhabiting them, in relation to my offensive operations, I not only coincided in the policy that dictated such a line of conduct—especially towards Persia—but was prepared to carry it out to its fullest extent. Contact, however, with the peculiarities referred to, has persuaded me that such a course is not feasible, and I hasten to lay the grounds of such conviction before your Lordship, in order to secure your after approbation, should the exigencies of war necessitate a course of action at variance with my instructions.

6. With regard to the first restriction, nothing has occurred, neither can I foresee any contingency which could prevent my adhering strictly to that limitation. In stating thus much, however, I refer solely to any direct or indirect personal influence to contravene the injunction imposed; for it is not to be lost sight of, that the attitude which we have assumed towards Persia, and the presence of our army occupying a part of her territory, together with the national ferment which such an invasion must create, may alone suffice to stir up intestine factions, and to raise up pretenders to the throne, whose machinations might eventually lead to a result contrary to our wishes in this respect.

7. But whilst this point occasions me no embarrassment, the remaining two restrictions (which in principle readily merge into one), present an insuperable obstacle to the execution of my plans. The former of them has, indeed, virtually been dispensed with from the day our army occupied Bushire; and, since the publication by the Persian authorities of such edicts as that contained in the Sooja-ool-moolk's letter to the sheiks of Roodhilla (copy of which formed Appendix B to my despatch to the Governor-General), whereby summary vengeance is threatened against every Persian subject who shall provide us with the most insignificant supplies, we have, *de facto*, by encouraging the surrounding peasantry to provision our force, co-operated in making them rebels against their lawful sovereign. Yet we must act in contravention of the restriction imposed to this extent, because the very existence of our army depends, in a great measure, upon the resources of the country; and our future advance into the interior much more so. And such at present appears to be the disposition of the people of the surrounding neighbourhood to supply us (which I doubt not will extend to the country beyond), that were we merely to maintain our ground here for one year, any attempt on the part of the Persian Government to carry out its threats would probably tend to revolutionize the entire district.

This result, however, is certain to ensue, so soon as the British force appears before Mohumra; in fact the Nassar Arabs, a subdivision of the Chaab tribes, inhabiting the island of Maheila and Abadox, between the Shat-ul-Arab and the Bamisheer, and extending from the banks of the Kaffar opposite Mohumra, to the estuaries of the above-named rivers, have already compromised themselves with the Persian Government by violently opposing the occupation of a fort situated in their terri-

tory, by the Shah's troops, on which occasion, it is reported, that four Sirbazees were killed by the Arabs. This occurred shortly after the capture of Bushire, and the alleged cause of such opposition on the part of the Nassar, was their determination not to appear to side with the Persians in the present war, lest they should incur the vengeance of the British, who they evidently presumed would attack Mohumra. Such is the statement made by one of the Nassar chiefs, whom the Reverend Mr. Badger, my Arabic interpreter, lately met at Kaweit, and from correlative testimony I am persuaded of its authenticity. I annex a letter, addressed to me by Mr. Badger, dated 21st February, on the present political relations of the great Chaab tribe, and the temper of its chiefs, from which your Lordship will readily gather that the presence of our army in their districts, will, in all probability, be the signal for a general commotion, if not absolute revolt, among the Arabs.

9. Such being the temper of these tribes, and such the slight hold which the Shah has upon their allegiance, it would be obviously futile, without abandoning our offensive operations in that quarter, to act up to your Lordship's instructions. An insurrection among them seems inevitable, and their co-operation with us, to the extent of furnishing us with supplies, and of opening out the resources of their country to our wants, (whereby they also violate the commands of their nominal sovereign), is absolutely necessary to the support of our army. It is further obvious, from all the reports which I have received, that, having once thrown off their allegiance to this extent, the aforesaid tribes will not rest there, but will proceed eventually to act upon the offensive. Their warlike, turbulent disposition, as well as their natural thirst for revenge, will prevent their re-

maining neutral. And should we attempt to enforce such neutrality, we should inevitably incur their passive opposition at least, and thereby seriously embarrass our future operations, not only in and about Mohumra, and in the direction of Shuster, but the operations of the campaign generally. I cannot conceive for a moment that her Majesty's Government contemplated any such forbearance as this; but the point which I would here beg to submit to your Lordship's consideration, is, whether it will be the more desirable course to let loose (as we must) the unbridled passions of these tribes, and to suffer them (which we can hardly avert) to plunder and devastate, on their own account, other territories and subjects of the Shah; or to discipline their native prowess in order to prevent such indiscriminate warfare, and to make it subservient to our own object? The latter course strikes me decidedly as at once the most humane and most expedient,—it is a course, moreover, which is not without a counterpart even in our late struggle with Russia in behalf of Turkey,—and should I be eventually obliged to adopt it, I trust that the necessity will be appreciated, and my decision consequent thereupon approved of by her Majesty's Government.

10. I cannot, however, draw this subject to a close without anticipating a serious objection which may be raised against the measure proposed, in the possibility of a demand being made upon me by the Arab tribes to guarantee their future independence; but I beg to apprise your Lordship, that under no circumstances should I feel myself authorized to hold out any such inducements. Not only they, but all other subjects of the Shah who shall have rendered us any assistance, will have compromised their future safety. This is, unfortunately, one of the drawbacks of war, and hence

it is that amnesties for political offences of this kind have ever formed one of the stipulations in treaties of peace between civilized governments. Such amnesties, I am aware, are not always sufficiently protective; but, as regards the warlike Arabs under notice, who are already semi-independent, and fully capable of maintaining that position, any such additional security (and which, from their situation on the navigable rivers, we could readily enforce) would suffice to shield them against the future vengeance of the Persian Government. But, however that may be, your Lordship may rest assured that no ulterior guarantee shall be held out to them.

11. Connected with my projected attack upon Mohumra, I have further to acquaint your Lordship that Captain Kemball, Political Resident and her Majesty's Consul at Bagdad, who has lately arrived at Bushire, has informed me of a report, to the effect that the Turkish district authorities entertain some idea of protesting against our hostile operations upon Mohumra, on the ground of its being an appanage of the Ottoman Empire. Should any such veto be put forward, it is my intention to reply to it briefly in the following sense, viz.:—1st. That far from being now under Turkish rule, Mohumra is actually held and garrisoned by a strong body of Persians, who, for the time being, are enemies of the British, and, consequently, in danger of being attacked and dislodged by them. 2ndly. That should the British, however, capture the place, their tenure of it will not interfere with any just claims upon it which the Government of her Majesty may recognize on the part of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

12. On the other hand, Captain Kemball informs me that the Turkish authorities at Bagdad have been most prompt, though as cautiously as possible, in aiding

him in his efforts to obtain and forward supplies and baggage cattle for our army.

13. I have also been given to understand that a Turkish brig-of-war, one of a small fleet maintained in these rivers as a coast-guard, is, and has been for some time, anchored in the Kaffar leading to Mohumra. As her removal is indispensable prior to our projected attack upon the town, I purpose despatching Captain Kemball, a few days before the expedition starts, to solicit her withdrawal by the Turkish admiral, or his *locum tenens*, pending hostilities. I sincerely trust that no objection will be raised to this request, and I intend, in case such a stipulation be required, to allow her re-anchoring in the same position after Mohumra is taken, should it not interfere with our ulterior operations, or give umbrage to any claim opposed to existing right and at variance with the interests of her Majesty's Government.

14. I have reason to think that the strength of the enemy (as estimated in Appendix D to the Governor-General's letter) is very greatly exaggerated. There is no doubt, however, that the Court of Tehran has directed every disposable man in Persia to march against us, the defeat of whom must compel the Shah to draw on his troops now in Affghanistan, unless openly aided by Russia.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Bushire, 22nd February, 1857.*

I addressed you on the 14th instant *viâ* Bombay, sending with my letter copies of despatches to the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief.

As an opportunity offers of communicating *viâ* Bag-

dad, I have now addressed Lord Clarendon, and enclosed to him copies of the despatches above referred to, as this packet may probably reach England before that sent *viâ* Bombay.

I enclose my despatch to Lord Clarendon under a flying seal, for your perusal, on reading which you will at once appreciate the feeling which has led me to address his Lordship directly, for even the fact of such arguments in deprecation of my instructions, coming through a third person, might in a manner implicate him, whereas, for the course which I feel constrained to adopt, I alone ought to be responsible. Whilst entertaining those sentiments, however, I no less sincerely hope that your verdict will be on my side.

The long delay in the arrival of the missing troops of my second division, is a source of very serious embarrassment. I had fully calculated on finding the whole of the expected troops here, on my return from the late expedition; for they were then overdue. And I relied on proceeding at once to Mohumra, and striking a blow there before the enemy could recover from the effect of his late defeat.

It was an object, moreover, to attack the enemy at Mohumra without delay, as every day increases the strength of the defensive works they are preparing, and adds to their numbers, already far exceeding, in that respect, anything I can take against them. But my troops are so superior in quality, that I can have no misgivings as to the result, and, besides, I shall have the aid of armed vessels. But the delay is very lamentable, and must prove detrimental to my future operations. The armament approaching from Tehran, &c. may be concentrated below the Passes, before the reinforcements I have applied for can reach General Stalker, who may be menaced in this camp. We are, however,

preparing such field works as will, I trust, render his position impregnable.

All previous information, which had led us to suppose that troops would not be available to the enemy in such strength as to allow of their venturing below the Passes, appears to have been very faulty. My plan of operations, submitted to the Governor-General from Aden (copy of which I forwarded to you), was framed on that supposition, and the known difficulty of bringing guns down the Passes, which led me to believe that the small additional force I then proposed, would suffice to hold the low country until the season for operating in the interior.

But I then stated that my plans would be liable to alteration on my learning, on the spot, the real state of affairs; and which I have now learnt (but could not have gathered from any information we had received hence, prior to my departure from Bombay), to be far more formidable than was expected. Still, I should have had sufficient means to carry out my plans in the troops which were to follow me from Bombay, had they arrived by the time promised, and I still hope to carry out those plans if they come soon, and the further reinforcements I have asked for General Stalker are sent without delay; but judging from the difficulty of supplying those already so long overdue, I know not when to hope for them. If they do not come, I may be unable to do more than hold Bushire and Mohumra for the present. But I hope the former will not prove so detrimental to Europeans as was apprehended, if we are detained here in the hot weather.

I trust European troops are being sent from England; for our sepoys could not stand the cold beyond Shiraz, even could they be supplied in sufficient numbers, which they could not.

With regard to a movement on Shiraz, I enclose extracts from a letter I addressed to the Governor-General the other day, answering some queries his Lordship put to me on the subject.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

P.S. On looking over what I have written, it occurs to me that possibly it may be supposed that I impute blame to the Bombay Government, for the delay of the troops now so long overdue. I should be very sorry to cause any such impression, for nothing could exceed the zealous exertions of that Government, and especially of Lord Elphinstone personally. The delay must have been caused by stress of weather, or paucity of steamers. Of this I am very sure.

J. O.

To Colonel Sykes.

MY DEAR FRIEND, *Bushire, 22nd February, 1857.*

I wrote to you on the 16th, *viâ* Bombay, but possibly this packet, *viâ* Bagdad, will reach you first. I enclose this in a large packet addressed to the President, containing copy of a letter to the Governor-General, and report of a late affair with the enemy to the Bombay Commander-in-Chief, also of a despatch I have addressed to Lord Clarendon, all enclosed under a flying seal to Mr. Vernon Smith; which, I hope, is the correct mode of communication.

When I wrote to you a week ago, I complained of the great disadvantages under which I suffered in consequence of the delay in the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, until the advent of which I am unable to proceed to Mohumra, where the enemy is in far greater force than I can take against him, and where he is all this

time vigorously strengthening his defensive works. But I have no misgivings as to the result, my troops being so superior to anything the Persians can oppose to us. This delay is the more vexatious as affording time for the enemy's armaments, approaching from Tehran, Ispahan, and Shiraz, to assemble below the passes, who possibly may be encouraged during my absence to assail Stalker in this camp. We are busily employed, however, in the interim, preparing defensive works which ought to render Stalker's position invulnerable, until the reinforcements for him I have asked for can arrive. The strength of the enemy in this quarter, however, obliges me to leave a larger force with Stalker than I can well afford, and I have determined on leaving another wing of native infantry besides what I expressed my intentions of doing in my letter to the Governor-General.

What still more embarrasses me than even the want of troops, is, the political restrictions imposed on me against in any way employing Persian subjects. I have written at greater length than will be agreeable to them, I fear, to the President, to the Governor-General, and to Lord Clarendon. But the vital importance of the question is such, that I trust I shall be excused.

I have not a moment to add more, and I must refer you to the despatches sent to the President for more precise information. . . .

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

To the Governor-General of India.

MY DEAR LORD, *Bushire, 25th February, 1857.*

My last despatch to your Lordship was dated 14th instant (closed on the 16th), when I had occasion to express disappointment at the non-arrival of the troops,

even then long overdue, on whom I had relied for the means of proceeding to Mohumra almost immediately after my return, on the 10th idem, from our late expedition to Borazjoon. But, I regret to say, we have yet no tidings of the missing brigade, and I am not a little anxious, in consequence, lest some mishap, even worse than putting back to port, may have happened to them; for there has been very boisterous weather throughout the whole of this month, so much so that we have scarcely had a day in which we could communicate with the shipping in the harbour since the 12th instant, when the *Punjaub* came in sight, with two vessels in tow, but had not been able to come into the inner harbour when my last despatch to your Lordship was closed. These vessels brought only a foot battery of artillery, and three companies of one of the two native regiments which are missing. None of the cavalry, or horse artillery, now also considerably overdue, have yet made their appearance. My only consolation under the vexation caused by the delay of the infantry, is in the hope that some portion of the cavalry may arrive simultaneously, and thus afford me the means of cutting off the enemy's retreat from Mohumra, after being driven from their position, which otherwise I may be unable to accomplish; for I must not diminish the small force of cavalry (500) now here, while the enemy is in such force in this neighbourhood, and likely to be reinforced by the armaments approaching from Tehran, &c., to an extent that may encourage him to menace General Stalker's position hereafter. I have withdrawn to Mohumra.

Had I been able to carry out my intention of proceeding to Mohumra immediately after my return from Borazjoon, when I had hoped to have found the missing brigade ready in the harbour, that place would have been ours a week ago, and the European troops might

have been back here, with a sufficiency of mule carriage now awaiting us at Bussorah, to have enabled me to move against the forces of the enemy, now concentrating below the passes in our front. As it is, they must continue unmolested for the present; but as they must be disposed of before I can venture on any movement from Mohumra to Shuster, I apprehend the necessity of abandoning that measure for the present, if in the first place I have to return here with any portion of the troops which were destined for that operation, as there would not then be time to organize the requisite force in time to advance from Mohumra before the hot season.

It is still possible, however, that General Stalker may be sufficiently reinforced from Bombay, ere then, to admit of the Shuster movement; for two regiments were warned for service to meet the contingency of their being required here before I left Bombay. And the additional troops I have since indicated (*vide* paragraph 8th of my despatch to your Lordship, dated 14th instant) as requisite to avert the necessity of my detaching to his aid from Mohumra, we may possibly learn in time from Bombay, will be ultimately supplied. In that case I may either advance from Mohumra to Shuster, or cross from Mohumra to Borazjoon, *via* Bebehan, to co-operate with a force from hence against the army of the enemy which is being concentrated below the Huft Moola Pass, after dispersing whom the Europeans might be quartered for the hot season on the Gizakoon mountain, as suggested in the 18th paragraph of my last despatch.

Whether we rest satisfied with holding the low country alone until the season for advancing on Shiraz next autumn, or in the following spring, and which of those periods is to be chosen for that advance, rests with your Lordship to decide, I having informed you,

in my private letter dated the 15th instant, of the relative advantages of those seasons, and the additional troops that would be required for the operation.

As we obtain further insight into the resources of the enemy, I am satisfied that the reported strength of armaments preparing to oppose us has been greatly exaggerated. And I think that the estimate furnished in the accompanying *précis* of information A is more to be relied on, wherein, though the cavalry is in excess of the estimate given with my last despatch, the artillery and infantry are very greatly diminished. The latter is partly accounted for by the utter disorganization of the infantry branch of the Sooja-ool-Moolk's army, which we encountered the other day, of whom but 2,000, out of nearly 7,000 who were engaged, now remain. The moral effect of that defeat is being more satisfactorily developed every day, by the abundance of supplies now pouring into our camp, and by the dissension and despondency said to be prevailing among the enemy's troops, which will most probably deter them from acting on the offensive in this quarter, even when their entire forces are united below the passes. At present, the enemy clings to the foot of the passes, ready to withdraw his guns into an unassailable position whenever he apprehends any movement on our part.

Notwithstanding these favourable considerations, every precaution is being taken to render this camp secure against attack, by the preparation of strong redoubts, which will be ready and armed before I leave for Mohumra.

In my former letters I adverted to the disadvantages under which I labour, in consequence of being debarred from securing the aid of the tribes occupying Persian territory, bordering on the Euphrates and the Karoon. Unless the restrictions by which I am hampered as

regards the Chaab Arabs bordering on the Mohumra are somewhat modified, I shall be utterly paralyzed. Lest, therefore, your Lordship might not feel warranted in authorizing any departure from the letter of my instructions from Lord Clarendon, I have taken upon myself to address his Lordship on the subject, apprising him of the course which I may find myself compelled to pursue towards the Chaab tribe, with whom I must be so soon involved in relations either of hostility or amity, according to the course I then adopt. I beg to submit herewith a copy of that letter and its accompaniments, for your Lordship's consideration (B).

With the Chaab Arabs in our interest, our supplies of every sort will be secured from the Euphrates, and also our communications in the interior, whether towards Shuster or Bebehan. And in their territory I trust to organize considerable levies of Turco and Perso-Arabs, Kurds, &c., who may there flock to our standard, without imposing the necessity, I presume, for any very strict inquiry as to their nationality. Through them, moreover, I hope to secure safe passage for our carriage cattle by land to Bushire.

In alluding to the delay of the coming troops, I trust your Lordship will understand my tone to be that of disappointment only, not complaint. I feel very sensible of the earnest desire and zealous exertions of the Bombay Government to supply our wants, and am quite certain that the delay is owing solely to inability to supply sufficient steam-towing power. I fear, too, that I myself may be in some measure the cause of this; at least, that the Bombay Government may have relied on the return of one or two steamers which I found here on my arrival, and which they may have expected to have previously been sent down; but as the second portion of the 2nd Division was to have left

Bombay a week after the first, which was to follow two days after my departure, and as I occupied twelve days on the voyage, I concluded that the infantry and artillery of the 2nd Division must arrive within ten days after me, at furthest; and, as it was my intention to proceed at once to Mohumra, the *Semiramis*, in which I came, and the *Berenice*, which I found here, I could not dispense with, no other steamers here being capable of towing transports up the river. Subsequently, the *Pottinger* and *Precursor* arrived (on the 31st January and 1st instant) with the first portion of the 2nd Division, but they were required to take on the same troops to Mohumra, and were detained accordingly, and I trusted that all would be ready by the time I returned from Borazjoon. It was not until the 12th, however, that the *Punjaub* brought a portion of the missing troops (a company of artillery, three companies of native infantry, and some cavalry for the 1st Division); I then dispensed with the *Precursor*, which it had been ascertained, in the meantime, could not go up the river; and for the same reason I purposed sending back the *Punjaub* as soon as she could be re-coaled, and some guns got out of her, which are urgently required for the defences of this camp. Until yesterday, however, the weather was so boisterous that no communication could be held with her, and the earliest date at which she could be got ready is to-morrow, when she will proceed to Bombay with this mail. What the amount of steam-power remaining in Bombay may be I know not, but it must be quite inadequate to tow the numerous transports containing the artillery and cavalry of the 2nd Division, besides what may have been sent with the two missing regiments.

Mr. Murray left two days ago, by the opportunity of two transports, which I then sent to the mouth of the

Euphrates, because they were of too deep a draft to admit of their crossing the bar except at spring tides, there to await the rest of the expedition, to be embarked so soon as the missing troops make their appearance. Thence he will be taken in the *Comet* steamer to Bussorah, whence the *Comet* returns, being required for the expedition. In passing Mohumra, on her way down, the *Comet* was not molested by the Persian batteries at that place, and I hope it may again pass up and return with the same impunity. Captain Kemball, and young Lord Ferdinand Seymour, came in the *Comet*.

Captain Kemball's local knowledge of Mohumra and its people will be of great value to me when I proceed there; I have requested him, therefore, to accompany the expedition, and afford me the advantage of his assistance in communicating with the Arab tribes in that quarter, and with the neighbouring Turkish authorities, for a short time after I occupy Mohumra, which I trust may meet your Lordship's approval.

The spirit and zeal which have induced Lord Seymour to join the army, and expose himself to the dangers, hardships, and discomforts attendant on war, in such a country as this, truly deserve the highest commendation and encouragement, and I hope may meet with such from your Lordship. I know not whether it is in your Lordship's power to confer local rank in this country on persons not holding her Majesty's or the East India Company's commission. If it is so, I would beg your Lordship to gazette Lord Seymour as a local captain, or lieutenant, while serving with the army in Persia, and that you will permit me to place him on my staff as an extra aide-de-camp. In the meantime, he has tendered his services gratuitously in any position where he can be useful, and I have attached him accordingly to Major

Taylor, political secretary—a specimen of his first labours will be found in Appendix A, which he copied for Major Taylor. Should it not be in your Lordship's power to confer such a commission, may I beg the favour of your exerting your high influence to effect this object through her Majesty's Minister-at-War, or the Horse Guards?

J. OUTRAM.

P.S.—I herewith transmit also a translation from the *Tehran Gazette*, marked C.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bushire, 25th February, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I beg your Lordship to do me the favour to forward the accompanying letter to the Governor-General, after perusal, as I have no time to prepare a copy of its voluminous enclosures. The latter, however, it might be as well, should your Lordship kindly oblige me so far, to have copied and forwarded to the Home authorities by the next mail, lest my packet, sent to the President (through whom I forwarded, under a flying seal, the despatch for Lord Clarendon) *via* Bagdad, may miscarry; for it is not impossible communication up the river may now be interrupted.

My letter to the Governor-General so fully describes our present position, &c., that I will not trouble your Lordship by entering on the subjects treated of in it, and I shall confine myself, therefore, to a brief mention of our principal wants, towards supplying which, I earnestly solicit your Lordship's kind influence, in support of the official applications I have transmitted through the military authorities.

Our chief great want is coal; respecting which, I am

well aware, your Lordship has caused everything to be done that can be done. But I am anxious the naval authorities should be impressed with the necessity of supplying us with as much as possible *now*, and likewise *before the monsoon*, when, the commodore tells me, our supplies from Bombay will be entirely cut off. I annex copy of a note I received from him yesterday, which alludes to this difficulty.

I hope also our requisition for shore boats, to work between the Bunder and the shipping, may be speedily supplied; for want of which great delay occurs in clearing transports, coaling steamers, &c.

I have brought to the Chief's notice the great inconvenience and extra trouble caused by ships being despatched from Bombay without any correct list of their cargoes being sent here. Consequently, until every bit of cargo is taken out of a vessel, the officers know not what stores have been sent by her.

We are in great want of commissariat officers—those for the 2nd Division have not yet arrived, and thus more work than can well be accomplished is thrown upon those of the 1st Division.

I have applied for more shoes and boots for European and native soldiers, which are urgently required. I learn that the 20th Native Infantry was sent up without any new shoes, and that when the commanding officer applied for them, he was told there were plenty here! Surely they ought to have been fully equipped before leaving the Presidency, where shoes can always be got. We are now entirely out of those most necessary articles.

A supply of Enfield rifles, with ammunition, is very desirable. Only 500 rifles have been sent up: we could use 1,000 more with advantage.

The above are the principal wants that at present

occur to me, regarding some of which I have officially addressed the Commander-in-Chief.

I am happy to report that no unusual sickness was caused by the great exposure to wet and cold to which our men were subjected on the late *dour*. On the contrary, we have improved in health since then. I enclose a memorandum showing the state of our hospitals this morning, giving a total sick, 588 out of 7,355, or a little under eight per cent. The 2nd Europeans, heretofore the most sickly, only 61 out of 858. The most sickly now is the 4th Rifles, which has 207 in hospital out of 842; but the cases are trifling I am assured.

The enemy is having plenty of time to prepare his defences at Mohumra; but my only anxiety is, lest he should escape after defeat, from our want of cavalry. The delay of our infantry may, perhaps, admit of some portion of Jacob's Horse arriving in time to accompany the expedition, and thus render us more able to effect that desirable object. The last accounts from Mohumra represented the guns there at sixteen; but a buggalow brought news yesterday that two more had been brought down by boat from Disfool. They talk of placing booms across the Kaffar, sinking buggalows, &c., to obstruct our advance on their Sebastopol. I anxiously look for the return of the *Feroze*, or the *Ajdaha*, that we may have an armed steamer to tow each of the two war-sloops, which will have to stand the first brunt of the enemy's batteries.

The enemy in our front here will be strong in cavalry, 9,000 being on their way. The 14th Dragoons may probably be required here when they arrive. Most gladly, too, shall we welcome the additional 500 native cavalry you have so thoughtfully prepared for us, besides Jacob's Horse. The latter, at all events, will be required at Mohumra to organize levies, and to escort our

carriage cattle and land-transport corps, when organized, from Mohumra to this place.

I need trouble your Lordship no further at present; but I hope yet to hear something of the missing transports before the mail closes to-morrow.

J. OUTRAM.

26th February.

P.S.—The swell prevented the *Punjaub* coaling yesterday, and the Commodore now reports that she cannot be ready before to-morrow. In the meantime, the *Chusan* has arrived at last, having left her tow (the *Saldanah*) ninety miles off, for which the *Pottinger* will be immediately despatched. She had been under orders some days ago to proceed to the assistance of the delayed transports, but stress of weather had detained her. To-day it is at last calm.

I am very grateful to your Lordship for so kindly informing me, in your letter, dated 4th instant, just received, of your determination to increase General Stalker's cavalry; of the preparation of the mountain train cradles; of the endeavour to expedite the Sinde Horse and Dragoons (though I regret to see there is now no chance of either arriving in time for Mohumra); and of the message which your Lordship sent to the Governor-General, regarding the Turks at Mohumra, &c., &c.

My letter to Mr. Vernon Smith, written the day after my arrival here (28th January), copy of which I sent to your Lordship, apprised you that I had abandoned the idea of establishing the Turks at Mohumra, even if my proposition had been acceded to. But I should have been glad to see your Lordship's proposition carried out—i.e., to acquire permission to send our troops through Turkish territory to Kermanshah, even if for

no other object than to cause the Persians to apprehend our penetrating by that route—if we did not thus increase the probability, or right, of interference on the part of foreign powers. But I do not see any likelihood of our army being increased to such extent as would admit of separate forces of sufficient strength to operate from two such distant points as Bushire and Bagdad. And if we are to invade Persia only from one quarter, I suppose our first object will be to occupy Shiraz. There can be no doubt, however, that the invasion would be of easier accomplishment from Bagdad; but surely, any operations directed from that quarter could not fail to compromise the Porte. My letters sent by the *Precursor* on the 16th, will have shown your Lordship when and how the Shiraz expedition could be undertaken.

When I arrived here, I was much vexed to learn the delay which had occurred in clearing out the building materials, stores, &c., from the ships. But I soon ascertained how impossible it is to effect such work in this harbour quicker than it had been done, owing to the deficiency of boats.

The naval officers have exerted themselves to the utmost of their power, and nothing could exceed the zeal and attention of Commodore Ethersey, and his harbour-master especially. But the want of boats, and the frequent interruption caused by wind and swell, render it impossible to clear vessels here as they might be cleared elsewhere. I have forwarded an official application by this mail for some assistance in the shape of shore-boats, &c.

I have been extremely vexed by the receipt to-day of a letter from Captain Young, stating that Colonel Jacob had declined to avail himself of his services. I personally spoke to Colonel Jacob on his behalf when at

Kurrachee, and regretted to find that he had strong objections to Captain Young, founded on a previous personal knowledge of that officer ; but I had hoped that his objections had been removed. As Major Curtis would gladly avail himself of Captain Young's services in the Land Transport Corps, I have informed him, in reply, that such employment is open to him should he choose to come for that duty.

Colonel Le Grand Jacob has just been with me, who informs me that the *Chusan* was compelled to cast off her tow, containing the 23rd Regiment, a week ago.

* * * *

J. OUTRAM.

2nd Postscript.—I have reopened my letter to add the following extract from a note from the Commodore, just received (in which he also informs me the *Punjaub* will be coaled and off to-night)—“ Two *cranes* would be of very great service for the bunder here, one that will lift five tons, the other three tons, with all improvements. Perhaps you would direct the Commissary of Ordnance to request them from the Government of Bombay, or write to Government yourself on the subject, which would insure their despatch.”

I have directed an official application to be made accordingly, but a word from your Lordship will insure early compliance.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bushire, 4th March, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I last wrote to your Lordship on the 26th ult., announcing the arrival of the *Chusan*, without her tow however, the transport containing the 23rd Regiment, which she had cast off a week before, at only 120 miles

distant. The *Pottinger* was immediately dispatched in search of the missing vessel, but has not yet returned, and a store-ship, which arrived on the 27th, had seen nothing of the transport. The north-westerly gales which recommenced on the 27th, and only abated last night, may have kept both *Pottinger* and transport weather-bound somewhere on the coast, even should they have met. But we are now seriously alarmed lest some mishap, worse than mere putting back, should have occurred to the missing transport. We are disappointed also in not yet getting the *Feroze* with her (expected) artillery troop in tow—or the *Ajdaha*, either of those armed steamers being urgently required for the Mohumra expedition. Five companies of the Light Battalion are also still wanting; thus 1,500 of our small infantry means destined for Mohumra, are deficient; ditto an expected troop of horse artillery; and no cavalry available. The enemy there, now said to be 15,000 strong, with 18 guns, are busily engaged all this time, in strengthening their position, and assembling in such force, moreover, in General Stalker's front, that I cannot venture to take more from him.

In the hourly expectation of the arrival of the missing troops, I dispatched two of the larger transports (containing a foot battery, &c.), which could only cross the bar at spring-tide, into the river some days ago at new moon. And, in the hope of their early arrival, I have been obliged to detain the *Semiramis*, *Berenice*, and *Chusan*, all of which (and more if we had them), are required to take the horse troop, 78th 26th, and wing of Light Battalion (which are ready to embark the moment we sight the missing troops), into the river and up to Mohumra.

This delay is most lamentable, not merely as increasing the difficulty of our operations at Mohumra, but as

likely to turn the tribes, on whose friendly aid we relied, against us (see what Mr. Murray says in the enclosed letter I received from him, from Bussorah, two days ago) and as rendering almost impossible our purposed advance to Shuster, or even the supply of carriage cattle to this army in time to operate against the enemy in our front, before the hot weather has set in, when the movement of our Europeans will be attended with serious difficulty and loss, from the effects of the climate alone.

Our expectations of a favourable change in the weather when I last wrote (on the 26th) were sadly disappointed, for next day the north-westerns recommenced as bad as ever, and only ceased last night. Our only hope is, that our missing transports may have thus been wind-bound within the gulf, and are now perhaps, close at hand.

Having no steamer to send, and indeed, if we had, our scanty coal being now scarcely sufficient to take us to Mohumra, we could not afford to send one, I am obliged to entrust this packet to the *British Flag*. But they say she is a good sailer, and is sure to have favourable winds, so I will hope you may receive this in tolerable time.

I hope my packets by the *Precursor*, dispatched on the 16th, and by the *Punjaub* on the 26th May, have reached your Lordship.

I am, &c., &c.

J. OUTRAM.

(Enclosure to the above Letter.)

Intelligence from 27th February to 3rd March. Further demands have been made for reinforcements on the Dushtee and Fungistanee tribes.

Prince Tahmash (o' Shiraz) is still at Naneezuk, but on the arrival of the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, the former is to make over all his troops and return to Shiraz.

Sirkeesheekchee Bashee has arrived at Ferashbund, with his troops

Fuzl Ali Khan at Khist, and Mirza Ibrahim Khan at Sirkorele. All three are coming by different roads (probably on account of the scarcity of provisions.)

A great deal of treasure (gold tomauns), dresses of honour, swords, &c., have been sent down for distribution.

The troops are expected to rendezvous at Naneezuk (thirty-six miles from Bushire) on the 6th March.

R. L. TAYLOR.

Sirkeesheekchee Bashee has 8 guns, 4 regiments, 1,500 cavalry; Fuzl Ali Khan, 10 guns, 5 regiments, 1,000 cavalry; Sooleman Khan, 12 guns, 3 regiments, 1,200 cavalry: total, 30 guns, 12 regiments, 3,700 cavalry.

Another account gives 31 guns, and 24 regiments, 5,000 cavalry. No mention is here made of Jafer Kolee Khan Elkhane, with his 3,000 cavalry, who is still at Shiraz. And if the tribes obey the call, they are able to bring 4,000 musketeers into the field.

R. L. T.

To the Honourable C. A. Murray.

Bushire, 5th March, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MURRAY,

Kemball starts for Bussorah to-morrow morning, where I hardly expect, and for your own sake do not wish, he may find you; for I trust you are by this time well on your way to Bagdad. But in case you may still be at Bussorah, I write to beg you will glance over a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Clarendon, and entrusted to Kemball open, for your perusal.

I have been induced to submit the suggestion therein contained in consequence of the objections to our demands on the part of Russia and France, reported by Lords Wodehouse and Cowley, forwarded in the last despatches from the Foreign Office to your address, which arrived a day or two after your departure.

I cannot but think that the sentiments of Russia and France, and the opposition to our Persian proceedings so strongly displayed in England, may incline the Cabinet to modify, in some measure, their demands. And I have suggested, therefore, certain modes by

which we may, I think, remove or weaken such objections; and by conceding some of the minor matters, secure the more important.

In all my propositions I think you will go with me, but should you differ in opinion on any point, I hope you will not scruple to let Lord Clarendon know why you do so, in order that he may have the benefit of your correction of any mistakes I have fallen into.

Though we have had lull, or fair wind, for the past two days, still no signs of our missing troops. Most of the troops, &c., intended for Mohumra from this place are embarked, or preparing to embark, and being sent into the river, so that I may not be delayed in proceeding with the remainder so soon as the *Feroze* arrives, which I am hourly expecting, with a troop of horse artillery and a wing of the Light Battalion. Possibly, too, some cavalry may come, but this I hardly hope for. I must delay no longer, whether or not, and do the best I can with such diminished means; for much further delay in the reduction of Mohumra would indeed be most detrimental to our interests here as well as there.

As I hardly expect this to find you before you reach Bagdad, and as ere then I hope to have addressed you from Mohumra, I will say no more just now.

J. OUTRAM.

To Colonel Sykes.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Bushire, 5th March, 1857.

You will, I hope, see a letter I addressed three days ago to Lord Clarendon, and sent under a flying seal through the Resident, *viâ* Bombay, and a duplicate of which I now send, *viâ* Bagdad. I was led to tender the observations and suggestions therein submitted, in

consequence of the objections to our proposed terms offered by Russian and French authorities in the conversations reported by Lords Wodehouse and Cowley, which reached me, *viâ* Bagdad, about a week ago, having come in a packet for Mr. Murray, who had previously left for Bagdad, but had authorized me to open any Foreign Office Packets that might arrive to his address.

Still no signs of the missing troops, though the lull we have had for two days is favourable for steamers coming up. The delay thus enforced on me is most embarrassing, and very injurious to our interests. It has caused misgivings as to our power in the minds of the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of Mohumra, which may cause them to side against us with the Persians now in such force there—who otherwise would have remained neutral at least, if they had not turned against the enemy. It gives time also for the enemy's entire forces to assemble in our front, who otherwise could not have done so before the troops I am obliged to borrow from Stalker's division had returned; for, had the infantry and artillery of the 2nd Division been sent up in the time promised when I left Bombay, they would have been ready here by the time I returned from the expedition to Borazjoon, and I should have sailed hence with them to Mohumra on the 11th or 12th ultimo, in ample time to accomplish our objects there and send back the 64th, &c., long ere now. All this time, too, the enemy has been busily engaged in strengthening his position at Mohumra, and collecting reinforcements. But whatever his strength may be, I must dislodge him with the limited means at my command, at all costs; for until we are in possession of Mohumra we are incapable of any offensive operations, being totally without the means of moving; for neither

carriage cattle, nor supplies, can be obtained until the enemy is driven from his commanding position there. This delay will I fear, moreover, render it impossible to carry out the advance on Shuster which I had contemplated; for the hot season will be upon us before our carriage arrangements can be organized, and all my disposable troops of the 2nd Division may be required to escort the carriage cattle for this portion of the army along the coasts to Bushire, whence, after the junction of the two divisions has been effected, I must proceed against the main body of the enemy, now assembling in our front.

In the hourly expectation of the arrival of at least some portion of the overdue troops, I sent off, about ten days ago, into the river, two transports containing artillery, they being too deep to pass the bar, except at spring tides. They have since been anchored within the river, in a position safe from any molestation from the enemy. I have more troops ready embarked here to proceed to the river to-morrow, and I only now await the arrival of the *Feroze* and her convoy, bringing a troop of Horse Artillery and half Light Battalion, to proceed against Mohumra with such means as we shall then have—though still I shall be minus a regiment of Native Infantry (the 23rd, now so long overdue—though cast off in a strong north-wester by the *Chusan* steamer ten days ago, 120 miles hence—that I despair of its arrival, fearing that either some disaster must have happened, or the vessel must have put back too far to be recovered in time), and totally without cavalry, unless some portion of the Sind Horse, or 14th Dragoons, may happen to arrive as soon as the *Feroze*. The latter want is particularly mortifying, for, situated as the enemy is at Mohumra, it would be impossible for him to carry off any guns, or to escape at all, perhaps,

if we had cavalry to interpose on the plain above Mohumra.

In the meantime we have done everything to render this camp safe against any attempt of the enemy, should he dare to assail it, which I do not think likely; for our late affair has struck such terror into the Persian regular infantry, that I do not think they could be induced to face our batteries. But I shall be glad when I learn that the reinforcements I have asked for, for Stalker, have reached him. When that can be, God only knows, for coal is deficient in Bombay, and steamers wanting. All they can supply will, I fear, scarcely suffice to bring up the cavalry now due before the monsoon, and *then* no transports can come up! We have not had any communication from Bombay since the 27th January. . . .

J. OUTRAM.

(Enclosure to the above.)

Bushire, 6th March, 1857.

Fuzl Ali Khan has arrived at the Huftmoolla with 600 cavalry; and the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee is expected to-morrow, bringing 8 guns, 2 howitzers, and 7 regiments of regulars.

The Persian Government are trying to enlist as many Hillmen as they can, offering 3 tomauns a month for infantry, and 6 tomauns for cavalry, all expenses included.

The various accounts differ a little as to the strength of the enemy's forces, but they agree in fixing the total as not exceeding 14,000 regulars, 30 guns, 12 regiments, and 3,700 cavalry.

Another account gives 30 guns, 14 regiments, 2,000 cavalry.

In addition to these, 3,000 Turkoman Cavalry are said to have reached Shiraz; and, if the tribes respond, as many as 4,000 may be collected.

A party of the enemy tried yesterday to intercept supplies. About 25 matchlockmen, supported by some cavalry, came down upon a party escorting commissariat sheep—there were 6 shepherds and 10 guards, country people; firing was kept up on both sides for some time; one of the enemy wounded (or killed), but all the sheep were brought in safely.

R. L. TAYLOR.

To the Governor-General of India.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bushire, 9th March, 1857.

To our great delight, on Thursday the 6th instant, three steamers, towing five transports, made their appearance, bringing all the missing infantry (except one company of the Light Battalion), one horse artillery troop, and a troop of the 3rd Cavalry; and assurance, moreover, from Colonel Jacob, that all the Sindie Horse would be embarked and despatched from Kurrachee by the 1st instant, which Captain Rennie, of the *Feroze*, who brought the communication, assured me will ensure their being here by to-morrow or next day, judging, as he does, from the winds which have prevailed for some days past, and relying on the capabilities of the steamers which were ready at Kurrachee to tow the horse transports. I rely, therefore, on having all here by the 12th, if not sooner. And as soon as they begin to make their appearance, I shall re-embark the native troops, and proceed with them on Friday morning to Mohumra, picking up the transports containing the artillery and portion of European troops at the entrance of the river, which had been despatched there within the last few days, to anchor within the bar for the advantage of being abundantly supplied with good water, which is our great difficulty with the shipping here. To European troops, remaining on ship board is no consideration; but with natives, who cannot cook on board, detention in the vessels is a great hardship. I, therefore, keep the sepoys till the last. And the two or three days I am thus able to give the latter on shore, especially the 23rd Regiment, which had been a month at sea, will completely set them up. Supposing they might be almost incapacitated physically, after so long an abstinence from cooked food, from satisfactorily

working in active service immediately on landing at Mohumra, I had arranged to substitute an equal strength of native troops from General Stalker's Division, for the 23rd Regiment. But the men are so eager to go on, and are really so strong, declaring that two days' cooking on shore here will fit them for anything, that I have decided on taking them. The only troops I borrow from General Stalker will, therefore, be seven companies of the 64th Regiment and a troop of Horse Artillery, leaving him three companies of the 78th.

I have now the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt, on the 6th instant, of your Lordship's three letters of 27th, 28th, and 31st January, on the subject of which I beg to offer the following remarks:—With respect to the sealed engagements exacted by Captain Jones from chiefs of tribes, I am very strongly impressed with the feelings expressed by your Lordship; as so was Lord Elphinstone, on communicating the circumstances to me, when General Stalker's announcement of an officer having been deputed to execute the compacts was received, just before I left Bombay. But as the business must have been accomplished long before any expression of the dissent of Government could arrive, there was then no help for it. My official reply of this date, to Mr. Edmonstone's letter on the subject, will show how anxious I am that the entire transaction should be annulled, the objectionable documents destroyed, and the correspondence obliterated from our records, in the manner I have ventured to suggest for your Lordship's consideration.

The next subject to which your Lordship adverts, is the negotiation with Dost Mahomed; for the information regarding which I am very grateful, and I shall convey it, as directed, to General Jacob when he joins me. Being debarred from expelling the Persians from

Herat by *direct* force of arms, which neither the Home authorities, nor your Lordship consider feasible or politic, but which I confess to think would be both; and as General Jacob's plan of permanently holding the Bolan and an advanced post at Quitta cannot be entertained (for which also I must admit my partiality), the arrangement with the Dost is certainly, I think, the most satisfactory our circumstances will admit of.

Your Lordship desires me to state, whether I think it advisable that Bengal officers should be sent out, immediately I have moved up to Shuster, to begin to collect animals for the Bengal force to be despatched to the gulf at the close of the monsoon. I would not advise that any separate staff should be employed for that purpose. When in possession of Mohumra, our Land Transport Corps will be fully organized, and its operations can be extended for 20,000 men, as easily as worked for half that body. All that will be requisite will be to provide the additional officers and establishments required to take charge of the animals procured for the Bengal troops, and which will, I hope, be procured without much difficulty after our transport officers have established their influence and agencies in the valley of the Euphrates. Animals are to be had in plenty if time admits. The great difficulty is to supply cash of the requisite currency; for our rupees are not received as yet, though doubtless they will soon become as acceptable here as they were in Affghanistan. If Bengal officers, for the formation of branch transport corps, could be placed under Major Curtis in good time, I have no doubt that able officer will establish the Bengal baggage corps on a sound footing, while at the same completing his own. But it might prove injurious to the public interests were the Bengal animals to be obtained separately, or under a different system; for

competition, which would of course arise, would raise the cost of animals, and confusion result from different portions of the same army being supplied in a different manner. I shall ask Major Curtis how far he would be prepared to supervise such an extension of the baggage corps hereafter contemplated, as would be required for the Bengal column, and will acquaint your Lordship with the result. Your second letter requires no reply, as I have abandoned the idea of locating the Turks at Mohumra so soon as I learnt, on my arrival here, the real nature of their position in that quarter, and as I informed the Resident, in my letter dated 28th of January, copy of which was, I believe, forwarded to your Lordship.

The third letter transmits a further communication from Major Laughton, for which I beg to thank your Lordship. That officer's personal experience in this country entitles his opinions to great weight, and they are by no means slightly regarded by me; but neither his objections to Shuster, nor Major Hill's gigantic conceptions of the force required for the occupation of Shuster, would disincline me from carrying out that operation with the force I originally contemplated, and which I am satisfied would amply suffice after effectually defeating the enemy at Mohumra, as I rely on doing, had not unexpected circumstances entirely changed the features which led me to indulge in the hope of carrying out the measure. The unfortunate delay of our occupation of Mohumra, at least six weeks later than the time I had contemplated—the unexpected strength of armaments preparing by the enemy in front of Bushire, which may call for the return here of the European portion of the 2nd Division—the lateness of the season, consequently, before the ascent of the Karoon could be commenced—and, above all, the restrictions imposed on me

which precluded me from embodying the tribes in that quarter, which was one of the principle objects for going there—all these are a combination of obstacles for which I was not prepared, and which render it very probable I may have to abandon the Shuster plan altogether. In that case, after the seizure of Mohumra, my operations will be probably confined to driving the enemy from below the passes in our front. And it will depend on the strength and condition in which they retreat up the passes, whether or not I follow on to Shiraz, or content myself with holding the low country, and placing the Europeans on the elevated plateau above Borazjoon for the hot months. But, under any circumstances, the hot season must have commenced before the troops here can be equipped to move against the enemy; for I can hardly hope to have obtained a sufficiency of baggage cattle before I have been at least a month at Mohumra, and then it will take nearly another month to march the cattle round by land (moving a force out to meet the troops that escort them before they approach too near the enemy's position) under escort of Jacob's Horse and such levies as he may have organized in the interim; for though debarred from engaging tribes nominally subject to Persia, I do not see why I should scruple about entertaining individual adventurers who please to flock to our standard, whether from the Persian or Turkish side of the Euphrates, and I know that some hundreds have already been engaged by Captain Kemball, who are now protecting the camels and mules that active and able officer has already secured for us, and that many of the Bashi Bazooks from the Crimea, holding English discharge certificates, are eagerly seeking to be engaged in our ranks at Bagdad and Mohsul.

My letters of the 15th ultimo informed your Lordship

what force I considered necessary for a forward march to Shiraz either this autumn or next spring ; but my calculation is based on the enemy retiring, as I advance, in almost unbroken power. Should I have the good fortune to encounter him below the passes, and defeat him signally there, capturing his guns, &c., of course you will anticipate a more rapid movement, and your Lordship will not be surprised, therefore, should I be in possession of Shiraz even before any but the reinforcements I have asked for General Stalker's Division have been received. As this, however, is a contingency depending upon accidents, on which I have no right to count, I have not dwelt on such an event as of likely occurrence. I apprehend the enemy will be too wide awake to allow me the opportunity of encountering him in the plains when I return from Mohumra, and that it will then be too late in the season to prosecute a campaign in the passes, involving much detention before every strong position to be forced, where neither water nor supplies are to be obtained.

The explanation and exposition I submitted to your Lordship on the 15th ultimo, of the forces I deemed requisite for the advance on Shiraz either this autumn or next spring, will, I hope, enable you to form some calculation as to the strength of the supports for this army to be prepared in the interim. I *may* possibly get to Shiraz by this autumn, if I can rely on the reinforcements I have asked for General Stalker arriving before the monsoon. But I may have to remain below the passes until after the monsoon, and that, perhaps, whether I am strengthened or not. It will then depend on whether I am sufficiently reinforced, immediately after the monsoon, to force my way to Shiraz next October or November, that is, before winter, or, whether I have to wait until the ensuing spring to ascend the passes

to Shiraz. What I would urgently recommend is this : that the reinforcements I have asked for General Stalker be immediately, or as soon as practicable, sent up ; and if I have intimation that they are coming before the monsoon, I may act on emergency as if they had already arrived. If I have so far discomfited the enemy as to be enabled to move on to Shiraz, the reinforcements will be in good time to aid in maintaining my communication with Bushire until after the monsoon, when further troops would be pushed up to enable me to maintain that position during winter, and to push on to Ispahan and Tehran in the spring ; or, should I not find it practicable to force the passes in or about autumn, the proposed reinforcements would enable me (having previously compelled the enemy to evacuate the low country and ascend the passes) to occupy the high land above Borazjoon during the hot months with the Europeans, and the intervening posts of communication with Bushire with the native troops ; and holding Mohumra by a detachment of sepoys—or, perhaps, an armed vessel would suffice—and the Indus river steamers being all employed to maintain a rapid communication with England, *viâ* Bagdad, since they would be diverted from the object for which they are coming here, *i.e.*, for the navigation of the Karoon River. In my letter of the 15th I estimate the troops required to hold Shiraz and Bushire during winter, with intermediate posts of communication, as follows :—

<i>Europeans.</i>	<i>Natives.*</i>
2 Regiments cavalry,	2 Regulars, 2 irregulars,
6 Regiments infantry,	8 Infantry,
4 Troops horse artillery,	4 Companies sappers,
6 Companies foot artillery.	4 Companies Golundauze.

At present I have (including 14th Dragoons, Sinde

* Should the contemplated Arab levies be raised, no more native cavalry would be required.

Horse, and company of Madras sappers about to join) :—

Europeans.

- 1 Regiment cavalry,
- 3 Regiments infantry,
- 2 Troops horse artillery,
- 3 Companies foot artillery.

Natives.

- 1 Regular, 1 irregular,
- 6 Regiments infantry,
- 1 Company Golundauze,
- 3 Companies sappers.

Consequently there will be required to complete :—

Europeans.

- 1 Regiment cavalry,
- 3 Regiments infantry,
- 2 Troops horse artillery.
- 3 Companies foot artillery.

Natives.

- 1 Regular, 1 irregular,
- 2 Regiments infantry,
- 3 Companies Golundauze,
- 1 Company sappers.

For a forward movement beyond Shiraz, perhaps, two-thirds or three-fourths of the Europeans might be available. Additional troops, to operate beyond Shiraz, should all be European—of what strength can only be hereafter estimated, according to circumstances adverted to in my former letter, previously referred to. The additional forces would thus amount to about 1,500 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, 600 artillery (Europeans), 300 Golundauze, and 100 sappers: total, 7,500 men.

Your Lordship's estimate, therefore, of "10,000" men, "or rather more," would certainly, I think, be ample. And should this force, or a considerable portion of it, be assembled in Upper Sinde, in readiness for shipment from Kurrachee when called for, not only would they be most conveniently placed for speedy transfer to Bushire, but the report of an army being assembled in that quarter would doubtless have a good effect, politically, as well in Persia as in Affghanistan, and even in India, should the Persians really advance to Candahar. One or two of the regiments (European), if coming from the Madras Presidency or Bengal, might perhaps be more conveniently sent to Kurrachee, where they would have barrack accommodation, and be ready for immediate shipment to Persia when required.—I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant General.*

To the Governor-General of India.

MY DEAR LORD, *Bushire, March 11th, 1857.*

Since I addressed your Lordship, the day before yesterday, I have received your two letters, dated 14th February, which arrived the night before last, by a steamer from Kurrachee, bringing three vessels in tow, containing a squadron of the *Sinde Horse*, baggage, ponies, &c., &c. By it I learn that General Jacob, with another squadron, may be expected in two or three days; but that the remainder of the regiment is coming in sailing ships to Kishen, where I am requested to send steamers to meet them. This, I regret to say, I am unable to do, all the coal we have here being barely sufficient to provide seven days' supply to the steamers we require to take our transports into, and up, the river to Mohumra, and our operations there could not be attempted with less. We have been busily embarking the troops since the missing regiments arrived on the 6th instant, but have unfortunately been interrupted by strong north-westerly gales for the last two days, when nothing could be done. I now calculate on all being on board (and many being despatched to the river in the interim) by the 14th, and that I may get off on that day, should the wind not spring up again, which is moderately calm this morning. But no steamers can be sent for the *Horse* transports, nor any mail be dispatched to Bombay, until coal arrives, which is expected daily, however, two colliers being over due. I know not, therefore, when this or my letter of the 9th instant can be dispatched to your Lordship. The scarcity of coal is a great misfortune just now, and has prevented my sending back the *Assaye* and *Pottinger* steamers, as I otherwise should have done.

The "minute" which your Lordship has done me

the honour confidentially to communicate to me, very fairly estimates our requirements for operations in the south of Persia, including Shiraz. And possibly Is-pahan might be ultimately accomplished with the additional troops your Lordship contemplates supplying, should we have had opportunities of defeating the enemy in the interim. But beyond these points we could hardly venture without a further increase of European troops. My letter of the 15th ult. has fully acquainted your Lordship with our prospects, and my opinion as to the amount and composition of reinforcements required for the seizure and occupation of Shiraz. I very gratefully thank your Lordship for your other most kind letter of the same date, explaining the circumstances which have rendered necessary my transfer to Rajpootana. I cannot but feel convinced that, for the good of Oude and for the interest of Government, it was most necessary that a *permanent* Commissioner should be appointed. I am satisfied, moreover, that those interests could not be better advanced than by the charge of Oude being placed in the very able hands of Sir Henry Lawrence, and I rejoice that he has been selected for and has undertaken the duty. Neither could your Lordship have sent me to any place or duty more congenial to my tastes than Rajpootana. But, as General Low is aware, I should not myself have sought the change, nor wished it so far as I am personally concerned; for the transfer from so important an office as that of Chief Commissioner of Oude to the less onerous one of Agent in Rajpootana, might be regarded by the public as an evidence that I had been *found wanting*. My present occupation will, however, I trust, preserve me from injurious imputations. But, whether or not, I should be sorry indeed, were my personal feelings or interests to be allowed for a moment to stand in

the way of an arrangement so obviously calculated for the public good as that which your Lordship has found it necessary to make. Even had it been a source of mortification to me, I should have considered myself more than compensated by the kindly manner in which you have condescended to announce the arrangement to me.

I am, &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay.

Bushire, 12th March, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I have this moment learned that a Dutch vessel is going immediately, by which I take my chance of forwarding this; but having no time to write, I must beg to refer your Lordship to the enclosed letter to Lord Canning, which pray oblige me by forwarding after perusal.

The French captain (of the *Sybille*) has just been with me, who has just returned from a trip to the Euphrates where he went to inquire after the lost French antiquities. He visited the Persian camp at Mohumra; examined all their works; saw their army (which he estimated at about 10,000 regulars, besides 4,000 or 5,000 Persian irregulars, and he thinks, about twenty guns in good order),* and he considers their works, both defensive and offensive, very formidable, much more so than we had been led to expect from the information heretofore obtained regarding them. I do hope General Jacob will be up by the day after to-morrow, when I hope to get away. As he has the *Precur-*

* Subsequently ascertained by Captain Kemball to be thirty guns, nine regiments of Regular Infantry, fifteen Cavalry, 4,000 Irregular Infantry.

sor and *Victoria* with him, I hope they may bring at least two more squadrons—we have already one. In reply to your query regarding “canteens,” I enclose a memorandum prepared by Colonel Lugard and General Havelock (No. 1), and I shall be glad if their proposals can be carried into effect. I enclose also a memorandum showing the troops I propose taking to Mohumra, and those left with General Stalker (No 2). Notes received yesterday from Captain Kemball, who has gone to the mouth of the river, and from the purser of the *Comet*, (which vessel had just arrived there from Bussorah) giving some account of the proceedings of the enemy (No. 3). And I send also a correspondence I had the other day with Captain Jones (No. 4), affording the first evidence I have yet had of the enemy’s Commander-in-Chief’s intention to negotiate, if the feeler really emanates from him. Your Lordship will observe, that, in the camp in our front, the impression prevails that the said Commander-in-Chief (Sirkische Bushi) has full powers to negotiate (see intelligence report of yesterday, No. 5) but no communication has yet come from him direct. Perhaps your Lordship will kindly have copies of these enclosures prepared for the Governor-General, if you think them worth sending; Captain Kemball and Mr. Badger have been sent up to Bussorah to open communication with the Chaab Arabs, and prepare them for our advent, and to cause the removal of the Turkish vessel now at Mohumra. Good-bye, my dear Lord Elphinstone. I hope next to address you from Mohumra, but we shall have no steamer to send unless in the meantime coal should arrive.

J. OUTRAM.

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD, *Bushire, 13th March, 1857.*

I herewith forward Major Curtis' reply to the reference which I informed your Lordship I should make to that officer, on the subject of cattle carriage preparation for the Bengal troops. On the margin of that document I have briefly noted my opinion on some of Major Curtis' propositions.

This packet will be taken to Bombay by the French frigate *Sybille*, expected here in three or four days, and as that is a safer and quicker opportunity perhaps, than the Dutch vessel by which I sent my original letters to your Lordship, dated 9th and 11th instant, I herewith forward copies of those despatches under flying seal to Lord Elphinstone.

I remain, &c., &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE, *Bushire,
15th March, 1857.*

This is, indeed, a sad announcement I have to make to your Lordship. General Stalker died by his own hand yesterday morning. I must refer you to the proceedings of the inquest for all that was therein elicited as to the cause of this dreadful act. But I have since learnt that his pecuniary entanglements had lately caused him great vexation, and that the result of the Bombay races had brought him much disappointment. This, and his anxiety regarding hurting the Europeans, I fear preyed on his mind, and he was in a weakly state consequent on illness caused by exposure on the trip to Borazjoon.

Your Lordship will see from the evidence, that so far from any depression being caused by his supersession by me, it had always been a matter of rejoicing to him. And a letter, which he addressed to me a few days before his death, recorded at the inquest, shows with what friendly feelings he regarded me. Indeed, we have lived together like brothers ever since I arrived here—during the whole time I have been at Bushire—as he insisted on my being his guest and sharing his tent. One of the witnesses examined at the inquest, alludes to my having refused to land a troop of the 3rd Cavalry as a cause for vexation to General Stalker, which induces me to offer some explanation regarding the circumstance, which I regret the inquest did not give me the opportunity to place before them.

A troop of the 3rd Cavalry having arrived in the harbour, I decided on sending it on to Mohumra, because I had lost all hope of the greater portion of Jacob's Horse arriving in time, two-thirds of the corps having been sent in sailing vessels, and I had no steamers to send to bring them up. I therefore arranged with General Stalker that, when they arrived, he might avail himself of their services if really necessary—he having already 500 cavalry, and another troop of the 3rd Cavalry being daily expected, while I should have only that troop, and, at the utmost, two squadrons of the Sind Horse. Unexpectedly, a troop of the 14th Dragoons arrived in the harbour, when General Stalker wrote to ask me if by taking them I should still require the 3rd Cavalry troop. I replied that as the troop was ready on ship-board, I still wished to send it into the river as I was still too weak in cavalry; and, having no expectation that the enemy would venture to face the formidable redoubts by which this camp is protected, I did not think he could risk much in waiting for the

cavalry which might soon be expected. In the evening, when I met General Stalker, to walk with him as usual, he said, "Never mind the cavalry, I don't care the least about it, but they (his staff, I presume,) were bothering me about it." Hence *then—three days ago*—I saw no immediate prospect of the enemy venturing to come near Bushire, nor did I do so till this morning, when, as you will see by the accompanying note I wrote to Captain Jones (Appendix, No. 1,) in reference to certain papers appended thereto, I intimated my belief that the enemy's armaments therein reported were exaggerated to give weight to his endeavour to excite eagerness on my part to open negotiations through his mediation—for I had previously been repeatedly misled by similar reports. Not two hours after writing that note, however, I received another note from Captain Jones (*vide C of No 1*) conveying information, confirmed by that obtained by Major Taylor from another source, which renders it, in my opinion, so probable (the more so as the pretended overtures to negotiate are probably intended to put us off our guard), that they may really attempt a night chuppao, after my departure, particularly when they hear that the other general is dead. I have deemed it advisable, therefore, to recall the 14th Dragoons, and also a troop of Horse Artillery, and have placed General Jacob in command at Bushire. Had poor General Stalker been alive, of course the same arrangement would have been made for him.

Indeed, I write with a sore heart, under the grievous affliction we are now suffering. The funeral this morning, attended by the entire force, was a most melancholy display. My amiable, kind-hearted comrade was beloved by all.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

N.B.—On the following night, the 16th March, Commodore Ethersey also destroyed himself, leaving evidence that he considered himself unequal to the responsibilities of his position.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Anchorage inside the Euphrates River,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE, *March 23rd, 1857.*

We arrived here on the evening of the 21st instant, having embarked at Bushire on the 18th, but detained so long on board by north-westerly-gales so strong for two or three days before embarkation, as to prevent any communication with the shipping; and thus have we again been most vexatiously delayed beyond the date on which I had calculated on getting off.

Two or three of our vessels had grounded on the bar, and one, with *Sinde Horse*, had not yet got off last night, but we hope to see her to-day, together with the two steamers which are giving her aid. If so, we move up about forty miles to-morrow, to the rendezvous four miles below Mohumra, and attack the place next day.

The Persians have been so long preparing defensive works, that they ought to be strong; and they are represented to be so, and of scientific construction moreover. They are supposed also to have prepared stockades of felled date-trees immediately behind their works. The main body of the enemy's troops are however, encamped about a mile beyond the works (inland), and I fear will decamp, when their batteries are silenced, before we can land the troops, which cannot be effected until the said batteries are silenced, as in order to get above the enemy's position, the troops will have to run the gauntlet of their batteries.

Captain Kemball and the Rev. Mr. Badger preceded me into the river some days before, to obtain accurate information as to the enemy's works, strength of troops, &c., and they have ascertained that there are 9 regiments of regular infantry, averaging about 700 each; total 6,300: 600 trained gunners, 1,500 cavalry, and 4,600 irregular infantry; total 13,000, with 31 guns, besides some old ship guns which they found at Mohumra, and are said to have mounted.

Your Lordship will learn the result as soon as you receive this, for there will be no opportunity of dispatching this packet before Mohumra falls; but I prepare it now, to enclose the accompanying despatch for the Governor-General, under a flying seal, for your Lordship's perusal.

The accompanying drawing of the Mohumra works, as they appeared the last time the *Comet* passed, was sketched by the purser of that vessel (I believe).

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

Enclosed is a copy of Captain Kemball's memorandum of information.

To the Right Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, K. G.

On board the H. C. steam-frigate, "Feroze,"

25th March, 1857. Off the village of

MY LORD, *Hartch, four miles below Mohumra.*

Shortly after the arrival at Bushire of Captain Kemball, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, he received an official communication from Redschid Pacha, Governor of Bussorah, declaring Mohumra to be disputed territory, and its consequent immunity from any attack by the British forces, in virtue of the claims put forth by the Porte. This veto upon our projected operations

being a matter of some delicacy, and as there was another difficulty besides to be disposed of with the Turkish authorities, viz., the removal of an Ottoman ship-of-war stationed in the channel before Mohumra, I determined upon dispatching Captain Kemball to Bussorah with instructions to treat with the Pacha in person on these subjects. I availed myself of the same opportunity to commission Captain Kemball to collect information respecting the number, position, armament, and resources of the enemy in and about Mohumra, and to communicate with such of the Arab tribes on Persian soil as had already made friendly overtures to the British. For this purpose I placed the services of the Rev. Mr. Badger at Captain Kemball's disposal, and the result of the negotiations carried on are embodied in the accompanying enclosures.

I am disposed to admit that the neutrality of the Shat-ool-Arab, or rather the mutual right over those waters, held by the Persians and Turks (although that point is not advanced by Redschid Pacha, who bases his argument against our operations solely upon the alleged claim of the Porte to the territory of Mohumra), presented a difficulty to our engaging in hostilities on that river, without giving some ground for expostulation on the part of the Ottoman Government, however amicably disposed towards us, or affording a pretext which other less friendly powers might have availed themselves of against the Porte, as well as against ourselves. That difficulty, however, has most fortunately been removed by the fact that the Persians themselves have taken the initiative, by firing upon the *Comet* from a fortified position, as she was steaming towards the mouth of the river on the 3rd inst. This vessel is well known in these parts, having been engaged for several years on the river as a despatch boat, consequently no valid excuse can be urged by the

Persians on the plea of ignorance. The particulars of this attack are reported in an accompaniment to one of the annexed letters from Captain Kemball, who has, moreover, informed me that the Pacha of Bussorah privately apprised him of his intention to intimate officially to the Persian Government of Mohumra, that, after such a violation of the neutrality laws, the Turkish authorities could not be held responsible for any consequence which it might entail.

The pledge given by Reschid Pacha for the removal of the Ottoman vessel of war from before Mohumra, is a tacit proof of the friendliness of the Turkish authorities and I trust the course adopted by Captain Kemball on that point, and at my direction, will meet the approval of Her Majesty's Cabinet.

The correspondence held with the Arab chiefs will, I hope, be equally satisfactory to your Lordship. Their friendly overtures to us have been met in the same spirit, and thus far nothing has been demanded of them beyond the assumption of a strict neutrality during the impending contest. The success of Captain Kemball's negotiations with them was remarkably displayed as we steamed up to the present anchorage. At several of the villages, the Arabs, male and female, approached the river waving their flags, and we had hardly anchored when several came on board the *Feroze*, volunteering to give us any information in their power as to the numbers and disposition of the enemy. The proclamation, of which I annex a copy, has been widely disseminated, and I have reason to believe that the effect has been to inspire them with implicit confidence in our views towards themselves.

Your Lordship will perceive that no guarantee whatever, beyond that contained in the proclamation just mentioned, has been held out to the Arabs, and when

once in possession of Mohumra, I anticipate little difficulty on that score. They will then, in my opinion, be quite ready to take an active post with us (should that course be deemed advisable), relying simply upon our temporary supremacy over their districts.

The result of Captain Kembball's inquiries into the strength and resources of the enemy in and about Mohumra, is comprised in one of the accompanying enclosures. I have every reason to believe that the details are substantially correct; and I cannot forbear expressing to your Lordship my high appreciation of the services, military and diplomatic, which that officer has rendered to the expedition by his last visit to Bussorah. A similar acknowledgment is due from me in behalf of the Reverend Mr. Badger, for his cordial co-operation with Captain Kembball.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Major-General Jacob, Commanding at Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB,

Mohumra, 28th March, 1857.

I regretted to be so long in announcing to you the capture of Mohumra, which we occupied only on the 26th instant, as I informed you in a pencil note I wrote that day, to go by a steamer sent on to coal at Bushire, to be in readiness for our despatches, to follow in another steamer to-morrow morning.

The enemy fled towards Ahwaz, going on all night (the night before last), so hurriedly that they dropped much of the little kit they carried with them, with which Green found the road strewn when he reconnoitred yesterday morning, and the Arabs had evidently been plundering the discomfited host—their stragglers,

of course—as Green passed numbers of them carrying off Persian plunder. He came in sight of a party of their cavalry eleven miles off, evidently left behind to cover their retreat. They are said to have carried off only five guns (we have got 18), but Green thought he traced the wheels of more. As, however, the minister of the Arab chief, who was with them till the last, and accompanied them some miles on their retreat, declares positively they only took off five guns, perhaps the other wheels Green traced may have been those of a tumbril only. They left all their camps standing, and an immense store of powder and shot (the latter chiefly 9 and 12-pounder), besides the numerous magazines they—and our shells—exploded; one especially, an enormous one, which they exploded in the outer camp, just before retreating. They took no ammunition with them beyond what they had in their tumbrils, and but very little kit (no tents) of any sort, as their carriage cattle were at Ahwaz for convenience of forage. They are said to have but scanty stores at Ahwaz, nearly everything having been brought here, so confident were they of holding the place. They had a brigadier and about 70 men killed; how many wounded the town's people cannot tell; few were left behind them of the latter. Their army consisted of nine regular infantry regiments, averaging 700 each—total, 6,300; 600 trained gunners; 300 Shah's, and 1,200 Bucktiara cavalry—total, 1,500 cavalry. Irregular infantry, 1,200 Bucktiara matchlockmen, 3,000 Arab levies, and 400 Belooch Mercenaries;—total, of all arms, 13,000. The Arabs and Belooches have all left them, and are ready and anxious to serve us. The latter we purpose engaging at once as camelmen. The Arab chiefs are all coming in, and have sent to ask to do so; glad apparently to get rid of the Persians. The

flight of the latter, without tents or kits, must have a good moral effect, and I would give the world to pursue them, but it is so fearfully hot now in the day that we could not possibly expose our men, even if we had the means of carrying commissariat stores, which we have not; for our coal is exhausted. Kemball hopes in a week or ten days to have two or three thousand camels and 600 mules, which are on the way down and must now be very near. The latter I purpose shipping to Bushire should I have enough camels to move up to Ahwaz with the aid of the little steamers, for which latter I hope you will be able to send coal immediately, for I trust you have had more colliers in by this time. Even two or three hundred tons would suffice in the first instance, and as none of the big steamers can go to Bombay until they have the means of coaling at Bushire (with the exception of the one which takes this mail), I hope you will be able to spare us so much. When coal is sufficient at Bushire, the steamers will be sent down as fast as they can coal to bring up your Horse, if they have not yet arrived. I think it probable I may send back the Dragoons to Kurrachee, and have only your Horse here, unless in the meantime I get a favourable report as to the means of forage at Ahwaz. If the enemy's army is so totally disorganized as represented, I may send back the 64th, and Havelock to command at Bushire—you coming here to command the 2nd Division as well as the cavalry, for here you would have all your own way, and may raise your levies, I trust, as well as govern the whole of Kuzzistan. After you have established your raj, I must go to Bushire to meet the overtures of the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, should he tender them. But if you think it practicable to move out with sufficient force to attack his army when you get these 600 mules, I would

have you effect that object if you wish it, sending you the 64th and the Dragoons, and keeping Havelock here for the present. I fancy Ahwaz will be the headquarters of this division, as we are assured good mud huts can be run up there for the troops, in a very short time, by the Arabs, which would be better than the mere Kajan barracks of Bushire. If, therefore, you see no prospect of attacking the enemy, and are of opinion that the troops at Bushire must merely remain on the defensive for the hot season, and would wish to keep the 64th here, let me know.

I shall follow up the enemy so soon as I get coal, for the camels will be here by that time, and possibly I may go on to Shuster—that is, if I learn to a certainty that the place is not capable of standing a seige. If it is, it would be madness to expose our troops in such an operation so late in the season. But if the enemy in your front is likely to give battle below the passes, I may content myself with leaving Havelock to occupy Ahwaz, and join you myself with the 64th so soon as possible after I get your reply. I have no wish, however, to rob you of the credit of defeating the Persian Commander-in-Chief; do not scruple, therefore, to tell me if you would rather I staid here till you have polished him off. I should, of course, enjoy being with you on such an occasion, but I know you would do at least as well without me, and my principal object in seeking to be there would be, to be on the spot to receive the overtures which Sirkeesheekchee Bashee will be sure to make immediately after defeat.

I enclose the copy in pencil of the translation of a letter the Shooja-ool-Moolk wrote to the Prime Minister before his defeat at Borazjoon, which gives a pretty good insight into the plans of the enemy. His advice is good, to “push on to Candahar;” and I

dare say, all about the Shah give much the same counsel ; but all the rest of the Persian troopers are now in these quarters, and they must be paralyzed by the loss of all their ordnance stores here and at Borazjoon. Mark the Shooja's proposal of destroying Bushire ! The only hope he could have had of effecting this must have been by the explosion of your magazines in the fort ; and since they appear to have meditated such a measure, it may be as well to adopt precautions against the possibility of it being effected. Murray, in sending this surreptitiously-acquired copy of Shooja's letter, begged me to keep it strictly confidential, as, were it divulged that he had obtained such a document, the party through whom it was obtained would inevitably be destroyed, and his best source of information cut off.

Yours, &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Earl of Clarendon, K.G.

Camp before Mohumra,
28th March, 1857.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Mohumra was captured by the British forces on the 26th instant.

For details of the engagement, I beg to refer your Lordship to the accompanying military despatch, from which it will be seen that, although the batteries of the enemy were admirably constructed, and their guns bravely fought, they were unable to withstand the heavy and well-directed fire of the Honourable Company's navy.

After the forts were nearly silenced, the landing of

our troops was effected in admirable order, and without any opposition.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded is estimated at 200, among whom is Aga Jan Khan, a serteef, or brigadier, who was killed bravely defending the northern fort. His death appears to have damped the courage of the enemy, for the Shahzada, on hearing of it, made immediate preparation for retreat, destroying a number of magazines, and leaving their camps still standing.

A small body of Sinde Horse, under the command of Captain Malcolm Green, my military secretary, followed the Persian army on the 26th, and again very early in the morning of the 27th, and came up with their rear-guard about fourteen miles from Mohumra. He reports that the enemy was in full retreat; and from the fact that their line of march was strewn with camp equipage and private property, it is evident that great disorder reigned among them. Reliable information obtained from the Arabs, describes the army as utterly disorganized by the unexpected capture of the forts, in which they appear to have placed their chief confidence.

Large stores of Government flour, wheat, and barley, have fallen into our hands, besides great quantities of ammunition and camp equipage. Of the sixteen guns captured, one was cast at St. Petersburg, and bears a Persian inscription, stating that it was presented by the Emperor to Abbas Mirza, in 1828.

The loss of Mohumra; the defeat of a large army by a British force numerically but one third as strong; their panic retreat in the presence of the Arabs to whom they had boasted of their vast superiority to us on land, whilst after the capture of their forts they did not dare to face us even beyond the reach of our

ships, though we marched out to meet them; and the destruction of so great an amount of military stores will, I trust, have a salutary influence upon the councils of the Shah. This territory being still considered in dispute between the Sublime Porte and the Persian Government, the latter had evidently made the most strenuous efforts to retain it, as well for the sake of establishing its prestige in the eyes of the Turks, as for preventing the possibility of our making it over to the latter power.

I am well satisfied that the Arabs generally have behaved as I anticipated they would, from my previous communications with them. As a matter of course perfect confidence has not yet been restored among them; but the principal chiefs have already sent in their submission, and requested permission to visit me in person.

On this score I anticipate little difficulty beyond adjusting the disputes which have been of long standing among themselves; but ably seconded as I am by the experience and ability of Captain Kemball, I trust to be able very soon to establish our supremacy over, and to secure the co-operation of, all the Arab tribes between Mohumra and Shuster, and perhaps along the sea-coast as far as Bushire. This virtual sovereignty over a large portion of the Persian territories, may induce the Shah to submit to our conditions, and as the want of baggage will, I fear, prevent any forward movement upon Shiraz during the ensuing hot season, I shall not deem the interval ill-spent in effecting this result. In the meantime I propose despatching immediately three armed steamers to Ahwaz, on the banks of the Karoon, and, should the report be favourable, shall move this camp to that reputed healthy position, where I have reason to believe that the troops can be hutted with greater facility than at Bushire.

From the correspondence attached to my last despatch, your Lordship will perceive that there is a probability of the Turkish Government putting forth some claims to the district of Mohumra. My reply to the Pacha of Bussorah, through Captain Kemball, will apprise you of the sense in which I have already answered his official declaration to that effect. Nevertheless, I must beg for ulterior instructions on this important matter, as well as on the subject submitted to your Lordship in my despatch dated 22nd ultimo.

I observe with satisfaction, that in my despatch to your Lordship, under date 2nd instant, I anticipated provisionally several remissions in the conditions of peace originally proposed by Her Majesty's Government; and I beg to express my sincere thanks for the announcement of their Lordships' confidence, and the latitude which they have been pleased to allow me in this respect, as conveyed in your Lordship's despatch (No. 5, of 23rd January, to Mr. Vernon Smith). Whilst I may be permitted to state that such an expression of confidence shall in no way deter me from submitting to your Lordship my conscientious convictions as to the best policy to be pursued under our present or future relations with the Shah, it will undoubtedly make me most anxious to uphold the dignity and rights of the British Crown in its relations with the Persian Government.

I have duly received the despatches from the Foreign Office, with their several enclosures, up to the 5th February; but as their contents do not call for immediate reply, and as I should wish to receive an answer to the suggestions submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 2nd March replying to the same, I trust that the delay will be approved of.

Agreeably with your Lordship's directions, I send

the present despatch under flying seal to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, together with a short summary to be transmitted to London by telegraph.

I beg to acquaint your Lordship that the continual occupation of Captain Kemball in matters connected with the expedition, has prevented him from being able to prepare his usual despatches for the Home Government, and for Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. I beg to state that his multifarious duties under me amply atone for the omission.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD,

Mohumra, 28th March.

This mail carries such voluminous official despatches, detailing all my military operations and political proceedings, that I need, merely, briefly intrude on your Lordship my speculations as to our future prospects.

Captain Kemball's correspondence shows that the Turkish authorities are precluded from openly allowing their subjects to engage in our service beyond the Turkish frontier, that is, from being embodied at Bagdad, or elsewhere in the Turkish dominions, for service in Persia, and, consequently, that they had exacted security from those engaged at Bagdad to escort baggage cattle to Bussorah not to pass the frontier. But Captain Kemball informs me the Pacha considers this a mere form, intended only to preclude his subjects from entering the Persian territory as an organized body, and that, having fulfilled their mission

of escorting the Kaffilla to Bussorah, and having there broken up, there is no hindrance to *individuals* crossing over to seek our service as mere mercenary adventurers, which Captain Kemball thinks they will do. I shall be careful, however, that every precaution is adopted, on entertaining such persons, to avoid any proceeding which might tend in any way to compromise the Porte.

I have, as your Lordship will have observed in my letter to Lord Clarendon, dated 22nd ultimo, already apprised the Cabinet that I consider myself fully warranted in accepting the services of the Chaab Arabs, now that they virtually are our conquered subjects for the time being. And from the friendly spirit they have displayed, I have little doubt I shall obtain valuable aid from these tribes, but in what shape I have not yet decided. Their principal chief is coming to-morrow, having already tendered his submission through his deputy, and several of the inferior chiefs have done so in person. These tribes entirely deserted the enemy on his retreat, and availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the confusion which prevailed during their flight the first night, to plunder all Persian stragglers of the little property they had been able to carry with them.

We have as yet no positive information where the Persian army now is, but it is supposed to have continued its disordered flight to Ahwaz, where there may be some stores; but scanty they must be, for we hear that almost everything had been brought here; and certainly the vast quantity of ordnance stores and commissariat supplies which have fallen into our hands, besides what was destroyed by the enemy, would lead to the supposition that every depôt in Kuzzistan was drained to supply the magazines at Mohumra.

To-morrow three armed steamers will be despatched

to Ahwaz, on hearing of whose approach I have little doubt the Persians will decamp, for they will consider them to be the advance guard of our army. My object in sending them is to obtain an accurate description of Ahwaz, as to its eligibility for the location of our troops; for I am led to believe it would be a more healthy position than any, except Shuster, for this division, and that mud huts can be prepared there rapidly, affording better protection to Europeans than the Kajan barracks of Bushire.

Captain Kemball, who has obliged me by accompanying the expedition, will be able at Ahwaz to ascertain for me the actual condition of the Persian army, and whether it is capable of making a stand at Shuster. And it is my determination to follow the enemy to Shuster, should it be certain that he has no means of standing a siege there. If he has the means (*i.e.*, supplies of provisions, and ordnance stores sufficient), I shall not of course attempt the operation, for it would be madness to expose our troops for the time requisite to prosecute a siege in the hot season, which has already commenced. In that case, should the report on Ahwaz be favourable, I probably may establish the head-quarters of the 2nd Division and Sindh Horse at that place.

I should have wished to follow up the enemy at once, had I possessed the means of moving. But neither had I baggage cattle, nor coal for the steamers that would have been required to accompany the army; and I am of necessity compelled to wait for the camels and mules now on their way from Bagdad (expected in a week or ten days), by which time, I hope, a supply of coal may arrive from Bushire.

I am anxious, too, before making an upward move, to hear from General Jacob what prospect there may be of attacking the enemy near Bushire. If he considers that

it will be practicable (*i.e.*, to get at him before he can escape into the passes), it is probable I may restrict the operations of this division to the occupation of the Ahwaz only, and return myself with the 64th Regiment and troop of 14th Dragoons to Bushire, with all the mules I can ship; which latter will, I hope, enable me to equip a sufficient force, with tents and commissariat supplies, for the few days that would be occupied in operating against the enemy in that quarter.

After defeat (if not before, on hearing of our approach), the Persian army would, doubtless, retire up the passes, and then I might be able to place the Europeans on the Geezakhan mountains. But, beyond that, I cannot now hope to effect anything this season; for the hot weather has already commenced, earlier than it usually does in the gulf, and I now despair of having anything like the quantity of baggage cattle required for the advance to Shiraz before September, at the earliest.

Under these circumstances, I shall not ask for any further European troops for the present, and would recommend that any such as may have been prepared for Persia may be sent to Kurrachee instead (whence they may be easily drawn, should any emergency arise), and remain until September; and I think it probable I may even send the portion of the 14th Dragoons now in Persia also to Kurrachee, thus securing quarters for them, and relieving our forage demands in some measure.

So far as the Persian army in this quarter is concerned, I am quite satisfied no further aid will be required to this division; for I believe the enemy cannot venture to assume the offensive until greatly reinforced, and supplied with the munitions of war, neither of which (*i.e.*, men—troops—or ordnance

stores) can now exist on this side of Tehran, excepting what may now be in front of Bushire. But before deciding the question (as to the detention of the intended European reinforcements at Kurrachee), I should wish to hear from General Jacob whether he is satisfied that his force now at Bushire will suffice for mere defensive operations during the hot season, with the addition merely of the two native regiments which have been warned for Persia, and another Golundauze Company (or two, perhaps) to relieve the European Artillery in some measure from exposure to the heat in the redoubts. I shall request General Jacob, therefore, on forwarding this letter to your Lordship, to state whether he considers the additional native troops I have indicated will suffice for Bushire, and whether he would recommend the 14th Dragoons being sent to Kurrachee for the present.

On my return to Bushire, I think of transferring General Havelock to the command of the 1st Division, and placing General Jacob in command here, where his administrative abilities will have full scope in controlling the Chaab tribes, organizing his levies, &c., &c. And I doubt not he will soon effect the expulsion of any Persian troops who may venture to remain at Shuster or Dijpool, by the imposing attitude his levies will soon assume, and the power of his name, without even the necessity for his making a hostile demonstration, from the dread they would feel of his coming suddenly upon them.

We should thus extend our supremacy over all the tribes from Mohumra to Shuster, and also, by occasional visitations of our war vessels at the intermediate ports, overawe the tribes occupying the sea-coast between Mohumra and Bushire. Our thus exercising a virtual sovereignty over a considerable portion of Persian terri-

tory may induce the Shah to submit to our conditions ; and as a forward movement on Shiraz during the hot season is now out of the question, we could not better employ the interval than in effecting this result.

I remain, &c., &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

P.S.—I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the translation of a letter of the Sooja-ool-Moolk to the Sudr Azeem, which forms one of the official accompaniments, as showing the nature of the councils by which the Shah is likely to be encouraged to prosecute the war in Affghanistan. If the Persians really do occupy Candahar, the troops which your Lordship contemplates assembling in Sinder for service in Persia hereafter, may have a beneficial effect, as tending to the supposition that we are preparing to oppose the Persians in that field.

To Colonel Sykes.

Mohumra, 28th March, 1858.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

The official despatch will acquaint you with the mode of our operations here, resulting in the capture of Mohumra, with all the enemy's guns except six (some accounts say they have taken away only five), both his standing camps, containing much private property, and immense stores of powder, shot, and shell, besides a vast quantity exploded in various magazines ; without a man of the army being touched, and very trifling loss in the ships. The war vessels did their work admirably ; silenced the batteries in about three hours, and then the troops passed up in steamers. So soon as a sufficient body of infantry was landed, and our foot artillery,

with a few of the Sinde Horse, I advanced through the date groves to attack them. But the enemy had retreated on seeing the troops about to land, and as we had no cavalry (beyond a troop of Sinde Horse) we had no chance of coming up with them, precipitately decamping as they did, without kit, beyond what they could carry on their backs, and a few mules, and five (or some say six) light guns.

Their works were very strong—well constructed, and scientifically placed; and so confident were the enemy of holding the place against us, that they took no steps to bring in their baggage cattle, which from scarcity of forage here they kept at Ahwaz, some fifty or sixty miles up the Karoon, though they had ample time to do so, as we were detained three days in the river by vessels grounding, besides the greater portion of the fleet being anchored within the bar for a fortnight before.

The captain of the French frigate *Sybilie*, who had visited the Persian camp about three weeks ago, described the works and strength of the enemy as most formidable, and the confidence of the Persians as most remarkable, but I could not believe they would be so foolhardy as to make no preparation for retreat, in the possible contingency of being worsted, however arrogant they might be. Their force consisted of nine regiments of regular infantry, averaging 700 each (6,300); 600 trained gunners, 1,500 cavalry, and 4,600 matchlock men—total of all arms, 13,000, with thirty guns. The flight of such a host totally without tents or baggage, and their sacrifice of such vast military stores as they had accumulated here, before a British force not one-fourth of their number, must have a moral effect very advantageous to our cause; for, though unable to stand against the tremendous fire of our naval artillery, the

Arabs well know that our army was numerically far inferior to the Persians, and they will justly appreciate the cowardice of the latter in not venturing to make a stand against us out of reach of the guns of the shipping. They saw us moving through the date groves to attack them, and three miles of open plain intervened between us and their outer camp where they might have made a stand, but they fled so precipitately as to be out of sight before we cleared the date groves. Their infantry is described to be in the utmost disorder, and utterly disheartened, and the Arabs plundered them of much of the little property they did carry off (chiefly on their backs) during their first night march. Captain Green, who followed them up next morning, with a horse patrol, for eleven miles, saw the road strewn with their kit, and many parties of Arabs carrying off property they had plundered.

Unfortunately, I have no means of following them up at once—neither baggage cattle of any description, nor steamers to take us up the Karoon, for our coal is nearly exhausted. But three of the small armed steamers will be despatched to Ahwaz to-morrow, where the flying host must have arrived by this time, to reconnoitre, or to take possession of the enemy's stores there, should the Persians continue their flight from thence, as probably they will do when they hear that steamers are approaching, which they will suppose to be the advance-guard of our army. But my chief object is to obtain accurate information as to the eligibility of that position for our camp, as I think of establishing the 2nd Division and Jacob's Horse, &c., there, if not at Shuster, being described as a healthy locality, where mud huts for the Europeans—in the fashion of the country—can be run up expeditiously, said to be better calculated for protection from the great heats, than the mere Kajan

barracks of Bushire. More coal has by this time reached Bushire, I trust, and soon will be sent after us, and two or three thousand camels and mules will be here within a week, which Captain Kemball has procured for us. Until they arrive we cannot move, but when we have the means, I purpose following up the enemy to Ahwaz at all events, if he makes a stand there, where he has some magazines. Possibly I may follow him up to Shuster, should I learn sufficiently certainly that the place is not capable of standing a siege, which operation it is too late in the season now to attempt, for it is already becoming excessively warm.

All the mules we procure (Kemball tells me 700 are already purchased) will be shipped to Bushire immediately, and the 64th Regiment I shall take back with me there, when I hope to have sufficient carriage to carry tents for the Europeans, in which case I shall then attack the Persian army in our front there. But I see it is hopeless to effect more during the coming hot weather, for the heat there is already oppressive, and has become so much earlier this year than usual. I must content myself therefore with holding only the low-lands of Southern Persia for the present, till September next, and in the interim make my preparations for ascending the passes in the autumn.

I regret for my own sake to think that in a few days you will have vacated the chair, though on your own account I rejoice; for the labours you have had to go through of late are more than mortal man could sustain for a continuance. It will be my duty then to address my demi-official letters to Mr. Mangles instead of to you, for I cannot possibly find time to write to both, but I will do so as often as I can. . . .

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

P. S.—Thanks for your two kind letters of the 6th February, and 30th January. The warm clothing you allude to, is certainly not wanted *now*, and would only be in the way before October or November next, when I hope it may reach us, not before.

I fear I may have appeared remiss to the Secret Committee, in not addressing *them* instead of the President; but nothing was further from my intention than any neglect of my duty to the Committee. The fact is, I was under the impression that the President of the Board of Control is *ex-officio* President of the *Secret Committee*, and that *he* was the proper channel to address. In future, I shall address the “Secret Committee” as a body.

J. O.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra, 29th March, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

The whole of the naval department were so occupied yesterday on various urgent duties, that it was found impossible to prepare the steamer to start this morning; so it will leave early to-morrow instead.

The enclosed letter for the Governor-General, sent under a flying seal for your Lordship's perusal, leaves little to add with which to trouble you personally.

I have asked General Jacob to acquaint your Lordship with the nature of his replies to the queries I have put to him, as to the advisability of retaining the regiment and artillery ordered to reinforce Bushire, at Kurrachee, till September; and also sending the 14th Dragoons to Kurrachee, furnishing us at present with merely the two native regiments warned for service, and one, if not two companies of Golundauze.

We should thus have a smaller number of Europeans

exposed during the hot season ; for one half of those we have cannot possibly be housed before the height of the hot weather, and save the drain of one regiment of cavalry on our forage.

I was anxious to send back all the big steamers at once, but they have only coal enough left to take them to Bushire, and unless more has by this time arrived there, we shall have nothing left for our work on the Karoon ; several coal-ships were due, however, when we left Bushire, and Muscat also has most likely been replenished by this time. No delay shall occur here in emptying the large steamers of stores, &c., and they will be sent off as soon as cleared. If, therefore, General Jacob decides on merely the native troops coming, there will soon be the means of bringing them up.

I regret to say that Commodore Young is so knocked up as to be obliged to leave. Luckily we have a first-rate officer in Captain Rennie to take his place, and I do most earnestly hope that your Lordship will confer upon him the command here, with temporary position of Commodore ; for there is no officer in whom I, and all the heads of departments who have to do with the shipping, have so much confidence. He is the life and soul of the fleet, and was of the greatest possible assistance on the late occasion, not merely in aiding the Commodore with his advice and judgment as to the operations, but in preparing the vessels, and especially in preparing the raft for our mortar battery, and going himself to place it in position. And now he has gone up the Karoon in command of three small steamers, though he might have deputed any junior officer had he chosen to shirk the duty. In fact nothing your Lordship could do would more highly gratify the whole army, as well as myself, than placing the fleet in Captain Rennie's hands, and giving him the rank which would enable him effi-

ciently to perform his duty ; for without the position of Commodore, the commander of the fleet is confined to a single vessel, and otherwise restricted in the exercise of his authority to an extent that renders him far less useful than otherwise he would be.

The guns we have taken here are all *magnificent*, and well mounted. They will really be very useful to us. We are all perfectly astonished at the vast amount of ordnance stores the enemy had accumulated. What with the destruction of war material here, and at Borazjoon, and Chakotee, there can be but little left in Persia. The Prince Royal's army has now only five guns, and the ammunition carried in their tumbrils, and the army in front of Bushire has only the ammunition it brought with its guns on a few mules, relying as it did on the Borazjoon depôt.

What a thousand pities we had not the means of following up the enemy ; but without cattle and coal it is impossible of course. The three steamers now gone up the Karoon will, however, I daresay, suffice to drive the Persians from Ahwaz, and I don't think they will ever make head again.

We are all very sorry indeed to lose Lord Dunkellin, who leaves with this mail. He is a general favourite, and I really esteem him an excellent officer. He is always zealous and ready to perform any duty ; and one which he undertook the day we landed, I at one time feared would prove a second edition of his Crimean adventure. I had sent him across the plain with a message to Captain Green, who was in advance observing the motions of the enemy ; before Dunkellin returned a number of horsemen crossed the plain, and I feared might get hold of our friend ; luckily, however, they were Chaab Arabs deserting from the enemy, whose tribe have anything but hostile feelings towards the English,

and they were glad to get out of our way lest they might be treated as enemies. Had they been mischievously inclined, however, they might easily have intercepted his Lordship on his return. I regret, for his sake, the army had nothing to do worthy of such a record as would have warranted my deputing Lord Dunkellin as the bearer of this despatch.

Referring your Lordship to my letter to Lord Can-
ning for our prospects, and to the official despatches for
our past doings, I will intrude no further at present.

I am, &c., &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S.—I am told that the buoys sent up for the
entrance to this river, are not provided with anchors,
or, if they have any, not of the proper weight; con-
sequently, they cannot be used. A great pity, for the
few temporary ones, now at the bar, are so small as not
to be discernible, and are too few besides.

To General Jacob, Commanding Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB, *Mohumra, 29th March, 1857.*

Pray read the enclosures, and oblige me by con-
veying your sentiments on the points in which I refer to
you, to the Governor-General, on forwarding my letter,
under cover to Lord Elphinstone, that his Lordship
also may have your views, and so be guided in his
arrangements.

I find I shall have upwards of 700 mules to send you.

The Belooches and Arabs are eager for service, and I
think you will not be very long in organizing a body of
cavalry which will enable you to hold all Kuzzistan, and
drive the crippled Persian troops out of the country,
without their ever daring to face you.

But our first duty must be, to expel the enemy from the plains, under the passes, in front of Bushire ; and I only await your summons to send the 64th and 14th Dragoons, and to come myself if you wish it.

Pray do not delay the *Berenice* for your despatch (on the subject of my reference to you), for I am anxious to relieve their anxiety in Bombay. After reading my letters to Lord Elphinstone and the Governor-General, just close them with a note enclosed in the former, saying you will write more fully by the next steamer (the *Bombay*, which takes this to you), which can follow the *Berenice* so soon as coaled.

You can send your reply to me by the *Lady Falkland* (or whatever is the name of the steamer you have at Bushire). Your harbour may do without her for three or four days without much inconvenience, I hope, now there are no troops to land, but you will soon have others from this place.

Should any of the Sinde horse transports arrive, pray send them here if the wind be fair, or, otherwise, let them wait till we can send steamers for them.

I don't know whether the *Lady Falkland* could bring us any coal beyond what she requires for her voyage here and back.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Mohumra, 30th March, 1857.*

I had the pleasure to receive your letter dated 6th February, just as the attack on Mohumra commenced.

My official despatches will acquaint you with the

mode in which our operations here were successfully carried out, and the accompanying copies of letters I have addressed to the Governor-General will show you what further I have in contemplation.

You will be glad to learn that the Governor-General has conferred the rank of brigadier-general on Colonel Jacob, which has enabled me to place him in command at Bushire.

He fortunately arrived on the very day of General Stalker's death; and by leaving him at Bushire, I was relieved from the anxiety I should have had regarding the conduct of affairs there during my absence, for the enemy is in considerable force in that quarter; and though the talk in their camp was, that the Sirkee-sheekchee Bashee (the Commander-in-Chief) had full powers to negotiate peace as well as to make war, and indirect overtures ("for small people" to meet preparatory to the "great ones" entering into discussion) were made, it was too probable that this was intended merely to delude me from carrying out the operation against Mohumra; and as certainly no real submission would be tendered while the Persians remained in power here, I did not, of course, relax in my exertions to despatch the expedition, nor defer my departure for a single hour on that account—already most vexatiously delayed as we were by north-westerly gales, &c., &c. To these overtures I merely replied, therefore, that the Shah and his deputy, being perfectly informed that I *had* powers to treat as well as to prosecute war, could communicate with me direct (*i. e.*, not through "small persons") whenever they were sincerely desirous to negotiate peace, &c.

Now that Mohumra has fallen, and the Prince's army has been disgraced by its precipitate flight before a numerically inferior force; for, though unable to

retain these works under the fire of the shipping, *that* was no plea for abandoning his camp, which was out of reach of the ships' guns, and flying so hastily as to carry nothing with them beyond what they had on their backs; sacrificing too, without attempt at defence, the vast magazine they had in the camp—it is impossible that the Persians can again make head in Kuzistan, which I fully expect they will have to abandon entirely; for it is impossible to reinforce this army unless the force now in front of Bushire should effect a junction through Bebehan, a measure not likely to be attempted, as thus the road to Shiraz would be thrown open to us. It is more likely that the Prince's army will retreat to Borazjoon, and effect a junction with the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee's army.

Had we the means of moving at once we should certainly occupy Shuster without difficulty; but the heat has commenced, and we can neither carry tents for shelter, nor provide coals for the river steamers necessary to transport supplies. We shall therefore be detained here till baggage cattle (now on the way) and coal arrive; and, in the meantime, the enemy may prepare to defend Shuster. It will depend on what I learn as to the capability of that place maintaining a siege whether I move there; for it is too late in the season now to expose our troops under canvass to the tedious and toilsome operations of a siege, even had we a siege train, which we do not possess.

The small flotilla I yesterday despatched to Ahwaz will inform me (through the exertions of Captain Kemball, who has gone with it) as to the state of the Prince's army; and I hope, also, will acquire information as to the means of defence he may possess at Shuster.

Should the advance to Shuster not be advisable, I may content myself with establishing this division at Ahwaz, said to be a healthy locality, leaving General Havelock to effect that measure while I return to Bushire. And there I hope to have the means for moving a sufficient force to attack the enemy in that quarter, or to drive him from below the passes should he decline battle. And this is the utmost I can hope to accomplish this season; for the heat has commenced much earlier than usual in Southern Persia.

As yet, I am happy to say, the troops are remarkably healthy; but I can hardly hope they will long continue so; I am now in a position, however, to forward to Bushire the material required for roofing the hospitals and barracks in the course of erection there; and should this division be placed at Ahwaz, I am assured that mud huts can be rapidly constructed by the Arabs, affording better protection than even the barracks of Bushire.

I hope to inform you by next packet more fully.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

To Major-General Jacob, Commanding Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB,

Mohumra, 1st April, 1857.

I received yesterday, by the buggalow which brought Major Gardiner, a packet of newspapers, and learnt from him that the *Bombay* had arrived, with two vessels with dragoons in tow, by which despatches had come for me which had not been forwarded by this opportunity, I conclude, because you expected to send a steamer immediately. The *other Bombay*, which we despatched to you three days ago will, I hope, afford that

opportunity; for, being adapted for the Karoon, we want her back, as I wrote in the note I sent by Dunkellin.

I shall then learn whether you wish the 64th to be sent to Bushire, and I have kept the *Ajdaha* and *Semiramis* to take them to you. The other big steamers are not yet cleared of commissariat stores, &c., but will be sent when they are so. All the small steamers are required for the Karoon.

Everything is going on satisfactorily. We have now got all the kit on shore, and all the tents pitched; but the greater portion of the men were exposed, without shelter, to a good deal of rain yesterday and the day before.

I send copy of a letter I received at mid-day from Kemball, which will acquaint you with we all yet know of the proceedings of the flotilla pushing up the Karoon to Ahwaz.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

To the Earl of Clarendon, K.G., &c., &c.

MY LORD,

Mohumra, 3rd April, 1857.

Prior to leaving Bushire, an indirect communication was made to me, purporting to proceed from Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, to the effect that that officer was disposed to treat for peace, and asking information as to the extent of my powers. The message, and channel through which it passed, were not such as to induce me to place any reliance on the sincerity of the overture; but since my arrival here, I have received information that the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, or commander-in-chief of the Shah's body-guard, who appears

to have assumed the command of the Persian force before Bushire, has exhibited his credentials to treat, and employed the Elkhanee to make further inquiries as to my disposition to come to terms. Now, although the authenticity of these reports is open to suspicion, I feel bound to bring them to your Lordship's notice, and at the same time to obtain further instructions from her Majesty's Cabinet regarding the conditions to be insisted on in any negotiation which I may have to carry on with a Persian plenipotentiary.

To this end I have lost no time in studying the contents of the despatches as per margin,* lately received from the Foreign Office, and collating them with the original conditions as proposed to Feruk Khan, and with my own suggested additions and modifications contained in my despatch to your Lordship of the 2nd March. The result is embodied in the accompanying three drafts, to which I have annexed explanatory observations setting forth the ground for the alterations made.

The emendations suggested in your Lordship's letter to the President of the Board of Control have been adopted with one exception only, viz., the proposal on our part to abandon the system of protecting Persian subjects not actually in the employment of our foreign missions, if all other foreign nations would do the same. Decidedly opposed as I am to the system which has so long obtained, and fully aware of the difficulties and annoyances which it engenders throughout the

* Letter from the Foreign Office to the India Board, dated January 20th, 1857.

Letter from Mr. Murray, dated October 25th and 30th, and November 8th, 1856, with Sir Justin Shiel's remarks. Draft of a Treaty of Peace.

Draft of a Political Treaty.

Draft of a Commercial Treaty.

Observations of the Board of Trade on the last-mentioned drafts, and letter from the Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Vernon Smith, dated January 23rd, 1857.

East, I deemed it unadvisable, for obvious reasons, to embody it in a treaty. Your Lordship's proposition may, nevertheless, be very properly committed to her Majesty's representative at Tehran, who might be commissioned to treat with other foreign resident ministers on the subject. The success of such a negotiation would be at once gratifying to the Shah, and remove a fertile cause of misunderstanding between our mission and the Persian Government. Your Lordship will perceive, however, that the arrangement in Article 5 of my proposed commercial treaty, by stipulating that protégés convicted of any crime or infraction of the law requiring punishment shall be delivered over to the Persian authorities, is calculated to secure the more orderly conduct of such dependants, and thus lessen the evils which are so much to be deprecated.

With regard to the other articles, which, with the guides supplied by your Lordship, I have ventured to alter or to modify, I trust that the grounds adduced in the margin will prove satisfactory. The fortune of war has placed us in a condition to exact from Persia a satisfactory treaty, and the late signal success of our arms at Mohumra will, I doubt not, induce the Shah to yield, and that speedily. Whilst sincerely denouncing any desire to take an undue advantage of our present position, I feel bound to express to your Lordship that the opportunity should be employed for insisting upon every point in which the dignity, honour, and prestige of Great Britain is in any way concerned.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Mr. Mangles, Chairman of the Hon. East India Company.

DEAR SIR,

Mohumra, 4th April, 1857.

When this reaches England you will be in the chair; I therefore now commence a series of inflictions on you personally, instead of at second hand through Colonel Sykes, as hitherto. I have sent through him to day some private notes I have received from the flotilla I sent up the Karoon, announcing the complete success of the expedition, most gallantly carried out by Rennie and his companions. A more daring feat is not on record perhaps, than that of a party of 300 infantry, backed by three small river boats, following up an army of some 8,000 men, braving it by opening fire, and deliberately landing and destroying the enemy's magazines, and capturing one of his guns, in face of his entire army, and actually compelling that army to fly before them, and then occupying, for three whole days, the position they had compelled the enemy to vacate! The effect will be to clear Kuzzistan entirely of the Persians; and the entire province, including Shuster and Dijpool, is now at our command. And the Persians will never make head again in this province, for they have neither troops, nor guns, nor stores, nor munitions of war, wherewith to reinforce and supply their troops in this quarter. Whether, therefore, we occupy Ahwaz, or Shuster, the Persians will certainly leave the province altogether, in apprehension of an attack from our army. So gallant an adventure, attended with such important results, merits, you will I think agree with me in opinion, marked distinction for the principal parties concerned. Captain Rennie (now officiating commodore), Captain Kemball, and Captain Hunt, and, also, Captains Wray and Malcolm Green. I hope, therefore, when you re-

ceive the official despatches, you will move the President of the Board of Control to place their names before the Cabinet for submission to her Majesty. Captain Rennie (now Commodore) especially, for his services not only on this occasion, but also for his most gallant conduct at the capture of Mohumra, deserves distinguished reward; and I trust also Captain (late Commodore) Young, who commanded the expedition to Mohumra, will not be forgotten.

The enclosed extracts from a letter I sent to the Governor-General the other day, forwarded through Colonel Jacob, for his opinion on the points referred to him respecting our intended proceedings at Bushire, and his reply, copy of which he forwarded to the Governor-General, will show you what our prospects in that quarter are. In consequence of what Jacob says, I have ordered the 64th Regiment, and troop of 14th Dragoons, to be re-embarked, and shall despatch them to Bushire, following them myself so soon as I get the mules, to bring which I have sent two transports to Margeil. I shall then be in a condition to attack the army commanded by the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, with the confidence of securing most of his guns at any rate, though I fear he will escape with his infantry up the passes, immediately under which his camp is situated, not, however, before he has suffered greatly.

I shall thus command the whole of the low country of Southern Persia, and place the Europeans on the Geszakhan mountain, if we can do nothing more until September.

This division will either be hutted at Ahwaz, or encamped near Shuster; and as the whole country is in our favour, I shall have no difficulty in subsidising the intermediate tribes, through whom I can preserve our communication by the river steamers free from inter-

ruption. After disposing of the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee, General Jacob will come here to organize his levies. But the loss of his southern provinces, and the obvious inability of his army to contend against us, will suffice, I think, to bring the Shah to reason ; for is impossible his ministers can succeed much longer in disguising the truth from him, ingenious though they are in misrepresenting facts. As an amusing illustration of their ingenuity in this respect, I send you a translated article from the *Tehran Gazette*, giving an account of the Borazjoon affair. You have now my despatch to compare with this Persian version, and must choose between them.

The same mail which takes this will carry the official account of the Ahwaz expedition, when I obtain the reports of the officers concerned, who will be back to night.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-Gen.*

To Colonel Sykes.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

4th April, 1857.

In my letter of the 29th ultimo, I mentioned my intention of sending three of the small steam-boats up the Karoon to Ahwaz, the only means I had of effecting a distant reconnoissance in the absence of baggage cattle, &c., with the expectation that the Persian army would decamp on seeing them, supposing them to be the advance-guard of our army, when they might effect the destruction of the enemy's magazines there. The enclosed copies of notes I have received from the flotilla, will show you how successfully and satisfactorily that object has been carried out. The commander of the

Assyria, which has just returned, tells me that thousands of Arabs were looking on from the opposite bank, and witnessed with delight the Persian host retreat before 300 British soldiers,* backed by three river boats, abandoning to destruction the only remaining magazine they had in the country. The Persians have gone to Dijpool, which place they must also abandon when we advance to Shuster, if they do not sooner; for, having now only five guns, and no ammunition or commissariat stores, they are not likely to remain even there; for they are in no condition now to enforce contributions from the neighbouring tribes, who, it is probable, will rise against them under any circumstances, and certainly would resist any demands that may be made on them by the Persian authorities, without any prompting or instigation on our part to rebellion.

I have now learnt that Shuster has no defences, and that its people are eager to welcome us. But it will depend upon the Quartermaster-General's report on Ahwaz, and Kemball's information regarding Shuster, at which of these places will the 2nd Division be located. Its appearance at either place will cause the enemy to abandon Dijpool, and so leave Kuzzistan entirely in our hands. I have ordered the 64th, and troop of 14th Dragoons, to embark immediately, and shall proceed with these troops to Bushire, and hope soon after my arrival there, to attack the Sirkeesheekchee Bashee's army in that quarter.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-Gen.*

P.S.—As this post won't leave for Bagdad till the flotilla returns (expected to-morrow), I shall be able

* Each boat contained 100 rifles from the 78th Highlanders and 64th Foot.

to send to Mr. Mangles, to whom, as chairman, I shall write in future the official reports, &c., &c.

P.S. 5th April.—Last night I was roused up by an express from Bagdad, bringing a telegraphic message from Constantinople, announcing that peace had been signed at Paris on the 4th March, so all further arrangements must be suspended until I hear further. By this opportunity I received Rawlinson's letter of the 3rd February, with the enclosed slip of paper from you, desiring to know whether his letter of that date, or yours of 30th January, reached me first. The latter I have not yet received, my latest from you, received about a week ago, *vid* Bagdad, is dated 13th February, 1857, by mistake I fancy for 13th January, 1857, for you make no mention of peace being concluded with Feruk Khan, which is announced by Lord Cowley as having been effected on the 4th March.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Mohumra, 5th April, 1857.*

My letters of yesterday to Colonel Sykes and Mr. Mangles will acquaint you with the measures I had then in view—all suddenly arrested to-day, by an express which reached me during the night from Bagdad, announcing “on the authority of Lord Cowley that peace was signed at Paris on the 4th instant between England and Persia.”

I had just prepared an elaborate review of the proposed treaties as submitted by Mr. Murray—annotations by Sir Justin Shiel—comments by Lord Clarendon, the Board of Trade, &c., &c., from all which I had compiled the terms which I myself recommend. All may now be useless, but I forward my despatch notwith-

standing, in case only the preliminaries of peace may have yet been settled, in which event my propositions may meet consideration, for they have been framed with great care, and in a just spirit.

I forward to-day, also, copy of my despatch to the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, reporting the very satisfactory proceedings of the flotilla reconnoissance, which, in my letter dated 30th ultimo, I informed you I had despatched to Ahwaz. My letters to the chairs, and my official despatch, enter so fully into the subject, that I need not trouble you by repeating the advantages I expected would accrue, and the measures I purposed carrying out, since all has now been changed by this sudden and unexpected conclusion of peace—very gratifying, though it be, if we have secured all the advantages by treaty which we are now in a position to demand.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Earl of Clarendon.

MY LORD,

Mohumra, 5th April, 1857.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that an expedition despatched under my orders on the 29th ultimo, to reconnoitre the Persian army which had retreated so precipitately after the capture of Mohumra, returned to this place yesterday.

2nd. The details of this military movement are amply recorded in the annexed copy of a despatch, with its accompaniments, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, and the political proceedings of the undertaking are similarly contained in the annexed report to my address from Captain Kemball.

The result of this short but successful expedition, cannot fail to leave a strong and enduring impression upon the inhabitants of these districts, who, there can be no doubt, would be now more ready than ever to co-operate with us should their services be required.

3rd. It only remains for me to intimate to your Lordship my high estimation of the gallantry and discretion of all the officers and men concerned in this affair. Those specially named in my despatch to his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset, I venture also to recommend to your Lordship's notice.

4th. I am happy to inform your Lordship that the forces now encamped here are remarkably healthy, and that provisions in abundance are being brought in from the surrounding districts. The Arabs and other inhabitants are flocking into the town, and deputations from the neighbourhood are coming in every day, to express their readiness to submit themselves to our control. The only fear now prevalent is that our rule will not be permanent.

5th. It had been my intention upon the return of the Ahwaz expedition, to remove the greatest part of this force to some more salubrious locality, higher up on the banks of the Karoon, or, if deemed practicable, to occupy Shuster before the summer; despatching the overplus to Bushire, and to return thither myself in the hope of dispersing the Persian army at Naneezuk. Copy of a despatch, however, received early this morning, addressed by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to the Honourable Mr. Murray, and opened at Bagdad during his absence, informs me that peace was signed on the 4th ultimo at Paris. This intimation suspends, until further advices from your Lordship, any projected movements, and, for the well-being of the troops under my command, I earnestly hope

that such advices will not be long delayed. Our recent success, joined with the justice of our demands, entitles us, in my estimation, to obtain from Persia full acquiescence in the same. Should that result have been gained by the negotiations that have been carried on at home, I shall most cordially congratulate Her Majesty's Cabinet. But should any concession have been made which the knowledge of our victories might have prevented, I shall sincerely regret that the announcement did not transpire before the treaty was amended.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta.

SIR,

Camp Mohumra, 5th April, 1857.

Being desirous of obtaining the services of Captain Kembell, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, for the political management of the Arab tribes in this quarter, I have requested that officer to prolong his stay at Mohumra.

In soliciting, accordingly, the sanction of Government to this arrangement, I would beg to recommend compliance with an application which Captain Kembell informs me he has already submitted to the Supreme Government, for the appointment of Dr. Hyslop, his *locum tenens* at Bagdad, to be his Assistant until the conclusion of the war. Dr. Hyslop has rendered efficient service to this force in the Land Transport Corps Department, and Captain Kembell bears testimony to his qualifications for the performance of the local duties of his office. As a special case, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council would, perhaps,

be disposed to sanction the appointment of Dr. Hyslop, as Assistant to the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, from the date of Captain Kemball first leaving Bagdad, in November last.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD,

Mohumra, 6th April, 1857.

I received, two days ago, General Jacob's replies to the questions which I informed your Lordship, on the 28th ultimo, I had put to him, as to his prospects and requirements at Bushire. And I presume he forwarded a copy of his letter to me, dated 1st instant, for your Lordship's information. I had, accordingly, on its receipt, directed the 64th Regiment, and troop of 14th Dragoons, to be re-embarked as soon as practicable for transmission to Bushire, and I had purposed following myself so soon as the mules should arrive (which also I had ordered to be shipped for Bushire), with the intention of attacking the Persian army in that quarter, now strongly posted at Naneezuk, under the Kufthmoola Pass.

I had also intended, before leaving this camp, to arrange for the march of the 2nd Division, under General Havelock, to Ahwaz or Shuster, when the announcement made in the accompanying copy of a despatch from Bagdad, received yesterday morning, required me, of course, to suspend military operations; and by its suddenness has, I confess, involved me in some perplexity. A movement into the interior would now be scarcely justifiable. And even did no objection present itself to such a measure in the form of

international right, I should still be loath to incur the vast expense it would entail, and further to embarrass myself by ties to the Arab tribes besetting my lines of communication, which it might be difficult to sever at a time when peace appears to be imminent; yet, in the face of the reputed deadly character of the climate of Mohumra, it must be very hazardous, I think, to retain a body of troops in their present position. In this dilemma, I shall be glad to find that the Persian Government is acting with good faith in its ostensible compliance with the demands of Great Britain. Time is now, indeed, a consideration of material importance, seeing that the season for an advance into the interior will have already passed before the doubt can be resolved. I am seriously disposed to think that the evacuation of this place would in either case be forced upon me, though its mere military occupation, whether with a view to the resumption of hostilities, or as a motive to the eventual and complete submission of the Slah, might still be maintained, without risk, by the naval means at my disposal; the complete defeat of the Persian army, under Khanler Meerza would, I believe, render this operation one of easy execution.

I by no means wish your Lordship to regard the sentiments above expressed as embodying my final determination. They serve to illustrate the embarrassment to which a protracted delay in the negotiations at Paris must necessarily expose me, and, at the same time, the measures which, in anticipation of a favourable issue, I have been led to adopt here. I will, of course, await the result of these negotiations before committing myself to any decided line of action; but, in the meantime, I have directed Captain Kemball to suspend the purchase of baggage cattle in the districts under his jurisdiction, pending further instructions. The camels already pro-

cured, aggregating in number about 5,000, will be located at one or more points in Turkish Arabia, where pasturage is abundant; and the mules, of which the number is supposed not to exceed 1,000, I have directed to be shipped for Bushire, where, in the event of the contingent occupation of that place by the British forces, until the treaty of peace has been ratified, their services may be required.

The embarkation of the 64th Regiment and troop of dragoons will, as previously ordered, be completed to-morrow, when they will proceed to Bushire. The former will be landed there, for the present at any rate, though I think it may be advisable, after the actual ratification of Ferukh Khan's treaty has been announced, to send all but one regiment of European infantry, and a portion of the European artillery, to Kurrachee, retaining all or most of the native infantry, cavalry, and Golundauze at Bushire. But, under any circumstances, the dragoons should, I think, be sent to Kurrachee or Bombay for the hot season, even should war continue; for it will be impossible to provide suitable cover for them, and scarcely possible, moreover, to forage so many horses as will now be at Bushire. I shall leave it to General Jacob's discretion, therefore, to land this troop of dragoons, or to despatch it to Kurrachee, in advance of the remainder of the regiment to be hereafter sent down from Bushire, when the horse transports, now awaiting the mules at Bus-sorah, and other vessels, are available.

I have also sent back to Bushire a company of sappers to aid in the completion of the barracks, which are now being erected there.

Copies of despatches I addressed to Lord Clarendon, on the 3rd and 5th instant, sent to your Lordship by this opportunity, under flying seal to Lord Elphin-

stone, furnish details of our late military operations, and will acquaint you with the terms I had proposed to negotiate. . . .

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.B.

Mohumra,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

7th April, 1857.

Your most kind exertions to supply our requirements, must by this time, or rather by the time you receive this, have been arrested by the announcement, which reached us two days ago, that peace had been concluded with Ferukh Khan, at Paris; the preliminary treaty (I presume), having been signed on the 4th ultimo.

The enclosed letter to the Governor-General, which I send open for your Lordship's perusal, and which I beg you will do me the favour to forward, will show you what I have resolved on (or rather, what I contemplate) doing, on learning that the treaty has actually been ratified, which I cannot well do for another fortnight at the earliest.

I think it probable that General Jacob, under the discretion left to him, will at once despatch the troop of the 14th Dragoons to Kurrachee, which leaves us to-day for Bushire, and that the remainder of that regiment now at Bushire will follow so soon as we can provide transports. Should your Lordship wish them to go elsewhere than to Kurrachee, your orders can await, at that place, the arrival there of the dragoon transports; and they would then continue their voyage wherever directed, instead of landing there. It is only in the event of the Government of India deeming it

politic to assemble forces in Upper Scinde, notwithstanding the submission of the Shah, or to hasten the withdrawal of the Persians from Candahar (if already there), or Herat, that I would recommend the detention of the dragoons at Kurrachee, unless indeed the engagement entered into by Ferukh Khan may seem so hollow as to render it possible that no real peace has been effected, and that we may have to resume hostilities after all.

Should peace have been effected in earnest, I shall be directed probably to retain such positions in Persia as we are now in possession of, for a certain period, until the conditions are fulfilled. In that case, an armed vessel or two will suffice to hold Mohumra I think, and all the troops destined to remain in Persia, would, I suppose, be located at Bushire. One, if not two, regiments of European infantry, and a portion of the artillery, might return to India and be stationed at Kurrachee, perhaps, until Persia fulfils her pledges—for, until she has done so, we must, I presume, be prepared to renew the war.

As yet, with so meagre and indefinite a message to guide me, I cannot make any certain arrangements for the future; but another fortnight will place me in possession of Ferukh Khan's engagements, and then I shall know what to do.

The official packet for the Governor-General, also sent under a flying seal for your Lordship's perusal, will inform you of all our military and political proceedings since my last. I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

P.S.—I send a very amusing, if not very veracious, account of the Khooshab affair, translated from the *Tehran Gazette*.

To the Right Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, K.G.

MY LORD, *Camp Mohumra, 11th April, 1857.*

The annexed translation of letters received from Sheikh Jahir of Mohumra, and Sheikh Faris of Felahieh (A), immediately after the capture of Mohumra, will enable your Lordship to judge of the success of the overtures made to these chiefs, as already reported, and of the impression generally created among the Arab tribes, by the precipitate flight of the Persian army under Khanler Meerza.

2nd. There can be no doubt that the visit of Sheikhs Jahir and Faris to my camp, and their reinstatement in office by me, would have been attended with many advantages. It would have completely reassured their respective followers, and have enabled me the more easily through their means to minister to the wants of my army, both during its stay here and on its march into the interior, inasmuch as, in the latter case, I could have counted upon their assistance to secure my rear, and to keep open my lines of communication.

3rd. Owing to the immediate departure of Captain Kemball to Ahwaz—the coming of the Sheikhs was, however, unavoidably deferred until his return—and on the same day, intelligence having been received of the conclusion of the peace at Paris—intelligence which reached the native community of Bussorah simultaneously with the despatch to my address from Bagdad, of which I enclose a copy (B)—your Lordship will not be surprised to learn that their outward bearing towards the English has undergone a change. Though earnest as before in their professions of attachment and good will to the British Government, they now avow their dread of the future anger of the Government of the Shah, and naturally demand guarantees of special pro-

tection far exceeding the intention of the amnesty, which they have been made aware will form one of the conditions of the definite treaty of peace between the two countries.

4th. Sheikh Jahir, more especially, assuming from our passive behaviour, consequent on the report referred to, that our stay at Mohumra will not be protracted beyond twenty days, has even opened a communication with Khanler Meerza at Dizphool, and seems to regard the prospect of his place being usurped, under our auspices, by his rival, Sheikh Faris, as a contingency which must, by the contrast, bring his own *quasi fidelitas* into more prominent relief; and eventually, on our retirement, secure to himself the undivided support of the Persian Government against the latter. Such is the gist of the communications from Sheikh Jahir through confidential agents. Captain Kemball's letter, to his address of the 6th instant, and his rejoinder (forming annexure 6 of A), has thus far closed the correspondence between them.

5th. As embodying my real views with respect to the occupation of Mohumra, I cannot do better than submit to your Lordship copies of demi-official letters I addressed on the 6th and 7th instant to Lords Canning and Elphinstone (C).

6th. Although the absence of an influential chief, to whom might be freely entrusted the local administration of these districts during our stay, is certainly to be regretted, I am happy to state to your Lordship that, looking as I do to the speedy termination of our present suspense, I do not anticipate any serious inconvenience from the ostensible recusancy of Sheikh Jahir. That chief has established himself on Turkish soil, immediately beyond the border, at a place called Dargee; and so long as he continues to maintain

the friendly attitude he has assumed towards us, and abstains from intriguing to incite the inhabitants to revolt, or to create dissensions among themselves, it is not my intention to require his withdrawal, or to invite the interference of the Ottoman authorities. Thus far the minor chiefs who acknowledged his authority, have, for the most part, waited upon me, and, trusting to the assurances of security they have received, have resumed their former domiciles. At the same time, their intercourse with Sheikh Jabir continues uninterrupted. Any sign of disaffection on the part of some of their number towards him, real or assumed, has been discouraged, and they even been the medium of friendly messages between Captain Kemball and their chief.

7th. The same motives which prompted my conduct towards Sheikh Jahir and his adherents, have equally deterred me from placing in power here Sheikh Faris, the head of the elder branch of the Chaab tribe residing at Felahieh. This chief, whose agent is still present in my camp, would doubtless, under a promise of present support, readily embrace so favourable an opportunity for supplanting his rival, but the policy of such a step is very equivocal, and might, in the end, be productive of considerable embarrassment. The animosity existing between the parties is too excessive to be restrained. This first act would assuredly be to dispossess the partizans of Sheikh Jahir in favour of his own creatures and relatives; and the heart-burning and complications arising from this, would not only be a source of trouble and annoyance to myself if I remained here, or advanced into the interior, but, in the event of the proximate withdrawal of the army, must render the country, for some time to come, a scene of anarchy and disorder.

8th. Under these circumstances, I have determined not to disturb the relative positions of the two Chaab chiefs, nor to excite the ambition of the one, or test the sincerity of the other, by insisting upon either presenting himself in person. Should the war continue, I may count, I believe, upon the complete subserviency of both to the extent originally contemplated. And in the opposite case, it will be sufficient for me to have gained our objects without hampering the Government by inconvenient guarantees, and also without needlessly impairing the authority, to which the Persian Government lays claim, over the country.

9th. Before closing this despatch, I may mention that the occupation of Mohumra by the English would seem to have raised hopes in the minds of the Turkish authorities of Bussorah, with respect to the final transfer of that place by us to the Ottoman Porte. A correspondence was immediately set on foot by them with Sheikh Jahir, whose characteristic astuteness prompted him to lend himself ostensibly to their views. In prosecution of the plan, Reschid Pacha proceeded in person to Bagdad; and since his departure, his *locum tenens*, in order to give a colour to the scheme, has addressed a letter to Captain Kemball, requesting that the Turkish vessel, which was before anchored at Mohumra, should be permitted to resume her station. I have only to observe that neither by act nor deed have I, in any way, encouraged the Turkish pretension; while, to the application made to himself, Captain Kemball has intimated that he would give a reply in person at some later date. This reply will, of course, be deferred until the final intentions of Government are ascertained.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To General Jacob.

MY DEAR JACOB, *Mohumra, 18th April, 1857.*

Just received your note of 12th instant, enclosing the Sirkesheechee Bashee's letter, and your reply. The latter is exactly what I should have wished you to send. And it will suffice to say, in reply to any further overtures, that you will forward the same to me, and that you expect my return to Bushire shortly; thus avoiding the appearance of uncertainty, which any direct reply from myself would necessarily display until I obtain more definite information from home.

The *Comet*, now overdue two days from Bagdad, will probably bring the requisite information, and as I shall immediately forward the same to you by steamer, you probably will receive it before this, by the buggalow, reaches you, so I need say no more at present.

Affectionately, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To General Jacob, Commanding Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB, *Mohumra, 20th April, 1857.*

Still no *Comet* from Bagdad, now overdue several days. I went up to Marzhul yesterday in the hope of meeting her, and have just returned. Saw the mules, now being shipped there—first rate animals, and in excellent condition.

I have determined on not delaying the head-quarters of the Scinde Horse (with Briggs) any longer. The vessel was waiting to be towed back to Bushire by the steamer which was to take the mail, so soon as that from Bagdad arrived, until when, nothing can be positively decided as to the future arrangements for the troops to remain in Persia.

Under any circumstances, it would now be too late to send this division to Shuster—a measure which peace would, at any rate, render impracticable—and I am determined, if any discretion is left to me, to leave no troops *here*. One (if not both) sloops of war will suffice to maintain our control over Mohumra until the Shah fulfils his engagements. And the whole of the division—minus the Scinde Horse—may well, I think, be sent back to India. The transports can sail down direct hence in time to reach Kurrachee and Bombay before the monsoon—unless you are of opinion that any portion of the regiments at Bushire should be relieved by others from this place; but that would cause much delay—and I question whether they could (after leaving this) be landed there, and the Bushire regiments embarked, in time to reach India before the monsoon. The Madras European Regiment, now on its way to you, might relieve one, if not both the European regiments now at Bushire; and the two native regiments coming from Bombay (*vide* Lord Elphinstone's letter, enclosed in my letter to you of the 12th instant) might relieve any two of the native corps at Bushire, should you think it advisable to send any back to Bombay; or, perhaps it may be as well to strengthen the 1st Division by those two native regiments, and lighten the duties in case much sickness may prevail in the hot season.

As Havelock wishes to stay, it will be necessary to transfer him to the 1st Division, and the Cavalry Division alone would remain to you. But I can scarcely hope you would think it worth while to stay now that the cavalry force will be reduced to Scinde Horse, 3rd Cavalry, and Poona Horse, with no levies in prospect. If you do stay, you may station your cavalry where you please (the Aden Horse sufficing for orderly

duty, and communication between the camps and town), and thus be independent in your command. Kemball, who has had many years experience of Bushire, strongly recommends Hallilah for the cavalry, where, he says, a sea breeze always prevails, and there is good water, and greater facility of obtaining forage (from sea-ward) than at Bushire, as during the hot season vessels can always land stores on the Hallilah beach, and with greater ease than at Bushire. As decreasing the drain on the water at the present camp, it would be very advantageous to have the cavalry elsewhere. At Chazadack there is scarcely any water in the hot season, and though a preferable location for individuals *well housed*, with *tatties*, it would not, Kemball says, be so for men living in tents; for whose *tatties* water could not be provided. On the contrary, he considers that Chazadack would be at least ten degrees hotter than Hallilah for tents. The same objection, he says, would apply to Chuckota, Ahram, or anywhere on the plains away from the sea shore.

It will be for yourself to decide whether you will retain the Cavalry Division, or return to the Scinde frontier, where, I hope, if you do go, the Governor-General may at last be induced to authorize your proposed arrangements. If you should decide on going, perhaps the Poona Horse might be sent back to India, in which case, the command might devolve on Henry Green as brigadier, if you would let me have him, and he be willing to stay.

I throw out the above propositions for your consideration, until you receive my next, when, provided with instructions from home, I shall be able to send through you, my proposed arrangements,* on forwarding the despatches to the Governor-General; one, pro-

* Should no detailed orders in the interim arrive from Bombay.

posing the retention of the Cavalry Division, the other, its reduction to a brigade, for you to forward wherever you please.

My despatches will follow in the *Pioneer* when the Bagdad mail arrives; and the *Scindian*, which takes this, will be ready at Bushire to take on the mails to Bombay, when the *Pioneer* reaches you. The *Scindian* takes back the electric telegraph, landing the bamboos at Bushire, which will be useful for other purposes.

Pray tell Younghusband I can do nothing in his case until it is decided what troops are to remain. If one division goes back to India, he can be transferred to it if he likes. The officers for the levies can also then be sent back.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

P.S.—Some buggalows have been despatched to Bushire, with mats, date sticks, &c., and many more are being stowed in the ships which will take the troops from hence; and one of the ships is loading with date-trees, to be applied to our hutting purposes at Bushire.

To the Earl of Clarendon, K.G.

Camp, Mohumra,

MY LORD,

22nd April, 1857.

I have this day had the honour to receive, through the Secret Committee of the East India House, copy of a letter from your Lordship, dated the 5th March, 1857, to the address of the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, announcing that a treaty of peace had been signed at Paris on the 4th idem, together with the accompaniments enumerated in the margin.

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's letter above quoted, I have prepared for immediate despatch to the Persian Commander-in-Chief in Arabistan, who is at present located at Shuster, an official communication, of which I annex a copy, enclosing therein the letter to his address from Ferukh Khan. I have further prepared a similar "official" to the Commander-in-Chief of Fars, now encamped with his army at Naneezuk, and shall transmit the same forthwith, through General Jacob, with Ferukh Khan's letter to that officer.

The annexed copy of a letter from Khanler Meerza, the Commander-in-Chief in Arabistan, together with an enclosure from the Sudr Azim, received by me recently, will explain to your Lordship the acknowledgment and information conveyed in the opening part of my letter to that functionary. The additional instructions, contained in your Lordship's despatch just received, have enabled me to subjoin what I deemed the most fitting proposal (considering the present relative positions of the armies, and more particularly the exigencies of our own) for the establishment of an armistice, until the ratification of the treaty has transpired.

The exigencies to which I refer are imminent, and of a nature to cause me serious concern for the welfare of the army under my command. I have already submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 11th instant (with enclosures) some of the plans which I had conceived for the distribution of the troops of this force, pending the ratification and subsequent fulfilment of the treaty; the terms and conditions of which were not then in my possession. In accordance with those arrangements, whose chief object was to remove as many of the troops as possible beyond the influence of

those debilitating and unhealthy climates, my purpose was to garrison Bushire with a force which I deemed adequate to the object contemplated by the treaty after its ratification, and to commit the protection and retention of Mohumra exclusively to the navy.

Such I beg to observe was the general outline of my views and intentions, but the tenor of your Lordship's despatch just received, and its accompaniments as above quoted, preclude me from carrying them into effect. I feel that without the expression of some discretionary power being committed to me in this respect, I should not be justified in removing any part of this force from the positions which we now occupy. Those positions are unfortunately, during the summer months, of the worst possible description for the health of the men, the climate of Bushire being inordinately hot, and Mohumra equally and notoriously deadly.

Now, although your Lordship's despatch under reply does not actually forbid the suspension of hostilities "until the ratifications are exchanged," yet, inasmuch as that allowed interval is accompanied with instructions directing me, in the meanwhile, to settle the terms of an armistice with the nearest Persian commander, I should deem it contrary to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government were I, even for so imperative a motive as the welfare of the troops under my command, to seize by force of arms what is nevertheless an object of vital importance, viz., the possession of distant healthy localities in which to pass the summer months.

I might, indeed, under the instructions received from the Secret Committee contemporaneously with your Lordship's despatch, advance so far into the interior of the country as would be necessary to secure such a position, but not to repeat the difficulties in which (under the altered state of our relations with Persia) such a

course might involve us with the Arab tribes, and which I have already submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 11th instant, every onward step will involve us in additional expenses and remove us further from the principal sources of supply, whilst we have no certain knowledge that any spot, short of Shuster (the possession of which is now out of the question), will be preferable, as regards salubrity, to other localities much nearer, and consequently much more convenient for our temporary occupation.

Under these embarrassing circumstances, I must, of necessity, adopt the best plan available, and in my letter to Khanler Meerza (as your Lordship will perceive) I have designed to provide against any objection on his part to my present intention; an intimation, however, against which he cannot possibly prefer any valid objection, since the districts I propose to occupy are far within the limits of our late conquests.

The well-known insalubrity of Mohumra, during the summer, makes it imperative upon me to remove this division of the army from its present position, and to locate it higher up, on the banks of the Karoon.

Sableah, about twelve miles hence, has been recommended on account of its freedom from malaria, and I am on the point of despatching a party to report upon the spot, and shall visit it myself before its selection is adopted. I am given to believe that the soil thereabouts is adapted to the erection of mud huts, which it is indispensable the troops should be housed in, instead of living under canvass; the supply of water from the river will be abundant; the distance from Mohumra will facilitate the transport thither of commissariat stores; and we shall be nearer to the Felahieh district, whence I hope to draw some part of our necessary supplies. Under this arrangement, Mohumra will

continue to form a *depôt*, and a small force of native troops will be stationed there for its protection.

The 1st Division will continue at Bushire and its neighbourhood, where every exertion will be made to maintain the health of the men against the heat. When the arrangements proposed for this place have been carried out, or put in train, I shall proceed to Bushire in person, to superintend those which have been projected for that station.

For the same reason, which precludes me from sending away any part of the force from Persia, I deem it expedient to keep up the baggage cattle which have been already purchased for the object of the expedition. Their maintenance will be a source of some anxiety, as forage is very scarce in this district, and the crops this year are said to be very scanty.

The three months proposed as the period for the execution of the ratifications will end on the 4th June, and our troops are not to be withdrawn from Persian territory until the stipulations regarding Herat and Affghanistan, and the reception of the British mission at Teheran, have been carried into full effect. As no certain time can be fixed for the fulfilment of the latter conditions, and it will be important when the period for the evacuation arrives to have the means at hand for transporting our troops back to India, I shall be under the necessity, however reluctantly, of retaining the greater part of the transport ships at present engaged for that service. This course will not, I presume, involve more expense (unless the time is greatly prolonged), and will be far more convenient, than dismissing the present vessels and engaging a new set when their services are required.

I shall communicate to your Lordship, without fail, whatever propositions may be made by the Persian

commanders-in-chief regarding the armistice. The position which the success of our arms has given us, as well as the very considerate manner in which the war has been carried on towards the Persians, entitle us to a corresponding consideration on their part, and I shall be rejoiced to be enabled to report to your Lordship that the authorities so lately opposed to us, have, agreeably with the alleged purport of Ferukh Khan's directions to them, treated them as friends and guests.

In conclusion, I beg to enclose the translation of a letter lately received, containing certain overtures for peace sent to my address by the Sirkesheechee Bashee. With my authority, General Jacob opened, and replied to, the letter. A copy of his reply, which meets my approval, is also annexed. The execution of the treaty of peace at Paris will, of course, put an end to any similar advances in that quarter.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Honourable Mr. Murray.

Camp, Mohumra,

MY DEAR MR. MURRAY,

23rd April, 1857.

I have to thank you for your letters, dated 12th and 17th instant, received yesterday, with the English despatches of the 6th of March.

The previous official announcement of peace, received here on the night of the 4th April, of course, tied our hands, and saved the Prince's army from unconditional capitulation, which must have followed the advance of this division to Ahwaz (if not to Shuster itself), for the inhabitants of Shuster and Dizphool would probably have risen against their oppressors at our approach (as,

indeed, we received intimation they proposed doing); but, without any such compulsion, their dread of our advance against them would, there can be no doubt, have induced proffers of surrender in their dispirited state, and conscious as they are of their inability to stand against us (even had they the pluck), as they are devoid of ammunition and supplies; for they would prefer the alternative of surrender to us to running the gauntlet of the tribes in any endeavour to retire towards Booroojid. They have scarcely any musket ammunition even left, wherewith to defend themselves. It is this defenceless state alone which deters the soldiery from deserting to their homes to the interior, and the Prince himself, who had started for Booroojid with an escort, was obliged to return to Shuster, owing to the hostile attitudes of the tribes eager to pay off old scores.

Knowing that this division would meet with no opposition, I had arranged to send it up to Ahwaz, under command of Havelock, there to be guided by the information Kemball would obtain regarding the state of the enemy whether or not to push on to Shuster, and the information we have since received makes it certain that the occupation of Shuster (and Dizphool) would have been effected without opposition; consequently, Havelock would certainly have advanced, and the surrender of the Persian army must have ensued. I, myself, arranged to return to Bushire (sending back the 64th there) to attack the Sirkesheechee Bashee; and from the information we now have of the position he has taken up at Naneezuk, there can be little doubt that we could have cut off his retreat by the cavalry dashing round to his rear when attacked by our artillery and infantry from the front. Of the result there can be no doubt—thirty more guns added to our store, and another army

captured or destroyed—a very satisfactory termination of our short campaign.

No discretionary power has been left to me to send back any portion of the army to India; and, perhaps, slippery as Persian diplomatists so notoriously are, it is as well to husband all our strength in Southern Persia until the Shah has really ratified the treaty. But I should have preferred all troops, beyond those who can be maintained in Bushire, being located at Kurrachee (whence they could be brought back in time for further operations should they be necessary), to keeping them here. As it is, I am compelled to leave the 2nd Division in this neighbourhood, for we cannot accommodate more troops at Bushire. But you will see all our plans detailed in my letter of yesterday to Lord Clarendon; and in my previous letter of the 11th instant referred to therein, which Kemball forwarded some days ago by cossid, and which I hope you received.

Taylor read me what you wrote about the Syed. Of course I have no wish to injure the vain little man, and have noticed his proceedings to no one but yourself, and never had any intention of recording anything whatever against him. I assure you, however, that nobody has endeavoured, or done anything, to set me against him, nor did any one suggest my sending him away. It was entirely my own act, on learning his officious meddling, as I did on questioning the Faris's agent, in the Syed's own presence, as to the cause of the discrepancy between the letter which he had delivered the day before from Faris himself, and those which he had subsequently presented in that chief's name.

With regard to the mules of the Land Transport Corps still at Bagdad, I see no objection, after *the*

treaty is ratified, to transferring 300 to you for your use to Tehran, and to be then disposed of; but, until the ratification is actually announced, I could not venture to relinquish them.

Since the above was written, I have consulted the parties concerned, and find that strong objections are made to transferring the mules for the long journey to Tehran, on the chance of there selling them, as some might die on the road. The simplest plan would be for you to take them at their cost to the India Government, and debit the amount to its credit with Her Majesty's Government.

I do not read my instructions as warranting my making any move beyond the possessions we have already acquired, after tendering the offer of an armistice to the Persian commanders, until a reasonable time has elapsed for the receipt of their answers, and, that I am bound to lose no time, after receipt of such instructions, in proffering the armistice. This I accordingly did yesterday, as you will see by my despatch to Lord Clarendon.

I remain, &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

To the Chairman of the Hon. East India Company.

Mohumra, 23rd April, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES,

The long-expected *Comet* only arrived yesterday, with the despatches of the 6th March; and much to my disappointment they leave me no discretionary power to send back any portion of the troops to India, so, as so large a force could not be accommodated at Bushire, especially as regards forage and

water, I am compelled to retain the 2nd Division in this neighbourhood near Shabla, the position recommended by Rawlinson as out of the influence of the malaria, and where I hope to run up mud huts, affording tolerable shelter for the troops.

Our accounts from Shuster describe the Persian army there, under Khanler Meerza, in a deplorable plight. Scarcely any ammunition: they having fled in such a hurry as not to refill their pouches, which were nearly emptied by the fusillade they kept up on the shipping, &c., and only carrying away twenty mules' load of gun ammunition; and all they had at Ahwaz having been abandoned on seeing our steamboats—no tents—and badly off for supplies, which they are no longer in a condition to exact by force from the tribes.

The Prince tried to leave, with an escort, to Borazjoon, but had to come back in dread of the hill-tribes who were ready to pay off old scores. The whole army would desert to their homes were it not that they would have to run the gauntlet of the hostile tribes—consequently, had not the advance to Ahwaz (or Shuster) been arrested by the official intimation of peace which reached me on the 4th instant, the Persian army, with the Prince at its head, would certainly have surrendered unconditionally; preferring safety with us, to the consequences of forcing a retreat through the tribes; for they had not the means (ammunition and supplies) for standing a siege at Shuster or Dizphool, even had they the pluck, or had either of these places possessed defensive works, which we now know they do not. In fact, the news of our approach would have caused the inhabitants of those places to insist on the departure of the Persians, in failure of which they would have risen against them (of this we received intimation),

and no other alternative would have been left to them than surrender to us, or running the gauntlet of the hostile tribes, there can be little doubt which they would have chosen. In the meantime I should have disposed of the Sirkesheechee Bashee's army at Naneezuk, whose guns at any rate (80), must have fallen into our hands, and his troops must have suffered severely in their flight, if indeed their retreat had not been cut off; which our information regarding their position now leads us to believe might have been effected, there being room, it is said, for our cavalry to have turned their rear, while the artillery and infantry attacked their front.

Thus would all the forces Persia possesses (beyond those occupied in Affghanistan) have been utterly destroyed in one short campaign, had the war continued.

The troops continued remarkably healthy. As the extreme heat here does not set in before the end of June, I hope they may be preserved from any great suffering. I am assured that good mud huts will be run up here (at Sabla) with the facilities of date trees, tenacious mud, and ample water close at hand, within a month, for all the troops; and all supplies (except perhaps forage), will be abundant. But the retention of the troops here, necessitates the keeping up of the transports; for should the fulfilment of the conditions of peace enable us to withdraw at the expiration of the time calculated, the transports could not possibly return from Bombay under sail in less than twenty days, and they cannot be towed by steamers during the monsoon. I have officially reported, that I think it advisable to retain them in the Gulf; all, however, except one or two hospital and store-ships, will be sent hence to Bushire, as more healthy, large ships not being able to go up the Karoon beyond the Mohumra reach.

I have been much vexed at being unable to send most of the steamers back sooner to Bombay, but we were out of coal. Three coal ships sent from Aden, have been long due, and we trust by this time may be at Bushire; but, when this expedition started, we had barely sufficient for seven days, which were nearly consumed by the time Mohumra fell. Since then one ship arrived, affording just enough coal to replenish the small steamers on constant work here; to coal two or three which have been sent to Bombay; and to furnish those which remain with a sufficiency to take them to Bushire, where, should coal have arrived, they will be supplied, and go thence to Bombay.

Believe me, &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

To the Governor-General.

Camp, Mohumra, 23rd April, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD,

Since I wrote the accompanying letter to your Lordship on the 20th instant, under the impression that a large portion of the troops now in Persia would return to India in consequence of the peace officially announced to me as having been concluded at Paris, I have received (yesterday) my long expected despatches, *via* Bagdad, which have again upset the measures which, on the 6th instant, I informed your Lordship I contemplated, on the expected announcement of the ratification of peace, which, under the supposition that Ferukh Khan had full powers to conclude, I had imagined required only the ratification of Her Majesty, and that an inferior force would then suffice to hold Bushire and

Mohumra pending the subsequent fulfilment of the treaty.

But my instructions now received from home (copy of which I have sent through Mr. Edmonstone), inform me that the ratification of the Shah has to be awaited three months. And no discretionary power is committed to me to reduce the forces now in Persia.

Under these circumstances, nothing is left for me but to locate this division at the nearest point to Mohumra beyond the influence of malaria, and that probably will be at Sabla, about twelve miles up, on the banks of the Karoon, at a spot indicated to me in a letter I received by this mail from Colonel Rawlinson (who deprecates any advance further into the interior, even had it now been at my option). I could not accommodate more troops at Bushire, and from all the information I can here obtain, the climate at Sabla is as salubrious as any position short of Shuster, while the facility of hutting will be greater than at Bushire, and, in respect of water and supplies, it will have the advantage, as also even in respect to heat; for at that distance from the sea tatties can be used, which are of no avail at Bushire.

But I must confess I much regret the necessity for retaining so large a force in Persia, and I had prepared the transports to re-embark the whole of this division for Kurrachee, or elsewhere, conveniently situated for return to Persia after the monsoon should the war be resumed, so soon as I should receive the discretionary power I expected.

I assume that the announcement of peace reached Bombay before the despatch of the reinforcements preparing there, and, consequently, that they will not now be sent up. If they do come, however, I think I shall be warranted in sending them back, and I purpose

instructing General Jacob to exercise his own discretion, either to retain or send back any portion, or the whole, of such reinforcements, as he may consider requisite or otherwise for the occupation of Bushire during the hot months—or, to relieve, by them any portion of the troops now at Bushire whom he may consider it desirable to send back to India on sanitary grounds, should no instruction to the contrary be received from India. In like manner, General Jacob will be instructed to send back the Madras European Regiment, should it not be required to relieve either of the two European regiments now at Bushire.

With a view to lighten the demand for forage at Bushire, I am desirous to bring the whole regiment of the Scinde Horse to join this division, a portion of which I caused to be landed at Bushire on arriving there after the announcement of peace, when I supposed that *there alone* would troops be detained.

I beg to refer your Lordship to my letter of yesterday's date to Lord Clarendon, copy of which I have forwarded, for more detailed information as to our position here.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To General Jacob, Commanding Bushire.

Mohumra, 24th April, 1857.

MY DEAR JACOB,

Our mail to you was to start this morning, but the receipt, during the night, of the mail brought by the Elphinstone, has induced us to put it off till noon to-day. By the *Elphinstone* I have received yours of the 21st, also one from Lord Elphinstone (which is

being copied for you). He alludes to a letter having been sent in some ship on the 25th ultimo, which I have not yet got, I forget the name of the vessel, but suppose she has not yet arrived at Bushire, if not one of those recalled to Bombay.

Pelly sent you copy of my letter of the 22nd instant to Lord Clarendon, which will show you the necessity I am in to retain all the troops now in Persia (except 14th Dragoons which I hope you will soon send away). Rather than burden Bushire with more troops, I have resolved to keep the 2nd Division in this vicinity, where they can be hutted better than at Bushire, and where they should be as healthy I think, as anywhere in Scinde. I leave to your own discretion whether or not to send the whole of the Jacob's Horse here; I myself think this much the best place for them, and it is not impossible they may be required here to keep the Arabs in order, who, consequent on the peace, will now be anxious to curry favour with the Persians. And from what I hear from Bagdad, of the spirit existing at the Court of Tehran, I am by no means confident that the Shah will ratify the treaty, too easy though it be, and we may very possibly have to renew the war. Under these circumstances, and the absence of any discretionary power to withdraw any troops from Persia, of course all *already in Persia* (except 14th Dragoons), will have to stay, but I had already written to the Governor-General and Lord Elphinstone, to say that I should think myself warranted in sending back any *reinforcements* that might come up hereafter, unless you wish to substitute them as a relief for any of the troops now at Bushire, or should deem their retention desirable on other grounds. Lord Elphinstone's letter just received, shows, I am happy to say, that they had already been recalled.

I cannot leave this until the new camp has been taken up, and the huts have made some progress. And I fear it may be a month yet ere I see you. Pelly and some others have gone up this morning to Bagdad, and will be back in ten or twelve days.

Your note sent through Jones, desiring a correction in the note you wrote to the Sirkesheechee Bashee, arrived yesterday (by buggalow, I suppose), just in time to correct the copies prepared for England and the Governor-General.

Your letter to the Nawab, just received, is admirable, and very characteristic of "John Jacob." Kemball is so delighted with it, that he has begged me to let him send a copy to his *locum tenens* at Bagdad.

I go to select the new camp this afternoon. Should you decide on sending the whole of the Scinde Horse, there is no occasion to interrupt the embarkation of the 14th Dragoons on that account. It will not signify much how long the former are delayed.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

P.S.—Would you now wish any mules to be sent to Bushire? We have 500 splendid animals on board transports at Margeil, almost ready to go; and 500 more have arrived at Margeil. Considering the scarcity of forage at Bushire, perhaps the former had better be landed here for the use of the 2nd Division, and the new batch just come to Margeil be sent back to the place higher up the river, where pasturage is more plentiful than here, and where some 5,000 camels are detained for the same reason for the present. You have, I calculate, about 1,000 baggage tattoos at Bushire, which, with the camels, will, I suppose, suffice so long as the armistice lasts.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

April 24th, 1857.

Our mail to Bombay was to have gone early this morning, but during the night the *Elphinstone* was announced with that from Bombay of the 7th instant, so the steamer is delayed till noon.

By this opportunity I have received your Lordship's letter of the 7th instant, and copies of those of the 3rd and 4th ditto, but that of the 25th ultimo, sent by the *Simoom*, I have not got.

I am glad to find that the Madras Fusiliers and 25th Regiment had already been recalled, which I yesterday told your lordship I thought I should be warranted in sending back, though not at liberty to reduce the troops already in Persia (excepting so far as the 14th Dragoons, which I must take upon myself the responsibility of sending back, and I am happy to learn from General Jacob were ready to sail). Indeed I quite agree with your Lordship in thinking, that any sudden withdrawal from the positions we now occupy in Persia, might encourage the Shah to refuse ratification.

From what I glean through Bagdad, of the bitter spirit at present prevailing at Tehran, I think this not at all impossible, and even likely, at any rate, that the Shah will play fast and loose, till we may be compelled to resume hostilities.

We have now, I am happy to hear to-day from Bushire, 1,500 tons of coal there, so there is no longer any obstacle to the *Assaye* and *Punjaub* returning to Bombay, they having just enough coal to take them hence to Bushire. The former will take the mail to-day to the steamer, ready for it at Bushire, and will herself go on to Bombay when coaled. The *Punjaub* will follow to-morrow or next day.

In reply to your Lordship's query about shore boats, we shall be very glad to get what have already been procured, though perhaps no more need be sent.

The announcement that hay in abundance is being sent up is very cheering to me; for *that* was my greatest anxiety. The Scinde Horse and mules being kept here, and the Dragoons having left, I think we may now rely on securing a sufficiency for the animals at Bushire.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

P.S.—The *Assaye* takes down some of the best of the captured guns. The fellow of the Russian gun, and two or three others which cannot be found, we conclude must have been rolled into the river before the Persians fled. When I leave this ground, I purpose sending to your Lordship the tent of the Persian commander who was killed here. It is large and circular, handsomely lined, and embellished with sentences from the Koran. And it pitches so well, that I think your Bombay tent-makers might benefit by the pattern. As I only brought one of your Lordship's tents from Bushire, it is at present required as a dining tent.

P.S.—Your Lordship is misinformed as to the amount of hay allowed to our horses in Persia—it is 12 bushels per horse, and 12 pounds of barley.

To Captain Felix Jones, I.N., Resident, Bushire.

Camp Mohumra,

MY DEAR JONES,

26th April, 1857.

It being decided that the 2nd Division remains here, most of the steamers can now be released for return to Bombay and other duties; and the *Semiramis*,

which is expected from Nargpeil to-day, will be sent the day after to-morrow to be placed at your disposal, in which you can at once proceed to visit your various ports. The *Falkland* also will be placed at your disposal for the protection of the pearl fisheries, or such duties as you deem requisite, so soon as relieved by the *Tigris*, now at Bushire.

The *Punjaub* goes to Bushire to-morrow, to transfer her mail to the *Bombay*, now ready, I hope, to proceed to the Presidency. The *Scindian*, I presume, will have gone with the mail which the *Assaye* took hence the day before yesterday; and the latter vessel, as well as the *Punjaub* and *Victoria*, will proceed to Bombay, when coaled; as also the *Ajdaha*, ready coaled, I believe.

The *Feroze* is to remain in the river for the present.

Pioneer will take the next mail from this place, on return of the *Comet* from Bagdad. The *Chusan*, *Hugh Lindsay*, and *Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy*, are to keep up the communication between Bushire and Mohumra.

Such are the arrangements ordered by Rennie, I believe.

We have examined the banks of the Karoon as far as about fifteen miles hence, but can find no site for this brigade so eligible as the position near this lately occupied by the Shahzada's camp, and the investigations we have made satisfy us that by hutting the troops and confining them to the Karoon for water, closing the nullahs which swamp the neighbourhood of the town, &c., &c., health may be preserved here as well as anywhere, short of Shuster, where, of course, we are now precluded from going.

The people here say that, in 1807, 2,000 troops from India were located at this place for upwards of a year, under General "Pisley," or some such name (Paisley?),

with fifteen ships. Have you any knowledge of this? Kemball has not, but has written to Bagdad to learn if anything is said of it in his records.

After the ratification of the treaty, the native regiments should be moved from the town to camp, I think, and guards supplied merely for the gate, arsenal, and commissariat. Please consult Jacob about this. When the hutting here has been fairly set a-going, I think it probable I may run over to Bushire for a day or two, but not finally to locate there till I learn whether or not the treaty is ratified. Do not, however, allow this to interfere with your voyage; the sooner you proceed on which the better, perhaps.

I note what you say of Rigby, and am happy to let the matter drop, for he is, I know, a very zealous officer.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

P.S.—I shall ask the Commodore to send the *Jamsetjee* at once to Bushire, and the *Hugh Lindsay* also, after the *Chusan* returns; for you must require them in the harbour to assist in coaling, embarking the Scinde Horse, &c.

It is just possible the Shah may instruct the Siresheechee Bashee to proceed to Bagdad, to exchange the ratifications with Mr. Murray, in which case, of course, Jacob would allow you to send him here in a steamer, should he ask for it.

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Clarendon, K.G.

MY LORD, *Camp Mohumra, 26th April, 1857.*

In my despatch of the 22nd instant, I acquainted your Lordship with my intention of despatching a party to survey the ground about Sabla, which had been pointed

out to me as an eligible spot for the encampment of our troops during the hot season, and expressed my intention to proceed thither myself, in order to test, by personal inspection, its adaptation for the object proposed.

2nd. The party selected consisted of Captain Wray, Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Captain Malcolm Green, my Military Secretary. They examined the ground on the right bank of the river, from Mohumra to five or six miles beyond the line of Sabla, and the result of their investigations I beg to annex in a report drawn up by the former officer.*

3rd. The day following—viz., on the 24th instant—I proceeded up the Karoon in the steamer *Planet*, accompanied by Brigadier-Generals Havelock and Lugard and Dr. Mackenzie, the Superintending Surgeon. On reaching Sabla, I communicated with Captain Wray, and regretted to learn that he had failed to discover any locality more promising than the higher ground adjacent to our present encampment. In company with all the officers above mentioned, I then proceeded in person to examine the ground, and made inquiries from the natives in the neighbourhood, with a view to ascertain its eligibility, remaining there during the night for that purpose. Learning from them that a preferable site existed a few miles lower, where the Turkish Commissioner and his suite had encamped, we dropped down the river to the spot indicated, taking the natives (who appear to be intelligent men, and, moreover, desirous that we should occupy some spot near their village) with us. We found nothing there, however, more promising than the ground higher up. Two long and narrow ridges, about four feet high, which appear to have given it the name of Oom-el-Felool (Mother of

* Enclosure No. 1

Hillocks), but deeply impregnated with saltpetre, and consequently quite wet, were the only eminences existing. The immediate vicinity was low, and exposed to the overflowing of the river, and I subsequently learned that a Persian force had encamped there once only—viz., when they suffered from an epidemic on the Island of Abadan—and were not allowed to approach nearer to the permanent encamping ground on this side of the river, for fear of communicating the disease under which they laboured to the other detachment.

4th. The last-named ground was the site occupied by the Shazada prior to our attack, and is about two miles to the north-east of the town. It is clear of swamp, and beyond the influence of the miasmata arising from the canals which irrigate the date groves. From current testimony, collected from different parties of Arabs, the same spot appears to have been selected by the English forces fifty years ago. It was afterwards chosen by the Persian garrison, who encamped there year after year, until Mohumra was captured by the Turks.

Ali Pacha made it the camp of his army during his occupancy of the place; and it was subsequently reoccupied by the Persians till expelled by our troops.* I annex for your Lordship's information a summary of the evidence collected on the subject from intelligent natives, whose united testimony corroborates the fact of the salubrity of the ground referred to, and its equal eligibility as compared with any spot between this place and Ahwaz. I further deem it of importance to submit copies of two reports from Brigadier-General Havelock and the Superintending Surgeon of the 2nd Division,† from which your Lordship will perceive that they deprecate any further advance into the interior, as well on account of what

* Enclosure No. 2.

† Enclosure No. 3. Enclosure No. 4.

they deem the equal salubrity of this neighbourhood, as because of the great difficulties and embarrassments which such a move would, in their opinion, unnecessarily entail upon us.

5th. I beg to observe, however, in connection with this subject, that no considerations whatever apart from the more important fact, now apparently proved, that our troops will be as healthy here as at any spot higher up the river, short of Shuster, would have deterred me from carrying out my previous design ; but I could not, in the face of such testimony, subject this force to any needless hardship, or incur any additional delay (with the season so far advanced) in getting the troops adequately protected against the heat of the summer months.

6th. Under these circumstances, it has been a matter of sincere congratulation to me to find, in an official memoir lately received from the Bombay Government, the following extract from a report drawn up by Commander Selby of the Indian Navy, regarding the respective salubrity of different places bordering on these rivers. I have, indeed, met with several opposite opinions, and my own impressions were, I confess, based upon them. The thorough investigations lately held upon this important subject have now induced me to rely much more on the statements made by Captain Selby—statements drawn up from actual experience—whereas those to the contrary effect are chiefly grounded on hearsay, or have reference only to the town of Mohumra and its immediate vicinity.

Captain Selby thus writes :—

“ Besides the advantages which Mohumra, considered
 “ either as a military post or commercial city, possesses,
 “ its great salubrity is of vast importance in a country so
 “ low and flat as the delta of the Euphrates ; and I am

“ enabled, from a personal knowledge of it for some
 “ years, to bear witness to its superiority in this respect
 “ over any other part of the adjacent country. So much
 “ so, that when, during the hot months, duty called me
 “ from Bagdad to the town of Bussorah or its vicinity, I
 “ invariably remained at or near Mohumra, to which, in
 “ a great measure, I attributed the entire absence of
 “ that deadly fever which committed such havoc in the
 “ second expedition, under Captain Lyrch, at its outset,
 “ and which can only be ascribed to its having been
 “ compelled to remain so long at Bussorah. I may
 “ further adduce, as a proof, that during the fifteen
 “ months I commanded the steamers *Euphrates* and
 “ *Assyria* I only lost two men; one from an accident,
 “ the other in consequence of a chronic disease of seven
 “ years’ standing; this latter was an artilleryman, who
 “ joined the expedition from Bombay, and was imme-
 “ diately pronounced by the surgeon unfit for duty.

“ The salubrity of the one place and the unhealthi-
 “ ness of the other, is entirely to be attributed to
 “ natural causes; yet where these are baneful, they
 “ might easily be mitigated by a little energy and self-
 “ denial on the part of the rulers of Bussorah, or rather
 “ the Pacha of Bagdad, for Bussorah is in his pachalik.

“ The one river (the Karoon), rising as it does in
 “ the Bukhtizari mountains, and fed only by the snow
 “ and rains which fall there, and by the River Dizphool,
 “ also similarly supplied, loses in its short passage (a
 “ transit of about 160 miles) none of its freshness and
 “ invigorating coolness. So different from the Shat-
 “ ool-Arab, in which, in the month of August, I have
 “ myself from personal observation, known the thermo-
 “ meter (Fahr.), immersed in the river, stand at 96°,
 “ while in the Karoon (the places of observation not
 “ 200 yards distant) I never found it above 80°. The

“ cause is this, the banks of the River Euphrates, above 60 miles above Bussorah, are low, and unless these are attended to, and embankments made previous to the waters rising in May and June, the country is overflowed, and a swamp, or, indeed, a fluvial lagoon, of miles in diameter, is formed close to Bussorah. From this, during the intense heat of summer, a deadly miasma rises, and devastating fevers, each year, diminish the inhabitants of a city which once was amongst the proudest of the East; and as population decreases, parts of the city become uninhabited, neglected, and at last ruinous; in June, 1842, it presented but a remnant to what it was no further back than 1835.

“ In the Karoon, and at Mohumra, on the contrary, a dry heat and rarified atmosphere are found, which is far healthier.”

7. The decision having accordingly been made, and the most eligible encamping ground selected, no time will be lost in completing the arrangements, begun to-day, for housing all the troops of this force. The plan finally adopted is to build mud walls, pierced with windows and doors, before which will be hung *tatties* constructed of camel-thorn (*Jewasse*), and which, when kept wet, will temper and cool the fierceness of the hot winds. The roof will be formed of double-flyed tents, the inner fly to be covered with mats or date branches, and the intermediate space between the two flies left open to allow thorough ventilation, and to protect the inner roof from the sun. The routies of the sepoys will be fitted, in like manner, to mud walls; but consisting as they do of a single fly, will be adequately protected by layers of mats or reeds. The floors of all will be excavated from two to four feet below the surface, that plan having been proved, at

Bagdad and elsewhere in these districts, to conduce greatly to assuage the heat in the interior.

8th. In addition to these arrangements, I have this day written to the Government of Bombay for an immediate supply of material to provide the whole force with gauze curtains. I have been induced to make this application in consequence of the concurrent testimony of all the natives consulted, who unanimously declare that for several months, beginning with the present, sleep will be out of the question, owing to the swarms of mosquitoes, unless our men are properly screened from their virulent attacks. Moreover, in order to foster and maintain the spirit of the troops by useful and cheerful recreation, I have also applied for a supply of books and games. And the necessary duties and exercises of the division will be carried out, so as to entail as little exposure to the sun as possible.

9th. It is further my intention to avail myself of some of the transports in the river, by converting their decks, which will be well roofed in for the purpose, into temporary barracks, where the sickly may be accommodated, and the Europeans may be sent by alternate reliefs to enjoy a change of air. I do not contemplate such an arrangement, however, except under the contingency of any great increase in the number of our sick.

10th. With these precautions taken, and the arrangements specified made, I confidently hope that the troops under my command at this place will enjoy their usual health, and be kept in a condition for active duty whenever the exigencies of Government may demand their services. As the contingency of great sickness, however, may arise, and prevail beyond the extent above supposed, I am seriously anxious as to the best mode of staying it, and of placing the troops beyond its influence. I have

already submitted to your Lordship that, in the absence of any discretionary power, I could not deem myself authorized to remove any portion of the force from the position which it had occupied, more especially before the ratification of the treaty agreed upon. That ratification is stipulated to transpire on or before the 4th of June, and, should the signature of the Shah be given, the only object for the continuance of the force will then be to see the stipulations carried into effect. As regards Mohumra, that service can be adequately performed by a small naval squadron; for the Persian army in Arabistan is in too disorganized and wretched a condition to be able to attempt any movement in this direction from Shuster for a long time to come. I shall, indeed, anxiously await the arrival of instructions authorizing me to carry out such an intention, when once the treaty is ratified, but if such powers are delayed, and an epidemic should unfortunately break out among the troops, I shall confidently rely upon your Lordship's after approval, to the despatch of the Europeans, and a portion of natives if necessary, to Kurrachee. Their removal thither would at once place them in better barracks and in a different climate, and they could be despatched thence to India, or return to Bushire or Mohumra, as the eventualities of the treaty might render requisite. The transports being kept up during the interval, these changes might be effected with a very little additional cost to the State, and without detriment to the position which it is desirable to maintain with Persia, until the fulfilment of the treaty.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra, 27th April, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

The result of our personal inspection of Sabla, and the banks of the Karoon fifteen miles up, and of the more searching inquiries lately instituted, satisfy us that no better position for the troops than the site of the Shazada's camp, a mile or two above Mohumra, can be found anywhere short of Ahwaz or Shuster, and that the outcry against the vicinity of Mohumra (not the town itself) as being so deadly, has been assumed on insufficient grounds.

It has been decided, therefore, for reasons specified in a despatch I have addressed to Lord Clarendon, copy of which I now forward under flying seal to the Governor-General through your Lordship, to keep this division here, every precaution being taken, in the way of hutting, Jewasse tatties, &c., to preserve the health of the troops. And I have applied for a supply of gauze for musquito-curtains for the Europeans—musquitoes being the greatest evil they are likely to be exposed to—which I hope may be sent up direct to Mohumra, by the first steamer. If much delay should be caused by making up the curtains, the soldiers will manage to stitch them for themselves. A simple bag, open at the bottom, and wide enough to surround the bedding and held up by a single loop, with string suspended from the roof (whereby also to trice it up when not wanted in the day-time) will suffice. I have also applied for books, newspapers, games, &c., for the amusement and recreation of the men.

By this means I trust the troops will be kept as healthy here as they would be in Guzerat. But we must be prepared for the contingency of epidemic

breaking out; and as no opposition could be prepared by the Persians to our re-occupation of Mohumra at our convenience, I would, in such event, at once embark them, and depatch the 2nd Division (the European portion at least) to Kurrachee, there to await the season for resuming operations. That is, if the Shah refuse to ratify the treaty on or before the 4th of June, the period allowed him. If he refuse, two or three war-vessels will suffice to keep open our communication, and maintain our hold over Mohumra, until we bring back the troops, should the necessity arise for withdrawing them in the meantime.

It being decided not to move further up the Karoon, I am enabled to dispense with all but one war steamer here, and one at Bushire required by Captain Jones to visit the various ports of the Gulf, Muscat, &c. Had we moved, we could not have done so without the aid of the crews of all the vessels; for the Arab boatmen will not work during the ramzan, which is just commencing. We have already sent off the *Assaye* to proceed to Bombay, after coaling at Bushire. The *Ajdaha*, ready coaled there, is also ordered down, picking up her 68-pounders at Bassadore on the way. The *Punjaub* and *Victoria* follow immediately. The latter requires, I believe, to patch up some shot holes, but I hope will be stationed at Kurrachee during the monsoon, as without her aid any transport going down there from this place could not enter that port. The *Semiramis* takes Captain Jones on his tour, and the *Feroze* stays here for the present. These two will be required to tow transports from the river to the entrance of the Gulf, should these troops have to move. From that point they are sure of a fair wind to Kurrachee. The *Pioneer* takes the next mail to Bombay, on return of the *Comet* from Bagdad. The *Chusan*, *Hugh Lindsay*, and *Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy*,

keep up communication between Bushire and Mohumra, and aid in the harbour-work, as also, in the latter work and running to Bagdad, do the small river steamers *Assyria*, *Napier*, *Planet*, and *Comet*.

The above, I believe, comprise all the steamers now in the Gulf. I hope your Lordship will approve the proposed distribution, liable, of course, to any modification you may direct.

The people here declared that a force from India, consisting of two regiments, under a General Fizby (Paisley?), was quartered here upwards of a year, about sixty years ago, with thirteen or fifteen ships. Is there any trace of this in the Bombay records? Captain Kemball was not aware of the circumstance, and has written up to Bagdad to ascertain. If they were here, the Bombay records may show how they fared as to climate. My latest letters from your Lordship are dated 3rd, 4th, and 7th of April. I have not yet received one of the 25th March, to which allusion is made. My latest from the Governor-General is dated 14th February.

The mutinous spirit so extensively displayed in the Bengal army is a very serious matter, and is the consequence of the faulty system of its organization, so different from that of Bombay, where such insubordination is scarcely possible; for with us, the intermediate tie between the European officers and the men, *i.e.*, the native officers, is a loyal and efficient body, selected for their superior ability, and gratefully attached to their officers in consequence. Their superior ability naturally exercises a wholesome influence over the men, among whom no mutinous spirit could be engendered without their knowledge, and the exertion of their influence to counteract it; whereas, the seniority system of the Bengal army supplies neither able nor influential

native officers—old imbeciles merely, possessing no control over the men, and owing no gratitude to their officers, or to the Government, for a position which is merely the result of seniority in the service.

I pointed this out to Lord Dalhousie once, who told me he had seriously considered the matter, and had consulted some of the highest officers of the Bengal army, who, one and all, deprecated any attempt to change the system, as a dangerous innovation. Whatever the danger, it should be incurred, the change being gradually introduced ; for, as at present constituted, the Bengal army never can be depended on.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-Gen.*

To General Jacob, Commanding at Bushire.

Camp Mohumra, April 27th, 1857.

MY DEAR JACOB,

In the accompanying despatch to Lord Elphinstone, sent open for your perusal, I assign the reason for resolving to keep this division at Mohumra, instead of moving it up to Karoon some twelve or fifteen miles. And from what we have learned since inquiring into the matter (for previously, I had rather gratuitously taken for granted that the outcry against Mohumra was well founded) I really do not see so much cause for apprehension. If, however, any serious epidemic should arise, we can always remove the troops, if necessary, after the period expires for the ratification of the treaty, should the Shah fail to accept it. The transports can sail to Kurrachee even in the monsoon, and could bring the troops back again ere the season for re-

commencing operations in October next, should hostilities be resumed; and the Persians will be in no condition to dispute our resuming Mohumra, for our base of operations in this direction, when we please to do so.

On the chance of that occurrence, do you think the officers assigned to you for the levies should be retained, or sent back to India? I am prepared to keep them or send them back as you may think advisable. In the former case, would you have them all attached to the Scinde Horse here, or wish them to be otherwise employed in the interim? If so, however, I do not see how they can be employed.

The *Punjaub* will take this mail to Bushire, to put on board the *Bombay*, which we understand is ready to take on your next mail. If not required to tow the rest of the Scinde Horse to the river (if you decide on sending them here), the *Punjaub* and *Ajdaha* might go on to Bombay (coaling at Bassadore or Muscat, to save your coal at Bushire), unless Rennie, in answer to an official I have just written to him on the subject, considers they would be necessary to aid in withdrawing the troops from hence in June, should that measure be found necessary. (I shall keep this open to tell you.)

Should the Sirkesheechee Bashee be deputed by the Shah to Bagdad, to exchange the ratified treaty with Mr. Murray, he may apply to you for a steamer, which, of course, you would grant. But it is more likely his Majesty will send some one down direct from Tehran.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

P.S.—I have told Jones the *Semiramis* will be placed at his disposal for his annual visitation to his ports,

which had better not be longer delayed, should you not particularly require him.

27th.—I have learnt to-day, for the first time, that one of the transports, the *Ocean Monarch*, has building materials on board intended for Bushire, and have ordered her to be towed back to Bushire to-morrow.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Mohumra, 28th April, 1857.*

As my despatch to Lord Clarendon, which, according to order, goes *viâ* Constantinople, may not reach you nearly so soon as this *viâ* Damascus, I may briefly inform you of its purport.

(RECAPITULATION.)

* * * * *

I despatched Ferukh Khan's letter to the Commander of the Persian armies on the 23rd instant, the day after I received them, with suitable letters from myself, but I cannot expect any reply for a week to come at least. On receipt of their overtures for the armistice, I purpose requiring their agreement to the following compact, or something to similar effect.

Article I.—There shall be a truce, or suspension of hostilities, between the English and Persian armies until the 4th day of June of the present year, that being the latest period fixed for the ratification of the treaty signed at Paris, on the 4th of March, by the plenipotentiaries of the high contracting powers.

Article II.—At the expiration of that date, this truce shall cease to have any effect, and shall be dissolved, both parties being at liberty from that date to enter into a fresh armistice, or to recommence hostilities, as they

may be empowered thereto by their respective Governments.

Article III.—The conditions of this truce are as follows, and either party contravening the same, shall entitle the other immediately to take up arms, not only for renewing the operations of the war, but for avenging the recent injury offered.

Condition 1.—The Persian Army having abandoned the entire district, from Mohumra to Ahwaz, to the British Army, they shall, on no account whatever, advance as far as the Eastern territory appertaining to that place, neither shall the Persian Government attempt, either directly or indirectly, to exercise any control or jurisdiction within the territory westward of that line, except with the prior consent of the British Commander-in-Chief.

Condition 2.—In like manner none of the English force shall advance beyond Ahwaz ; but up to that place, and the Eastern limit pertaining thereto, they shall be free to go and come, and to exercise jurisdiction, over all the districts and people comprehended within the limit aforesaid.

Condition 3.—While the above two conditions forbid, under penalty of an immediate resort to arms, the advance of any military men or officers of either army beyond the limits aforesaid; except when charged with special messages or despatches from one Commander-in-Chief to the other, all other subjects of the two contracting powers, as well as all Persian subjects comprehended within the limits of the British conquests as above limited, shall be free to pass and repass for trade or any other lawful object, without let or hindrance, in the same manner as it is allowed in time of peace.

Condition 4.—Should either of the two contracting parties, during the continuance of this truce, have just

and sufficient cause of complaint against any person or persons, for creating disaffection or disturbance, or ill-will, between the inhabitants or tribes of the districts comprehended within their respective limits, on the same being made known by the one party to the other, the latter shall not attempt to interfere in any way with the judgment of the former, neither shall he suffer the accused, in case of expulsion from the one side to find refuge within the limits of the other.

Article V.—This truce shall be solemnly published within the limits occupied by the armies of the two contracting parties, and shall not be obligatory on either unless so published.

The arrangements for hutting the troops having been made, and the work having actually commenced, I purpose starting for Bushire to-morrow, in order to inspect the similar arrangements in progress there under the zealous supervision of General Jacob. I shall in all probability, during my short stay there, receive the expected overtures from the Commander-in-Chief of Fars, and be enabled to settle the armistice with him, and return thither in time to receive a similar application, and conclude a similar truce, with the Commander-in-Chief of Arabistan, whose reply to my letter, forwarding that from Ferukh Khan, cannot reach Mohumra in less than a week from this date.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Chairman, Hon. East India Company.

Mohumra, April 28th, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES,

The enclosed copy of a letter I addressed to Lord Elphinstone, and my letter to Lord Clarendon,

copy of which goes to the Secret Committee by this mail, will inform you why I have resolved on keeping the 2nd Division here rather than moving it to Sabla, which Rawlinson mentioned as likely to prove a better site, but which, on inspection, we found to be quite impracticable. As the letter to Lord Clarendon goes *viâ* Constantinople, this, sent by Damascus, will probably reach a week sooner, and I have written also to Mr. Smith, by the latter route, mentioning the terms of the armistice I purpose concluding with the Persian Commanders. I proceed to-morrow to Bushire, in the expectation of receiving the overtures of the Sirkesheechee Bashee, and hope to conclude with him, and return here, in time to meet those of the Prince at Shuster, whose reply to the letter with which I forwarded Ferukh Khan's sealed despatch, cannot be here for a week to come.

The work of hutting the troops here has commenced, and I doubt not will rapidly progress under General Havelock's supervision, and I hope to find the barracks at Bushire well advanced.

I was much vexed at the large steamers being detained here so long, but positively they could not move for want of coal. Now, however, we have got some at Bushire at last, and all, except one steamer required here, and another required by Captain Jones for visiting the Gulf ports, are now on the way to Bombay.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY LORD,

Bushire, May 2nd, 1857.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, agreeably with my intention, as intimated in a despatch

to the Earl of Clarendon, dated 22nd April (copy of which, forwarded on the 23rd ultimo, will reach your Lordship in due course), I left Mohumra on the 29th instant, for the purpose of inspecting personally the arrangements in progress at Bushire for housing the troops of the 1st Division, stationed at that place. On the 30th I landed at Karrack and examined its eligibility for a sanatorium, and how far the fort, and several old buildings erected during the last Persian expedition, might be made available for accommodating a wing of Europeans, and thus serve as an agreeable and healthful change from Bushire for half a regiment at a time, supposing that the whole of the 1st Division should be obliged to remain there during the summer months.

On my arrival here, I was disappointed to find that notwithstanding the most energetic exertions of all concerned, the difficulties of procuring material and workmen have been so great, that the buildings are not so far advanced as I had hoped. From inquiries made, however, I cannot confidently anticipate that sufficient sheds will have been erected before the fierce heat of this country sets in, to accommodate one fourth of the European force.

Under these circumstances, coupled with the intimation conveyed in the annexed letter and its enclosures from Sirkesheechee Bashee, which reached me on landing at Bushire, I had well nigh made up my mind, in order to avert the consequences of keeping the Europeans under canvas for an indefinite time, to despatch two-thirds of them, at least, to Kurrachee. The only consideration which would have prevented me from carrying such a plan into execution, was the absence of all discretionary power, though at the same time I felt satisfied, as I have before stated, that the

ulterior objects of our occupation could be effectually compassed without the co-operation of European troops. This day, however, I have received from the authorities at Bombay, what, in connection with the announcement above referred to, I deem a sufficient warrant, and agreeably with such intimation shall proceed forthwith to make the necessary arrangements for despatching Her Majesty's 64th and 78th, and the 2nd Bombay Europeans, together with one Native Regiment, to the several stations already allotted to them by the Commander-in-Chief, in the event of my being able to dispense with their services.

Your Lordship will perceive by the letter from the Sirkesheechee Bashee, and its enclosures from the Sudr Azim, that the ratification of the treaty by the Shah seems no longer problematical. Under that conviction preparations will begin at once for carrying out my plan, but its final execution will be deferred until the ratification of the treaty has been officially announced to me by the Hon. Mr. Murray. That announcement will, I trust, meet me about the middle of this month, when no time will be lost in embarking the regiments above named for Kurrachee and Bombay.

At the same time I shall deem it advisable, under the altered circumstances of the case, to carry out my original idea, as submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 6th April, with regard to Mohumra; for, notwithstanding that every precaution has been taken in the selection of the most eligible site, and every available means would have been used to insure the health of the troops there, yet a justifiable doubt existed as to its salubrity, and the removal of so large a force during the hot weather, in case of an epidemic supervening, must have been attended with serious embarrassment, and, perhaps, considerable loss of life.

My intention, therefore, is, on receiving intelligence of the ratification of the treaty from the Honourable Mr. Murray, to remove the whole of the troops from that place, leaving an adequate naval force to retain possession and prevent its re-occupation by the Persians, until the conditions of the treaty are fulfilled, or until further instructions shall enable me to modify that arrangement.

The troops removed from Mohumra, with the exception of those which are to be despatched to India, will be located at Bushire and Karrack, where every effort will be made to hut them without delay. As the artillery will be the only Europeans then requiring barrack accommodation, such arrangements for the natives can be proceeded with immediately.

I cannot refrain from expressing to your Lordship how sincerely rejoiced I am at the prospect of being able to make this disposition of the Persian Expeditionary Force; for the idea of being obliged to retain so large a body of Europeans in these notoriously debilitating climates, without adequate protection against their influences, has been a source of serious anxiety to me throughout.

It is further satisfactory to me, to feel assured that this desirable object can be compassed, supposing the treaty to be duly ratified, without in any way injuriously affecting the object contemplated by our ulterior occupation of the country.

As I purpose starting for Mohumra to-morrow, in order to meet the despatches which I hope to receive from the Foreign Office and Mr Murray, as also to give directions for making the arrangement specified above in connection with that place, I have empowered General Jacob, in my absence, to carry on the relations already entered upon with the Sirkesheechee Bashee, the

import of which are fully communicated in the annexed documents.

I cannot conclude without expressing to your Lordship my deep sense of gratitude to the Bombay Government. Throughout this expedition their exertions have been unceasing and unwearied, and in every instance my requests in behalf of this force have been scrupulously attended to, and in many instances anticipated. By late letters from Lord Elphinstone, I am informed that no less a quantity than 8,500 tons of coal have been despatched since January last, the greater portion of which has been made available here and at different ports on the intermediate line, the remainder being on its way. We are, further, in actual receipt, or in expectation of upwards of 70,000 bales of compressed hay, amounting to no less than 14,000,000 pounds. This, in addition to the supplies from the Shat-ool-Arab, would, had the war continued, have sufficed to provision the whole of our cavalry and baggage cattle for some months to come. The extraordinary labour and diligence which must have been used to collect and despatch these stores, and therewith also other stores, for the immediate and prospective wants of the army, deserve the highest acknowledgment on my part, and I feel persuaded that the prevailing sentiment of this army, at seeing its wants so carefully attended to, is one of heart-felt gratitude to a really provident and paternal Government.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received copy a letter (No. 117 of 1857) addressed to the Government of India, by the Government of Bombay, on the subject of the removal of a portion of this force after the

ratification of the treaty, and therewith, also, the telegraphic reply empowering me "to send back the European troops at my discretion." Although firmly persuaded that this measure may be effected without detriment to the ulterior objects contemplated by a further occupation of Persian territory, I beg, nevertheless, to express my sincere gratification at the confidence which the Supreme Government has been pleased to place in me, in a matter of such importance. My arrangements consequent upon a similar intimation from the Bombay Government, previously received, are so fully detailed in the foregoing despatch, that no additional remarks seem called for.

J. O.

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bushire, 3rd May, 1857.

I am most sincerely gratified to be able to announce to your Lordship that I now find myself fully warranted in carrying out the arrangements which I informed you, on the 6th ultimo, I purposed effecting, on the receipt of the instructions I then looked for, consequent on the expected immediate ratification of the treaty, which I had hoped would leave me full discretion as to the troops and positions to be retained in Persia, pending the fulfilment of the conditions. In this I was disappointed; three months were to be allowed for the Shah's ratification, and no discretion was left to me to weaken the forces in Persia prior to that ratification. Consequently, I had to take measures to accommodate all the troops as far as I could, for that period at least, though much, indeed, to my regret and disappointment. The arrangements resolved on accordingly, I reported to Lord Clarendon on the 22nd ult.,

as I informed your Lordship next day, on forwarding copy of that despatch. On my arrival here, however, I received such positive assurances from the Persian Commander-in-Chief in this quarter, that the Shah had already ratified the treaty, as to warrant the confidence that a very few days must bring an official announcement of the fact from Mr. Murray. This, coupled with the desire expressed by the Bombay Government in despatches received the night before last, for the return to India of all the Europeans I could spare, has decided me on assuming the responsibility of carrying out the arrangements I had originally contemplated, *i. e.*, withdrawing the troops from Mohumra and leaving its occupation to the navy alone, and sending to India what troops are not required to maintain Bushire and Karrak.

In consultation with General Jacob, I have decided on retaining at those positions only native infantry (five regiments), all the artillery now here (one troop horse artillery, and two foot batteries (European), mountain train, and one company Golundauze. And, with the exception of the Aden Detachment, all the cavalry (3rd Light Cavalry, Jacob's Horse, and Poona Horse). The Aden Detachment I purpose sending there direct from this place, as at this season the winds are always favourable.

Had I had any misgivings, your Lordship has now most considerately relieved me from any dread of the responsibility I incur, by your telegraphic message sent to me through the Bombay Government, empowering me "to send back the European troops at my discretion." The despatch containing this intimation, through some mistake, was not landed with the rest of the mail, and did not reach me until after my official despatch to your Lordship of yesterday's date had been

written. I need hardly add, that it is a satisfaction to me to know that I had anticipated your wishes. Thus three European regiments (64th, 78th, and 2nd Europeans), one troop horse artillery, and one foot battery (European), and one native regiment (Light Battalion), will return to India. I send back the Light Battalion, because I am very sensible how detrimental it must be to the regiments of the Bombay Army, of which it is composed, to be each deprived of an entire company and three European officers. It is right that I should state I myself am responsible for the formation of this battalion, as it was embodied at my own especial request.

In my official of yesterday, I mentioned my intention to defer moving the troops until the ratification of the treaty is officially announced, but the naval authorities have since informed me that it will be impossible for the regiment destined for Belgaum to reach Vingorla—the nearest port to that station—later than the 22nd or 25th of this month, should the monsoon set in as it usually does about that date. That regiment is her Majesty's 64th, whose families are at Belgaum, any delay in despatching which would involve a further separation of the men from their families of several months, till after the monsoon, besides putting the Bombay Government to the inconvenience of providing temporary barracks for more European troops than can be conveniently quartered at Bombay and Poona, which stations only would be accessible during the monsoon. I have determined therefore on embarking the 64th at once, in the *Punjaub* and two transports. The order has been issued, and I trust the regiment will be off in eight days—in time to insure its arrival at Vingorla before the commencement of the monsoon. I only yesterday received your Lordship's letters of the 19th March, and

I am indeed most highly gratified by the approbation they convey. At the same time I received Mr. Edmonstone's official letter of the 25th March (No. 95). Fortunately I had no occasion to resort to the contemplated measure of embodying levies from among my so-called "conquered tribes," for I am now convinced by your Lordship's unanswerable arguments, that I should, by so doing, have committed a very grave error. And I feel very sensibly the kindly consideration which induced your Lordship to furnish me officially with an excuse (or, more properly speaking, relieving me from the responsibility) for any shortcomings that might have resulted from abstaining from enlisting.

Some of the officers belonging to the Bengal Presidency, who were placed under General Jacob for employment in the intended levies, will now proceed to Calcutta to join their regiments. Of these Captain Sheehy, of Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, and Mr. Lynch, of Her Majesty's 70th Regiment, applied to me for six months' leave, for the purpose of joining the troops proceeding to China. I informed them that I had no power to give such leave, but recommended them to proceed at once to Calcutta, and make their wishes known to your Lordship, who, I hoped, would consider them worthy of every indulgence that could with propriety be conceded to officers who had undergone so much inconvenience as they had been exposed to in their endeavours to serve their Queen against a foreign enemy. Captain Sheehy I would especially beg to recommend to your Lordship's favourable consideration, as he has sacrificed one year's leave in England, and only just returned from the Crimea, for the sake of seeking service in Persia.

Lord Dunkellin returned to India after Mohumra fell, there being little prospect then of any further

service. His departure was regretted by the whole army, for he was a general favourite, and I am sure would have distinguished himself highly had the enemy been more worthy to contend with British soldiers. Lord Seymour now purposes visiting India, or at least Bombay, and Lord Schomberg Kerr rejoins the Tehran mission.

I certainly should have hesitated in sending back *all* the European Infantry, and had determined to keep one regiment here, as calculated to give heart to the native troops (though certainly I have never seen our sepoy in better spirit than those now in Persia) until General Jacob expressed his willingness to remain in command of this division if I desired it—an amount of self-denial on the part of that noble soldier most truly admirable, for I know he yearns to return to the Scinde frontier now that there is no prospect of active service in Persia. General Jacob's presence here is of more importance than the retention of a whole regiment of Europeans, for where *he* is, there never can be any want of confidence. All ranks, officers or men, white faces or black, regard General Jacob with equal devotion; and his influence with troops is such as I have never seen surpassed in the thirty-eight years I have served in the army.

But General Jacob should be supreme here. And I shall consider it advantageous to the State when I can transfer to that officer all the military and political powers with which I myself am vested. In which confidence, your Lordship need have no hesitation in summoning me to India whenever my services may be required there.

I am, &c.,

JAMES OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

P.S.—Since the above was written, I have learnt from the naval officers that I was mistaken in supposing favourable winds to Aden will now prevail. On the contrary, adverse winds may be expected, and probably a transport would occupy sixty days from Bushire to that port. So my purpose of sending the Aden troop there must be abandoned for the present, there being no steamer to spare to tow the vessel.

J. O.

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bushire,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE, *4th May, 1857.*

I had the satisfaction to receive your Lordship's letters of the 17th and 19th ultimo on the 1st instant, the day after my return from Mohumra.

The enclosed letter for the Governor-General, and an official for the same, dated 2nd and 3rd instant, forwarded under a flying seal for your Lordship's perusal, convey the gratifying intelligence that I now consider myself warranted in sending back to India the three European regiments, Light Battalion, one troop of Horse Artillery, and one Field Battery, thus reducing our European troops in Persia to one troop of Horse Artillery, and two foot batteries, for whom we shall have ample accommodation, besides sufficient material for all the native troops to hut themselves, so I trust we may be as healthy at Bushire as we should be in India. And, happily, Mohumra will be abandoned; for though I had hoped we should be better off there than we had been led to expect, still it was a fearful hazard to risk, and I am truly rejoiced to be permitted to avoid it.

The exertions of your Lordship's Government to

supply this army with every *requisite* have been crowned with an amount of success I feared was impossible, and every man amongst us, European and native, is fully sensible of the vast obligations we are under to a Government so careful of our welfare, and we only regret that we have had so little opportunity of proving that we are worthy of so much consideration.

With General Jacob here, we can have no anxiety for the future, and my only wish now is, that he were vested with supreme control, conscious as I am how much better fitted for it he is than myself.

I trust the 14th Dragoons will get off in time to reach Vingorla before the monsoon sets; for it would be very hard should the poor fellows be separated from their families much longer. The rest of the returning troops will be embarked for the destinations detailed in the Quartermaster-General's memorandum so soon as I can get the official (or *certain*) announcement of the ratification of the treaty, of which, however, I believe there can now be no doubt. I have been unable to return to Mohumra so soon as I intended, there being much to do here, and perhaps I may not get away before the 6th. I shall keep this open, therefore, till the *Pioneer* arrives from Mohumra, whence she is to start immediately after the *Comet* returns from Bagdad, due at Mohumra to-day. The *Pioneer* then takes the mail to Bombay, and will convey this packet. No. 8 Field Battery, with a native company of artillery, arrived to-day, from Kur-rachee, in sailing vessels. In reply to a note I wrote to General Jacob, announcing the circumstance, and asking whether he would wish the company to land, to return, or to relieve one of the European batteries, he says, "I should say certainly land the native company, and " No. 8 Battery, and keep them here by all means. If

“artillery be wanted *much* elsewhere, I would give them
“my troop of Horse Artillery.”

The battery will be landed accordingly.

5th May.—We are disappointed in not yet having received the Bagdad mail; and I have determined on going on board to-night and sailing early to-morrow morning, as I do not like to delay longer the preparations for sending off the troops from Mohumra. But I trust ere then the *Pioneer* will make her appearance. I am assured the 64th will be embarked by Thursday (7th) in two transports, towed by the *Punjaub*, for Vingorla direct.

Believe me, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General*.

P.S.—The last transport of the 14th Dragoons sailed on the 3rd instant. The other transports will do so, so soon as filled. The naval men calculate on their reaching Bombay in twelve to fourteen days.—J. O.

To the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY, *Bushire, 5th May, 1857.*

I deeply appreciate, and very sincerely thank you for, your most kind congratulations, and the good wishes expressed in your notes dated 14th, 17th, and 20th ultimo.

I had already anticipated your Excellency's wishes by sending back the 14th Dragoons. And I now have very much pleasure in carrying out your desires as respects the European infantry, all of whom will be sent back with the least possible delay. The 64th I have directed to embark at once, to ensure their reach-

ing Vingarla before the monsoon. And the 78th and 2nd Europeans will go when I receive official intimation from Bagdad of the ratification of the treaty.

The only wish of your Excellency I find a difficulty in meeting, is the release of the 4th Rifles. As I take for granted your *first* desire is for the return of the Light Battalion, *that* I am prepared to send; but I do not think any more of the native troops could well be spared just yet, for an imposing force will still be required here to insure the Shah's prompt fulfilment of the conditions. But I do not apprehend that the 4th Rifles will be much worse off here than they would be at most stations in India. They are quartered in the town, where the officers have good quarters, and pendals are now erecting for the men, which will be very airy, as we are knocking down the town wall which intercepts the sea breeze. *All* the native troops will soon be hutted with the ample material we have collected, and all the Europeans (artillery) will have ample accommodation.

So I hope all will go well with the troops in Persia.

I know not when I may be recalled to India, but I care not how soon, for with General Jacob here, I certainly am not required. But without orders, either from Calcutta or home, I cannot venture to take back the Head-Quarter Staff, or return thither myself. Possibly it may be deemed necessary to maintain the appearance of being prepared to renew the war, until the Shah has actually fulfilled the conditions of the treaty which he has ratified.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieutenant-General.*

*To Mr. Murray, Her Majesty's Ambassador at the
Court of Tehran.*

Mohumra,

MY DEAR MR. MURRAY,

8th May, 1857.

Your announcement that the ratified treaty has actually arrived from Tehran, enables me to withdraw the troops from Mohumra, and send back almost all the Europeans to India, at which I am truly rejoiced. About a week hence, after all have departed, I hope to visit Bagdad, for three or four days, to bid you good-bye.

As you were good enough to propose to Lord Clarendon to nominate commissioners in consultation with me, to see the evacuation of Herat carried out, I would recommend Major Taylor (who I know you yourself intended to depute), Captain Malcolm Green, and Lieutenant Clerk. They are all good friends, and would, I am sure, pull well together. As Malcolm Green's elder brother is desirous to visit Bagdad, and has no time to spare, he purposes going in the steamer to-day, and his brother and Clerk will accompany him, to await there Taylor's arrival (probably in the next steamer), or to return with the elder Green, should you not approve of their being associated with Taylor on this mission.

I am extremely vexed at the disgrace the Mirza has suffered in consequence of having incurred the wrath of General Jacob, who I cannot but think has taken an unnecessarily strong view of his case; but unfortunately the Mirza has deprived me of the power of doing anything in his behalf, by the very improper letter he wrote to the General. Taylor will forward to you General Jacob's report of the

case, and the Mirza himself will go up in to-day's steamer.

Pray excuse this very short note, for I am overwhelmed with work just now.

Believe me, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR,

Mohumra, 8th May, 1857.

Your letter of the 20th and 26th March met me two days ago at the mouth of the river, on my return from Bushire.

My official despatch to the address of Lord Clarendon, dated 2nd instant, will relieve your mind from any anxiety that may have been caused by my previous communication, intimating the necessity I then was under of retaining the troops in their positions until the treaty had actually received the Shah's ratification. And Lord Clarendon's correspondence with Lord Wodehouse, now received, satisfies me that I was right in believing that I should not have been justified in weakening our forces in Persia until assured of that consummation.

Happily, on my arrival at Bushire, I obtained that assurance from the Persian Commander-in-Chief of Fars, in such form as satisfied me that the official announcement of the ratification would reach me in a few days from Bagdad. And I no longer hesitated, therefore, in taking measures for withdrawing the troops from Mohumra, and sending back to India such as are not required to maintain Bushire and Karrack, pending the fulfilment of the "conditions."

Accordingly, all the European infantry (three regiments), all the European artillery of the 2nd Division (one troop horse artillery, one foot battery, and Reserve Company), and a native light battalion, go back immediately. The 14th Dragoons had already been despatched, and Her Majesty's 64th Regiment sails to-day from Bushire under steam escort; Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders will follow in the course of this week, as also the artillery above specified. And the 2nd Bombay European Regiment will follow so soon as the two native regiments now here are transferred to Bushire.

This answers your question as to the forces I could spare for China. I now proceed to reply to your other query—"Which I think the fittest for that service?"

Her Majesty's 64th, and 78th Highlanders are in excellent health and heart, and admirable discipline; prepared for immediate service anywhere, and provided with camp equipage, camp followers, &c., in the transports which take them to Bombay. Should the Indian Government have been directed to despatch to China the troops returning from Persia, I have little doubt these regiments will be sent on without landing at Bombay, where they need only be detained long enough to replenish their stores. Of the artillery, only the Reserve Company would be available for China, *horsed* artillery being of no use in that country. And it happens that the mountain train attached to the Reserve Company, is perhaps better adapted for service on shore in China than any other species of artillery, being so easily transported by manual labour. I purpose, therefore, despatching the Reserve Company, with its mountain train complete in every respect, with the 78th Highlanders. The 64th, 78th, and mountain train, will all be assembled in the Bombay Harbour by from 20th

to 25th instant; and, if despatched without delay, will, I am assured by Captain Rennie of the Indian Navy, reach Hong Kong thence in thirty days, even in sailing vessels alone. Only one native regiment can be dispensed with at present—the Light Battalion, a strong and very efficient body—but being composed of companies taken from ten regiments of the Bombay Army, its prolonged absence on distant service may, perhaps, be objectionable. However, this regiment will reach Bombay shortly after the European troops, and it will be for the Indian Government then to decide whether or not it also can be sent to China.

You are doubtless aware of the existence of one serious drawback to the employment of our India troops in China; viz., the difference between the India allowances the latter are entitled to, and the colonial allowances which only Her Majesty's troops receive on foreign service.

As regards blood feuds with the Arabs, which Mr. Layard dreads will arise out of our proceedings, you will have learnt from my official despatches, that the utmost care was taken to obviate such an evil.

In no instance have our operations brought us into collision with the tribes, and I trust that our public proceedings, as well as the individual conduct of our soldiers, will leave—and I feel convinced they will—a most favourable impression upon the Arabs of these districts.*

As respects the treaty, you do me justice in assuming that I approve of the abandonment of the demands for the dismissal of the Sudr Azim, having myself suggested its relinquishment in my observations on the

* This was fully borne out by the reports of Col. Taylor and other officers who passed through the country on their return from Herat, *via* Tehran, to Bushire some months afterwards. See page 80.

proposed exactions, which must have reached you soon after your letter, now under reply, was written.

I am not sorry to observe that the demand regarding Bunder Abbas was not pressed, which I deprecated enforcing until we were at least better acquainted with the case. Perhaps it is as well that it should be abandoned, as Russia and Armenia might have taken just umbrage at our enforcing such a condition.

The several cases of alleged insults, reparation for which had been demanded, are passed over in silence, which I had recommended should be settled by the code to be embodied in the commercial treaty. I observe in the newspapers that a commercial treaty is being drawn up in London, and I trust my suggestions on that head may reach in time to be of some use.

* * * * *

You have gained more with regard to the debts due to British subjects, by Persians, than I had stipulated for in my draft. I hope there will be less trouble in future in this kindred grievance, saddled upon us by useless *protégés*. I must own, however, that I would have preferred that the subject of protection, and our views thereon, as now embodied in the treaty, had been committed for negotiation to our ambassador at Tehran, who might have been instructed to induce other resident ministers to follow the same course. However, the declaration in its present form may be useful to us.

You will see that I approved of the proposal in the draft treaty drawn up at home, for the retention of Karrack, and I confess I feel some regret that that point was not secured. In any future war with Persia, a small garrison there, with a few ships of war, might

effect all that would be required in this quarter, and thus leave the army free to operate upon some more vulnerable point. Its occupation would have given us, moreover, the command of the Gulf, and rendered null the competition of any other European power which may be seeking to establish its influence here.

* * * * *

Knowing the relationship which Persia has already established with the two first-rate European powers, and the influence and jealousy which were thus arrayed against us at Tehran, I feel disposed, on the whole, to greet the treaty with a hearty welcome. More, perhaps, might have been exacted from the Shah, had all our successes been known; but such a triumph in its after effects might have neutralized our future influence in Persia, and given us cause to regret hereafter that we had not been more generous, when generosity was at our disposal.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B., K.G.

MY LORD, *Camp at Mohumra, May 8th, 1857.*

On my arrival here this morning, I found a letter to my address from his Royal Highness Khanler Mirza, commanding the Persian forces in Khuzistan, of which, and of my reply, I have the honour to submit translations for your Lordship's information.

The intimation mentioned in the latter enclosure, that the Shah had ratified the treaty, reached me from the Hon. Mr. Murray on the 6th instant, and, consequent thereon, as your Lordship will observe, I have

not hesitated to announce to his Royal Highness, my intention to withdraw the British troops from Mohumra, and to continue, by means of a naval force only, the military occupation of the town and adjacent districts, in accordance with the stipulation in the 14th Article of the treaty.

The troops at Mohumra, under the command of General Havelock, C.B., will accordingly commence embarking to-morrow, and the whole will I trust have taken their departure from their allotted destinations in a week or ten days from this date.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Right Hon. Lord Elphinstone, G.C.H.

Mohumra, 9th May, 1859.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

Nothing has occurred since I wrote to your Lordship from Bushire on the 4th instant, beyond the ratification of the treaty, announced to me by Mr. Murray in a hasty note, which met me near the mouth of the river (a copy of which I forwarded by the *Pioneer*).

This announcement enabled me to proceed at once to break up this force; my first step being to get off the 78th and mountain train, which commenced embarking last night, and will go to-day, I trust, towed by the *Semiramis*, ensuring, I hope, their arrival at Bombay within the time specified in the enclosed copy of a letter to the President, who probably, from what he wrote to me on the 20th March, may have urged your Lordship to forward troops to China when returned hence.

The 78th is a noble body of men, ready to serve

anywhere, and sure to uphold the honour of our arms wherever they may be employed.

From the correspondence between Lords Wodehouse and Clarendon, dated respectively 13th and 25th March, which reached me by the last Bagdad mail, it is clear that I should not have been justified in weakening the forces in Persia before the Shah had actually ratified the treaty, which Russia openly avowed she would exert her influence to prevent. Happily, the news of the fall of Mohumra reached the Shah in time to counteract her endeavours, and to this, I believe, we owe the Shah's unexpectedly prompt ratification.

I hope to have all the troops despatched hence in six or eight days, and purpose then running up to Bagdad for a few days, to arrange with Mr. Murray the mission to be sent to witness the evacuation of Herat. It probably will be composed of Major Taylor, Captain Malcolm Green, and Lieutenant Claude Clerk. I shall take Major Curtis with me also, to arrange for the disposal of the surplus camels and mules. The 700 of the latter animals nowhere will go to Bushire, and should eventually be sent to Bombay, I think, to form the nucleus of a land transport corps, which I hope your Lordship may permanently attach to the Bombay army.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Major-General Jacob, C.B., Commanding Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB,

Mohumra, 9th May, 1857.

The 78th, and all our artillery, are already embarked; the announcement from Mr. Murray, which met me in the river, of the Shah's ratified treaty having actually arrived, enabling me to proceed to the work at once on our arrival here on Thursday, but we lost a

day by grounding before we reached the bar, and I got a black eye and broken nose by the round house coming down upon me when in bed at night. Mr. Badger, who was sleeping in the other half of the round house, was a little bruised likewise. By a miracle we both escaped being crushed to death.

You expressed your wish to keep the Madras Sappers, who, I said, I had little doubt would be delighted to stay; but the enclosed representation which Lugard received from Major Boileau, not written in a spirit of remonstrance in the slightest degree, but because he thought it his duty to show what his men had gone through of late years, displays such an amount of knocking about, and such lengthened separation from their families, that I am sure you will agree with me in thinking it would be cruel to keep them back, unless the exigency was very emergent indeed. I have, therefore, directed their return to India, in the confidence that you will approve; they will call at Bushire, however, and Boileau will have orders to report to you, and to take your orders before proceeding further, when, if you urgently require their services, you will of course land and keep them.

The 26th N. I. will be embarked and sent to you so soon as we have shipped all our commissariat stores, which, however, the commissariat officers calculate will occupy three days. The Light Battalion will then follow, proceeding direct to Bombay, and the 23rd Regiment will embark for Bushire after we have got the Scinde Horse and mules on board.

Yours, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S.—I find the Madras Sappers have been told off to accompany the Light Battalion, as the only means of

sending them to Bombay; and as the Light Battalion does not touch at Bushire, I hope you will approve their going on without the previous reference to you I had intended Boileau should make.

To the Governor-General.

MY LORD,

Mohumra, 9th May, 1857.

I have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, copy of an order I have this day issued to the Persian Expeditionary Force, detailing the troops which return to India, and those which will garrison Bushire and Karrack, until the conditions of the treaty are fulfilled.

Her Majesty's 64th Regiment has, I trust, already sailed from Bushire, whence Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons had, as I reported, been previously despatched.

Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, and Reserve Company Artillery with mountain train, are now embarking, a portion of whom will be despatched to-morrow, in tow of the *Punjaub*, and the remainder next day, towed by the *Semiramis*—thus ensuring their arrival in Bombay by about the 21st or 22nd instant.

The embarkation and despatch of the remainder of this division will proceed without delay, and the withdrawal of the troops from Mohumra will, I hope, be completed by about the 17th instant.

On the arrival of the 26th N. I. at Bushire, General Jacob will despatch the 2nd European Regiment to Kurrachee, when all European troops will have been withdrawn from Persia, excepting the portion of the artillery remaining at Bushire.

In my despatch from Bushire, dated the 2nd instant, I informed your Lordship that the final evacuation of

Mohumra would be deferred until I received official intimation from Mr. Murray of the ratification of the treaty. On the 6th instant, a communication from Mr. Murray, dated 2nd May, met me at sea, when on my voyage back from Bushire, which, though not in official form, announced the fact that the Shah's ratification had arrived at Bagdad, and that the exchange of the ratified treaties would take place next day. This I consider sufficient warrant for carrying out the measure; for to have awaited the next mail from Bagdad might cause the delay of another fortnight, and then the return troops could not have reached Bombay before the monsoon had commenced.

My arrangements for the naval occupation of this position will be hereafter reported.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB, *Mohumra, 12th May, 1857.*

The 26th N. I. leaves for Bushire to-day, towed by the *Victoria* and *Chusan*, which steamers will be available to aid in the transport of the 2nd European to Kurrachee; but Rennie is most anxious the *Victoria* should be sent as soon as possible to aid the artillery transports, one of which sailed yesterday and the other this morning, in landing the troops at Kurrachee.

I enclose Rennie's note on the subject.

Affectionately, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra, 12th May, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I cannot presume to bring the case of the officers selected for the intended Arab levies officially before your Lordship, as, unfortunately, they have had no opportunity of performing any service; but that is no fault of theirs; and I do hope the readiness with which they devoted themselves to an arduous and dangerous duty, though allowed no opportunity for performing that duty, will be fully appreciated by your Lordship.

I beg to enclose, for your Lordship's information, extract from a letter I wrote to Lord Canning on the 3rd instant, concerning two of her Majesty's officers in the Bengal army, in terms which would equally apply to Captain Evan Grant, and the Bombay officers similarly situated, on whose behalf I beg to solicit your Lordship's kindly consideration.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra, 13th May, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

The captain of the *Ocean Monarch* takes charge of the tent of the Persian Brigadier who was killed in our attack on Mohumra, which, with another cloth over the fly, will prove preferable, I think, to anything of Bombay manufacture; and, perhaps, your Lordship may think it a good pattern for the Bombay tent-makers.

It has its carpet and a necessary tent—rather curious concerns.

The pole is a most clumsy affair, and too short for

the tent if pitched in our way ; it being made to pitch on a raised platform, about a foot higher within the inner cannaughts than it is within the outer.

I know not whether your Lordship is sufficiently well versed in Persian to read the scrolls inscribed on the inner walls and doors.

I am &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Mohumra,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

13th May 1857.

I send copy of a letter from Ikbal-ool-Dowlah, Nawab of Lucknow, residing at Bagdad, and its translation, which displays a feeling the more creditable to the old gentleman, inasmuch as he can hardly consider he has been much beholden to the British Government, which ignored his claim to the throne of Oude, and though, perhaps, it was quite as good as that of the father of the ex-king.

I have not of course accepted on behalf of the troops the offered present ; but I have sent the letter to General Jacob for communication to the native troops concerned, with a private note, of which I enclose a copy.

This is by no means the first occasion on which the Nawab has evinced his good-will and zeal in our cause, as will be seen from the enclosed extract from a letter from Captain Kemball, dated 14th March last, which, to my regret, I now learn I omitted to forward officially to the Governor-General at the time I had intended to do so.

May I beg you will do me the favour to communicate these circumstances to his Lordship.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

Extract from the letter to General Jacob, alluded to in the above, dated Mohumra, 13th May, 1857.

"I send an original letter, and its translation, from a member of the royal family of Oude, who resides at Bagdad, and was by some considered the rightful heir to that throne, when the ex-king succeeded. I would not, of course, accept his proffered present for the troops, referred to in his letter; but, perhaps, you may think it right to communicate to them the warm congratulations of their countryman, which Kemball assures me are perfectly sincere; for the Nawab has always stood up manfully for the character of the Indian soldiers when sneered at, as heretofore the Bagdadees, and Persians especially, were wont to indulge in."

To the Honourable C. A. Murray, Bagdad.

Mohumra,

MY DEAR MR. MURRAY,

14th May, 1857.

I received this morning your official to the Governor-General, dated 3rd instant, sent by a messenger, under a flying seal, for my perusal, announcing the exchange of the ratified treaties. And by this opportunity, Kemball has learnt from Dr. Hyslop, that you were making preparations for leaving for Tehran on the 20th instant.

I had hoped to have had all the troops nearly cleared from Mohumra by this time, but certain transports summoned from Bushire have not yet arrived, and the embarkation is consequently delayed, and I cannot say for certain when it will be completed; until when, I cannot leave of course, and, possibly, even then I may be unable to go to Bagdad. Lest, therefore, you might be induced to defer your departure in the expectation of my arrival, I have requested Kemball to forward this by a special messenger, and beg you will not alter your plans in the slightest degree on my account.

Captain Green and Lieutenant Clerk, whom I recommended to you (in conjunction with Taylor) for the Herat Mission, are already with you, and Taylor will

certainly follow by the next steamer, whether I myself go up or not. Should you have left Bagdad in the interim, he can easily overtake you.

I presume, and hope, that the duty of the Herat Commissioners will be strictly confined to seeing and reporting the *evacuations of Herat by the Persians*, and that the British Government will have nothing whatever to do with the nomination of the future ruler of Herat, simply requiring the *literal* fulfilment of the "condition" that the Persians entirely withdraw from the Herat territory, and abstain from interfering with its future government; the Commissioners merely seeing that they (the Persians) leave the country, and exercise no influence whatever in behalf of any Affghan chief who may assume the Government; for it is most strongly to be deprecated that we should be shackled by obligations to support *any* party in Affghanistan. I think these are your views, and hope you will impress the same on the Home authorities.

Good-bye, for the present, in case I should not have the happiness to see you at Bagdad.

Very sincerely, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

To the Governor-General.

MY LORD,

Mohumra, 14th May, 1857.

I have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I addressed to Lord Clarendon on the 8th instant, with its accompaniments.

Since then the embarkation and despatch from hence, of the 2nd Division, has been going on uninterruptedly. Her Majesty's 78th Regiment, 3rd Troop Horse Artil-

lery, 1st Company 2nd Battalion Fort Artillery, and Mountain Train, with the Reserve Company of Artillery—comprising all the European troops—were first embarked and despatched to sea, chiefly under steam escort, as the transports were filled. The 26th N. I. sailed for Bushire yesterday, towed by the *Chusan*, and, on its arrival, General Jacob will despatch the 2nd European Regiment to Kurrachee.—Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons and 64th Regiment having previously been sent to Bombay.

The Scinde Horse are being embarked to-day for Bushire. The Light Battalion will, early to-morrow, be put on board the *Ocean Monarch*, to be towed by the *Berenice* to Bombay. Next day the Land Transport Establishment and mules will be embarked for Bushire, and on Sunday the 23rd Regiment will go on board the *Soldana*, to be towed by the *Feroze* to Bushire.

No troops will then remain, and our control over Mohumra will be maintained by the sloops of war *Clive* and *Falkland*.

After these arrangements have been completed, I purpose proceeding myself to Bagdad for a few days, to settle with Mr. Murray the mission to be sent to Herat to witness the evacuation of that fortress and district, in accordance with the conditions of the treaty; and to arrange, in conjunction with Captain Kemball and Major Curtis, for the disposal of the land transport animals and establishments not required at Bushire.

I had the honour to address your Lordship on the 9th instant, forwarding my farewell order to the troops returning to India, and previous correspondence with the Persian Governor of Khuzistan.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

To Brigadier-General Jacob, Commanding at Bushire.

MY DEAR JACOB, *Mohumra, 16th May, 1857.*

The 23rd Regiment N. I., is now embarking, and the last of the mules. All your Horse have embarked except a duffadar's party, which remains until all the mules have got off. But all will be on board by evening I trust. I stay till to-morrow, and then go with Lugard and Kemball to Bagdad, to arrange the Herat Mission with Mr. Murray; and, in conjunction with Kemball, the disposal of the baggage cattle collected in various points of Turkish Arabia. These matters may occupy me there a week or ten days perhaps, so possibly it may be three weeks or a month before I return to Bushire.

If any mail arrives from Bombay, pray send the *Hugh Lindsay* or *Jamsetjee*, with what may be for us. (*i. e.*, both the Greens, Hervey, and his clerk, Mr. Badger, Clerk, Taylor, Lugard, and self—Mr. MacDonald the apothecary, Kemball, and the Commodore and naval officers of *Clive* and *Falkland*).

Three river steamers remain here to keep up the communication with Bagdad, the *Napier* and her flat go to Bushire to-morrow; and the *Hugh Lindsay* and *Jamsetjee* will be available to communicate with the senior naval officer at Mohumra, who will forward the packets. The next river steamer will leave for Bagdad when the mail arrives from Bushire. I send copy of a letter from Lord Clarendon, authorising the levies, should the war have continued; also extract from Mr. Stevens' last news from Tehran.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B. & K.G.

MY LORD,

Mohumra, 17th May, 1857.

I have now the satisfaction to inform your Lordship, that the evacuation of Mohumra, by the troops under my command, has this day been completed, in accordance with the arrangements, detailed in the accompaniments, for the naval occupation of Mohumra until the "conditions" are fulfilled, which are reported in a separate despatch.

The re-embarkation of the troops commenced on the 9th instant, and the last regiment (23rd Bombay N. I.) went on board yesterday. I myself, accompanied by Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, General Lugard, C.B., and other officers of the staff, proceed to Bagdad, there to arrange with Mr. Murray the formation of the mission to be deputed to Herat to see the evacuation of that fortress and district carried out by the Persians; and, in conjunction with Captain Kemball, to take measures for the disposal and discharge of such portion of the animals and establishments of the Land Transport Corps as are not required at Bushire.

The accompanying copy of field force orders, issued to the troops in Persia on the 9th instant, will acquaint your Lordship with my sense of their very praiseworthy conduct, and with the detail of the troops returning to India, who all, I trust, will arrive at their destined ports before the monsoon commences. Her Majesty's 64th and 78th Regiments, and Mountain Train with Reserve Company of Artillery, I despatched first, in case they might be required for China, and as they are provided with camp equipage and camp followers, complete for foreign service, there will be no occasion to detain their

transports in the Bombay harbour (where they will be all assembled between the 20th and 25th inst.,) longer than may be requisite to replenish their stores.

I have, &c.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B. & K.G.

Camp at Mohumra, May 17th, 1857.

MY LORD,

Adverting to the intimation conveyed to Khaular Mirza, the Governor of Khuzistan, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch, under date the 8th inst.; and in anticipation of his Royal Highness's reply, I requested Captain Kemball to invite Sheikh Jahir to come in person, or to depute one of his relatives, to Mohumra, for the purpose of taking upon himself the civil administration of the town and adjoining districts. Sheikh Jahir at once acceded to my proposal. And, accordingly, on the morning of the 15th instant, when the commissariat stores had been removed, and the guards at the gates withdrawn, the town was formally made over to Sheikh Alie Khan, the nephew of this chief, the person whom he had selected to represent his authority.

It is my gratifying duty to report to your Lordship, on the close of our operations in this quarter, that the same friendly relations which were established with the Arab tribes at the outset, have been maintained unimpaired to the last, and that, between them and my troops and camp followers, I have no single instance of collision, however trifling, to record.

Having, in a separate despatch of this day, communicated to your Lordship the details of the embarkation of the British troops, with other matters connected

with my future movements, it only remains for me here to submit for your information, a copy of my instructions to Acting Commodore Rennie, I. N., respecting the duties of the officer in command of the vessel of war to be stationed at Mohumra, as completing the arrangements in the terms and in the sense in which they have been clearly announced to Khanler Mirza, and fully made known to Sheikh Jahir and his nephew, whose appreciation of our forbearance and good-will was evinced by their ready acceptance of them, coupled with expressions most flattering to our national character.

I have, &c.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

(Enclosure to the above.)

*From Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.,
Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force, to
Commodore James Rennie, I.N.*

SIR,

Mohumra, 15th May, 1857.

You will learn from the annexed extracts from a letter I have addressed to Khaular Mirza, the Governor of Khuzistan, that I have intimated to his Royal Highness my intention, after withdrawing the British troops from Mohumra, to leave a naval force to represent the continued military occupation of the place, in conformity with the treaty of peace lately concluded between Great Britain and Persia. Accordingly, I have the honour to request that you will be pleased to take steps to carry into effect this arrangement.

The object mainly contemplated by me, is to prevent the Persians from rebuilding the batteries or constructing fresh defences near Mohumra. Although, therefore, I have positively stated to the Prince that the condition which precludes the return of his troops will be enforced, it is not my intention, in the event of its infraction, that the officer whom you may place in command here, should proceed to extremity, or have recourse to forcible measures, without further instructions. It will be sufficient for him, in such case, to make a formal protest to the Persian authorities, and immediately report the circumstances to you for my information. He should further understand, that with the civil administration of Mohumra and the adjoining districts he has no concern whatever, and that, in the condition stated, is not meant to be included any individual whom his Royal Highness may depute for that purpose to be associated with Sheikh Jahir, provided the individual in question be not accompanied by soldiers.

Mr. Taylor, British Agent at Bussorah, whose acquaintance with the language and experience of the people of the country fully qualify him to become a medium of communication with the local authorities and Arab tribes, has been directed to render every assistance in his power to the officer commanding at Mohumra, and to repair thither whenever the occasion may appear to the latter to call for his services.

(Annexure to the above.)

Extracts from a letter from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., to His Royal Highness Khanler Mirza Khan, Governor of Khuzistan.

"The ratification of the treaty of peace between the two Governments has been officially announced to me; consequently, all hostilities between our two armies will cease. Your Royal Highness is, however, aware that Article XIV. provides for the occupation by the British Government of all the ports, places, and islands, belonging to Persia, now in its possession, until the conditions of the treaty are fulfilled.

"I beg accordingly to acquaint you with my intention to remove the British troops from Mohumra, leaving a certain number of vessels of war to represent the military occupation of the place until the provisions of the treaty have been fully executed. During such period, it is of course necessary that Persian troops should on no account return to Mohumra and by so doing incur the risk of collision with these vessels, whose commanders will receive positive instructions to enforce this condition. At the same time, as it is not my intention to deprive the Persian Government of civil jurisdiction over the town and adjacent districts, I hereby invite you to depute Sheikh Jahir, or any other influential chief of the country, to assume charge of the administration, and conduct the same as formerly until the period specified, that is, until intelligence be received, from her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, that the terms of the treaty have been carried into execution. On this understanding, which, I repeat, is in conformity with Article XIV. above quoted, I withdraw the British troops from this quarter, and I trust that nothing may occur to disturb the alliance which has been so happily established between the two States.

"I have, &c.,

"J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*"

To the Right Hon. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, G.C.B.

MY LORD,

Bagdad, May 23rd, 1857.

I beg to thank your Lordship for your letter, marked "private," dated 2nd inst., and for the very gratifying assurances it contains.

Your Lordship's anticipation that our successes would remove any hesitation that may have arisen in the Shah's mind as to the ratification of the treaty, appears to have been well founded; for our information from Tehran shows, that the treaty was signed and despatched to Bagdad, immediately after the receipt of intelligence of the fall of Mohumra.

Lord Wodehouse's report from St. Petersburg gave little encouragement to hope for so speedy a consummation, and, under the then aspect of affairs, I should not have deemed myself warranted in weakening the forces in Persia. On receipt of certain information, however, that the treaty actually had been ratified, I most gladly availed myself of the authority I then obtained, to remove the troops from Mohumra, and to send back to India all but what are required to garrison Bushire and Karrack, as your Lordship will find reported in the despatches I now send through you.

After completing the evacuation of Mohumra, I have come here for a few days to arrange some matters with Mr. Murray, and then return to Bushire, between which place and Bagdad we have now established bi-monthly communication.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Right Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, G.C.B., K.G.

MY LORD,

Bagdad, 23rd May, 1857.

I am honoured by the receipt of your Lordship's note of the 17th ult., and beg to express my sincere gratitude for the prompt and favourable reply accorded to my application respecting the Arab tribes. As an additional proof of the confidence reposed in me by her

Majesty's Cabinet, your Lordship's announcement of the same was gratifying in the highest degree.

Fortunately the speedy restoration of peace obviated the necessity of my availing myself of the power thus entrusted to me; and it will be as satisfactory to your Lordship, as it is to myself, to know, that whilst our relations with the Arab tribes have been carried on in the most friendly spirit, in no one instance has their presumed loyalty to the Shah been tampered with, neither have we fettered ourselves with a single after engagement towards them.

Their only regret seemed to be, that we were not to continue in permanent possession of their country; and when it is remembered that such sentiments were expressed after our victorious troops had occupied their soil for nearly two months, the fact reflects the highest credit upon the discipline and morale of our Anglo-Indian army.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bagdad, 23rd May, 1857.

My official letters to the address of Lord Clarendon, dated 17th inst., brought by the steamer in which I arrived here to-day, and now forwarded *via* Constantinople, will give you the details of my arrangements at Mohumra, and its complete evacuation by our troops, to be held hereafter, until the conditions of the peace are fulfilled, by naval means alone; the return to India of all the European troops which were in Persia, excepting some artillery retained at Bushire; also of a portion of native troops, about 7,000 men of all arms, main-

taining Bushire and Karrack, comprised in one division, the 2nd Division being broken up, &c. &c., but I am assured that this, which will go *via* Damascus, will reach you first.

After despatching the troops from Mohumra, I accompanied Captain Kemball to this place, to arrange certain matters with Mr. Murray, and I purpose returning to Bushire a fortnight hence. On my way up the river I met your letter of April 9th, and on my arrival this morning, received that of the 16th April. I thank you most sincerely for your congratulations on the Kooshab affair. If that were not sufficient to open the Shah's eyes to the futility of contest with us, the easy capture of Mohumra, and flight of his army, must have sufficed to counteract the efforts of Russia—if efforts she made—to dissuade his Majesty from ratifying the treaty. And his unexpectedly prompt acceptance of our terms, has happily released us in time, from the necessity of maintaining Mohumra with troops, and enabled me to send back our Europeans to India in better health even, than when they left Bombay and Kurrachee to come to Persia.

I regret to learn from your letters now received, that I should have been justified in addressing my official correspondence regarding points of policy in Persia to you; for nothing was further from my wish than unnecessarily to intrude on Lord Clarendon, or to abstain from addressing, on *all* subjects, you who had ever been so kind and courteous to me; but I was led into the error of supposing that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs alone could be addressed officially on such subjects, copies only being furnished to you as President of the Secret Committee, by seeing that the Political Agent at Bagdad did so. And I confined myself, therefore, to addressing you demi-officially, for which I beg most sin-

cerely to apologize. As, however, you tell me that I am at liberty to follow either channel of communication, and my correspondence on Persian affairs is likely so soon to close, I presume you would wish me to continue that course to the end; if, indeed, my letter to Lord Clarendon of to-day may not be the last I may have occasion to address to his Lordship.

That letter will inform you how far I have acceded to Mr. Murray's proposition with regard to the projected mission to Herat. It appears to me that, in his despatch to Lord Clarendon on the subject, he takes for granted that a commission for that object is sanctioned by the concluding clause of Act VIII. of the Treaty; whereas, as I read it, the commission therein alluded to, has reference solely to the liberation of captives. It is to obviate any misapprehension on this point, and which might, moreover, if urged on such ground, give rise to objections on the part of the Persian Government, that I have stated my opinion, not only as to the importance of the end proposed by the commission, but the manner in which the arrangement for its prosecution should be carried out, and the object to which its functions should be confined. The latter point I have insisted upon most strongly, because Mr. Murray's despatch appears to contemplate a much more intimate and searching inquiry than I deem it advisable for us to institute. Any effort on our part to ferret out "secret and intriguing" Persian agents in Herat, and other parts of Affghanistan, would certainly prove abortive, and the attempt, by bringing our officers into intimate relations with Herattees, and others, might lead to embarrassing complications hereafter.

I have made these observations on Mr. Murray's despatch, in order that you may be aware how far my opinions accord with his, and, lest similar objections,

raised at home, might lead her Majesty's Government to withhold its sanction to the projected measure. Apart from all such objects of doubtful utility and questionable prudence, it appears to me, that simply to secure correct and reliable information of the evacuation of Herat, is a sufficient warrant for the appointment of the commission suggested, and I sincerely hope that the necessary authority will be accorded and despatched without delay, together with any instructions which her Majesty's Government may deem fit to guide and limit the proceedings of the commission.

The drift of the foregoing remarks will apprize you how perfectly in accordance with your views are my own ideas regarding the impolicy of any interference on our part with the internal affairs of the Herattees, or, generally, of Affghanistan. Nothing is more to be deprecated, in my opinion, than the most distant attempt on our part to side with this or that chieftain, much less to foster a policy for incorporating the whole of that country under one rule or ruler. Any such scheme, however cautiously pursued, would involve us in inextricable difficulties; and be followed with one only result—failure—as regards any solid advantage which our Indian empire would reap therefrom. The time is not come for British intervention to effect any good among the Affghans themselves; and the consolidation of an Affghan empire, under present circumstances, and in view of the geographical position of that country, might be attended with serious inconvenience as well to our North-West Frontier, as to our political relations with Russia and Persia.

Before the receipt of the despatch on the subject of the Mirza Agha, or of your note referring to his case, that gentleman had returned to Mr. Murray at Bagdad, of whose intentions respecting him, since the receipt of

the Government intimation of their views, I am at present unacquainted. The despatch referred to should have covered an enclosure, but the enclosure, which seems to have contained the objections raised by the Persian Government to the employment of the Mirza, has not reached me. I do not know how far my opinion might have been modified by a perusal of that document, but, in its absence, it excited my surprise that Ferukh Khan, who so strenuously deprecated our demand for the removal of Sudr Azim, should, nevertheless, raise such serious objections to the employment of a subordinate officer by the British Mission. That the Mirza was obnoxious to the Persian Government is obvious, and the secret correspondence from Tehran apprized us that Ferukh Khan would use his utmost endeavours to obtain his dismissal; but unless the charges against him outweighed his evident fidelity to our mission, I cannot suppose that the Home Government would accede to so unreasonable a demand on the part of his avowed enemies. Of course I state this irrespective of the merits or demerits of the individual.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Sir Henry Rawlinson, K.C.B.

Bagdad, 23rd May, 1857.

MY DEAR RAWLINSON,

You will have been rejoiced to learn of the more speedy ratification of the treaty than I could hope for when I last wrote to you; for I concluded the Shah would delay till the last moment allowed to him, *i. e.* 4th June, if not dissuaded from ratifying it at all under Russian influence. And even the announcement of the complete evacuation of Mohumra by our troops (retain-

ing war sloops alone there) will not be more satisfactory to you than the knowledge that we have left the most friendly impression on the Arabs, without having committed them in any way to the hostility of the Persians, who will find the way prepared for the resumption of their sway at Mohumra so soon as the conditions of peace have been carried out. Indeed, I invited Khanler Mirza to send any functionary he pleased to unite with Jahir (the Chaab chief) in the civil management of the district, on the sole condition that no Persian troops should accompany him. There had not been time for his answer when I left Mohumra, but I expect to receive it, and the announcement of his deputy's arrival there, by the next steamer. And I do hope that the Shah will be able to resume his entire authority there, without difficulty, when I announce to Khanler Mirza that he is at liberty to send back his troops on learning that Herat has been evacuated, and the other terms of the treaty carried out.

We had a difficult and a delicate part of play at Mohumra, to avoid either embroiling the Arab tribes, in hostility to ourselves, or committing them in hostility to the Persians, and, at the same time, keeping the Turks in good humour, which, unaided by Kemball, I certainly should have been unable to do. To his tact and pluck, and personal influence with all classes—for his character appears to be equally well known and respected by all, whether Arabs, Turks, or Persians—I attribute the entire success of our measures, besides being indebted to him for his incessant and unwearied exertions in our aid from first to last, whether in obtaining supplies for the army, acquiring information, aiding us in landing at Mohumra, by erecting bridges, &c., over the nullahs which obstructed the artillery; guiding the detachment to Ahwaz, corresponding for me with

Khanler Mirza; and, indeed, *in every possible way*; but, above all, by his sound advice on every occasion of difficulty, of which I too highly appreciated the value to scruple to avail myself, and I freely consulted him in all matters. My official acknowledgements heretofore of Kembball's services are far below what is due to him, but I shall have opportunity of placing them more prominently before the Court after my return to Bushire, when my personal connection with Kembball will have closed.

Next to Kembball, I am most indebted for so satisfactory an intercourse with the Arabs, to the Rev. Mr. Badger, whose thorough knowledge of Arab customs and feelings, as well as of the Arab language, is most invaluable to me; and he and Kembball worked most heartily and cordially together.

With such aids and guides, I could scarcely go wrong; and the result has been the very satisfactory relations we have established with all the Arab tribes with whom we have come in contact; insuring us a very cordial reception from all, should Persia compel us to renew the war; and long to be remembered to our credit hereafter, I trust, should we not have to return.

You all complain of the dilatoriness of my communications, and appear to blame me for not sending weekly despatches *via* Bagdad. But, until Mohumra fell, we had not the means. The *Indus*, river boats, arrived at Bushire only just before we left for Mohumra, and even after we took the place, could not be dispensed with so long as we purposed advancing to Ahwaz. Indeed, the communication with Bagdad could not be depended on so long as the Persians were in power at Mohumra. That they did hold that place so long, is, you are now aware, no fault of mine: it

was solely caused by the delay in the arrival of the troops from India ; and, after all, I had to go there without cavalry, having only a squadron of Scinde Horse and troop of 14th Dragoons.

I trust the authorities will appreciate, as is undoubtedly deserved, the admirable conduct of our troops in Persia, and that her Majesty may be graciously pleased to bestow a medal to remind our countrymen that we had warred in Persia. On the one side our Queen's image, on the reverse the Lion and the Sun. Only the Sun to be sinking below the *Lion*, instead of rising above him, as in the Persian order. Pray speak to the "Chairs" and President on the subject, and oblige me by letting me know if I may hold out any hope of such a reward. That we have not earned it by harder fighting is no fault of the troops. They always advanced to attack the enemy with the utmost alacrity, however numerically superior they were supposed to be, whenever there was a chance of getting at them. And they have cheerfully undergone considerable hardship, and looked forward, without repining or dismay, to exposure during the hot months to what they were led to believe would prove a deadly climate, had the war continued. I do hope her Majesty's ministers and the Court of Directors will deem the conduct of the troops which have been employed in Persia worthy of being brought favourably to the notice of the Queen.

I presume the Governor-General will commend the Anglo-Indian army in Persia to her Majesty's favourable consideration in due time ; but you may perhaps be able to inform me what prospect there is of any such reward as I have indicated being granted.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD,

Bagdad, 26th May, 1857.

As the Persian war is now virtually at an end, and there is every reason to believe that the remaining portion of the Expeditionary Force will before long return to India, I deem it incumbent upon me to express to your Lordship my deep sense of gratitude to the army which I have had the honour to command, together with my earnest hope that the gallantry, devotion, and endurance they have displayed during this short campaign will be deemed deserving of some token of our gracious Sovereign's approbation. In no other way more appropriate can I suggest such a general recognition, than by the bestowal of a medal to be worn by all ranks, in memory of their services in Persia; for though I cannot urge such a reward on the ground of fierce and frequent collision with the enemy, nevertheless on the few occasions afforded them, both officers and men exhibited an ardour of martial spirit in their advance, and a determined bravery during the contest, however great were the odds arrayed against them, which proved them equal to the most daring exploits. Equally worthy of recognition are the passive qualities exhibited by our troops during this expedition: hardships were undertaken and endured by them, not only without a murmur, but cheerfully and with alacrity; and the prospect of a summer residence in what was regarded as a deadly climate, was looked forward to with this regret only, that they would so long be deprived of the hope of again meeting the enemy.

Most sincerely, therefore, do I trust that the Government of India will deem such services worthy of being brought to the favourable notice of her Majesty, with a view to their being rewarded by the suggested medal.

In addition to the medal, I beg to suggest to your Lordship the propriety of awarding six months' batta to all ranks of the Expeditionary Force. All seizures from the enemy, consisting of guns, war material, and large stores of provisions, have, since I assumed command, been made over to and appropriated by the Government, or by the different departments in the field, for public purposes, and nothing has been retained to be distributed as prize property.

In lieu of the latter, I venture to recommend the gratuity above suggested, which I deem to be more especially merited in this instance, by the admirable conduct of the army in having abstained, whenever opportunity offered, from individual plunder. Their exemplary behaviour in this respect has been the theme of frequent eulogy on the part of the Persians and Arabs, who, accustomed to a less civilized style of warfare, were really astonished at the disciplined abstinence of our troops, forming as it did so striking a contrast to the licence allowed to oriental armies generally, and sanctioned by their own custom.

The prize property taken at Bushire, before I assumed command, should, under the suggested arrangement, be made over to the Government.

Having therefore expressed my opinion of what is due to the army generally, I venture, in the next place, to submit to your Lordship's attention the enclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, wherein I give a detailed list of the officers whose services warrant my recommending them for some special token of her Majesty's gracious favour.

First in order, as well as in desert, is the name of Brigadier General Lugard, C.B., to whom I have no hesitation in saying the army is indebted, not only for

the admirable strategy in the affair at Kooshab after I had been disabled, but also for the conduct of the details of every military movement and arrangement, whereby the forces under my command have been kept in the highest condition of martial order and discipline. Apart from these services, however, General Lugard's discharge of the onerous duties of his office—an office which, from its novelty and its intimate relations with, and supervision over, every department of the Force, was by no means an enviable one—has been such as not only to demand my highest approbation, but has won for him the esteem and regard of all. His promotion to his present local rank by your Lordship was most popular, and I feel convinced that his decoration with the additional honour of K.C.B. would be as gratifying to all ranks of the Expeditionary Force as its bestowal would be fully earned and justly merited.

The names of the other officers mentioned in the despatch are those whose services come next in order of desert; and, without recapitulating their claims to distinction, your Lordship must permit me to recommend them also for special reward.

Precluded as I am from advancing the claims of the navy in my military despatch, I beg to apprise your Lordship that I consider them, both men and officers, deserving of the same general rewards for their valuable and gallant co-operation during this expedition. I feel bound, moreover, to give prominence to the cases of Captain (late Commodore) Young, and Commander Rennie, whose zealous services entitle them to special notice.

The former, as your Lordship is aware, commanded the naval forces at the brilliant affair of Mohumra; and the latter, succeeding to the post of acting commodore on that occasion, as well as on the subsequent expedition

to Ahwaz, displayed the most energetic devotion and bravery combined with the most unwearied discharge of his onerous duties. Captain Rennie it was, who led the small flotilla up the Karoon, where, in conjunction with Captain Kembell, Political Resident at Bagdad, Captain Hunt of Her Majesty's 78th Regiment, and Captains Wray and Malcolm Green of the Bombay Army, with 300 troops, and the crews of three small river steamers, faced the entire Persian Army; compelled that army to retire from its position, which this small detachment then occupied three days; and did not return before destroying the enemy's magazines, taking possession of their stores, and capturing one of their guns.

The military officers who accompanied that expedition I have already named for distinction in my despatch to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and I would now solicit your Lordship's recommendation of Captains Young and Rennie for the decoration of the Bath (C. B.), as a reward for their distinguished services. The latter, indeed, I purpose putting forward as deserving of the Victoria Cross, for his gallantry in having so successfully constructed and planned the mortar raft in front of the enemy's batteries on the night preceding the attack on Mohumra, and other gallant deeds; but as there may be a few other instances worthy of that honour, I defer my direct application on this head until I am able to examine carefully into the merits of each individual case.

Captain Kembell I have already had occasion to bring to your Lordship's notice on more than one occasion, for his zealous co-operation with me in all my diplomatic and other relations with the Persian authorities, and also with the Arab tribes, both before the capture and throughout the occupation of Mohumra. His military services were also such, at the landing of our troops

there, as well as in the expedition of the Karoon, that I felt bound to bring them to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to their being rewarded by a step in rank; but that officer's indefatigable zeal and really invaluable aid richly deserve the higher honour of C. B. in addition; and in expressing my own sense of his merits, I feel convinced that I do no more than reiterate the sentiments of every department of the force, which have one and all availed themselves of, and benefited by his most ready and important assistance.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S.—With regard to any rewards for distinguished services, beyond what I have suggested, or performed prior to my assumption of command, I cannot do better than leave the selection in the hands of Government. General Stalker's despatches will doubtless afford an appropriate list of deserving candidates.

J. O., *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bagdad, 27th May, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I leave open for your perusal the accompanying letters to the Governor-General, and I feel assured that your Lordship's support will not be wanting in backing up my application in behalf of the officers and men of the Persian Expeditionary Force.

Bombay may well be proud of such soldiers; for a braver and better disciplined body of men never took the field. The smart affairs at Bushire and Khooshab,

and the subsequent capture of Mohumra, gave the Persians a tolerably correct idea of the metal they had to deal with ; and that the lesson was not lost upon them, was conspicuously apparent in their precipitate flight at Ahwaz before 300 of our gallant soldiers. Well have they earned the decoration and rewards which I have ventured to recommend, and my earnest hope is, that the Government, with its usual liberality, will sanction what I have suggested.

There is one department however, to whose untiring exertions much, very much, is due, and without whose co-operation and support the best efforts of our army in the field would have been unavailing. Would that it were within the compass of my insignificant powers to recognize such services in a manner commensurate with their deserts and with the debt of gratitude which I individually owe to them ! The department to which I allude, is the Government of Bombay, placed under your Lordship's guidance and control, and to which I feel my obligations to an extent beyond adequate expression. Proud have I been, as well as grateful, for such earnest, hearty co-operation, and my only regret is that an individual cannot reciprocate it. To your Lordship more especially is this expression of my feelings due, and your uniform kindness to me personally throughout this expedition, has placed me under an obligation which, as I cannot repay it, I shall ever feel bound to entertain and acknowledge with the best feelings of my heart.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bagdad, 27th May, 1857.

The accompanying letter regarding rewards which I have ventured to suggest for this army generally, and for those whose services I deem deserving of special recognition, I have put into an official form, under the impression that your Lordship would prefer such a subject in that shape. I sincerely trust that in my recommendations I have not overstepped the limits which would meet your concurrence, and that my suggestions will accordingly be honoured by your Lordship's cordial approval and influential support. Never has an army better deserved the applause of the Government, both for its active and passive qualities, and discipline. And there is good reason to believe that the speedy termination of the war, and the results attained, are mainly attributable to the bold attitude assumed by our troops, and their indomitable bravery in contest with the Persians, whose contempt for our Indian troops has now been superseded by such an esteem, as I trust will secure to us a more wholesome respect for British power than has hitherto influenced the court of Tehran.

I have not yet received the estimated value of the booty captured from the enemy; but when such returns are forthcoming, I trust that the aggregate amount may prove equivalent to, or at least a satisfactory offset to, the batta which I have recommended. Under any circumstances, I hope that the liberality of the Government will not be overtaxed in according the compensation suggested.

I cannot conclude this note without expressing my deep sense of gratitude for the cordial support, and if I may be permitted to say so, the affectionate kindness, I have received from your Lordship throughout this

campaign. Such sympathy has been most flattering to me, and the recollection of it shall ever claim my heartfelt acknowledgment.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To the Right Hon. the Earl of Clarendon,
G.C.B. and K.G.*

MY LORD,

Bagdad, 28th May, 1857.

I have the honour to submit to your Lordship the annexed copy of a despatch (with accompaniments) which I have addressed to the Governor-General of India on the subject of rewards and decorations for the officers and men of the Persian Expeditionary Force.

I shall not encroach upon your Lordship's valuable time by any needless repetition of the grounds upon which I have ventured to solicit this public recognition of the merits of the army I had the honour to command, more especially as I feel fully convinced that Her Majesty's Government are prepared duly to appreciate the disciplined bravery and signal success of that army during the late short campaign.

I entertain the gratifying anticipation that the Government of India will be disposed to consider favourably the suggestions which I have made to them on this subject; and it will be a source of sincere congratulation to me, if your Lordship should so far support these super-added recommendations as to submit them for the approval and sanction of her most gracious Majesty.

No army could have behaved in the camp and field with more admirable fortitude, or with more distinguished gallantry; and I should be wanting in the gratitude I owe to them as their general, was I either to omit this testi-

mony to their devotion, or to fail in soliciting for them some token of their Sovereign's approbation.

I have called upon Brigadier General Jacob, C.B., for a supplementary list of meritorious services, and as soon as his reply reaches me, I shall do myself the honour of submitting it to your Lordship. At the head of that list I place the name of General Jacob himself, whom I shall recommend most strongly for some adequate recognition of his well-earned claim to a reward. It was at my special request that that officer assumed the command of Bushire on my departure for Mohumra, nobly foregoing an opportunity for distinguishing himself which no man would lightly relinquish. The assurance that a man of such renowned bravery and skill held the command of that important position, relieved me of a great responsibility, at the same time that it imposed on him, menaced as his small force was by an army so vastly superior in numbers, a task which demanded unwearied vigilance and consummate military skill. It was, I feel persuaded, the importance and possible danger of the post for which I had thus selected him, that induced General Jacob to forego so readily the more certain prospect of winning renown at Mohumra; and I rely with confidence on your Lordship's appreciation of such self-devotion, and on your influence in obtaining for it its due reward from Her Majesty's Government, on my being able to submit to your Lordship the supplementary list above alluded to.

I have yet to trespass on your Lordship in one more instance. Owing to his profession and position, as chaplain on the ecclesiastical establishment of Bombay, I have been precluded from bringing to notice in my accompanying official despatches the services rendered to me, and to the expedition generally, by the Rev. Mr. Badger, who, at my special request, was appointed

to accompany me as chaplain on the staff and Arabic interpreter. The latter designation very inadequately describes the important assistance which I have received from that gentleman, who, in conjunction with Captain Kemball, carried on so successfully all our written and most delicate communications with the Arab tribes. I have already in a former despatch taken occasion to acknowledge Mr. Badger's services; but now that the war is happily terminated, I must venture once more to notice them with the view of soliciting your Lordship's interest towards their recognition. I do this with less hesitation, because, from the peculiar position of chaplains on the Indian establishment, the Government of India has no means at its disposal for appropriately rewarding the distinguished services performed by them. Her Majesty's Government is, I believe, differently situated, and it has occurred to me that your Lordship might be pleased, in this instance, by obtaining for Mr. Badger the promise of the presentation of an adequate Crown living, after the term of his Indian service has expired (which will not be till the middle of 1860), to bestow upon that gentleman a reward most suitable to his sacred profession, and one for which his abilities, both as a scholar and a divine, so eminently fit him. If I am rightly informed, several chaplains received such preferment from the Government for services in the Crimea.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD,

Bagdad, 28th May, 1857.

In my despatch to your Lordship dated the day before yesterday, I made a grave omission which I am

most anxious to supply (as far as I am able to do so at present) without delay. The omission to which I allude is the name of Brigadier-General Jacob, and those of any other officers under his command at Bushire, whose services there, after my departure, he may deem worthy of recognition. I have already written to the General for a list of such officers, which shall be transmitted in due course; but I beg to apprise your Lordship of my intention, in so doing, of heading that list with the name of the General himself. Your Lordship is aware that, on my departure for Mohumra, I requested, as a favour, that General Jacob would assume the command at Bushire during my absence; for I would not authoritatively have directed an arrangement which separated him from his regiment of Scinde Horse. He at once expressed his readiness to serve wherever and however required, though by so doing he most disinterestedly and nobly resigned the prospect of earning additional distinction before Mohumra. One consideration doubtless served to reconcile General Jacob to the arrangement, viz., the importance of the post with which he was to be entrusted, and the possibility that the Persian army in his front—an army so numerically superior to his small force—would be rash enough to attack him. In such event I felt so perfectly confident of the result, with General Jacob in command, and with the conviction of the confidence which his renown and gallant bearing would inspire among our troops, that I left Bushire without the least anxiety arising from any such contemplated contingency. And that the Persians did not attack our entrenched camp was due, in all probability, to their knowledge that one of our most distinguished Indian generals kept that post with unwearied vigilance, and that their best efforts would fail before a com-

paratively weak force led by his consummate skill and undaunted bravery.

Such devotion on General Jacob's part to the interests of the service, coupled with such self-denial, demand from me the highest acknowledgment; and when, on the receipt of the list above referred to, I shall have an opportunity of making some specific request on General Jacob's behalf, I trust that I may fully rely on your Lordship's appreciation of his just merit to support my recommendation.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

P.S.—I beg to enclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter I have this day addressed to Lord Clarendon.

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR, *Bagdad, 28th May, 1857.*

The despatches which will reach you with this note, will acquaint you with the rewards I have solicited for our army in Persia, and when the Governor-General's application, consequent upon my request, shall reach the Home Government, I trust that I may confidently rely on your influential support.

Our army has indeed done well and nobly, and I do not anticipate that the authorities at home will appreciate their services less highly than I have done. It was not from any lack of martial spirit, or ardent gallantry, that they did not win additional victories, but because, as you are fully aware, the enemy were too wary to give them the opportunity; nevertheless, perhaps the highest laurel they have gained is the speedy restoration of peace, hastened, unquestionably, by the indomitable bravery displayed in a quick succession of triumphs.

That Her Gracious Majesty will be favourably disposed to reward such conduct on the part of the soldiers, should their just claim be submitted to her, I do not doubt; and equally certain I am that you, who have throughout manifested such an anxiety for the success and welfare of the Persian expeditionary force, will do all in your power to have their claims fully represented.

I must further depend upon your interest to support my application in favour of General Jacob, as soon as I am able to make any specific request in his behalf. Far from having exaggerated the importance of his services, in my despatch to Lord Clarendon, I feel how very imperfectly I have dwelt upon them; but my earnest hope is, that they will be adequately rewarded by Her Majesty's Government.

Before leaving England you were aware of my anxiety to secure the services of the Reverend Mr. Badger, on account of my former experience of his talents, both as an Arabic scholar, and his remarkable tact in dealing with Arab tribes. The result, throughout this expedition, has more than answered my expectation, and I must solicit your kindness to do all in your power to obtain for him the prospective reward which I have solicited on his behalf—a reward which I trust will be available to him at the expiration of his Indian career.

And now permit me, in conclusion, to acknowledge heartily your uniform kindness to myself throughout this campaign. Your frequent letters expressive of your concern in my welfare, and betokening your confidence in my proceedings, have been the source of the highest gratification and support to me, as the recollection of such sympathy will ever be cherished by me with the sincerest gratitude.

Believe me, &c.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Chairman of the Hon. East India Company.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES, *Bagdad, 28th May, 1857.*

The mail which carries this, will also convey to you copies of my despatch on the subject of rewards and decorations, which I have ventured to suggest in behalf of the officers and men of the Persian expeditionary force. You, I am sure, and the Court generally, will sympathize in my anxiety that their services should meet with adequate reward; for most gladly do I bear this testimony—that a better-equipped, better-disciplined, braver, and more enduring body of men never took the field. Proud was I, indeed, to be honoured with the command of so compact and gallant a force, and justly proud may the Court be to possess under its control, the soil, the material, and the system, which can, as it did in this instance, almost extemporize an expedition, which might, had the war continued, have subjugated a distant empire; and which, during a short campaign, has established the prestige of our Anglo-Indian army, and, by its rapid success, hastened the restoration of peace.

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the services of those for whom I have solicited rewards, since they are enumerated in detail in the accompanying despatches; but when I am enabled to do full justice to the claims of General Jacob, and to make a specific request on his behalf, I shall rely upon the Court to back up my recommendation. Jacob's name is too well known in the records of our Indian military annals to require any allusion from me to his past services; but those which he has rendered to this expedition, are such as to demand from me special notice, as I trust they will be deemed worthy of some distinguished recognition.

With regard to the Rev. Mr. Badger, I believe that

I have not misapprehended the powers of the Indian Government in what I have stated in my despatch to Lord Clarendon, with regard to his being suitably rewarded. Should it occur to me that the Honourable Court can, in any way, mark its sense also of the services which he has rendered to me throughout this expedition, I shall not fail to have recourse to them, trusting that you will, in this instance also, support my application on his behalf.

I should fear to have wearied you on this subject, were I not persuaded that you will be deeply interested in it; and this assurance it is that leads me to write to you with such perfect confidence. Much will, doubtless, depend upon the decision of the Court how far several of my recommendations are sanctioned; but with yourself in the chair to abet my appeal, I feel more than sanguine as to the result. With expression of my reliance—reliance originating in your own uniform kindness to myself—I must now conclude.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Chairman of the Hon. East India Company.

Bagdad, 1st June, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES,

Nothing has occurred since I wrote to you on the 28th ultimo, beyond making over to Mr. Murray the officers he asked for, and arranging for the disposal of the camels, and retention of the mules, of the Land Transport Corps—as the former would eat their heads off, but the latter can be maintained at little cost. The Shah's actual fulfilment of the "conditions" enables us finally to leave the country. I now only await the receipt of your next despatches to return to Bushire,

which, perhaps, may bring some fresh instructions consequent on your learning the fall of Mohumra, though I trust I have anticipated them by the despatch of all the European troops to India, and the reduction of the expeditionary force to one division.

Yours, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to the Government of
India, Foreign Department.*

SIR,

Bagdad, 1st June, 1857.

The demeanour of the Persian Government since the conclusion of peace at Paris, appears to me to afford a reasonable assurance that the Shah will, *bonâ fide*, fulfil the obligations imposed upon him by treaty. I have considered myself justified, therefore, in reducing, to a certain extent, the heavy expenditure to which Government would otherwise be subjected by the maintenance, for so protracted a period, of the baggage cattle at present collected in Turkish Arabia, and I have, accordingly, the honour to submit for the information of Government, a copy of the instructions I have caused to be issued on the subject to Major Curtis, the Director of the Land Transport Corps.

Experience having shown that camels may, at the shortest notice, and to any extent required, be obtained in the districts bordering on the Euphrates and Tigris, while, on the other hand, the mortality among animals of this description, if not properly tended, is almost proverbial; I have deemed it advisable that those purchased at Sukesleshinkle and Koweit, and of which the numbers have already been reduced by deaths from about 4,000 to little more than 3,000, should be at once disposed of; and, adverting to the risks and expense of

transit in this country, I have preferred, it will be seen, whatever the apparent sacrifice, to direct their being sold on the spot rather than send them to Damascus, Aleppo, or other distant markets, where, if Captain Kembball's information be correct, the sale of the camels destined for service in the Crimea, occasioned an actual loss to the British Government over and above their original cost.

In the case of the mules, of which the number may be approximately stated at 15,000, a different course has, for various reasons, suggested itself. Seven hundred have been transferred to Bushire for the use of the camp there, and there being no demand whatever for these animals in the Southern portion of Turkish Arabia, the remainder have been remanded to Bagdad, where a ready sale may always be found for them at a reduction, perhaps, of one-third the purchase price.

As, however, some time is required to procure baggage cattle of this class, owing to the supply being principally derived from the Perso-Kurdish Mountains, while their maintenance here, with a reduced establishment, will be comparatively trifling, it is not my intention to authorize their being disposed of until the execution of the treaty is finally announced.

An additional motive for adopting the arrangement above announced, is, that while mules may readily be transferred by water from Bagdad to Bushire, camels must necessarily be conducted by land, through Persian territory, to the same destination. In the event of hostilities being resumed, the mules now at Bagdad would be available to complete the baggage cattle required by the force at Bushire, the column to operate from Mohumra being supplied exclusively with camels from Turkish Arabia.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bagdad,

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE, *2nd June, 1857.*

I have the pleasure to enclose copies of three letters I have received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe since my arrival here—the last yesterday; which, perhaps, your Lordship will do me the favour to forward to the Governor-General, should you think proper. You will observe that Lord Clarendon's message, transmitted by Lord Stratford, was sent from London on the 9th May, on receipt of the telegraphic messages only, regarding Mohumra and Ahwaz. As my despatches were not forwarded from Constantinople until the 4th May, they could not reach London before the 12th idem.

And your Lordship will also observe, that at that time they had no knowledge of the Shah having ratified the treaty.

You see they give me discretionary power to send back troops to India *after that event*, but they do not think it advisable the forces in Persia should be reduced until the conditions of the treaty are actually fulfilled. I am satisfied, however, that when they learn my reasons for withdrawing the troops from Mohumra, and that more than the force now at Bushire (nearly 7,000 men of all arms) could neither be accommodated nor supplied there, the Home Authorities will approve of my sending the troops away which have returned to India. Should the war have to be resumed, there will be ample time to reinforce the army in Persia ere the season for active operations (October and November). And Mohumra, as well as Bushire, will be open to us for the base of such operations. But there is little chance of that contingency. The Shah is now thoroughly convinced of the inability of his best troops to oppose the

English, and is heartily sick of the war, and we shall soon learn, I expect, of the disgrace of the minister—the Sudr Azim—who drove him to it. We hear from Tehran that the Shah now knows the rights of the Kooshab affair, which he admits cost him 100,000 tomams (cost of military and commissariat stores we destroyed, I suppose). And the Mohumra business so terrified him, that he at once ratified the treaty, in spite of the underhand endeavours of Russia to prevent it (if really she did try to prevent it), and the Shah's only anxiety then was lest Mr. Murray should, in consequence of that success, refuse to exchange the ratification without a further reference to England.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General of India.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bagdad, 4th June, 1857.

With reference to my official report to Mr. Edmonstone, dated 1st instant, of my proposed arrangements respecting the baggage cattle, I have been induced, on further consideration, to defer ordering the sale of the camels, until I see Mr. Taylor at Margeil, on my return down the river, whom Captain Kemball has directed to ascertain whether or not those animals might all be collected, and taken good care of, in the Koweit district, whence, from the facility of sea communication with Bushire, they could be shipped to that port in buggalows, or marched by land to Mohumra, through Turkish territory, as required.

This arrangement may be preferable to selling off the camels at once, as that measure, if reported at Tehran, might encourage the Shah to defer the evacua-

tion of Herat, if Russian influence is really, as is reported, being exerted to induce the Shah to evade that condition.

I have little doubt myself, however, that the Shah will now be too anxious to get back his army from Herat, to keep down the spirit of insurrection threatening in some of his provinces, and too glad, moreover, of the excuse the treaty affords for withdrawing with honour from Affghanistan, ere expelled by the treacherous and fickle Affghans, while still retaining the credit of his conquest, to defer the evacuation longer than he can help.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bagdad, 5th June, 1857.

I received your letter, dated 1st May, about a week ago, but deferred answering it until I should obtain General Jacob's report, consequent on inquiries I had directed him to institute regarding the conduct of individuals in the affairs of Bushire and Khooshab, who might, by their gallantry, afford warrant for my recommending them for the Victoria Cross, and I am glad indeed to find that, in so doing, I had but anticipated your wishes.

I have now received a demi-official letter from General Jacob, addressed to the chief of my staff, transmitting a series of reports from officers of the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry, but in such form as I cannot make use of officially. I have, therefore, called for a report in proper official form, which, when received, I shall forward to the Commander-in-Chief of

the Bombay army, with my recommendation of the individuals I consider most deserving.

I might have framed my list at once upon these papers, informal though they are, but as General Jacob appears to have omitted to require similar information from the officer commanding the Poona Horse, who also greatly distinguished themselves on that occasion, a further reference was requisite, at any rate, and I cannot therefore furnish my official report until I return to Bushire. In the meantime, however, I beg to enclose for your information a copy of the documents above referred to.

Among them you will observe, also, a notice of the gallant conduct of an officer of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry, Captain Wood, which is the more deserving of notice, inasmuch as that officer, though sent back to Bombay by the surgeons as likely to be disabled for months, returned to Persia ere his wounds were well healed, and was again engaged with his regiment at Khooshab.

Lord Seymour had left for Bombay before I returned from Bushire, as, I think, I informed you.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To H. E. Viscount Stratford, G.C.B.

MY LORD,

Bagdad, 8th June, 1857.

The accompanying copies of notes I received yesterday from Bushire and Kurrachee, convey very startling information, which you may deem it right to telegraph to Lord Clarendon, to the following effect.

Mr. Frere, on the 18th and 20th May, despatched steamers from Kurrachee, with information from Lahore up to 15th idem.

The native troops of the Bengal army in insurrection from Delhi and upwards ; state of matters below Delhi not known at Lahore, communications being cut off with Calcutta and Bombay.

At Delhi, Europeans had been massacred (expression—"pretty general massacre of the European population"); magazine taken possession of by the insurgents ; Emperor of Delhi proclaimed their head.

At Meerut (the head-quarters of the artillery with 1,800 Europeans), reported that the mutineers had surprised the European officers and troopers at night, burning some to death, and destroying others ; European soldiery defending the barracks, but no details had been received.

Umballa had been saved by the arrival of the European troops from the hills.

At Umballa, Phillour, Umritsur, and Lahore, mutiny had been prevented by disarming the native troops and taking possession of the arsenals, forts, &c.

At Ferozepore, two native regiments had burned part of the camp, and taken possession of the bridge of boats ; but the 10th Native Cavalry stood by the Europeans, and defeated the mutineers.

Sir John Lawrence writes from Jhelum, on the 15th, that he was forming a moveable column of Europeans and "other staunch troops."

At Mooltan, two native regiments disaffected, but the fort, &c., safe in the hands of local regiments and police.

Shortly after Mr. Frere wrote, the undermentioned troops which I had despatched from Mohumra and Bushire, must have arrived at Kurrachee, viz :—

2nd Bombay European Regiment.	
One Troop Horse Artillery	} Europeans.
One Foot Battery horsed	

and, since then, General Jackson sent there

- One Troop Horse Artillery.
- One European Foot Battery.
- One native European Battery.

81 Her Majesty's 64th and 78th Regiments, a company of European artillery, a light battalion of native infantry, and a company of Madras Sappers, were despatched from Mohumra direct to Bombay, and must have arrived there from the 20th to 25th May.

There can be little doubt that the spirit of disaffection had spread throughout the Bengal army, and that the last mail from India must have conveyed disastrous intelligence from the North-West and Bengal Provinces below Delhi.

All the troops England can furnish will be required to restore our power in India; and I presume the troops destined for China will be required at Madras and Calcutta—Hong Kong, and other positions in China, being left to the protection of the navy for the present.

It will occur to your Lordship how advantageous it would be to send troops through Egypt, which the Sultan and Said Pacha, might permit, perhaps, if without arms. The regiments destined for the next Indian relief might thus be sent. I mention this in the hope you may suggest the measure.

I return to Bushire to-morrow.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bagdad, 8th June, 1857.

I yesterday received your kind letter of congratulation, dated 8th ult. The enclosure for Lord Seymour I shall forward by the first opportunity to Bombay.

Your anxiety for the preservation of the health of the troops will be removed, when you learn the arrangements I have made for the merely *naval* occupation of Mohumra, and for holding Bushire and Karrack by native troops only, with the exception of a few European artillery, for whom ample barrack accommodation has been prepared.

And you will be the more satisfied with the return of so large a portion of the Anglo-Persian army to India, when you receive the very startling intelligence thence, which I am distressed to have to communicate, in the accompanying copies of notes which I yesterday received from Kurrachee. It is possible you may have had the same intelligence from Bombay by the mail of the 23rd ult., but not likely, as the communication between Delhi and Bombay had been cut off, and it could hardly have reached from Kurrachee in time; but you must have been somewhat prepared for these sad events by the indications of extensive disaffection in the Bengal army which have been displayed for some time past.

I beg to forward the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as this (*viâ* Damascus) will probably reach you before his despatches, and may more fully explain the object of his telegraphic message. I ventured to suggest to his Lordship the advisability of sending troops through Egypt, in the hope that he will inform Ministers, at the same time, if that measure may be practicable.

I understand that some of the regiments at Malta are destined for the next India relief, and they might be despatched through Egypt with merely their accoutrements and without arms, so soon as steamers can be furnished from Bombay to convey them from Suez.

Our interests in China are very secondary to the

vital state in India, and I presume, therefore, the troops on their way to Hong Kong, round the Cape, will be diverted to India, by requisition from the Governor-General, which may await them at Point de Galle, or Singapore. Should the insurrection spread throughout the Bengal and Madras Presidencies, the first object will be to strengthen their capitals, whence, and from Bombay, we shall soon have the means, I trust, of detaching support to such of our troops as faithfully maintain their positions; and we shall ere long, I hope, recover lost ground. By maintaining a confident bearing, the timid and wavering will be deterred from committing themselves against us; and our deluded sepoys will become sensible of their folly, when they have time to reflect on the injurious consequences of casting off the comforts, protection, and ample provision they enjoyed under their old masters. *Then* the reaction will, I believe, be as sudden as the outbreak—all seeking to atone by tendering submission and pleading repentance. But it is dreadful to contemplate the atrocities that may be perpetrated ere then, and the years that must elapse ere India can recover from the effects of this convulsion, if the insurrection does become general.

My latest letter from Lord Elphinstone, dated 13th May, does not assign the threatening aspect of affairs in India as the cause for urging me to send back to India all troops and officers that can be spared; but his Government has officially requested me to do so (I enclose a copy), and his Lordship strongly advises me to return myself to Bombay till the autumn, on the ground that, if the war is then to be renewed, I should be more fit for work, &c. This personal consideration would have little weight with me, for it is my duty to expose myself as much as others do; but by my stay a much larger staff of officers has to be maintained in

Persia than there would be, were a divisional command (on the same footing as General Stalker was placed before I joined) alone to be retained at Bushire. And now that the expeditionary force is reduced to one division, and that my diplomatic functions have ceased, there does not appear any necessity that the State should be put to the expense of sustaining me and my large staff in Persia, so efficient an officer as General Jacob being now in command at Bushire. And I should, I think, have been warranted in complying with his Lordship's wishes, feeling as I do that, though not stated, they have been influenced in some measure by the critical state of affairs in India, which urgently demands the presence of every available officer. I should hardly have required, therefore, his Lordship's assurance that, should I act upon his suggestion, he was "ready to take the entire responsibility upon himself, and to bear me blameless."

If, therefore, I considered myself justified in proceeding to Bombay on Lord Elphinstone's requisition, before he became acquainted with the very serious occurrences communicated by Mr. Frere, I can have no doubt whatever *now* that I am bound to return to India as soon as practicable, to return here hereafter if requisite, or to be employed in India, as the Governor-General may direct.

In thus acting, I trust I shall meet your approbation, and that of her Majesty's Cabinet, and the Honourable Court of Directors. I return to Bushire to-morrow and expect to arrive there about the 15th inst., where I purpose remaining only so long as requisite to arrange matters with General Jacob, and then shall proceed to Bombay taking with me all the surplus staff.

You will learn from the copies of correspondence, sent *viâ* Constantinople, that the relations between General

Jacob and the Sirkesheechee Bashee are not of the most cordial character. I do not apprehend any ill results from this state of things, and certainly, if I may judge from the following extract from a letter I have received from Captain Jones, the Resident at Bushire, dated the 29th ultimo, the Sirkesheechee Bashee is hardly in a position to seek, or even to hazard, a collision with our troops. "All is quiet here, and we hear nothing of Persian army beyond that detachments are being sent from it to quell disturbances, which have arisen both to the East and West of Shiraz. The Sirkesheechee Bashee keeps himself quite aloof from us, and has maintained, to the present time, an obstinate silence to Jacob's last letter to him" (of 20th May.)

I have &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Chairman of the East India Company.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES, *Bagdad, 8th June, 1857.*

Should my telegraphic message, sent through Lord Stratford, be the first intimation of the insurrection in Upper India, it will come like a bomb-shell among you; but you must have apprehended evil from the unsatisfactory spirit evinced by the Bengal army for some time past, though little anticipating such very serious consequences as have resulted. I myself am more shocked than surprised; for I have long dreaded something of the sort, and you may recollect I told you of the warning I gave to Lord Canning when I was last in Calcutta, when I suggested that measures should be adopted for the better security of Allahabad. We know not yet what may have happened to the eastward of Delhi, but I shall not be at all surprised if that strong fortress, with all its valuable stores and war

munitions, has fallen into the hands of the insurgents. That would indeed be a climax to our misfortunes, more serious even than their seizure of Delhi; for while held by an enemy there can be no communication between Bengal and the Upper Provinces, and a very large army will be required to retake it; while its occupation by an enemy will raise Benares and the whole country against us, and encourage an invasion from the Nepaulese probably.

To add to the anxiety I feel on public grounds, I am tortured by fears for my wife and son. He is stationed at Allyghur, and she was with him when I last heard from her in the middle of May, but expected to leave for Landour in ten days. At that time all was tranquil in that quarter, but ere she could leave most probably the country may have risen, and God only knows what may have been her fate. It is dreadful to contemplate.

I enclose a letter for my mother, which I beg you will kindly forward. Of course to her I do not let it appear that there is any cause of anxiety—but should she become acquainted with their danger, she also may become a victim. At her age (nearly eighty) such anxieties could ill be borne.

Harassed as I am by my feelings, you will, I am sure, excuse a long letter. With much difficulty I have written one to Mr. Vernon Smith, from which you will learn my reasons for returning to India, which I trust you will approve.

I herewith enclose an extract from a letter from Lord Elphinstone, to which I allude in my letter to Mr. Vernon Smith.

You will I hope kindly make my excuses for not writing at present to Colonel Sykes, Willoughby, Eastwick, and Rawlinson.

My next will be from Bombay, unless there should be anything of importance to communicate from Bushire, where I do not expect to stay more than three or four days.

I trust you will order out all officers now on leave in England—never has there been an occasion in which the services of every individual was more urgently required.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Chairman of the East India Company.

Margnul, 11th June, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES,

It is my duty, on leaving the Euphrates, to bring to your notice, and most earnestly to recommend to your favourable consideration, the services of a very deserving and hard-working class of your naval officers, the masters, and second masters, of the vessels employed on this river, now increased to three in number, to maintain a bi-monthly communication between Bushire and Bagdad.

The first on the list, as well as regards length of service, importance of service, and high character, is Mr. Anthony Holland, acting master in charge of the *Comet*, a memorandum of whose services I enclose, together with certificates of the officers under whom he has served for many years past, namely, Captains Felix Jones and W. B. Selby, of the Indian Navy. Those officers have represented to me personally, and in the strongest terms, their high estimation of Mr. Holland both as an officer and a gentleman, as has also Captain Kembell, Resident at Bagdad; and I have little doubt

Sir Henry Rawlinson will speak as highly in his favour, if you refer to him. I myself have made two voyages in the *Comet*, and have remarked his constant attention to his duty (scarcely ever off the deck, night or day) and his kindly but firm demeanour towards his crew, and the Arab tribes, with whom these officers have much intercourse at the several wood-stations, in ascending and descending the river.

I have to acknowledge also the valuable assistance the force under my command obtained from these steamers, but especially from the *Comet*, during the late operations at Mohumra. I say especially the *Comet*, for, in addition to the duties they all performed in common—transporting troops, embarking and disembarking troops and stores, &c.—involving an amount of labour only to be estimated by naval men, exposure to the fire of the enemy, &c., the *Comet* had to keep up the communication with Bussorah and Bagdad, which necessitated her repeatedly passing the enemy's works at Mohumra, with the prospect on each occasion of the batteries being opened upon her (which happened, however, only once).

So impressed am I with the merits of Mr. Holland, and his claims to the consideration of the Court, that I felt it my duty to question him as to what favour he would wish me to solicit from you on his behalf—when I ascertained that his sole ambition is, poor fellow, to be brought on the permanent strength of the Indian navy as a master! This, after twenty-five years' hard and continuous service, you will, I am sure, consider a very humble and modest aspiration, and an ambition which I am satisfied it will afford you happiness to gratify; for I understand that the Court has now resolved to bring all deserving officers of this class on the fixed establishment. In placing Mr. Holland in

the permanent service, I hope, too, his standing would rate from the commencement of his employment in 1832. I am encouraged, moreover, to trespass still further on your generosity (not yours individually, but on the Court's generally) in behalf of Mr. Holland. On my asking if I might not seek to do something better for him, than merely asking for his confirmation as master; he said that he wished for nothing more for himself personally, but that he would indeed be grateful to the Court if they would generously assist two of his six children (two boys and four girls) by putting his eldest boy, now twelve years old, into the Indian navy (the boy's name is Joseph Holland, now at school at Grove House, Woodford, Essex), and his other boy, Alfred Bruce Wallace Holland, into the Blue Coat School (this child is four years old, and living with his father at Bagdad.) Could this be done, or, if not both, at least one of his boys be thus provided for, this good and faithful servant would be relieved from much anxiety. I am sure Rawlinson will heartily plead with me his behalf.

So far I speak for Mr. Holland personally. I next would beg to recommend the masters of the other three river steamers—*Planet*, *Assyria*, and *Napier*—which shared in the arduous duties I have indicated above, during our late operations, and especially the acting masters of the *Assyria* and *Planet*, who, together with Mr. Holland with the *Comet*, took the reconnoitring party up to Ahwaz. Their names are:—

E. H. S. Neale,	Acting Master of the	<i>Assyria</i> .
Thomas Fletcher,	Do.	do. <i>Planet</i> .
H. N. Maclaren,	Do.	do. <i>Napier</i> .

These officers would, I believe, consider themselves well rewarded by being placed on the permanent estab-

lishment as masters, and you will, I hope, think their services deserving of such a favour.

But I am bound to say that I consider also the acting second-masters of those vessels well worthy of being enrolled, in their relative grade, in your permanent service; for they, too, had nearly as hard duty to perform, and performed their duties equally zealously and cheerfully. Their names are :—

Henry Salmon,	1st Class,	2nd Master,	<i>Comet.</i>
William Fivey,	Do.	do.	<i>Assyria.</i>
Thomas Keen,	Do.	do.	<i>Planet.</i>
— Carey,	Do.	do.	<i>Napier.</i>

Mr. Salmon is especially deserving of reward, for having undertaken a very fatiguing and dangerous duty with the utmost alacrity, on the emergency when I was obliged to call on Captain Selby to despatch a boat from the rendezvous below Mohumra to Bussorah, on the night before the attack, on which occasion Mr. Salmon, with four native sailors, in the *Comet's* gig, ran the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and returned before daybreak next morning.

I have requested Captain Kemball, to whom I send this open, to submit to you his own opinion of Mr. Holland on forwarding my letter.

I remain, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

I returned here this morning, having left Bagdad on the evening of the 9th instant. About half-way down the river I met the *Planet*, carrying up the mail which the *Pioneer* brought to Bushire, and with

it your Lordship's letters of the 17th and 18th May. I had previously, while at Bagdad, received those of the 12th and 13th idem. In the latter, you most kindly urge my returning to Bombay. Whatever hesitation I might have had about adopting the course suggested by your Lordship, I could have none of its propriety, after I became aware of the sad events in Upper India by letters, which I, at the same time, received from Kurrachee, from Mr. Frere, communicating the occurrences at Delhi, &c., which too plainly show that every available servant of the State is urgently required in India.

I accordingly determined on proceeding to Bombay as soon as practicable, and lost no time in returning here (where I arrived this morning) after communicating my resolution to the Home authorities, as your Lordship will observe in the accompanying copy of a letter I addressed to Mr. Vernon Smith, dated 8th instant; and, at the same time, I communicated the Indian news to Lord Stratford, to be telegraphed to London; and, as I also offered certain suggestions, I herewith submit a copy of that letter likewise.

Your Lordship's letter of the 18th May would, I think, warrant my sending to Bombay the *Feroze* and Captain Rennie; but he is so strongly of opinion that this large fleet of transports should not be left without a war vessel, and that he ought not himself to go until relieved (though most anxious to return to India), that I must await further instructions, which the mail, now over due, will probably bring, and conveyed, I hope, by the steam frigate and officer intended to relieve Captain Rennie and the *Feroze*; in which case General Lugard, some others of the staff, and myself, will return in the *Feroze*—otherwise in the *Precursor*, which I regret to find has been detained here some days, under

the impression, how originated I know not, that she would be required to take away the head-quarter staff. I should have sent the *Precursor* back at once, as the more expensive vessel, had I not received orders from Bombay to send back the *Pioneer*, as urgently required for the communication with Kurrachee.

But as it is probable I may be in Bombay nearly as soon as your Lordship receives this by the *Pioneer*, I will now say " Good-bye."

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B., K.H.,
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.*

SIR,

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the accompanying lists of officers and men recommended for the decoration of the Victoria Cross, for acts of daring, collective and individual, at Bushire and Khooshab.

I have made the fullest inquiries, and have satisfied myself of the correctness of all that I have recorded.

I beg to annex reports from Captain Forbes, commanding the 3rd Cavalry, and from Captains Moore and Oldfield, of the same regiment ; also one from Brevet Major Baynes, who commanded the 20th Regiment Native Infantry at the time the report was called for.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General,*
Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

List of Officers and Men recommended for the distinction of the Victoria Cross, for their conduct in the assault of Fort Bushire on the 9th Dec., 1856.

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

Captain Wood, commanding Grenadier Company, 20th Regiment Native Infantry.—On the 9th December, 1856, Captain Wood led the Grenadier Company which formed the head of the assaulting column sent against Bushire. Captain Wood was the first man on the parapet of the fort, where he was instantly attacked by a large number of the garrison, who suddenly sprang on him from a trench cut in the parapet itself.

These men fired a volley at Captain Wood and the head of the storming party, when only a yard or two distant from that officer; but, altogether, Captain Wood was struck by no less than seven musket-balls. He at once threw himself upon the enemy, passed his sword through the body of their leader, and being closely followed by the men of his company, speedily overcame all opposition, and established himself in the place. Captain Wood's decision, energy, and determined valour, undoubtedly contributed in a high degree to the success of the attack. Captain Wood's wounds compelled him to leave the force for a time; but, with the true spirit of a good soldier, he rejoined his regiment, and returned to his duty at Bushire, before these wounds were proper healed.

Soobadar Major Mahomed Shereef, 20th Regiment Native Infantry.—This native officer was with the leading section of the Grenadier Company of the 20th Regiment in the assault of Fort Bushire, above mentioned. He was shot through the leg; but, emulating the example of his captain, still continued to lead his men to the attack, and refused to leave his division

until the action was over, and all resistance had ceased—thus setting an excellent example to the sepoys, and greatly contributing to the success of the attack on that fort.

Private Bheer Bhut, of the 20th Regiment, Native Infantry.—Severely wounded in the assault of Fort Bushire; but, though his right arm was shattered to pieces by a musket shot, he continued fighting in the ranks of the storming party, his comrades supplying him with cartridges, which he was unable to take from his pouch himself, having lost the use of his arm.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

List of Officers and Men recommended for the decoration of the Victoria Cross for their conduct in the battle of Khooshab on the 8th February, 1857.

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

Captain Forbes, commanding 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.—At the battle of Khooshab, Captain Forbes, seeing a column of the enemy's infantry advancing toward him, immediately proceeded to attack. Captain Forbes had with him at the time, one hundred and twenty men of his regiment in all—that is, a number about equal to one weak squadron. Observing his advance, the enemy's column halted, and formed square in the most regular manner. The column consisted of one strong regiment. One side of the square was just equal to the front of Captain Forbes's attacking squadron. The square was formed with perfect regularity, with bayonets fixed, and the front ranks kneeling. Its fire was given closely, rapidly, and steadily. The enemy's infantry seemed fully confident in the strength of their army, and there appeared to be no wavering in their ranks.

Captain Forbes led the squadron, at the utmost speed of their horses, straight down on the square, and without the least check or hesitation, every horseman went through the kneeling and standing ranks. In one instant the square was broken to pieces. Great numbers of the men who had composed it were left dead on the spot, and the remainder dispersed in flight. In closing with the infantry square, Captain Forbes was severely wounded by a musket-shot through the thigh, but, notwithstanding his wound, after executing this destructive charge on the square, Captain Forbes, with Captains Moore and Wren, and such men as they had been able to keep together, after riding through the infantry, instantly fell on the Persian artillery, about two hundred yards in rear of the broken square. Captain Forbes himself killed two of the artillerymen, and Captain Moore three of the drivers of the gun (a brass nine-pounder), which they thus took, and for a considerable time kept possession of under a heavy fire of musketry from the Persian infantry, who were all around them.

In the encounter, Captain Moore's horse was killed, and this accident alone prevented him from at once carrying off the gun they had taken, which was ultimately left on the ground.

After the fight at the gun, Captain Forbes was compelled by loss of blood to leave the field.

2. Captains Moore and Wren, Lieutenants-Adjutant, Moore, Spens, and Malcolmson, and Cornets Combe and Hill.—These officers were present with the squadron with which Captain Forbes destroyed the infantry square. They were all, of course, in front, and were all among the first to break into the bayonets; in effecting which, Captain Moore's horse was shot in three places, one musket ball, fired by a man of the kneeling ranks, enter-

ing the front of the horse's neck and coming out of his withers, without apparently interfering with or delaying the animal's progress in the least.

In closing with the square, Captain Wren's horse received three musket balls. The horse of Cornet Combe was severely wounded in three places, two balls and a sword cut, and that of Lieutenant Spens by a bayonet.

Lieutenant Moore, the adjutant of the regiment, was the first of all by a horse's length. His horse leaped into the square, and instantly fell dead, crushing down his rider, and breaking his sword, as he fell amid the broken ranks of the enemy. Lieutenant Moore speedily extricated himself, and attempted with his broken sword to force his way through the press, but he would, assuredly, have lost his life had not the gallant young Lieutenant Malcolmson, observing his peril, fought his way to his dismounted comrade through a crowd of enemies to his rescue, and, giving him his stirrup, safely carried him through everything out of the throng.

The thoughtfulness for others, cool determination, devoted courage, and ready activity, shown in extreme danger by this young officer—Lieutenant Malcolmson—appear to be most admirable, and to be worthy of the highest honour.

3. Captain Graves, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.—This officer succeeded to the command of the regiment on Captain Forbes becoming disabled by his wound. He did most gallant service throughout the day, repeatedly charging the enemy, with invariable success, wherever and whenever he could get at them, and having been personally engaged in a severe struggle for one of the enemy's guns, which he finally captured after hard fighting. At the commencement of the action, Captain Graves was sent to the front, to examine the

enemy's line of battle, and he performed this dangerous and difficult duty in a manner deserving of great praise. Commencing at the left of the Persian line, Captain Graves, accompanied by four troopers, rode along the whole front of the enemy's army, at about two hundred yards distance, under a continual fire, and having succeeded in observing everything returned unhurt, and reported the result of his observations.

4. Captain Oldfield, Lieutenant Legeyt, and Riding-master Brookes.—These officers behaved most gallantly throughout the day. Captain Oldfield's squadron took one of the guns which was captured, and remained in the possession of the British, at Khōoshab. The enemy fought hard for the possession of this gun, and all those around it were killed before the piece could be finally secured.

5. Havildar Runjeet Sing, 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry.—This man has now been promoted to the commissioned rank of jemadar.

In the charge of the square he was shot through the centre of the breast, the ball entering in front, and lodging under his shoulder-blade. The wound did not check his progress in the least, and he entered the square close to Lieutenant Moore. After riding through the square, he was close to Captain Forbes in the attack on the enemy's guns, and there received a second wound, which immediately took from him the power of using his sword. He, however, continued to retain his hold of his sword, and went on until the men re-formed for another charge. After the fight at the guns, when coming up to his commanding officer, the havildar saluted him, told him that he was shot through the chest, and that he knew that his wounds were mortal, but that he did not mind losing his life in the least, if his officers thought he had done his duty bravely.

Havildar (now jemadar) Runjeet Sing has not yet recovered of his wounds, but is doing well.

6. Trooper Lall Khan.—This man, Lall Khan, was with Captain Moore in the attack on the enemy's artillery after the destruction of the square. He dismounted under a heavy fire, and, at Captain Moore's orders, mounted the leading horse of the Persian gun, which Captain Moore was endeavouring to carry off from the midst of the enemy, as described above, and had not Captain Moore's horse just then fallen dead, the attempt would have proved successful.

In considering the degree of merit due to Captain Forbes and his regiment on that day, it should be borne in mind that the particular regiment which was attacked and destroyed on that occasion was some 800 strong, and was one of the very best of the Persian regular army, that the soldiers composing it were fine, tall, strong, athletic men, from Northern Persia; that they were perfectly well accoutred, armed, and drilled, according to the best European model; that they were formed in square in the most approved, regular manner—four deep, with two ranks kneeling; that they stood perfectly firm and steady until the cavalry sprang into their ranks, and on them; that they gave their fire with rapidity and precision up to the last moment; that this fire was such that, out of the eight European officers who were engaged in the charge three were wounded; and of their horses, five were either killed or wounded as they closed at speed with the enemy, one horse dropping dead as he sprang into the square, and two others receiving three musket balls each; while Captain Forbes, the leader of the whole, was himself shot through the thigh; and, lastly, that the number of British cavalry engaged in this particular charge was,

when Captain Forbes commenced his attack, 120 men; and that, as many men and horses were shot during the advance, not more than about 100 could actually have fallen on the enemy, who had thus the odds of eight to one in his favour.

After the fullest inquiry, I am myself quite satisfied that the undermentioned officers and men of the 3rd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry are well deserving of the high distinction of the Victoria Cross for their conduct at Khooshab, on the 8th February, 1857, for which I beg earnestly to recommend them.

The order of merit in my opinion is as I have placed their names:—Captain Forbes, Lieutenant and Adjutant Moore, Captain Moore, Lieutenant Malcolmson, Captain Wren, Lieutenant Spens, Cornet Combe, Cornet Hill, Jemadar Runjeet Sing, Trooper Lall Khan.

I have further to observe, that though not actually engaged in the charge on the enemy's square, the conduct of the following officers appears to be worthy of the highest distinction, and I would strongly recommend them, more especially Captain Graves, whose conduct throughout the action was very conspicuous for coolness and gallantry, and who succeeded to the command of the regiment when Captain Forbes was obliged to retire:—Captain Graves, Captain Oldfield, Lieutenant Legeyt, Cornet Currie, Riding-master Brookes.

It is found quite impossible to specify other individual instances of distinguished bravery among the lower ranks of the regiment, where all appear to have done their duty heroically; but, in addition to the list of names given above, I would respectfully recommend that two crosses be given to each troop of the regiment, according to the provisions of the thirteenth article

of the rules regarding the decoration of the Victoria Cross; and, further, that an extra standard be granted the regiment, commemorative of its gallantry on the 8th February, 1857.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General,*
Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

To Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B. and K.H.,
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

SIR,

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the accompanying roll of an officer recommended for the decoration of the Victoria Cross for an act of gallantry at Mohumra.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM,
Commanding Expeditionary Force.

(Enclosure to the above.)

List of Officers recommended for the decoration of the
Victoria Cross for Mohumra.

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

Captain Worgan, Artillery, commanded a mortar battery, formed on a raft, which was moored, during the night of the 25th March, at a low island in the river Shat-ool-Arab, immediately opposite and under the fire of the Persian batteries at Mohumra.

Captain Worgan opened fire from his mortars at dawn on the morning of the 26th, and engaged the enemy's batteries for some two hours before he was supported by the men of war, evincing much coolness and great gallantry.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General,*
Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

*To Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset, K.C.B. and K.H.,
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.*

SIR,

Bushire, 13th June, 1857.

I have the honour to bring to the notice of your Excellency the following native officers and men of the Poona Horse, whose conduct at the battle of Kooshab, on the 8th February, was distinguished for great gallantry and steadiness.

In my despatch detailing the operations of that day, I reported to your Excellency the gallant conduct and distinguished service of this fine regiment under their commander, Colonel Tapp.

I have since been furnished with the names of the following men, who I beg most earnestly to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Government, trusting that the "Order of Merit," or some suitable reward, may be conferred upon them for their distinguished conduct, and that the regiment may be permitted to carry the captured standard in commemoration of their gallantry?

1. Khunday Rao Pole (the senior native officer) commanded the supporting troops in a most efficient manner, and his steadiness throughout the day was deserving of the highest praise.

2. Russeldar Ahmed Ali Khan, commanded the leading troop with much gallantry and success.

3. Bargeer Golam Hussnen Khan, killed the standard bearer, and captured the standard of the Kashkai Regiment.

4. Bargeer Shumshoo Deen spiked the gun with a horse-shoe nail, driving it in with the butt of his carbine, and performed most efficient service.

5. Sillidar Mahomed Ali, when his horse was killed in the midst of the enemy, transferred the equipments

to the back of a captured mule, on which he took his place in the ranks, and performed his duties during the remainder of the action.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Mr. Frere, Commissioner in Scinde.

MY DEAR FRERE,

Bushire, 14th June, 1857.

I received your announcement of the disaffection at Lahore, Delhi, &c., just before leaving Bagdad, and I immediately despatched an express to Lord Stratford to telegraph the sad news to London, where his message would arrive in twenty-one or twenty-two days after the date of my letter, copy of which I enclose, as also copy of a letter I addressed to Mr. Vernon Smith assigning my reasons for immediately returning to India.

The command here could not be in better hands than Jacob's, who cheerfully undertakes the duty, or will be ready to return to Scinde, should he be urgently required there; but his position here is very important, as it is by no means impossible Persia may (instigated by Russia) seek to evade fulfilling the conditions of the treaty when she hears of our difficulties in India.

I am glad he despatched the Artillery in addition to the troops I had previously sent back to Scinde. Every soldier and every officer who can be spared hence is required in India, and I have urged the "chairs" to order out every officer in England not on sick leave.

Should Jacob's presence be absolutely indispensable on the Scinde Frontier, I shall learn this when I reach Bombay, and would then arrange with the Bombay Government for his relief.

It is a very fortunate circumstance that you have returned to Scinde at this crisis.

I expect to leave this in three or four days, and may perhaps call off the Kurrachee harbour for any despatches you may wish to send off to us, but it would cause too much delay to land, I cannot therefore have the pleasure of seeing you for the present.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the President of the Board of Control.

MY DEAR SIR,

Bushire, 16th June, 1857.

I last addressed you from Bagdad on the 8th. Next day I left Bagdad, and I arrived here on the 13th, idem, since when a mail has arrived from Bombay, bringing me a letter from Lord Elphinstone, dated 3rd inst., in which he communicates the following telegraphic message from Lord Canning, *i. e.*, "Write to Sir James Outram, that I wish him to return to India immediately, and the same to General Jacob—we want all our best men here."

Having made every requisite arrangement to transfer my command, &c., to General Jacob, I purpose leaving in a steamer to-morrow for Bombay, with General Lugard, and some other officers of the staff, and shall call at Kurrachee to consult with Mr. Frere, as to whether the presence of General Jacob is urgently required in Scinde; for it would, I think, be very impolitic to remove him from Bushire at present. While he remains, the most perfect confidence is entertained by the troops, which might not be the case were the command to devolve on the next senior officer, and as it is possible that the urgency for *all* the Bombay troops may become so pressing in India, as to compel the Government to order the evacuation of Bushire, even before the conditions of the treaty have been actually

fulfilled; and, as it is possible, moreover, that our difficulties in India, may encourage the Shah even to break the treaty, the evacuation, under such circumstances will be rather a complicated operation, requiring the supervision of an able commander. Unless, therefore, I ascertain at Kurrachee that General Jacob is very urgently required in Scinde, I purpose recommending to the Governor-General that he should remain here. General Jacob, with his usual devotion to his duty, though personally most desirous to return to India, has cheerfully consented to stay, so long as his services may be deemed requisite here.

This garrison numbers about 5,800 men, including all ranks, of whom only about ten per cent. are sick, and those generally of very trifling complaints. Hitherto the climate has been far more agreeable than that of India at this season, and there is every prospect of the troops keeping their health quite as well as in India. All are now hutted, and very comfortable, happy, and contented, and though what is passing in India is well known to the sepoy here, the latter certainly do not sympathize with their Bengal brethren, and would not hesitate, I am sure, to operate against them if required to do so.

Our latest accounts from India, are—Bombay 4th, and Kurrachee 6th June. At that time the spirit of insurrection was far from abating; the delay in the advance of our troops against the insurgents at Delhi, appears to have given them heart, and nothing short of a very signal defeat there, with the re-occupation of that city, is likely to check the revolt. Mr. Colvin appears to have perfect faith in the levies furnished by Scindia, the Bhurtpore Rajah, &c., but I confess I somewhat mistrust their sincerity, and should we meet with any check doubtless they too would turn against us.

I had anticipated the desire of the Government of India, by sending back all the European troops, excepting a portion of artillery. And a troop of horse artillery, and two more batteries, have been sent back by General Jacob since we learnt the sad events in India, only two batteries now remaining here.

The Poonah Horse will follow immediately.

Further than this I would not advise the reduction of the force; for when our Indian difficulties become known at Tehran, it is by no means unlikely that excuses for a rupture may be sought, and a collision be forced upon us. Rather than retain a weaker garrison here, I would advise the withdrawal of the entire force, and holding Karrack alone with one regiment of native infantry, and one foot battery, and a sloop of war, or steam frigate, or, even the wing of a regiment, with half a battery, might suffice, with the aid of a war vessel.

Under the circumstances, the best arrangement now would be, I think, to establish the Resident in the Persian Gulf permanently at Karrack, where he would be perfectly protected. This need not involve the necessity of our taking possession of Karrack as British territory.

This force could then be removed bodily to Kurrahee, ready for service anywhere. And, should Herat not be evacuated, that question could then be settled by moving a force up the Bolan Pass; which movement would effectually erase from the minds of Persia and Russia the impression of our weakness in India, which the late internal disorders may have created.

An officer of high rank, wearing a Russian order, waited upon me this morning from the Persian commander-in-chief, with a complimentary letter, &c., which has enabled me to part with him in a very amicable manner. And having personally introduced the officer

to General Jacob, he has received such assurances from the General, as will ensure cordial intercourse between the commanders in future, unless it may become the policy of the Persians to seek pretexts for quarrel.

This, my dear sir, is the last letter I shall address to you from Persian soil, consequently the official intercourse with which you have honoured me, is, I fear, at an end for the present, and it only remains for me to thank you, as indeed I most sincerely and gratefully do, for the great kindness and courtesy I have ever experienced from you.

I am, &c.

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Chairman of the Hon. E. I. Company.

Bushire, 16th June, 1857.

MY DEAR MR. MANGLES,

I returned here three days ago, and leave tomorrow by steamer for Bombay, calling at Kurrachee on the way, to ascertain from Mr. Frere whether he considers General Jacob *urgently* required in Scinde just now; for, unless he is so, he ought not to leave this army. In my letter to the President I have stated why I think so.

Lord Elphinstone, in a letter dated 4th instant, quotes a telegraphic message from the Governor-General, requiring the immediate return to India of both Jacob and myself.

Before this reaches you, you will have received much later information from India than I communicated from Bagdad in my letter, dated 8th instant, and even later than what I now have from Bombay (3rd June) and Kurrachee (6th June). I shall say no more, therefore,

than that I apprehend a further spread of disaffection throughout the Bengal Presidency, should the re-occupation of Delhi, and defeat of the insurgents, have been much longer delayed. As for the *apparently* cordial aid so promptly proffered by such native states as Gwalior, Bhurtpore, &c., I confess I regard it with much distrust: *their* troops flocking to the scene of strife will but swell the ranks of the insurgents should the British troops not prove immediately successful. But if we are at once successful, *then*, doubtless, they may make a show of zeal in our behalf, and be of some use in following up the runaways.

I am still anxious about Allahabad, which you may recollect I told you, in England, I had informed Lord Canning I thought was insufficiently garrisoned, but I see Europeans were being sent up there in driblets; and, if time allowed, it might have been saved.

My wife and son had a narrow escape from Allyghur. Her letters, dated only two days before her flight, described everything there as most favourable to all appearance; but the sepoys at last broke out in mutiny, and all Europeans were obliged to fly. Our boy Frank placed his mother behind him on a pony, and carried her safely till they overtook a carriage on the Agra Road, and they made good their way to Agra; but all their kit (including her jewels and some of my medals, &c.) was sacrificed, except the clothes on their backs. Her latest letter was dated 26th May, by which time she had recovered from her fatigues, but was in much anxiety about Frank, who forms one of a band of volunteers who scour the country to rescue isolated Europeans. If Allahabad is saved, and Delhi recovered, Agra may be maintained in quiet; but there is much cause for anxiety, and I shall be on tenter-hooks till I reach Kurrachee to obtain further information.

My communications to Lord Clarendon will show you that our relations with the commanders of both the Persian armies, lately opposed to us, are most friendly. But there is no saying what effect our difficulties in India may have on the Court of Tehran. Should the Shah break the treaty, India cannot at present furnish the means for prosecuting the war. Even the troops still here may be wanted back. In that case we must be content to hold Karrack only for the present. And, indeed, under any circumstances, I think our Resident would be better situated there than at Bushire, as thereby debarred from meddling interference with Persian subjects at Bushire.

As probably my next from Bombay may reach you before this, I will say no more at present.

With kind remembrances, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

P.S. I enclose a memorandum, showing the satisfactory state of the troops here.

I take the liberty to enclose a letter for my mother. I dread the effect these Indian anxieties may have. She is eighty years old!

(Copy of the Memorandum.)

EUROPEANS.

Officers.....	91	Men.....	205
Sick	1	„	18

NATIVES.

Strength	5,818
Sick.....	492

To the Right Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, K.G., &c.

MY LORD,

Bushire, 17th June, 1857.

I have the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information, copies of correspondence as per margin,* with the Government of Bombay, showing the extent to which I have been enabled to comply with their urgent requisition for troops.

The force now remaining in Persia, in occupation of Bushire and Karrack, will amount to 5,431 fighting men of all arms† (exclusive of officers), of whom only 202 are Europeans (artillery).

Two sloops of war maintain Mohumra, and a steam frigate protects the shipping in this harbour.

At present the troops are tolerably healthy, the number now in hospital being 534, or about ten per cent., chiefly slight cases; but the extreme heat has not yet commenced, when a much heavier sick list must, of course, be expected. I am decidedly of opinion, therefore, that it would be unsafe further to reduce this force; seeing the possibility of the Persians being tempted by our difficulties in India to break the treaty and renew hostilities. As yet their demeanour is quite friendly; but they have not yet learnt the extent of our embarrassments in India.

And indeed I should not have ventured to reduce this army so far, and must have retained with it a European regiment, had I not relied on the command continuing in the hands of Brigadier-General Jacob,

1. From Colonel Melville, Military Secretary, dated 2nd June, with enclosure. 2. To ditto ditto, 16th June.

[illegible]

12 Field Battery Guns.

Total	5,431
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whose indomitable energy, and well-established character, inspire a confidence in the troops which no other officer of the Indian army could maintain.

The Governor-General has summoned me back to India, and accordingly I depart this day, having made over the command of the Persian Expeditionary Force, with the political duties which devolved on me, to General Jacob.

The Governor-General desired also the return of General Jacob to India. But I shall point out to his Lordship how impolitic it would be to remove him from this command at present, and that, should such be the exigencies of India as absolutely to require his return there, I would earnestly advise that he should withdraw the entire force from Bushire and proceed with it to Kurrachee, leaving merely such garrison as he may think adequate for holding Karrack, which is, in my opinion, a preferable position to Bushire, whether considered politically or on military grounds, as commanding this port and the mouths of the Euphrates, and capable of being maintained, even in its present state, by a very small garrison against all the power of Persia, and of easily being rendered impregnable to more formidable naval powers.

It appears to me that Karrack would also be a preferable position for the Resident in the Persian Gulf, as placing that functionary beyond the necessity of exercising the vexatious interference with Persian subjects which cannot be avoided while he is located in this town.

The occupation of the island will not involve the necessity of our taking possession of it as British territory, should the Shah really fulfil the conditions of the treaty. And it is now the most valuable acquisition we could retain if he does not do so.

As the state of India precludes the possibility, I presume, of resuming the war in Persia at present, should the Court of Tehran now seek a rupture, I would beg to suggest for your Lordship's consideration, whether it would not be best, under any circumstances, to abandon Bushire, and garrison Karrack as early as General Jacob could effect the measure.

Should this be decided upon, your Lordship's orders, sent *viâ* Bagdad, would reach General Jacob in about a month; and as he is nearly sufficiently—if not quite so—provided with transports, with such steamers as can be supplied from Bombay, he would not be very long in effecting the evacuation.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lord Elphinstone.

Bushire, 17th June, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD ELPHINSTONE,

As the *Precursor* goes direct to Bombay, it may arrive three or four days before the *Chusan*, in which I go to Kurrachee; I therefore beg to enclose the accompanying letters for your Lordship's perusal, and in the hope they may be in time for the mail.

In those letters I express myself so fully, I need trouble your Lordship no further at present; but I beg to explain, with reference to the military and political secretaries I have appointed on General Jacob's staff, that I consider he requires such aid in his present arduous and difficult position as commanding the forces in Persia, though he would not be entitled to it if commanding a division in India. I earnestly hope, therefore, your Lordship will kindly support their nomination.

I have transferred Captain M. Green as Military Secretary to General Jacob, who greatly needs his services. I had placed Captain Green at the disposal of Mr. Murray for the Herat Mission, and he was anxious to proceed on that duty, but cheerfully relinquished it at my desire, when the startling news from India displayed the necessity for every available officer being with the army there.

I have authorized General Jacob to appoint also a political secretary, and I really think the services of both officers are absolutely necessary to a general commanding an army in a foreign country, considering the very onerous duties and important interests attending this particular command.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To His Excellency Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset,
K.C.B. and K.H., Commander-in-Chief.*

SIR,

Bushire, 17th June, 1857.

In the list marked A, appended to the letter I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 27th May last, I find that the names of two very meritorious officers were inadvertently omitted, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Le Grand Jacob, who commanded the Light Battalion at Mohumra, and Captain Macleod, 20th Regiment N.I., who succeeded to the command of that regiment at Bushire when Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd assumed the command of the brigade on the death of Brigadier Stopford.

May I beg the favour of your Excellency submitting the names of these officers to Government, and further, that you will be so good as to have the word "Bushire"

erased from opposite Major Baynes's name, that officer having arrived in Persia after the fall of Reshire, and having only commanded the 20th Regiment at Kooshab.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bombay, 5th July, 1857.

I beg to thank your Lordship for the very gratifying order, issued on the 16th ultimo by your Lordship's command, on announcing the termination of the war with Persia.

The gratification I experience at the flattering notice of my own services, renders me the more sensible of the mortification which must be felt by those whose names have inadvertently been omitted, who I know were equally entitled with myself to honourable mention. And in justice to those officers I am bound to bring the omissions to your Lordship's notice, in the hope that you may be graciously pleased to cause the mistake to be rectified by a supplemental order, thus :—

The medical branch of the army is entirely unnoticed, whose conduct was most exemplary and services most praiseworthy. The heads of the department were Doctors Stovell and Mackenzie, the superintending surgeons of the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

Major Hill, Commanding Engineer, whose services were most important, as recorded by General Stalker at the capture of Bushire, and by me at the expedition of Borazjoon and affair of Khooshab, and who had the severe duty of planning and superintending the erection of the defensive works of the entrenched camp at Bushire,

and of the barracks and hospitals, which obliged me to deny his earnest solicitation to be employed on the expedition to Mohumra, is disposed of by his name being inserted in the margin among those of the general staff; but he well merits, I conceive, a separate paragraph.

Major Boileau, of the Madras Engineers, Commanding Engineer at Mohumra, and the Madras Sappers under his command, are unnoticed. His and their services were most conspicuous, in the zeal and activity they displayed in filling ditches, preparing bridges, &c., to facilitate the landing and advance of the troops at Mohumra, and subsequent incessant labours they were exposed to during our occupation of Mohumra; and I consider that they deserve special notice and warm commendation for the alacrity with which they volunteered for foreign service, though they had only very lately rejoined their families, after a separation of nearly five years of successive absences on field service. Although sent back to India, this devoted body of soldiers, instead of being allowed to rejoin their families in the Madras Presidency, has, I understand, been attached to the column under General Woodburn intended for the relief of Mhow, with which they are now employed; having displayed, I am told, the utmost cheerfulness and alacrity when ordered on that duty.

Brigadier Hutt, C.B., who commanded the artillery of the 2nd Division at Mohumra, is not only omitted, but his actual command at Mohumra is assigned to Brigadier Trevelyan (as "having taken part in every operation except that against Ahwaz"), who remained at Bushire, and never was at Mohumra at all.

Brigadiers Wilson and Stuart are also represented as present at Mohumra, who were not there.

Major Baynes, who commanded the 20th Native Infantry at Khooshab (Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd

having remained at Bushire in command of the camp), is not named, though his junior, Captain Macleod, is mentioned.

The Light Battalion, and its very able and zealous commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Grand Jacob, are unnoticed, though every other native regiment and their commanders are specially named.

Captain Graves,* who commanded the 3rd Cavalry, in action at Khooshab, after Captain Forbes was disabled, is not mentioned.

Captain Worgan, also, who commanded the mortar battery at Mohumra—a post of such danger that it was regarded as almost a kind of “forlorn hope,” and whose efficient service was prominently reported, is not mentioned.

These omissions are such obvious mistakes that I feel assured your Lordship will be pleased with me for pointing them out, and be happy to cause their rectification.

As there is* no allusion to General Jacob, who was entrusted with the most important duty of the whole campaign—that of maintaining the entrenched camp at Bushire after the departure of the Mohumra force—the omission must, I presume, have been intentional, with the view of specially thanking him in a separate despatch on the completion of his service in Persia; for your Lordship cannot have overlooked the noble self-denial, and devotion to duty, of that distinguished officer, in so cheerfully undertaking, at my earnest desire, the very arduous and responsible, and very disagreeable (as solely *defensive*) task of maintaining that position; threatened by a (numerically) vastly superior force of the enemy, when he might have justly claimed his right to accompany his Scinde Cavalry to Mohumra.

By so readily acceding to my desire on that occasion, General Jacob earned my warmest gratitude and acknowledgements, as your Lordship will observe from the accompanying extracts from letters which I addressed to your Lordship and others. He at once relieved my anxiety regarding that important position. And to his masterly arrangements, bold bearing, and unceasing activity and vigilance, I mainly attribute the enemy's abstinence from any attempt on Bushire; as positively were they awed, as our own troops were inspired thereby, who otherwise might well have been depressed by the sudden, and simultaneous, and peculiar deaths of their former General and the Naval Commander, which had just preceded General Jacob's assumption of the command, and by the departure of so large a body of their comrades.

But my obligations to General Jacob did not end with his holding in check the Persian army opposed to him until the termination of the war. I was again beholden to him for maintaining the command of the troops in Persia after my departure, when he might have claimed to come away under your Lordship's telegraphic message through the Bombay Government, and your Lordship is aware that I was enabled to send back all the European troops, solely under the confidence inspired among the native troops that remained by General Jacob's presence. So long as Bushire is held, that officer could not safely be withdrawn; and to no other officer would I entrust the delicate and difficult duty of carrying out the final evacuation of the place; for it is by no means certain that our difficulties in India may not encourage the Persians to break the treaty and renew hostilities, when the withdrawal of our troops would be by no means an easy operation.

Aware of these circumstances, I cannot suppose that

your Lordship will allow General Jacob's services in Persia to be passed over without notice, and I can have no doubt that you will deem him deserving of a Gazette to himself; but delay in the publication of your Lordship's approbation long after the notification of the 18th ultimo, will greatly weaken its effect; I should be much gratified, therefore, if you could avail yourself of the opportunity afforded by my order making over the command of the troops in Persia to General Jacob on the 17th ultimo (copy enclosed), which, perhaps, might be published with a notification of your Lordship's sentiments, and of the appreciation by the Government of India of the services of General Jacob, and the officers named by him in the accompanying memorandum,* since he assumed command at Bushire in March. This would not, I hope, be in the form of a mere supplement to the notification of the 18th June, such as will supply the omissions I have specified above, but an entirely distinct order, devoted to General Jacob and his officers alone. I think it very probable orders may now be on the way from your Lordship for the evacuation of Bushire and occupation of Karrack only, in accordance with my propositions to Lord Clarendon, under date the 17th ultimo, a copy of which letter was forwarded to you; for our exigencies in India will, I presume, require the return of every man from Persia, beyond what may be required for the Karrack garrison.

Should such orders not yet have been issued by your Lordship, but still be contemplated, I herewith forward a brief sketch of the data on which I would propose to frame instructions to General Jacob to carry out that

* N.B.—I regret to learn that this document was lost in a boat containing General Lugard's kit, which was swamped in going to the ship. A duplicate has been called for, from General Jacob, which will be forwarded to your Lordship by General Lugard, when received. In the meantime, the order respecting General Jacob might be published, with an intimation that the officers hereafter to be named by him will be duly noticed.

measure which I furnished to Lord Elphinstone, in the event of his Government assuming the responsibility of recalling the troops from Persia.

I await your Lordship's reply to a message which the secretary telegraphed for me on the 26th ult. (the day of my arrival here), intimating that I awaited your commands. As, however, access to my charge (Rajpootana) through Malwa is now cut off by the insurrection at Mhow, and the sea voyage to Guzerat, whence I might have penetrated, is impracticable at this season, my quickest and most feasible way now will be *viâ* Calcutta and Agra. Should I, therefore, receive no orders from your Lordship to the contrary in the interim, I purpose proceeding to Calcutta by the first steamer.

I have, &c.,
J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General*.

P.S.—Other omissions have just been brought to my notice, viz., the brigade majors, especially Captain Pottinger, major of brigade of artillery, 1st Division, who was prominently noticed in General Stalker's despatch; and General Havelock's aide-de-camp, Captain Keatly; and also the captain of her Majesty's 64th Regiment at Ahwaz, whose name I do not recollect, but it will be found, I believe, in the Ahwaz despatch.

2nd P.S.—I have now learnt that "Good" is the name of the officer of the 64th Regiment at Ahwaz. I beg also to point out the omission of the name of Lieutenant Clerk, one of my aides-de-camp, who is not mentioned, though the others are named.

*To General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G.,
and G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Horse Guards.*

SIR,

Bombay, 7th July, 1857.

I am induced to hope that your Royal Highness, as Commander-in-Chief of the British army, will pardon the liberty I take in thus personally presuming to express to your Royal Highness the great obligations I am under to an officer of that army—Col. Lugard, C.B. (late brigadier-general in Persia)—for the efficient aid I received from him as chief of the staff of the army lately serving in Persia under my command.

The nature and extent of my obligations to Colonel Lugard, and of the services he rendered to the army during the campaign in Persia, will be best understood from the accompanying extracts of letters I addressed from time to time to the Governor-General of India, and Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company, which I beg to submit for your Royal Highness's perusal.

Colonel Lugard was the only officer of her Majesty's army on my immediate staff, and I beg to recommend to your Royal Highness's protection, and to solicit your powerful intercession to obtain for that most deserving and highly-distinguished officer some suitable mark of her gracious Majesty's approbation. Any honours conferred on General Lugard will be as gratifying to myself individually as to the entire Anglo-Indian army with whom he lately served.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of
State, &c., &c., K.G.*

MY LORD, *Camp Allahabad, 5th Sept. 1857.*

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, No. 14, dated July 11th, 1857, conveying to me her most gracious Majesty the Queen's approval of the service performed by me and the troops under my command in the late war in Persia.

I beg most humbly to express on behalf of the troops I had lately the honour to command, to whom her Majesty's gracious commendation will be duly communicated through the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, that no reward for good conduct could be esteemed more highly by her soldiers than her Majesty's approval. And I beg, on my own behalf, to express the very deep sense of gratitude I entertain for the high and honourable distinction which it has been her Majesty's pleasure to confer on me.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

To the Governor-General.

MY DEAR LORD, *Bombay, 8th July, 1857.*

In the letter which I did myself the honour to address to your Lordship on the 5th instant, I omitted the names of the clergymen employed with the Persian Expeditionary Force, to whom also, if you may deem it fitting to direct the issue of the supplementary order I have solicited, I shall esteem it a great favour if an expression of your Lordship's thanks can be conveyed, viz., to Rev. Messrs. Badger, Watson, and Schwabe, and

to the Rev. Mr. Strickland, Roman Catholic clergyman, for their zealous and devoted attention, in whose praise, collectively and individually, too much cannot be said.

I am, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General.*

*To Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government of India,
Foreign Department.*

SIR,

Calcutta, 3rd August, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 1st July last, No. 186, which having been sent to Bombay, had followed me here, and only reached me yesterday. In reply, I beg to state, that the names of officers enumerated in the margin of your 4th paragraph, to whom his Lordship the Governor-General's thanks were conveyed in the General Order dated 1st July, comprise nearly all who had, in my opinion, earned a claim to acknowledgment and reward, and all whom I, myself, had brought to his Lordship's notice in my despatches. But I regret to state that I had inadvertently omitted to mention the clergymen, to whom the whole European community of the force were so greatly indebted for the most zealous and devoted attention of those gentlemen, viz., the Rev. Messrs. Badger, Watson, and Schwabe, and the Rev. Mr. Strickland, Roman Catholic clergyman.

2nd. To the above omission on my own part, I am bound also to add the name of Captain Playfair, of the Bombay Engineers, who was field engineer under General Stalker at the affair of Reshire and capture of Bushire, field engineer with me at Khooshab, and again at Mo-

humra; and whose zeal and activity were very conspicuous.

3rd. As but just to those gentlemen, I hope the Governor-General in Council may be pleased to cause the omission to be rectified by notifying that it was caused by my not sooner having brought them to his Lordship's notice.

4th. There are some mistakes in the notification of the 16th June, which might have been rectified had I brought them to his Lordship's notice before the issue of the second notification; but though it may be too late now to notice them in General Orders, I hope that it may not be so to point them out to the Home authorities ere her Majesty's gracious pleasure regarding them is announced; they are as follows:—

5. The name of Major Hill, whose position as commanding engineer, and very important services, entitled him to prominent notice, is disposed of in the list of general staff, in the margin, instead of a separate paragraph recording such notice as might acquire for him the distinction of C.B.

6th. Captain Worgan, of the Artillery, is deserving of special notice for his services as commanding the mortar battery at Mohumra, a post of such danger, as to be regarded almost as a forlorn hope. This officer's gallantry on that occasion, I should hope may be deemed worthy even of the high honour of the Victoria Cross.

7th. No allusion is made to General Jacob and his officers for their services in maintaining the position at Bushire after departure of the force to Mohumra, the great importance of which, and the self-denying devotion of General Jacob in undertaking that duty, I have repeatedly and earnestly brought to his Lordship's notice. This omission is intentional, I presume,

with a view to devoting a separate despatch in acknowledgement, on the termination of that officer's services in Persia. As the value of such notice would be greatly weakened by so much delay, I am induced to hope that the occasion may be availed to issue such notification now, on announcing the order for the final evacuation of Bushire, which, having reached the Bombay Government on the 21st ultimo, must, by this time, be known to the public at that Presidency, so that no inconvenience could be caused by its promulgation here.

8. In reply to your 5th paragraph, requiring explanation regarding the omission of certain names in the list which accompanied my despatch of the 27th May, I have to observe :—

9th. Brigadier Stewart was not present at any of the affairs in Persia, not having joined General Jacob at Bushire until after the Mohumra expedition had departed ; but I know that General Jacob very highly esteemed that officer's services in command of the Cavalry Brigade at Bushire, and the insertion of Brigadier Stewart's name, therefore, is but an anticipation of its appearance in the notification acknowledging the services of General Jacob and his officers.

10th. Captain MacLeod was mentioned in General Stalker's despatch as commanding the 20th Regiment Native Infantry at Bushire, his name, therefore, appears with propriety in the notification of 16th June ; and the omission of Major Baynes's name, who commanded that regiment at Borazjoon, has been rectified by its insertion in the subsequent General Order of 1st July.

11th. Captains Rigby and Shewell are highly deserving of the notice they obtained in the 16th June notification, and their names were only omitted in my list, because I had no doubt they would be included in

the list I had called for from General Jacob, under whom they were serving at Bushire.

12th. The omission of Lord Dunkellin's name in my final despatch is entirely a mistake, and a very unwarrantable one; for his Lordship's zealous services on every occasion on which we engaged the enemy were prominently and deservedly acknowledged in my despatches, as well as in General Stalker's. I trust, therefore, that this *after* omission may not be allowed to militate against his Lordship's just claims to notice and reward.

13th. Lieutenant Johnstone, of the Indian Navy, though not noticed in my despatch, was thanked by General Stalker, under whom he did good service; he is justly named, therefore, in the "notification."

14th. I omitted to mention Lieutenant Baigrie, because his subordinate position in the commissariat scarcely entitled him to notice, the more especially as the name of Captain Good, who commanded a detachment of her Majesty's 64th Regiment on the expedition to Ahwaz, was not mentioned. I consider that Captain Good's services on that occasion might now be acknowledged, at the same time as those of the clergymen and Captain Playfair; as having been inadvertently omitted in my despatches, but subsequently brought to his Lordship's notice. This would suffice to avert the necessity of now erasing Lieutenant Baigrie's name, which would be understood to imply that that officer had incurred censure, instead of being entitled to praise.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Major-General*.

P. S.—On looking over the notifications, I now observe that Captain Felix Jones, the Resident at Bushire, is not mentioned. This is owing, I presume,

to my not having mentioned that officer in my military despatches, as he was not present at the affairs of Khooshab or Mohumra. But he was actively engaged in General Stalker's operations, and was prominently noticed in that officer's despatches. I had, moreover, acknowledged my obligations to Captain Jones on the occasion when he conducted a reconnoitring party up the Shat-ool-Arab, and furnished me with plans of the river in the vicinity of Mohumra, which were of great service when I attacked that position. I beg, therefore, that his services may be suitably noticed.

J. OUTRAM, *Major-General.*

To the Adjutant-General of the Army, Bombay.

SIR,

Calcutta, 11th January, 1859.

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 28th ultimo, No. 470, conveying the request of his Excellency Sir Henry Somerset that I would notify in the vacant column of the roll which accompanied your letter, opposite each officer's name, the opinion entertained by me of their claims for promotion and reward.

2. I have filled up the column accordingly, and herewith return the roll.

3. On reference to my remarks, you will observe that the only instances in which my estimate of the claims of officers, recorded in that roll, at all differs from that of his Excellency, are in the cases of Lieutenant-Colonels Hutt and Younghusband, and Captains Dickenson and Collier, who I consider entitled to "strong recommendation." And I have ventured to record "recommended" opposite to the names of Lieutenants Sykes and Clerk, with reference to whom his Excellency had merely written "Personal Staff."

4. Two of the officers named in his Excellency's roll—Lieutenant-Colonel Younghusband and Captain Pottinger, were recommended also by the late Brigadier-General Jacob, and I have therefore notified the fact opposite to their names.

5. As none of the other officers named by General Jacob are included, I beg to submit a printed copy of a Field Force Order by that lamented officer, and earnestly to solicit his Excellency's support to the recommendations therein contained, all of which I consider to be well deserved, especially the officers of his own staff, Majors Green and Ballard, and Captains Malcolm Green and Lewis Pelly.

6. I take this opportunity of respectfully bringing his Excellency's recollection to the letters which I addressed to him on the 13th June, 1857, submitting lists of officers and men recommended for the decoration of the Victoria Cross, and of again soliciting his support to the recommendations therein contained.

7. And this appears to me a fitting occasion to submit the claim to some honorary distinction of Captain (Local Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) R. L. Taylor of the 18th Regiment Native Infantry, who, in addition to his services during the war, so frequently acknowledged in my despatches, has subsequently earned a high title to such reward by diplomatic service of great value, in his admirable conduct of the mission to Herat, which, whether regarded for its political importance, or the personal risk involved in its accomplishment, well merits, I consider, the distinction of a civil C. B., for which I beg to recommend him, and I respectfully solicit his Excellency's support to that recommendation.

8. I beg also to bring to his Excellency's notice that two most deserving officers of the Indian navy have obtained no reward, whose services I hope he will

agree with me in considering well worthy of recognition. Captain Felix Jones, Resident at Bushire, and Commander G. N. Adams, who commanded the *Assaye* at Mohumra. I am aware that, as belonging to the Indian navy, these officers do not come within his Excellency's province to recommend, but I hope that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency which supplied the united military and naval forces in Persia, he may deem himself warranted in advocating the claims of these officers of the sister service, for services performed in support of his own troops, in so far at least as to induce the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian navy to submit them for the consideration of Government.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM, *Lieut.-General,*
Late Commanding Persian Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from Speeches in Parliament relating to the Persian Campaign.

HOUSE OF LORDS.—May 7, 1857.

Lord Portsmouth.—As regards the hostilities in which we are actually engaged with Persia, I must be allowed to express my opinion that her Majesty's Government deserve great credit for breaking through the old course of routine, by appointing Sir James Outram, an Indian officer, to the chief command of the expedition. That was putting the right man in the right place, and they deserved every credit for it. However, before quitting this subject, my lords, I must say I am proud as an Englishman, to find that my countrymen have manifested the same gallantry in Persia, that has distinguished them in every other part of the world. The thanks of the country are especially due to the native Indian troops for the gallantry displayed by them, particularly in the charge of the Irregular Cavalry at the battle of Khooshab. Their conduct upon that occasion is another proof that the Indian native troops, when efficiently led, are animated by the same gallantry and determination as they exhibited under Clive, and under the greatest of modern warriors, Wellington, who gained his spurs on the plains of India when commanding Indian native troops.

Earl of Malmesbury.—With respect to the peace fortunately concluded with Persia, I trust that her Majesty's Government will inform the House at what date they expect that the news of that peace would reach Sir James Outram and his army, so that we may have some hope of an end being put to the unnecessary shedding of blood, all the more to be regretted that it had taken place after the terms of peace had been concluded.

Earl Granville.—In answer to the question which was addressed to her Majesty's Government by the noble Earl who has just sat down, I have to state that a telegraphic message has been received this very afternoon, from which it appears that on the 5th of April, the General commanding the British forces in Persia, received information of the treaty with Persia having

been signed at Paris; and that the same information was communicated to the Persian General, whose name I do not at the moment recollect; so that we can have no doubt that subsequently to that date all unnecessary bloodshed had ceased.

Earl Grey.—But I would venture to take this opportunity of pointing out to your lordships and to her Majesty's Government, that there are some topics adverted to in that speech which will require very speedily to be brought under your lordships' notice, and upon which, therefore, it is desirable that we should have information with the least possible delay. Among those topics, one of the first that we should discuss is that with regard to the Persian war. I must remind your lordships that that war has been begun and concluded without any formal communication to Parliament of the grounds upon which hostilities were commenced, or the means taken by her Majesty's Government to avert the necessity of having recourse to war. Upon these points, I think it is absolutely necessary that we should be fully informed. In the last session of Parliament her Majesty's Government declined to produce any papers relating to these affairs, in the first place on the ground that negotiations were proceeding at Paris; and in the second, when these negotiations had been concluded, because any discussion of the subject might have a dangerous effect upon the prospect of obtaining the necessary ratification of the Shah of Persia to the peace which was concluded at Paris. For my own part, I think that Parliament was somewhat too easily induced to abstain on those grounds from pressing for an earlier production of information. But admitting that it was right on those two grounds to refrain at that time from pressing for information, there is now no reason whatever for any longer deferring to produce the papers. I know that, according to the usual practice, a treaty cannot be laid on the table until it is ratified; but the papers to which I allude, containing the correspondence which preceded the breaking out of the war, may be produced without the treaty; and there ought, therefore, to be no objection to lay them immediately on your lordships' table. The negotiations have ended, the decision has gone to Persia, and whether it be ratified or not, no discussion by the House can have the slightest effect on that decision. I trust, therefore, that those papers will be produced without delay.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.—*May 7, 1857.*

Mr. Dodson.—We have also been engaged in hostilities with another Eastern Power—Persia—which seems to have supposed that it could brave us with impunity. This House has learned

with satisfaction that a treaty of peace with that Power has been signed at Paris, which, I hope, is an honourable one to that country, and will not fail to secure to England those objects for which we engaged in war. Meanwhile the results of our operations in the Persian Gulf and the advance of our troops into the interior of the country, will serve to show that there is no coast so inhospitable, no climate so formidable, and no country so inaccessible, as to be secure against the energy and valour of the British soldier; and I trust that our successes in Persia will have the effect of spreading the prestige of the British name amongst the most remote tribes of Central Asia.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.—*July 16, 1857.*

Sir Fenwick Williams.—After the fall of Kars, he (Sir Fenwick Williams) went as a captive into Russia, and there, as in Persia, he found the invasion of India through Persia to be the universal and favourite topic. Under these circumstances, he was firmly convinced of the policy of the Persian war. With respect to the expedition to the Persian Gulf, which had been admirably arranged, in his opinion it was the best move ever made by England. For ten years, to obtain the transfer of Mohumra from the Turks to the Persians had been the object of ceaseless negotiations, and therefore it might be inferred that to the latter people the place was of great value, and when he (Sir W. Fenwick Williams), in the course of his duty, placed Mohumra in the hands of the Persians from the Turks, he little thought that he should have witnessed its being taken by British troops. It was said, that the finger of Russia was seen in the capture of Herat, and in the same way it might be affirmed that the finger of England was seen at Mohumra, and the House might depend upon it that for one hundred years to come its speedy capture would not be forgotten by the Persians. It was said that the Persians would not give up Herat. He should like to see them retain it, as we should then retain Mohumra, which, being seated on an embouchure of the Gulf, was the great entrepôt of their trade. He mentioned these circumstances to justify the policy of the war, and to show how successful and wise had been the negotiations for peace.

Colonel Sykes.—And what had been the result of the promptitude and energy displayed by us in the Persian war? Continued success, until the war was brought to a termination equally honourable to this country and advantageous in its results, because, whereas Persia before the war suspected our policy towards her, she now felt that the only friend on which

she could rely for her defence was the British Government. He had that statement from the mouth of the Persian Ambassador himself. After the treaty was despatched from this country doubts were very generally expressed whether the Shah of Persia would ratify it, in consequence of the influence of Russia. He had a long conversation with the Persian Ambassador, and himself raised that very objection. The Persian Ambassador's reply was, "we are thoroughly satisfied from the manner in which you have conducted this war, that our only hope of preserving the integrity of the Persian Empire is the friendship of the British Government." The war was brought to a successful termination almost before Parliament could be brought together again after its prorogation last year. Was it at all necessary, in the midst of an uninterrupted success, to consult the Members of that House as to what ought to be done? To have done so would have been more prejudicial than otherwise, for "*quot homines, tot sententiæ*," and the debate in that House might have produced dissensions which would have weakened our cause. At the head of the expedition was placed a man (Sir James Outram) in whom confidence might well be reposed, and who had given ample proofs of the excellence of the choice. Every minute particular of his plan was laid down before he started on the expedition. He (Colonel Sykes) would not touch upon the policy of the war, but he would say that he entirely concurred in the propriety of a measure to prevent Persia from taking possession of Herat, which had been known for ages as the key of India.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.—July 16, 1857.

MR. VERNON SMITH.—In this contest the Indian army has distinguished itself in the most eminent degree, and the glory it has achieved in the Persian Gulf will long be remembered in the East. Long will the rapidity with which the Persian expedition was fitted out be sung in story on those shores. Long will the inhabitants of India bear in mind the gallantry with which the work which it had to execute has been performed. When Persia is again disposed to offer us an insult, she will pause before she does so, when she reflects upon the renown of those few gallant soldiers whom her own thousands were unable to resist. She will call to mind the victories which General Outram has achieved, and the bravery which upon the part of the youngest lieutenants in the service has been so conspicuously displayed. The result of these victories and of that bravery will, I trust, be beneficial to the country.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.—On the other hand, the effect of the

war in Persia must be greatly advantageous to British interests throughout the East; for when the Asiatics see that we are capable of despatching so rapidly an expedition to Persia, which has been attended with such great and signal success that even on the extremity of the Persian territory we have been able, by that expedition, to coerce the Persian Government to evacuate Herat, and to agree never again to occupy it, that, I say, is a triumph of British arms and diplomacy over Persia.

Those 5,000 men have returned, and for some time have been again on the shores of India; and therefore, if the British forces were weakened by the original detachment of those troops, they are now strengthened, not only by their simple return, but by the glory they have accomplished, by the character and honour their arms have acquired, and by their distinguished performances on the Persian territory.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.—*August 21, 1857.*

COLONEL SYKES asked the President of the Board of Control whether it was the intention of her Majesty's Government to confer upon the officers of the Persian expedition the customary testimonials of approval of successful military operations in brevets, honours, and a medal. Expeditions by sea were always more trying to the temper, to the physical constitution, and to the comfort of troops, than were those by land, and they were more than commonly trying to the sepoys, who, if they were all of good caste, were, during the whole voyage, compelled to live upon a dry vegetable diet as they could not cook food while they were on board-ship. It was no doubt to be regretted that such a thing as caste existed among the Hindus, but then it was a great fact, and we could not help it; so it was to be regretted that antagonistic religions existed in the world; but there they were, and we could not help it. Caste entailed personal sufferings and sacrifices upon the sepoy while he was on board-ship, and therefore gave him a greater claim to consideration than if his services were rendered by land. The House would admit that the expedition to Persia had been managed with unexampled success, that the officer who commanded it had not failed to accomplish any of its objects, but had conducted it to an end which was creditable to the troops and to himself. Under these circumstances, and considering the present state of affairs in India, it was highly desirable that those honours and rewards, which were so dear to soldiers, should be conferred with as little delay as possible.

MR. VERNON SMITH said that the honourable and gallant gen-

tleman and the House must be aware of the high honour and estimation in which her Majesty's Government held the gallantry, the courage, and skill which were displayed by the officers and men of the troops engaged in the Persian expedition. Whether their services had been such as to bring them within the rules observed in the granting of the honours and rewards referred to, and whether the success of the expedition was such as to justify the striking of a medal for the occasion, must be questions for future consideration. The course pursued on these occasions, as the honourable and gallant member well knew, was that the Governor-General should specify the officers whom he recommended for honours to the Court of Directors, and that the Court should forward these recommendations to her Majesty's Government. Therefore, if the honourable and gallant member was anxious to expedite the conferring of these honours, instead of asking him (Mr. Vernon Smith) for information, his best course would be to urge the question upon the Court of Directors, of which he himself was a member.

*"Times" leaders, relating to the Persian Campaign.—
31st March, 1st April, 18th May, 12th June, 1857.*

March 31, 1857.

As the Persian war has been already concluded by a satisfactory peace, the interest attaching to its events has, of course, somewhat diminished, and some regret must be necessarily occasioned by the intelligence of bloodshed, which as far as regards its influence upon the dispute, might possibly have been saved. The exploit, however, of our troops upon Persian territory, recently announced, is of so brilliant a character, and reflects at once such a lustre upon our arms, and such a light upon the nature of the expedition in which we have been engaged, that it is impossible to pass it over, even at a crisis like the present, without a tribute of applause to our army and its commander. From the intelligence now received, it appears that the encounter telegraphed on Saturday as a cavalry combat, formed one of a series of operations undertaken against the enemy in the early part of last month. It will, perhaps, be recollected that the British forces, after the capture and occupation of Bushire, were encamped, with the exception of a garrison in the place itself, on the plain outside the town. One of the positions taken up by the Persians appears to have been at Borazjoon or Brazjaun, a place situated on the road to Shiraz, but within fifty-six miles of Bushire. Here they were intrenched, and from this position

it was anticipated that we might be attacked. On the 3rd of February, therefore, an expeditionary force marched from Bushire against the Persian position, which was reached on the 5th, and which was presently evacuated by the enemy, with the loss of all their ammunition and stores. This success having been achieved, the troops prepared to return to their quarters on the 7th, during which movement the Persians seem to have ventured upon a night attack, but without effect. On the 8th, being on their return march, they arrived at Khooshab, a place between Borazjoon and Bushire, and here occurred the engagement so brilliant and decisive.

At Khooshab was posted a Persian division about 6,000 strong, but whether composed of the troops dislodged from Borazjoon, or of some separate levies, we are not distinctly informed. The British force employed upon the expedition comprised 4,300 infantry, 419 cavalry, and 18 guns, and with the cavalry and guns alone an attack upon the enemy as they stood was promptly made. The results were most remarkable. Not only was the Persian army entirely routed, but the victory was attended with slight loss on our side, though the enemy left 700 on the field, besides 100 prisoners remaining in our hands. The details of the combat we are left to conjecture by the aid of the few particulars conveyed in the report. It is probable that the strength of the Persians consisted chiefly in cavalry, not only from their known preference for that arm, but from the circumstances of our own cavalry, to the exclusion of the infantry, having been employed against them; and, as they had only five guns, perhaps not very well served, it is clear that we had a decided superiority in artillery. Either by the aid of this advantage in driving them from their position, or in pursuance of some other manœuvres, it seems that the Persian horse must have been brought into such a collision with ours, that the Bombay cavalry found a fair field for the exercise of their prowess, and an irresistible charge, followed by severe execution on the routed host, will represent, probably, the history of the battle.

It is true that a result of this kind was always confidently predicted by those best acquainted with the cavalry of our Indian armies, but the signal success of some 400 troopers against a force which we must presume to have been at least four or five times their strength, must satisfy, even if it does not surpass, the anticipations of the most sanguine. It does not seem that our infantry was engaged at all. Under the skilful command of General Outram a few squadrons of Indian cavalry, with a battery of two guns, have proved sufficient to drive in headlong rout a division of the enemy so considerable as to be styled "the Persian Army," and to kill or take prisoners about twice their own number. This exploit will be the more extra-

ordinary if it should prove that the battle was mainly fought not with artillery, but with the sabre alone; for the Persian horse, as opposed to horse, should be no contemptible foe. Discipline they might undoubtedly lack, but most Eastern nations, and the Persians especially, furnish good horses, good horsemen, and dexterous swordsmen. Marked, indeed, is the contrast between the cavalry charge at Balaklava and that at Khooshab. The first was "magnificent" even in the eyes of the Russians, and exhibited as much dauntless and devoted heroism as any action on record; but the last was not only "magnificent"—it was scientific "war" as well. There was skill as well as valour—gain as well as glory, and such a passage of arms may aid the world in conceiving what is likely to happen if any expedition, after struggling through Central Asia, should encounter upon the Indus an army of troops like these.

April 1, 1857.

The official despatches of Sir James Outram to the Bombay Government, the information published in the Indian journals, and our own correspondence from the East, enable us now to give a complete and authentic description of that week's campaign in Persia, which included the brilliant victory of Khooshab; and it is not too much to say that in some particulars this achievement will be found even more remarkable than it was presumed to be on the receipt of the telegraphic reports announcing the facts. The reinforcements despatched from India to augment the small army which had captured and occupied Bushire, were preceded by General Outram in person, who arrived at Bushire on the 27th of January, and was immediately informed that a considerable Persian force lay entrenched at Borazjoon, about forty-six miles distant, with the design of recovering the town from our hands as soon as sufficient strength could be collected for such an enterprise. A day or two later, the First Brigade of the Second or reinforcing Division, composed of the 78th Highlanders and the 26th Native Infantry, arrived from Bombay, and as soon as they were disembarked, Sir James lost not another moment in forming and conducting an expedition into the interior in quest of the Persian army. The force mustered for this purpose comprised 243 troopers of the 3rd Native Cavalry (Regulars), and 176 of the Poonah Horse (Irregulars), making 419 sabres in the whole. The infantry assembled in greater strength, including, besides the two battalions just arrived, the 64th Foot, the 2nd Bombay Europeans, the 4th and 20th Native Infantry (the former being a Rifle Corps), and a regiment of Beloochees; giving a total force of 4,234, of

whom rather more than half, or 2,212, were Europeans. The artillery attached to the expedition, consisted of two field batteries, of six guns each, and troop of Horse Artillery; altogether eighteen pieces.

With this force, which left only some 1,800 troops, with a serviceable contribution of seamen and marines, for the protection of the camp, Sir James marched straight for Borazjoon, but the enemy, as already related, evacuated the position at the first intelligence of our approach, and left their stores and ammunition to the victors. From this point, however, the operations assume a complexion differing in some degree from that given in the summary communication of the telegraph, and present features of great interest and curiosity. Although the Persians were so dismayed at our advance as to abandon without a blow their own fortified position, they had no sooner done so than they projected an attack upon us while occupying these very same defences, and they did really assail us on the instant of our quitting them, and continued to act on the offensive with great audacity and vigour until they were absolutely routed in the battle which ensued. Whether they found our force smaller than they anticipated, whether they took courage on our declining to follow them into the hills, or whether they were inspired by some motive unknown, it is impossible to say, but General Outram himself informs us that he and his troops were to have been attacked in the Borazjoon camp on the very night they left it, and that the intended operation was changed into a pursuit when the explosions occasioned by the destruction of the enemy's magazines, communicated the intelligence of our departure.

The whole affair now became one continuous engagement, carried on by abrupt attacks through the darkness of the night, and culminating in a pitched battle and decisive victory as soon as the break of day brought an opportunity of action. Sir James, after remaining two days in the Persian position, and completing the demolition of their stores, wisely abstained from following the retiring enemy into the mountains, and gave orders, on the night of the 7th, for the return march to Bushire. The Persians instantly commenced the work of pursuit and attack by surrounding our rear-guard with their cavalry and threatening on all sides our line of march. To repel these assaults, the troops were formed into a large oblong square, with the baggage of the army in the centre, an attitude which proved quite effective in averting any mischief, though the enemy maintained an incessant discharge of musketry, and even brought up, towards the morning, three or four heavy guns, which opened upon our column like the Sikh cannon in the night after Ferozeshuhur, but which could not, owing to the

darkness, be silenced in a similar manner. At length, as the morning dawned, the Persian force became visible on the left rear of the British, and was found to be drawn up in battle array in the vicinity of Khooshab.

Although General Outram's despatch contains a detailed enumeration of the troops composing the Shah's army, it is difficult to discriminate the several corps under their oriental designations, but we can ascertain that they were 6,900 strong, with about 1,000 cavalry. On other points, some remarkable corrections require to be made in the accounts previously received. The Persians, instead of being weak in artillery, are supposed to have had as many guns as ourselves, though it is not quite clear that they were all in the field, and they worked them, according to the reports before us, with extraordinary energy. It is still more surprising, however, to find that the brunt of the battle was borne, not by their cavalry, as originally reported, but by their regular infantry, drawn up in squares, according to the tactics of modern warfare; indeed, after the night attack, little mention of the Persian horse appears in the despatches. As soon as it was light, and the position of the Persians was ascertained, our force was at once formed for the attack, the cavalry and artillery in front, and the infantry in two lines in support. After a vigorous cannonade, our two cavalry regiments—one, be it remembered, of less than 250, and the other of less than 200 sabres, charged right at the enemy's squares, and with the results before announced. The regulars charged a battalion of Persian Guards, 900 strong, and pierced the square like a shot, killing, as we learn from Sir James himself, "nearly the whole regiment;" the irregulars bore down upon the Kashkai regiment, broke it, and took its colours. It was not, however, upon the instant that the Persians took to flight; on the contrary, we read in one of the Indian accounts of the engagement that they twice recaptured their guns, which had fallen to our cavalry in their onset, and General Outram only fixes ten o'clock as the termination of the battle, which had commenced at daybreak. But it remains clear that the cavalry and the artillery between them—400 horsemen with eighteen guns—achieved the rout of the Shah's army, nor could the infantry ever come up with the enemy in the rapidity of their flight.

Our intelligence informs us that after the return of the troops to Bushire, it was in contemplation to undertake a second expedition against Mohumra—a town opposite Bussorah, on the river Euphrates, where the Persians were mustering in considerable force; and we learn, indeed, that the remainder of the Second Division, part of which had already, on the 13th of February, arrived at Bushire, would not be disembarked, but

would proceed straight to the new scene of action. It must be a matter of earnest hope, that the news of the pacification may arrive in time to prevent any further effusion of blood in a quarrel already settled; but the credit acquired by our troops and their commander would be sufficient to remove all apprehensions about campaigning in Persia. Some readers, we have no doubt, will be well pleased to find that the regular cavalry of India can fully compete in efficiency with those irregular comrades of whose aptitudes for service so much was justly predicted; but all must concur in admiration of soldiers who, Europeans as well as Indians, have so gallantly discharged their duty. The brilliancy of a victory naturally concentrates attention upon itself, but it deserves to be recollected that the troops not only fought and won at Khooshab, but after marching, without tents or extra clothing, forty-six miles in forty-one hours, over the worst possible roads and in the worst possible weather, to Borazjoon, again, after an interval of two days only, performed the return march in fifty hours more, besides gaining a decisive battle on the way. On such soldiers we may rely with perfect confidence, but we sincerely trust that their prowess may not again be tested in a campaign which peace has happily terminated.

May 18, 1857.

The treaty of peace with Persia has, as we learn from Tehran, been ratified, and is already well on its way to this country; but, before we have done with war, we may as well collect from the details just published of the Persian campaign two pieces of very instructive information. The first illustrates the importance in oriental warfare of that confident and unhesitating spirit which takes no account of odds or difficulties in improving an advantage or pursuing a success. Skilful arrangements combined with intrepid conduct soon placed Mohumra in the possession of the British; but this achievement, though extremely creditable in itself, does not represent the most striking feature of the expedition. The distinctive character of General Outram's campaign is to be sought rather in the extraordinary boldness and promptitude by which the victory was improved, and the accumulation of results which a single success was thus made to produce. No sooner had the Persian army retired from its entrenchments at Mohumra, and commenced its retreat into the interior; than Sir James despatched a force on its track, although it was perfectly clear that the original strength of the enemy had been very considerable, and that his loss had been comparatively trifling, while to crown the difficulties of the crisis

the British cavalry had not been able to complete its landing, and a single troop of horse only was available for the contemplated service. Nevertheless, even under such circumstances as these, Sir James did not hesitate for a moment, but gave orders to Captain Malcolm Green to follow up 13,000 Persians with only forty-five troopers—a duty which that officer very effectually discharged. Upon the receipt of his report and upon the intelligence subsequently brought in, the British commander at once resolved to take advantage of the enemy's dismay, and in the course of eight-and-forty hours he detached a flying column of some 300 men to overtake the Persians, and do whatever might be practicable in completing their rout. The result was that this little force, on penetrating to Ahwaz, a town some distance up the river, not only came up with the whole Persian army in a new position, but actually succeeded in dislodging it and putting it a second time to flight, and a new victory, almost as important, and even less costly than that at Mohumra, was gained solely upon the credit of the original success. But for this dashing exploit the enemy might have recovered his confidence at Ahwaz, collected his forces anew, and moved down, perhaps, upon Mohumra, to fight the last battle over again. As it is, not only has the fortified position been carried, but the entire army of the Persians, under the immediate command of the Shahzada, or heir-apparent, in person, has been driven in a state of terror and disorganization, league after league, before a mere handful of our troops, and—what is more—the whole population of the country has witnessed and appreciated the spectacle. Such a system of tactics, evincing as it does a thorough knowledge of oriental character, will remind some of our readers of the campaigns of Alexander, who thousands of years ago employed the same audacity against the same enemy with the same completeness of success. It is not every general, however, who would venture on making forty-five troopers do duty for the cavalry of an army, or who would send 300 men in pursuit of 13,000. Numbers, it is true, count in reality for little under such conditions, and the event has shown as much, but it requires a commander of no ordinary merit to act unshrinkingly on the conviction.

The next lesson we may draw from the despatches before us is suggested by the comparative inefficiency of the Persian troops when opposed to the British, notwithstanding the singular excellence of their preparation and the science which had apparently been placed at their command. From the description given by Sir James Outram of the works at Mohumra, it appears as if the best engineers in Europe could not have planned defences more cleverly, constructed them more solidly, or armed them more formidably, than had been here done by the officers of the

Shah. "Batteries had been erected of great strength of solid earth, 20 feet thick, 18 feet high, with casemated embrasures * * * *. These, with other earthworks, armed with heavy ordnance, commanded the entire passage of the river, and were so skilfully and judiciously placed, and so scientifically formed, as to sweep the whole stream to the extent of the range of the guns up and down the river and across the opposite shore; indeed, everything that science could suggest and labour accomplish in the time appeared to have been done by the enemy to effectually prevent any vessel passing up the river above their position."

This description might serve for Sebastopol itself, and it may perhaps be in the reader's recollection that similar praise was bestowed upon the forts found to have been constructed by the Chinese. Both Chinese and Persians, too, we are expressly told, stand to their guns with considerable intrepidity, and yet in both cases the balance of advantages in actual conflict appears almost as completely on the side of the British as it might have been a century ago. For that matter, indeed, the Chinese are thought to have anticipated Europeans in the discovery of gunpowder, and should therefore be the most experienced, if not the most skilful, artillerists in the world. Nevertheless, neither intrenchments, which sometimes inspire even disorderly troops with fortitude, neither ample earthworks nor solid masonry, neither shot, shell, rifle, nor cannon, can raise Asiatics to the level of Europeans, nor does there appear, indeed, much difference of character between the days of Clive and the days of Outram—between the battle of Plassy and the battle of Khooshab.

The moral we draw from these facts is, that it takes something more than equipment to make a soldier. The superiority of one army to another does not depend upon new rifles, conical bullets, or well-made field guns. It cannot be decisively affected even by those arts of fortification which are especially designed to augment the strength of the weak. Perhaps, indeed, we may be disposed to conjecture that the defences of Mohumra were planned and constructed by European assistance, and that if the Persians had really been themselves the architects of such works, like the Romans and the Swedes, they would also, like the Romans and the Swedes, have known how to maintain them. We collect, also, from the detail given of the captured artillery, which would naturally include all the heaviest pieces, that the Persian ordnance must have been very inferior to the guns of our steamers in weight and calibre. But, after all these allowances have been made, there remains still unimpeachable proof that the weapon cannot make the man, and that it need not be apprehended even after all the discoveries now announced, that

the difference between superior and inferior troops is likely to disappear. When we read of such battles as those between Cortez and the Mexicans, we are naturally apt to attribute the result to European arms; but it is plain that Europeans in the present day can encounter Asiatics with just as decisive success, and just as little loss, although the Asiatics have howitzers and sharpshooters as well as their adversaries. The Persians have artillery and ammunition, riflemen and mortar-batteries; at a review they could probably make very good practice, and Sir Henry Rawlinson has assured us that at bottom they are really a patient and courageous people. Something, however, beyond all this is evidently wanting to make first-rate troops, and that something must be looked for in the organization which gives to every branch of an army the infallible assurance of support from every other; in the thousand appliances which genuine civilization contributes; and, above all, in the self-respect, self-confidence, and resolution of character, which education and intelligence impart to the individual soldiers. The aspect of war may be changed by new inventions, but the relative value of armies will remain the same. No description of projectiles, however terrific, is likely to demolish the superiority of race over race, or nation over nation. We may continue our experiments in musketry with every prospect of augmenting our own strength, but with very little danger of fabricating elements of power against ourselves.

June 12, 1857.

Among the mitigations of human existence must be set down the kind delay which always intervenes between the conclusion of a treaty and the publication of its terms. Up to the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, all is passion and excitement. Indignation and vengeance, not to say ambition, dictate the most preposterous demands and the most extravagant expectations. Then comes the pause, broken only by whispers of successful or baffled negotiation; and, after several hitches, it is announced to the world, that a perseverance, which the sense of justice alone could inspire, has won excellent terms and ample security. We rejoice, and once more love our neighbours. Then comes the vague intermediate state we have mentioned. Minor questions have to be settled, clauses worded, commissions appointed, schedules drawn up, and ratifications exchanged. When the Courts are happily distant enough, Queen's messengers, Tartars, or Arabs, are kept galloping or "expressing" across the world; and at the cost of a hundred horses, and not a few men, two

months may be made to elapse before the long-expected document sees the vulgar light of day. Happily, the public by that time have ceased to expect it or to care about it, or even to be aware that it is due. They only know that we have fought hard; that we have shown "pluck;" that the foe is sensible of it, and that he is not likely to molest us for some time to come. Why need people know more? Happy, indeed, if they never know more, or had never more to know! Of the treaties of 1814 and 1815, what survives that should survive, except the sentiments naturally inspired by a long and bloody struggle—the mutual respect of nations, and a deep desire of peace? After two months' delay, we yesterday published the text of our treaty with Persia. We should be sorry to hazard a conjecture as to the number of our readers who have thought it worth their while to scrutinize this document in the simple interest of their country. Why, then, has it passed unread, or been perused with a listlessness that failed to catch the points? Merely because people look elsewhere for the results of the war. We have struck a blow at Persia; we have invaded her territory; we have evidently frightened her out of her wits, and let her know what we can do, and what we are certain to do, if necessary. The expedition has done its own work—written its own peace; and happily some of its text is much more recent than that of the treaty before us, besides being written in a stronger hand and somewhat brighter colours. Sir James Outram has been the real negotiator, and no one can mistake or forget what he means.


We are not apologizing for a lame convention. We have no fault whatever to find with this treaty. It costs, indeed, an effort of reason, not to say imagination, to feel it worth the expenditure of a million or two of money, and the death of some thousand men on both sides, in one way or another. The terms are so reasonable, so just, so moderate, so much what most Englishmen took for granted was the state of things before the rupture, that their faith will be rather taxed to believe the thing could not be done more quietly. Persia is to retire from Herat; to leave it and Affghanistan alone for the future. In case of any quarrel with them, she is to request the friendly offices of the British Government, which is to do its best. Persia is only to attack Herat for the defence of her frontier, and to push her arms no further than necessary for repelling aggression. Our consular establishments are to be on the same footing as those of the "most favoured," or, to call things by their right name, the "most feared" nation. The pecuniary claims of British subjects, or of Persians under British protection, are to be settled by a Mixed Commission. England gives up the protection of Persian subjects, unless in the employ of British Representatives

and Agents, and provided also that no larger privilege of protection is allowed by Persia to any other Power. The dignity of the British Crown is to be vindicated in the person of Mr. Charles Murray, who is to receive in state a letter of apology for some offensive remarks of the Shah, and to be solemnly invited to the capital. He is to be conducted thither in state, to receive a visit from the Prime Minister, to be accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the palace, and presented by him to the Shah. He is to receive another visit the day after from the Premier, at noon; which visit Mr. Murray is to return the next day, at the latest before noon. No private names or domestic circumstances appear in the treaty. There is not a word about the proposed Electric Telegraph, or the Euphrates Valley line, or any port or emporium in the Gulf, or about the Russian acquisitions of territory on the Caspian. Russia only appears under the euphemism of "the most favoured nation," and, in place of the bold but fruitless diplomacy which fifty years ago was pledging England and Persia to resist that Power by force of arms in defence of one another, we now suppose an universal peace, only stipulating for the same position in all respects, whatever that position may be, as Persia's northern neighbour.

No doubt, some political fire-eaters will think this a lame, impotent conclusion. We have already described it as a disappointment on the popular estimate. But what did people think of Persia, and what did they expect us to get by the war? No doubt, the expedition of Alexander the Great was attended with more tangible and remarkable results. But his object was conquest, and ours was to keep Persia and its neighbours in a state of independence and mutual respect. Our object is founded on the *status quo*, and the abandonment of mere traditional claims and visionary prospects. It is, then, the greatest praise of a treaty which professes to carry out this object, that it seems at first sight to do nothing, to create nothing, to give nothing, and to take away nothing. Any such positive feature would have contradicted the tenor of the treaty and the purity of our intentions. In fact, there are few intermediate terms, no fixed ones, between independence and ruin. We could not have gained anything from Persia but to her irreparable loss and disgrace. This is the very thing most opposed to our own interests in the East. It is our interest that all the various races between us and Russia should remain as they are, only growing stronger, more peaceable, more settled, and more consolidated in natural combinations. We would rather see "the absolute King of Kings of all the States of Persia" better respected by his own subjects, in order that he may be able to say "Nay" to the rising demands of the Power with which he

Nº 1.

Rough Sketch
OF THE ATTACK ON
RESHIRE,
9th December, 1856.



- A. The Redoubt of Reshire.
B. Village occupied by the Enemy.


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
Nº 2.

Rough Sketch
OF THE ADVANCE ON
BUSHIRE,
10th December, 1856.

REFERENCES.

- a. Battery at N. point.
- b. D^o facing Sea.
- c. D^o D^o D^o
- d. D^o facing Sea or land.
- e. D^o behind Gateway.
- f. Gateway.
- g. Deserted Redoubt.
- A. Shews the position of our H.A. and Cavalry which were sent off to the right to cut off the garrison when we saw them moving off from the battery at b.
- B. The advance of the troops 5th L^t Fd Battery on right, 1st Brigade deployed 2nd Brigade in mass of Columns, afterwards deployed into contiguous Columns at quarter distance.
- C. Small party of 3rd Cavalry.
- D. 4 Cos 2nd E.L.I. Infantry, 2 Cos Sappers & Miners and 6 Guns 3rd L^t Fd Battery sent to occupy the enemy's deserted battery at b.
- E. Intended position of Gun boats in the Creek.





Nº 3.

Rough Sketch

OF OUR OPERATIONS

From the 3rd to 10th Feb^r. 1857.

LIEUT^T GEN^L SIR JAMES OUTRAM, K.C.B.
Commanding.

№ 4.

Sketch

OF THE ACTION OF

K H O O S H A B.

Between the English and Persian Forces,

8th Feb^y 1857.

[illegible]


T. E. Bates

L. J. Barry

2nd Guns
3rd Troop

Photographed by Smith, Elder & Co. 65, Cornhill, London, 1859.


Scale, about 400 Yards to an Inch.



N^o 5.
 Rough Sketch
 of the attack on the Batteries of
MOHUMRA,
 BY THE COMBINED NAVAL & MILITARY FORCES,
 under command of
 LIEUT GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, K.C.B.
 MARCH 26th 1857.


Scale, 400 Yards to an Inch.

Lithographed by Smith, Elder & Co. 65, Cornhill, London. 1857.



Nº 6.

Sketch of the Ground
 IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF
AHWAZ ON THE KAROON,
 shewing also the position occupied by the
 PERSIAN ARMY,
 AND THE ADVANCE OF THE
 BRITISH DETACHMENT,
 upon the Town.



shares the Caspian. We should even have been content to let him enjoy a barren title to the ancient sovereignty of Herat. But the weakness of Persia, which compels it to recede on the North-west, makes it listen to schemes of aggression on its Eastern frontier. It is pushed against us by a stronger hand. We show it, then, as much kindness as to ourselves when we ascertain its position, decide its frontiers, and disabuse it of pretensions which may make it a prey to foreign intrigue. This is the work of the treaty before us. It is not a very showy work. It does not read like the life of Alexander, or even of Philip. We are neither conquering Persia nor plotting for a supremacy over it. We are only teaching it to let others alone, and be itself independent of others.